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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON , Deceased

- - - - -- - -- ~ -- -- -JADIGWA MELTON, Personal Representative
Plaintiff - Appellant
vs.

)
)
)

44768

SUPREME COURT NO.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

HEINZ ALT,

_ _ _ _ _ _D_e_fe_n_d_a_
n t_-R
_e_s~p_o n_d_e_n_t _ _ _ )

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Boundary.

HON . JOHN R. STEGNER
District Judge
MARY W . CUSACK ISB #5332

BRENT FEATHERSTON ISB #4602

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
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Date: 3/13/2017

First Judicial District Court - Boundary County

Time: 10:08 AM

ROA Report

User:
DARMSTRONG

Case: CV-2013-0000313 Current Judge: John Stegner
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton , etal. Deceased
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton Deceased

Formal Estate
Judge

Date
8/29/2013

New Case Filed - Informal Estate

Justin W. Julian

Filing: A6 - Application for informal probate Paid by: Bruce H. Greene
Justin W. Julian
Receipt number: 0002858 Dated: 8/30/2013 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For:
Melton , Jadwiga B. (other party)

8/30/2013

9/6/2013

Other party: Melton, Jadwiga B. Appearance Bruce H. Greene

Justin W . Julian

Petition for Summary Administration of Estate Where Surviving Spouse is
Sole Beneficiary

Justin W . Julian

Inventory

Justin W. Julian

Decree Vesting Estate In Surviving Spouse

Quentin F. Harden

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Justin W . Julian

Civil Disposition entered for: Melton, Jadwiga B., Other Party; Melton ,
Robert Ernest, Subject. Case Close date: 8/30/2013

Quentin F. Harden

Reopen (case Previously Closed)

Justin W. Julian

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or
petitioner Paid by: Linda O'Fallon Receipt number: 0002979 Dated:
9/6/2013 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: Alt, Heinz (other party)

Justin W . Julian

Filing: J1 b- Probate, Demand for notice Paid by: Linda O'Fallon Receipt Justin W. Julian
number: 0002979 Dated: 9/6/2013 Amount: $9.00 (Check) For: Alt, Heinz
(other party)
Motion To Convert Proceedings To Supervised Administration And To
Determine Testacy

Justin W . Julian

Demand For Notice

Justin W . Julian

Lis Pendens

Justin W . Julian

Other party: Alt, Heinz Appearance Brent C. Featherston

Justin W. Julian

9/9/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/15/2013 03:00 PM) to Set Aside Decree & 0 . Lynn Brower
Convert

9/30/2013

Motion to Set Aside Decree and Notice of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 10/15/2013 03:00 PM : Interim
Hearing Held to Set Aside Decree & Convert

0 . Lynn Brower

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 10/15/2013
Time: 3: 17 pm
Courtroom: 002
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson
Party: Heinz Alt, Attorney: Brent Featherston
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Bruce Greene

0. Lynn Brower

10/21/2013

Order

Justin W . Julian

2/13/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/17/2014 09:30 AM) to Convert to Formal
Estate

Justin W . Julian

3/14/2014

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 03/17/2014 09:30 AM : Hearing
Vacated to Convert to Formal Estate

Justin W. Julian

4/4/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Petition 05/19/2014 10:00 AM) for summary Adm .

Justin W. JulianPage 2 of 438
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton Deceased

Formal Estate
Judge

Date
Supoena Duces Tecum for Production or Inspection of Documents,
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things
(Panhandle State Bank)

Justin W. Julian

Subpoena Duces Tecum for Prodcution or Inspection of Documents,
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things
(Mountain West Bank)

Justin W. Julian

Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production or Inspection of Documents,
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things
(Wells Fargo Bank)

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Filing Petition And notice Of Hearing

Justin W . Julian

4/17/2014

Notice Of Deposition And Subpoena Duces Tecum

Justin W. Julian

4/23/2014

Affidavit Of Service

Justin W . Julian

Notice Of Deposition And Subpoena Duces Tecum

Justin W. Julian

Amended Notice of Deposition and Subpoena Duces Tecum

Justin W. Julian

Stipulation to Vacate Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Hearing result for Petition scheduled on 05/19/2014 10:30 AM: Hearing
Vacated for Summary Adm.

Justin W . Julian

Order Vacating Hearing

Justin W. Julian

5/21/2014

Subpoena Duces Tecum For Production Or Inspection Of Documents,
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things

Justin W . Julian

8/12/2014

Affidavit Of Service

Justin W . Julian

8/26/2014

Motion To Strike Petition For Summary Administration Filed August 29,
2013 and Motion To Convert Proceedings To Formal Administration and
Notice Of Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Memorandum In Support Of Motions To Convert Proceedings And To
Strike Petition For Summary Administration

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion To Convert Proceedings To Supervised
Administration And To Determine Testacy

Justin W . Julian

Affidavit Of Counsel

Justin W. Julian

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/09/2014 09:00 AM) to convert
proceedings to supervised administration and to determine testacy.

Justin W . Julian

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Justin W . Julian

8/29/2014

Motion and Objection

Justin W. Julian

9/4/2014

Second Amended Notice of Hearing Re: Motion to Strike Petition for
Summary Administartion Filed Augsut 29, 2013 and Motion to Convert
Proceedings to Formal Administration and Determine Testacy

Justin W . Julian

4/8/2014

5/7/2014
5/9/2014

8/27/2014

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 09/09/2014 09:00 AM: Continued Justin W . Julian
to Convert Proceedings to Supervised Administration and Determine
Testacy
One hour
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/17/2014 09:30 AM) to Strike, Convert and Justin W. Julian
Determine
11/17/2014

Stipulation to Mediate and Reset Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Order to Mediate and Reset Hearing

Justin W . JulianPage 3 of 438
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, etal. Deceased
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton Deceased

Formal Estate
Judge

Date
11 /17/2014

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 11/17/2014 09:30 AM: Continued Justin W. Julian
to Strike, Convert and Determine 2 hours
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 12/22/2014 09:30 AM) to Convert and Strike Justin W. Julian
Substitution Of Counsel

Justin W. Julian

Other party: Melton, Jadwiga B. Appearance Mary W. Cusack

Justin W . Julian

Acknowledgment Pursuant to Rule 16(k)(7) I.R.C.P. Regarding Case
Status/ Mediation

Justin W . Julian

Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/09/2014 09:30 AM) Cusack request.
Cusack appear telephonic

Justin W. Julian

Motion To Appear Telephonically

Justin W. Julian

12/4/2014

Notice Of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

12/5/2014

Stipulation And Motion For Entry Of Order For Status Conference Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Order Granting Entry Of Order For Status Conference Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Order Denying Motion To Appear Telephonically- Featherston

Justin W. Julian

Order Denying Motion To Appear Telephonically- Cusack

Justin W. Julian

12/8/2014

Objection to Motion to Convert to Supervised Administration

Justin W. Julian

12/9/2014

Hearing result for Status scheduled on 12/09/2014 09:30 AM: Interim
Hearing Held

Justin W . Julian

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 12/9/2014
Time: 9:30 am
Courtroom : 001
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson
Party: Heinz Alt, Attorney: Brent Featherston
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Mary Cusack

Justin W . Julian

Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 12/22/2014 09:30 AM: Hearing
Vacated

Justin W. Julian

Motion to Continue Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Motion To Shorten Time

Justin W. Julian

Order To Shorten Time and Order To Continue Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Petition for Formal Probate Of Will and Formal Appointment Of Personal
Representative

Justin W. Julian

Acceptance Of Appointment

Justin W. Julian

Claim Against Estate For Homestead Allowance and For Exempt Property

Justin W. Julian

11/24/2014

12/3/2014

12/10/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/22/2015 01 :30 PM) to determine validity of Justin W. Julian
will

12/11/2014

Notice Of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

12/23/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 01/13/2015 09:30 AM)

Justin W. Julian

12/26/2014

Motion To Compel Answers To Request For Production

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Service Of Discovery

Justin W . Julian
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Formal Estate
Date

Judge

1/7/2015

Subpoena Duces Tecum For Production Or Inspection Of Documents,
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Items

Justin W. Julian

1/12/2015

Notice To Vacate Motion (Cusack)

Justin W . Julian

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled on 01/13/2015 09:30 AM:
Hearing Vacated

Justin W. Julian

Claim Against Estate

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Service

Justin W. Julian

Subpoena issued - Annie Swift

Justin W . Julian

Subpoena issued - Kristina Scholten

Justin W. Julian

1/13/2015
1/15/2015
1/21/2015

Memorandum Of Points And Authorities Regarding Formal Probate Of Will Justin W. Julian

1/22/2015

Hearing result for Petition scheduled on 01/22/2015 01 :30 PM :
Disposition With Hearing for Formal Probate
Half day

Justin W. Julian

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Petition for Formal Probate
Hearing date: 1/22/2015
Time: 2:06 pm
Courtroom: 002
Minutes Clerk: Kristina Westbrook
Petitoner: Jadwiga Melton, Atty: Mary Cusack
Respondent: Heinz Alt, Atty: Brent Featherston

Justin W. Julian

Affidavit Of Service-A. Swift

Justin W . Julian

Affidavit Of Service-D. Anderson

Justin W. Julian

Affidavit Of Service-A. Olson

Justin W. Julian

Affidavit Of Service-L. Robinson

Justin W. Julian

1/23/2015

Notice Of Service

Justin W. Julian

2/2/2015

Order For Formal Probate Of Will And Formal Appointment Of Personal
Representative

Justin W. Julian

Letters Testamentary

Justin W. Julian

Information To Heirs

Justin W. Julian

Notice To Creditors - Known

Justin W . Julian

2/9/2015

Notice To Creditors - Unknown

Justin W . Julian

3/17/2015

Notice Of Disallowance Of Claim

Justin W. Julian

4/10/2015

Affidavit Of Publication

Justin W. Julian

5/4/2015

Petition To Allow Claims

Justin W. Julian

5/7/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/27/2015 09:30 AM) Summary Judgment.
Cusak request 2 hours.

Justin W. Julian

6/29/2015

Notice Of Hearing and Motion For Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor
Claim

Justin W. Julian

Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment To Deny
Creditor Claim

Justin W. Julian

Affidavit Of Mary W . Cusack

Justin W . Julian
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Formal Estate
Judge

Date
7/10/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 07/14/2015 11 :00 AM) To Vacate and
Continue and Motion to shorten time. Featherston request

0. Lynn Brower

Claimant's Motion To Vacate and Continue Estate's Motion For Summary
Judgment, Motion To Shoten Time and Notice of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Vacate and Continue Estate's Justin W. Julian
Motion For Summary Judgment
7/ 13/2015

Notice Of No Objection To Vacate And Continue Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 07/14/2015 11 :00 AM : Hearing
Vacated To Vacate and Continue and to shorten time.

0 . Lynn Brower

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 07/27/2015 Justin W . Julian
09:30 AM: Continued To Deny Creditor Claim - 2 hours
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 08/24/2015 09:30
AM) two hours

Justin W. Julian

Stipulation To Vacate Hearing

Justin W . Julian

Creditor's Response To Estate's Motion For Summary Judgment

Justin W. Julian

Affidavit Of Counsel

Justin W. Julian

8/17/2015

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment To
Deny Creditor Claim

Justin W. Julian

8/19/2015

Notice Of Disallowance Of Claim

Justin W. Julian

8/24/2015

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 08/24/2015 Justin W. Julian
09:30 AM: Interim Hearing Held two hours

8/10/2015

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 8/24/2015
Time: 9:31 am
Courtroom: 001
Minutes Clerk: Della A Armstrong

Justin W . Julian

Affidavit Of Mary W. Cusack In Support Of Sur-Reply Memorandum In
Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Claim

Justin W. Julian

Sur-Reply memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment To
Deny Creditor Claim

Justin W . Julian

9/ 16/2015

Creditor's Post Hearing Memorandum in Response to Estate's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Justin W. Julian

10/8/2015

Memorandum And Opinion

Justin W. Julian

12/3/2015

Judgment I.R.C.P. 54(b)

Justin W . Julian

1/4/2016

STATUS CHANGED: closed

Justin W. Julian

1/12/2016

File #2 created

John Stegner

1/13/2016

Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Court Paid by:
FEatherston Law Receipt number: 0000090 Dated: 1/13/2016 Amount:
$81.00 (Check) For: Alt, Heinz (other party)

Justin W. Julian

Notice of Appeal

Justin W. Julian

Appeal Filed In District Court

Justin W. Julian

9/8/2015
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, etal. Deceased
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton Deceased

Formal Estate
Judge

Date
1/13/2016

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Justin W . Julian

1/15/2016

Order of Reassignment

Lansing L. Haynes

1/25/2016

Order Assigning Judge

Jeff M. Brudie

Change Assigned Judge - John Stegner

John Stegner

3/2/2016

Amended Notice of Appeal

John Stegner

3/3/2016

Estimate Of Transcript Cost

John Stegner

3/9/2016

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 587 Dated 3/9/2016 for 120.25)

John Stegner

3/15/2016

Transcript Filed (Motion For Summary Judgment August 24th , 2015)

John Stegner

Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal

John Stegner

Bond Converted (Transaction number 29 dated 3/15/2016 amount 120.25) John Stegner
3/17/2016

Receipt Of Transcript

John Stegner

5/2/2016

Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral Argument

John Stegner

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 08/19/2016 10:00 AM) Judge to place John Stegner
call
5/4/2016

Appellant's Statement Of Issues On Appeal

John Stegner

6/8/2016

Appellant's Brief

John Stegner

7/6/2016

Order Vacting and Resetting Oral Argument

John Stegner

Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on 08/19/2016 10:00 AM:
Continued

John Stegner

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 08/26/2016 09:30 AM) Judge to place John Stegner
call
Respondent's Brief On Appeal

John Stegner

7/27/2016

Appellant's Reply Brief

John Stegner

8/26/2016

Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on 08/26/2016 09:30 AM:
Hearing Held Judge to place call

John Stegner

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Oral Argument
Hearing date: 8/26/2016
Time: 9:27 am
Courtroom: Nez Perce County
Court reporter: Sheryl Engler
Minutes Clerk: Nez Perce County Clerk

John Stegner

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 10/07/2016 10:00 AM)

John Stegner

9/1/2016

Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Rescheduling Oral Argument

John Stegner

9/9/2016

Appellant's Brief Re Jurisdiction

John Stegner

9/21/2016

Personal Representative's Response Brief

John Stegner

10/7/2016

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 10/07/2016
10:00 AM: Case Taken Under Advisement Judge to place call

John Stegner
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, etal. Deceased
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Robert Ernest Melton, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton Deceased

Formal Estate
Judge

Date
10/7/2016

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal
Hearing date: 10/7/2016
Time: 10:00 am
Courtroom: Latah County
Court reporter: Sheryl Engler
Minutes Clerk: Terry Odenborg
Party: Heinz Alt, Attorney: Brent Featherston
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Mary Cusack

John Stegner

11 /30/2016

Opinion on Appeal

John Stegner

12/14/2016

Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to IAR 40

John Stegner

12/22/2016

Order Denying Appellant's Request for Attorney's Fees on Appeal

John Stegner

12/23/2016

Respondent's Objection To Appellant's Memorandum Of Fees and Costs
Pursuant To IAR 40 and Motion To Disallow

John Stegner

Memorandum In Support Of Respondent's Objection To Appellant's
Memorandum Of Fees and Costs Pursuant To IAR 40 and Motion To
Disallow

John Stegner

1/3/2017

Appellant's Reply To Respondent's Objection To Memorandum Of Fees
and Costs

John Stegner

1/11/2017

Filing : L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Cusack, Mary W (attorney for Melton, Jadwiga B.) Receipt number:
0000112 Dated : 1/11/2017 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Melton,
Jadwiga B. (other party)

John Stegner

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 113 Dated 1/11/2017 for 100.00)

John Stegner

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 114 Dated 1/11/2017 for 100.00)

John Stegner

Appealed To The Supreme Court

John Stegner

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

John Stegner

Notice of Appeal

John Stegner

2/3/2017

Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal

John Stegner

2/7/2017

Amended Judgment

Justin W . Julian

2/14/2017

Order to Withdraw Conditional Dismissal and Reinstate Appeal

John Stegner

2/22/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2017 10:00 AM) Re Amended
Judgment

Justin W . Julian

Motion Regarding Amended Judgment

Justin W. Julian

Notice Of Hearing

Justin W. Julian

Motion To Shorten Time

Justin W. Julian

Motion To Appear Telephonically

Justin W. Julian

Order To Shorten Time

John Stegner

Order Re: Telephonic Appearance - Denied

John Stegner

Notice Of Joinder In Motion

John Stegner

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/27/2017 10:00 AM: Hearing
Held Re Amended Judgment

Justin W . Julian

2/24/2017
2/27/2017
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Judge

Date
2/27/2017

3/10/2017

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion For Amended Judgment
Hearing date: 2/27/2017
Time: 10:00 am
Courtroom: 001
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Mary Cusack

Justin W . Julian

Second Amended Judgment

John Stegner

Amended Notice of Appeal

John Stegner
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BRUCE H. GREENE, P.A.
Attorney at Law
320 North Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-1255
Fax (208) 265-2451
I.S.B. # 1817

STATE Of' IDAHO

COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
GLENDA PQSTON. CLERK
BY \;,LA,, LY":\
DE:P:.!TY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

IN THE MATIER OF ESTATE OF
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
Deceased.

__________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV13-

b \ '3:,

PETITION FOR SUMMARY
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE
WHERE SURVIVING SPOUSE
IS SOLE BENEFICIARY
(I.C.15-3-1205)
Category:
Fee:

A(6)
$96.00

PETITIONER, JADWIGA. MELTON, STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT:

1.

Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of the surviving spouse of the decedent.

2.

The decedent, Robert Ernest Melton died on July 4, 2013 .

3.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this
county.

4.

The decedent and Jadwiga B. Melton were duly married at Bonners Ferry, Idaho on
June 7, 2010, and remained married until the date of decedent's death.

5.

Testacy status: The decedent died testate leaving a will in which the surviving
spouse is named as the sole divisee. The original of the decedent's will, dated
December 17,

2010, accompanies this petition.

AS s GNEDT
I
0

JUDGE 9J:, 1.. .:.o

1

PETITION FOR SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE WHERE SURVIVING SPO~SOLE
BENEFICIARY - PAGE I
Page 10 of 438

6.

The schedule of property attached to this petition is a full and complete inventory of
the property owned by the decedent. The nature of the property
(community/separate) is set forth in the schedule.

7.

The surviving spouse of the decedent is the sole devisee or heir of the decedent and
is therefore entitled to have all of the interest and estate of the decedent distributed
to and vested in the surviving spouse, free and clear of the claims of any person or
persons claiming or attempting to claim under the estate of the decedent as heir,
devisee, or otherwise, except as a proper creditor.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT:

I.

The Court fix a time and place of hearing and that notice be given as required by
law.

2.

That the Court enter its Decree that the decedent and the surviving spouse were duly
married and that the surviving spouse is the sole heir and devisee of the decedent
and vested with all of the interest and estate of the decedent, free of claims of any
person or persons c1aiming or attempting to claim under the estate of the decedent as
heir, devisee, or otherwise, except as a proper creditor

a.~ , ,

f1.--.

DATED this ~

day of

2013.

~H.

BRUCE
GREENE
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION
ST ATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF Bonner

)
: ss
)

The petitioner, being sworn, having read the foregoing says that the facts set forth herein
are true, accurate, and complete to the best of petitioner's knowledge and belief.

~

17:nl> #{&;IA
OTARYP~
Residing at: ,
My Commission Expires:

J~ :r./)

7- 0/ ~col'f
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
ROBERT MELTON

I, Robert Melton, a resident of Bonners Ferry, Idaho declare this to be my Last Will and
revoke all former Wills and Codicils.

ARTICLE I
Identification of Family

In making this Will I have in mind my wife, Jadwiga Melton, but does not include any
children hereafter born to or adopted by my wife and me.

ARTICLE II
Appointment of Fiduciaries
A.
my estate.

Appointment of Personal Representative. I appoint my wife as Executor of

B.
Bond; Court Supervision. My Executor shall have the right to serve without
bond and to administer and settle my estate without the intervention or supervision of any court,
except to the extent required by law. Nothing herein shall prevent my Executor from seeking
the assistance of the court in any situation where my Executor deems it appropriate.

ARTICLE III
Disposition of Residue
A.
Provision for Wife. I give all of the rest and residue of my estate, wherever
located (hereafter referred to in this Article as "residue"), to my wife if she survives me.
1.
residue to my heirs.

Provision for Others. If I am not survived by my wife, I give the entire

ARTICLE IV
Alternative Methods of Distribution
A.
Purpose of Article. Recognizing that under certain circumstances the terms of
this Will may direct that property be distributed outright to a person who is under age twenty-one
(21) or under a legal disability; I make the following provisions to facilitate the distribution of
property to such persons.

Will of Robert Melton
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B.
Alternative Methods. Whenever the terms of this Will direct my personal
representative (referred to in this Article as the "fiduciary") to distribute property outright to a
person who is then under age twenty-one (21) or under a legal disability, the fiduciary may retain
pursuant to Paragraph C. of this Article or distribute all or any portion of that property in any one
or more of the following ways:
1.

Delivery directly to the beneficiary;

2.

Delivery to the parent or stepparent of the beneficiary;

3.

Delivery to the guardian of the beneficiary's person or property;

4.

Delivery to any Custodian for the beneficiary under the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act;

5.

Delivery to any then existing trust created for the beneficiary;

6.

Deposit in a financial institution in an account established in the name of
the beneficiary alone pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho;

7.

Storage of any tangible personal property in safekeeping with the costs of
storage to be borne by the beneficiary; or

8.

Sale of any tangible personal property and delivery of the proceeds in any
manner permitted by this Article.

Provided the fiduciary acts in good faith, upon delivery of any property in accordance
with the provisions of this Article, the fiduciary shall be discharged from all responsibilities in
connection with the property.

C.
Discretionary Trust. Any property not distributed as provided in Paragraph B.
of this Article shall be retained by the fiduciary in trust for the beneficiary on the folJowing terms
and conditions: During any period in which the beneficiary is under a legal disability or under
twenty-one (21) years of age, the fiduciary shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the beneficiary
so much of the income and principal of the trust as the fiduciary, in its sole and absolute
discretion, determines is advisable for the beneficiary's health, support, education and general
welfare. At such time as the beneficiary is neither under a legal disability nor under age
twenty-one (21 ), the fiduciary shalJ distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary. If
the beneficiary dies before alJ of the trust assets have been distributed, the fiduciary shall
distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary's estate.

ARTICLEV
Administrative Provisions

A.

Powers and Duties of Personal Representative. My personal representative
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shall have all of the powers and duties granted to or imposed upon personal representatives
serving with non-intervention powers pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho.
B.
Debts and Expenses. All expenses of administration chargeable to principal, the
expenses of the disposition of my remains, and all my legitimate debts, if and when paid, shall be
paid from the principal of my residuary estate. No debt need be paid prior to its maturity in due
course and except as otherwise provided in this Will no interest in any property passing under
this Will need be exonerated.
C.
Taxes. All estate, inheritance or other similar death taxes, together with any
interest or penalties thereon, arising by reason of my death with respect to any property
includable in my taxable estate, and any adjusted taxable gifts, whether passing under or outside
of this Will, shall be paid from the principal of my residuary estate without reimbursement from
the recipients or beneficiaries of such property, provided, however, that in the event any
proceeds of insurance upon my life or any property over which I held a power of appointment
are included in my estate for purposes of determining the federal estate tax liability of my estate,
then the residue of my estate shall be entitled to receive from the recipients of any such proceeds
or property the portion of such federal estate tax liability attributable to such proceeds or
property determined in accordance with IRC §§ 2206 and 2207.

ARTICLE VI
Miscellaneous
A.
Number and Gender. Unless the context indicates a contrary intent, the plural
and singular forms of words shall each include the other, and every noun and pronoun shall have
a meaning that includes the masculine, feminine and neuter genders.

B.
Survival. To "survive" me, as that term is used in this Will, a person must
continue to live for thirty (30) days after my death.
C.

Descendants. The "descendants" of an individual include only the following:
1.

All such individual's biological descendants, except any person not born in
lawful wedlock and his descendants, unless the biological parent who
would otherwise cause him or her to be a descendant has acknowledged
paternity or maternity in legitimation proceedings, or in an unambiguous
signed writing identifying such person by name, or by raising such person
in the same household; and

2.

Persons adopted by such individual or one of his or her descendants, and
their descendants.

If the parent, who would cause a person to be a descendant as defined above, is replaced in an
adoption proceeding, such person shall remain a descendant unless such parent voluntarily
consents to the relinquishment of his or her status as parent in connection with such adoption
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proceedings.

D.
Heirs. The term "heirs" shall mean those persons entitled to inherit under the
then-applicable laws of the State of Idaho governing the descent of an intestate's separate estate.
They shall inherit in their statutory proportions. If the provisions of this Will call for a
distribution of property to my heirs or the heirs of any other person and the event giving rise to
the requirement for such distribution takes place at a time later than my death or the death of
such person, the determination of the identity of such heirs shall be made as if I ( or such other
person) had died on the date of the event giving rise to such requirement for distribution.
E.
Exclusion of Pretermitted Heirs. Other than as set forth in this Will, I make no
provision for any child of mine or descendant of a deceased child of mine. I specifically make
no provision for any person (whether now living or hereafter born), other than a child named or
referred to in Article I or a descendant of mine as defined in this Will, who may be entitled to
claim an interest in my estate under the laws of the State of Idaho.
F.
Legal Disability. A person is under a legal disability if my personal
representative determines, in good faith, that the person is incapable of managing his property or
of caring for himself, or both, or is in need of protection or assistance by reason of physical
injury or illness, mental illness, developmental disability, senility, alcoholism, excessive use of
drugs, or other physical or mental incapacity.
G.
Title to Real Property. Upon my death, title to any real property passing under
this Will shall vest in my personal representative in his :fiduciary capacity and shall remain so
vested until my personal representative distributes or sells that property, at which time title shall
vest in the distributee or purchaser.
H.
Disclaimer. Except as may be otherwise specifically provided in this Will, in the
event that any beneficiary disclaims an interest arising out of this Will or any trust created herein
it is my intention that the interest disclaimed shall be distributed in the same manner and at the
same time as if the disclaiming beneficiary had died immediately preceding the event pursuant to
the laws of the State ofldaho.

I.
Governing Law. The provisions of this Will shall be interpreted in accordance
with and in light of the laws of the State ofldaho.
J.
Corporate Successors. Whenever a corporation or other business entity is
referred to herein, the reference shall include any successor organization.

K.

References to Statutes. In this Will, the abbreviation "IRC" shall refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended.

Will of Robert Melton
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I have initialed and dated for identification purposes all pages of this, my Last Will, and
have executed the entire instrument by signing this page on the 12- day of DEC
, 20J__Q_,
at Bd~l\lc:R.s Pts:-~i<Z- 1 , Idaho.

Robert Melton

Attestation and Statement of Witnesses

Each of us declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that Robert Melton,
the Testator, signed this instrument as his Last Will in our presence, all of us being present at the
same time, and we now, at the Testator's request, in the Testator's presence, and in the presence
of each other, sign below as the witnesses, declaring that the Testator appears to be of sound
mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence.

~~
6noirn~ ,T_:ifussdl

~/~
711.
in.;ss Signature]
,6.//q_ /JI

[Print Name]

[Print Na.me]

Residing at

Residing at

:-t2' e-' #PJ,v-(5 7e,,uy,,

'3:roaecs krcu, .IchJ,o
2:ot,,1 ndo ~ Ca..Lb+e~
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SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF

a

_Ji& wn j ~

}
} ss.
}

£;

/ / 14 /1/1.
h 'E1.s ,:7 ,r v and
,'tii'e 'Testator and the witnesses, whose names are signed to
the attached or foregoing instrument in those capacities, personally appearing before the
undersigned authority and being first duly sworn, declare to the undersigned authority under
penalty of perjury that: 1) the Testator declared, signed and executed the instrument as his last
will; 2) he signed it willingly or directed another to sign for him; 3) he executed it as his free and
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and 4) each of the witnesses, at the request of
the Testator, in his hearing and presence, and in the presence of each other, signed the will as
witness and that to the best of his knowledge the Testator was at that time of full legal age, of
sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence.
We, Robert Melton and

lJ7tll{ (51-111J;f-

Robert Melton

dJ,

/,$1,

uJ[Witness
r'i.rz:,112'.
Signature]

&ee-s,>rv c~

[Witness Signature]

A1 / 4, 41

£: /us~

[Print Name]

l/n11te. Sr.iJi/lz
[Print Name]

Jl _

Resit at
,1)-fLtll-Y> / ~ ,I

Q-J
l

Section for Notary Public:
Subscribed, sworn and acknowledged before me IS
ert Melton, Testator, and by the
said /4.,//q_ /If. ~ ,l 'tr_s ~ Y]..,, , and -"-d:_=f4-..JI.L-..l"'l,,,-"l~-4.-"-"'--1,,.j.....,..__ __ , , witnesses, this
J1dayof :I&,__c_. . ,20/D.

---~

/fr;sfr il<iU.'KLf.D s eel
[Print or stamp name ofNotary]
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FJL.. ED
BRUCE H. GREENE, P.A.
Attorney at Law
320 North Second A venue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-1255
Fax (208) 265-2451
I.S.B. # 1817

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

IN THE MATTER OF ESTATE OF
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,

Deceased.

3 13

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV13-

)
)
)

DECREE VESTING ESTA TE IN
SURVIVING SPOUSE

)

(I.C.15-3-1205)

Upon consideration of the Petition for Summary Administration of Estate of Which
Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary filed by Jadwiga B. Melton on

~ . ~ q 1!), 2013 the

Court finds that:
1.

The facts set forth in the petition are true.

2.

The required notice has been given or waived.

3.

The decedent, Robert Ernest Melton died on July 4, 2013, domiciled in Boundary
County.

4.

Venue is proper.

5.

The decedent and Jadwiga B. Melton were duly married at Bonners Ferry, Idaho on
June 7, 2010, and remained married until the date of decedent's death.

6.

The surviving spouse, Jadwiga B. Melton, is the sole heir or devisee of the decedent.

DECREE VESTING ESTATE IN SURVIVING SPOUSE - PAGE I
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7.

The decedent died testate, leaving a will dated December 17, 2010. The will was
validly executed and is the last will of the decedent and properly characterizes the
property as community or separate property.

THEREFORE, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
1.

Jadwiga B. Melton is the surviving spouse of the decedent and is the sole heir or
devisee of the decedent.

2.

The property of the decedent described on the schedule attached to this Decree is
hereby vested in and distributed to Jadwiga B. Melton free and clear of all right,
title, claim or demand of any person or persons claiming or attempting to claim
under the estate of the decedent as heir, devisee, or otherwise, except as a proper
creditor.

3.

The surviving spouse shall assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness that
might be a claim against the estate of the decent.

4.

There shall be no administration of the estate of the decedent.
DATED this

JD

day of

A&.'1'

7

, 2013.

kj_
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON #4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone: (208) 263 -6866
Fax: (208) 266-0400

I.,

- . ----

.,

.,.
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:-_
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STATE Cf IOAHO
COU
Of BOUND ARY
GLE DA OS TOH. CLERK
8 Y-4,-;:;;,.:;.;,~...,,.i,..~-:--

Attorney for Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07-04-2013 ,

)
)
)
)

)
Deceased.

)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313
MOTION TO CONVERT
PROCEEDINGS TO
SUPERVISED
ADMINISTRATION AND
TO DETERMINE TESTACY

COMES NOW, Brent C. Featherston, for and on behalf of the Petition herein, and
hereby informs the Court as follows:
1.

Heinz Alt is the son of Hedwig ''Hedy" Melton, who died testate on

Augustl 1, 2008.
2.

The decedent Robert Ernest Melton died on July 41\ 2013, at the age of 81

years of age. The marital community of the decedent and Hedwig Melton was dissolved by the
death of Hedwig Melton on 08-11-2008.
3.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this

county and owned property located in this county.
FFATHERSTON [Aw

OiJD.

A-TTORHt'YS AT lA

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L . Ossman

4.

Robert and Hedwig Melton received a loan of funds from Petitioner herein in

excess of One Hundred Five Thousand Dollars ($105 ,000.00) on condition and in reliance
upon a promise by Robert and Hedwig Melton to execute a Last Will and Testament leaving
their entire estate to Petitioner. The funds were received by Robert and Hedwig Melton from

113 S . Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington
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Petitioner during the period from 1996 onward and were primarily used for the purchase and
improvement of the real property which is described as follows:
Lot 4, BLUME HILL SUBDIVISION, according to the Plat
thereof recorded in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, records of
Boundary County, Idaho.
5.

In exchange for Petitioner's loan, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton executed

their Last Will and Testament leaving the entirety of their estate to the Petitioner. True and
accurate copies of said Last Will and Testament are attached hereto as Exhibits A and Band
incorporated herein in their entirety by reference.
6.

Following Hedwig Melton's death in 2008, Robert remarried in June 2010 to

Jadwiga Melton. Jadwiga Melton has submitted what she claims to be the Last Will and
Testament of Robert Melton which purports to be executed on December 1i\ 2010. The
Petitioner alleges on information and belief that the 2010 Last Will and Testament is invalid
and that the 1998 Last Will and Testament of Robert and Hedwig Melton, attached hereto, are
the true and valid Last Will and Testament.
7.

The names and addresses of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees of the

decedents and other persons entitled to notice pursuant to J.C. 15-3-403, and the ages of those
who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by petitioner are:
NAME

FEA'IHERYrON lAw Fl

arro.

.-.TToRNEY.5 "TI.AW

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L . Ossman
113 S . Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington

ADDRESS

RELATIONSHIP

Jadwiga B. Melton

Wife (Robert)

Gerald Melton

Son

Ernest S. Melton

Son

Douglas Melton

Son

Debra Nakkula

Daughter

Carol Soucie

Daughter

Wolfgang J. Alt

19.1.1956 strindberggasse 1/27/18.
1110 Vienna, Austria
Stepson

Michael F. Bruckner

Hasenleitengasse 5/8/2.
1 110 Vienna. Austria

MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS TO SlJPERVISED ADMINISTRATION
AND TO DETERMINE TESTACY

Stepson

Page 2
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Andreas J. Bruckner

8.

Karl-lowelgasse 17-19/20/12.
1120 Vienna, Austria

Stepson

Prior to the Petitioner learning of this proceeding, the attorney for Heinz Alt

was preparing documents for a formal probate ofthis matter, which included probating the Last
Will and Testament of Hedwig Melton, which Will has not yet been probate.
9.

The time limit for formal probate and appointment has not expired because not

more than three years have passed since the decedent Robert Melton's death. The three year
provision applies only to the death of the decedent Robert Melton and not to the death of
Hedwig Melton, pursuant to LC. 15-3-111.
10.

The original of the decedent's will is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable,

but its contents are described in the exhibits attached hereto.

In 2007, attorney for the

Petitioner closed the Bonners Ferry offices of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and returned most
original Wills to the client. The Petitioner believes that the original Last Will and Testament
of Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton were delivered to the decedents at that time. Following
Hedwig Melton's death, Robert Melton remarried Jadwiga Barbara Donifacy.
11.

The Court is asked to convert these proceedings to a supervised administration

and add the estate of Hedwig Melton to these proceedings and to enter orders that Jadwiga
Melton is not permitted to sell, convey encumber or dispose of any assets of the estate until
further court order and until the testacy of Robert and Hedwig Melton are determined.
Dated this 6th day of September, 2013.

~RSTON lAW flRM.Qrro.
lnomllis ~TV. • ~

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint , ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
•Licensed in Idaho & Washington
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of September, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
Bruce Greene
Attorney at Law
320 North 2nd Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

[o<J
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile
Other: _ _ _ _ _ __ _

By<fil??da)

04z/b/)1

Fl:ATHERSrON lAWFlRM,Oflu
ATTO RN

AT(>.W

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C . Featherston*
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint. ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington

Page 4

MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS TO SUPERVISED ADI\IINISTRA TION
AND TO DETERMINE TESTACY r
Page 24 of 438

OF

HEDWJ.6 "HEDYP' MELTON
I, HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, of Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho, being of

sound and disposing mjnd and memory and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue
influence of any person whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will
and Testament in manner and form following:

L
1 hereby expressly revoke and cancel any and all other former Wills and Codicils to Wills

made by me.
IL

There are the following persons whom I wish to be remembered in this my Last Will and
Testament:

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON
HEINZ ALT
DL

I direct that my Personal Representative hereinafter named pay the expenses of my last
illness, funeral expenses and just claims against my estate as soon after my death as is practical.
However, this does not mean that my Personal Representative shall be required to pay time
obligations which are not yet due at the time of my death nor shall this clause in any way be
interpreted to accelerate the due date of any debt.

IV.
J hereby nominate and appoint my husband, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, as my
Personal Representative or Executor of this, my Last Will and Testament, but if for any reason he is
wiable to so act, then I nominate and appoint my attorney, DANIEL P. FEATIIBRSTON and/or
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, to appoint a person or bank, including himself, to so act

My

Personal Representative shall act as such without intervention of any court and this Will shall be

'

,/ ,

Paget

.E~BIT
•

I

,'

r-

B

•.. ._ -

. .. f ' · -
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probated in the manner allowed for by a nonintervention will. The Personal Representative herein
named shall have the full power to sell, convey and encumber without notice or confirmation any
assets of my estate, real or personal, at such prices and tenns as to my Personal Representative seem
just, whether or not such acts are necessary for the best interest of my estate and which I mjght or
could do if I were living.

V.
1 hereby give, devise and bequeath all that I have, whether real, personal, or mixed property
wherever situated, to my husband, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON.

VI.
Should my husband, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, fail to survive me, or should we both
die as the result of a common accident, or so closely together from the standpoint of time that it is
difficult to determine which one predeceased the other, then I hereby give, devise an.d bequeath all
that 1 have, whether real, personal, or mixed property wherever situated, to my son, HEINZ ALT,
presently residing in Vienna, Austria, per stirpes, to be divided equally between his wife and
children.

VIL
I have deliberately made no provision herein for the benefit of my sons, WOLFGANG J.
ALT, MICHAEL F. BRUCKNER, AND ANDREAS J. BRUCKNER

VIII.
I specifically reserve, pursuant to the provision of 15-2-513, Idaho Code, the right to make
apportionment of my personal effects pursuant to the authority of such statute.

IX.
1f any legatee, devisee or taker under this Will shall interpose objections to its probate or in

any other way contest it, such person shall forfeit his entire interest under this Will and the gift,
bequest or devise made to such person shall pass as part of the residue of my estate; provided,
however, that if such person is a residuary beneficiary, his or her interest shall be divided
proportionately among the remaining residuary beneficiaries.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal

this2/1:i-i,,day o::ri11
f~
'I'_ •

1998, at Bonners Ferry, Idaho, in the presence of two (2) witnesses who attest the same at my

¾(lfi~

request.

HEDWIG"

~D~ MELTON

Testatrix

I, HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, the Testatrix, sign my name to this instrument this~

day of

OU ,Q_&

, 1998, and being first duJy sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned

authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my last will and that I sign j,t willingly (or
willingly direct another to sign for me, that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no
constraint or undue influence.

HEDWIG "![EDY" MELTON
Testatrix

and

&.vr:x>-:YRJ3o..yho,-; the witnesses, sign our

names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority
that the testatrix signs and executes this instrument as her last will and that she signs it willingly (or
willingly directs another to sign for her), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the
testatrix, hereby signs this will as witness to the testatrix's signing, and that to the best of his/her
knowledge the testatrix is eighteen ( 18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint
or undue influence.
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State of Idaho

)

County of Boundary

) ss
)

Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON..
the testatrix and subscribed and sworn 1o before me by
,i rd~~l.i(
and
&Mm , PAY b.( v:
, witnesses, this -=7)-4], day of
, 1998.

l

r¢~~1JL~

N;taryi>;- State ofI~
Residing at 80n Vlt r:k½r r ~
My Commission expires: 3- [?.>~ ~&> 2..,
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OF

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON
I, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, of Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho, being of
sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue

influence of any person whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will
and Testament in manner and fonn following:

L

I hereby expressly revoke and cancel any and all other fonner Wills and Codicils to Wills
made by me.
IL
There are the following persons whom J wish to be remembered in this my Last Will and

Testament

HEDWIG "HEDr' MELTON

HEINZ ALT
Ill.

l direct that my Personal Representative hereinafter named pay the expenses of my last
illness, funeral expenses and just claims against my estate as soon after my death as is practical.
However, this does not mean that my Personal Representative shall be required to pay time
obligations which are not yet due at the time of my death nor shall this clause in any way be
interpreted to accelerate the due date of any debt.

IV.

I hereby nominate and appojnt my wife, HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON, as my Personal
Representative or Executor ofthis, my Last Will and Testament, but if for any reason she is unable to
so act, then I nominate and appo.int my attorney, DANIEL P . FEATIIBRSTON and/or
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, to appoint a person or bank, including himself, to so act.

My

Personal Representative shal1 act as such without intervention of any court and this Wil1 ~hall be

-. _ - . ...
~

~

J>.gel

EXRIBIT

~

--
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probated in the manner allowed for by a nonintervention will. The Personal Representative herein
named shall have the full power to sell, convey and encumber without notice or confinnation any
assets of my estate, real or personal, at such prices and terms as to my Personal Representative seem
just, whether or not such acts' are necessary for the best interest of my estate and which l might or
could do ifI were living.

v.
I hereby give, devise and bequeath an that l have, whether real, personal, or mixed property
wherever situated, to my wife, HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON.

VL
Should my wife, HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON, fail to survive me, or should we both die as
the result of a common accident, or so closely together from the standpoint of time that it is difficult
to determine which one predeceased the other, then I hereby give, devise and bequeath all that I
have, whether real, personal, or mixed property wherever sjtuated, to my step-son, HEINZ ALT,
presently residing in Vienna, Austria, per stirpes, to be divided equally between his wife and
children.

VII.
l have deliberately made no provision herein for the benefit of my children, GERALD
MELTON, ERNEST S. MELTON, DOUGLAS MELTON, DEBRA (MELTON) NAKKULA, and
CAROL (MELTON) SOUCIE.

VIlI.

I specifically reserve, pursuant to the provision of 15-2-513, Idaho Code, the right to make
apportionment of my personal effects pursuant to the authority of such statute.

IX.
If any legatee, devisee or taker under thjs Will shall interpose objections to its probate or in

any other way contest it, such person shall forfeit his entire interest under this Will and the gift,
bequest or devise made to such person sha11 pass as part of the residue of my estate; provided,
however, that if such person is a residuary beneficiary, his or her interest shall be divided
proportionately among the remaining residuary beneficiaries.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this~~l\iay o f ~
1998, at Bonners Feny, ldaho, in the presence of two (2) witnesses who attest the same at my
request.

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON
Testator

I, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, the Testator, sign my name to this instrument this~
day of

ctuJ..zt

, 1998, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to .the undersigned

authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my last will and that I sign it willingly (or
wilJingly direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and vo]unta.Jy act for the purposes
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no
constraint or undue influence.

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON
Testator

and

e~rbo..v-a. Bu.ch.fr,

the witnesses, sign our

names to this instrument, being first du.1y swom, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority
that the testator signs and executes this instrument as his last will and that she signs it willingly (or
willingly directs another to sign for hls), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the
testator, hereby signs this will as witness to the testator's signing, and that to the best of his/her
knowledge the testator is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint
or wtdue influence.
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State of Idaho
County of Boundary

)
) ss
)

Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by ROBERT ERNEST MELTON~
the testator and subscribed and sworn to before me by L, yy;lg, .,
ryj tQ.c.d;'.
and
1?,1xloo YCL- f){.Lfb.r lf
•witnesses, tbiscJ9flday of
1998.
1

3

ID

,;iJ

,

,~ili-111-~

NotaryPlic - State of!~
Residing at BoY\'(\t' r:'") ~ n~...
My Commission expires:

-

~

c!Jacb
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF

.

J{OBERT MELTON
I, Robert Melton, a resident of Bonners Ferry, Idaho declare this to be my Last Will and
revoke all fonner Wills and Codicils.

ARTICLE I
Identification of Family
In making this Will I have in mind my wife, Jadwiga Melton, but does not include any
children hereafter born to or adopted by my wife and me.

ARTICLEil
Agqointment of Fiduciaries
A.

Appointment of Personal Representative. I appoint my wife as Executor of

my estate.

B.
Bond; Court Supenrision. My Executor shall have the right to serve without
bond and to administer and settle my est.ate without the intervention or supervision of any court,
except to the extent required by law. Nothing herein shall prevent my Executor from seeking
the assistance of the court in any situation where my Executor deems it appropriate.

ARTICLE III
Disposition of Residue
A.
Provision for Wife. I give all of the rest and residue of my est.ate, wherever
located (hereafter referred to in this Article as "residue"), to my wife if she survives me. ·
1.

Provision for Others. If I am not survived by my wife, I give the entire

residue to my heirs.

ARTICLE IV
Alternative Methods of Distribution
Purpose of Article. Recognizing that under certain circwnstan~es the terms of
this Will may direct that property be distributed outright to a person who is under age twenty-one
(21) or under a legal disability; I mak~ the following provisions to facilitate the distribution of
property to such persons.
A.

Will of Robert Melton
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B,
Alternative Methods. Whenever the tenns of this Will direct my personal
representative (referred to in this Article as the "fiduciary") to distribute property outright to a
person who is then under age twenty-one (21) or under a legal disability, the fiduciary may retain
pmsuant to Paragraph C. of this Article or distribute all or any portion of that property in any one
or more of the following ways:
1.

Delivery directly to the beneficiary;

2.

Delivery to the parent or stepparent of the beneficiary;

3.

Delivery to the guardian of the beneficiary's person or property;

4.

Delivery to any Custodian for the beneficiary wider the Unifonn Gifts to
Minors Act;

5,

Delivery to any then existing trust created for the beneficiary;

6,

Deposit in a financial institution in an account established in the name of
the beneficiary alone pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho;

7.

Storage of any tangible personal property in safekeeping with the costs of
storage to be borne by the beneficiary; or

8.

Sale of any tangible personal property and delivery of the proceeds in any
manner permitted by this Article.

Provided the fiduciary acts in good faith, upon delivery of any property in accordance
with the provisions of this Article, the fiduciary shall be discharged from all responsibilities in
connection with the property.

C.
Discretionary Trust. Any property not distributed as provided in Paragraph B.
of this Article shall be retained by the :fiduciary in trust for the beneficiary on the following tenns
and conditions: During any period in which the beneficiary is under a legal disability or under
twenty-one (21) years of age, the fiduciary shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the beneficiary
so much of the income and principal of the trust as the :fiduciary, in its sole and absolute
discretion, detennines is advisable for the beneficiary's health, support, education and general
welfare. At such time as the beneficiary is neither under a legal disability nor under age
twenty-one (21 ), the fiduciary shall distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary. If
the beneficiary dies before all of the trust assets have been distributed, the fiduciary shall
distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary's estate. ·
ARTICLEV
Administrative Provisions
A.

Powers and Duties of Penonal Representative. My personal representative

wm of Robert Melton
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shall have all of the powers and duties granted to or imposed upon personal representatives
serving with non-intervention powers pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho.
B.
Debts and Expenses. All expenses of administration chargeable to principal, the
expenses of the disposition of my remains, and all my legitimate debts, if and when paid, shall be
paid from the principal of my residuary estate. No debt need be paid prior to its maturity in due
course and except as otherwise provided in this Will no interest in any property passing under
this Will need be exonerated.
C.
Taxes. All estate, inheritance or other similar death taxes, together with any
interest or penalties thereon, arising by reason of my death with respect to any property
includable in my taxable estate, and any adjusted taxable gifts, whether passing under or outside
of this Will, shall be paid from the principal of my residuary estate without reimbursement from
the recipients or beneficiaries of such property, provide~ however, that in the event any
proceeds of insurance upon my life or any property over which I held a power of appointment
are included in my estate for purposes of detennining the federal estate tax liability of my estate,
then the residue of my estate shall be entitled to receive from the recipients of any such proceeds
or property the portion of such federal estate tax liability attributable to such proceeds or
property determined in accordance with IRC §§ 2206 and 2207.

ARTICLE VI
Miscellaneous
A.
Number and Gender. Unless the context indicates a contrary inten~ the plural
and singular forms of words shall each include the other, and every noun and pronoun shall have
a meaning that includes the masculine, feminine and neuter genders.
·

B.
Survival To "survive" me, as that term is used in this Will, a person must
continue to live for thirty (30) days after my death.

C.

Descendants. The "descendants" of an individual include only the following:
1.

2.

All such individual's biological descendants, except any person not bom in
lawful wedlock and his descendants, unless the biological parent who
would otherwise cause him or her to be a descendant has acknowledged
paternity or maternity in legitimation proceedings, or in an unambiguous
signed writing identifying such person by name, or by raising such person
in the same household; and

· Persons adopted by such individual or one of his or her descendants, and
their descendants.

If the parent, who would cause a person to be a descendant as defined above, is replaced in an
adoption proceeding, such person shall remain a descencµmt unless such parent voluntarily
consents to the relinquishment of his or her status as parent in connection with such adoption

WHJ of Robert Melton
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proceedings.

D.
Heirs. The tenn "heirs" shall mean those persons entitled to inherit under the
then-applicable laws of the State of Idaho governing the descent of an intestate's separate estate.
They shall inherit in.their statutory proportions. If the provisions of this Will call for a
distribution of property to my heirs or the heirs of any other person and the event giving rise to
the requirement for such distribution takes place at a ti.me later than my death or the death of
such person, the determination of the identity of such heirs shall be made as if I (or such other
person) had died on the date of the event giving rise to such requirement for distribution.
E.
Exclusion .of Pretermitted Heirs. Other than as set forth in this Will, I make no
provision for any child of mine or descendant of a deceased child of mine. I specifically make
no provision for any person (whether now living or hereafter born), other than a child named or
referred to in Article I or a descendant of mine as defined in this Will, who may be entitled to
claim an interest in my estate under the laws of the State of Idaho.

Legal Disability. A person is under a legal disability if my personal
representative determines, in good faith, that the person is incapable of managing his property or
of caring for himself, or both, or is in need of protection or assistance by reason of physical
injury or illness, ment.al illness, developmental disability, senility, alcoholism, excessive use of
drugs, or other physical or mental incapacity.
F.

G.
Title to Real Property. Upon my death. title to any real property passing under
this Will shall vest in my personal representative in bis fiduciary capacity and shall remain so
vested until my personal representative distributes or sells that property, at which time title shall
vest in the distributee or purchaser.
· H.
Disclaimer. Except as may be otherwise specifically provided in this Will, in the
event that any beneficiary disclaims an interest arising out of this Will or any trust created herein
it is my intention that the interest disclaimed shall be distributed in the same manner and at the
same time as if the disclaiming beneficiary had died immediately preceding the event pursuant to
the laws of the State ofldaho.

I.

Governing Law. The provisions of this Will shall be interpreted in accordance
with and in light of the laws of the State of Idaho.

J.
Corporate Successors. Whenever a corporation or other business entity is
referred to herein, the reference shall include any successor organization.
K.
References to Statutes. In this Will, the abbreviation °1RC 11 shall refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as am.ended.

Will of Robert Melton

Page4 of S

Initials:'t'f.(l/)

Date: )k- q- ID

Page 36 of 438

Utl/lO/lU 1J

P.005/006

(fAX)

U9: ~tS

I have initialed and dated for identification purposes all pages of this, my Last wni and
have executed the entire instrument by signing this page on the J.2_ day of DEC
, 20J..!:!.,
atfl11J'llt'll!:Rs. Fl!:,~12 1 , Idaho.
·

Robert Melton

Attestation and Statement of Wi1J!esses
Each of us declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that Robert Melton,
the Test.ator, signed this instrument as his Last Will in our presence, all of us being present at the
same time, and we now, at the Testator's request, in the Testator's presence, and in the presence
of each other, sign below as the witnesses, declaring that the Testator appears to be of sound
mind and under no duress, fraud, or widue influence.

;;6. j,., lfi.

\

6,//q_

[Print NameJ

_/1,.·;,s ~
/ , ~us-rv

/fl

[Print Name)

Residing at

Residing at

.L
¥4 "tUU:1->

'B:roaecs ferct.t, .L:;k:....'ao

2:a,;.odo.~ CCAJ...q-k 1
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SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF

}

} ss.

-.6,P r«n /449=

iJnnl{. ,Su ,it:

We, Robert Melton and
1

}
J / /a 111, Lt l>ets,
and
,'the Testator and the witnesses, whose names are signed to
11?.r/'f/

the attached or f9regoing instrument in those capacities, personally appearing before the
undersigned authority and being first duly swom, declare to the undersigned authority under
penalty of perjury that: 1) the Testator declared, signed and executed the instrument as his last
will; 2) he signed it willingly or directed another to sign for him; 3) he executed it as his free and
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and 4) each of the witnesses, at the requesi of
the Testator, in his hearing and presence, and in the presence of each other, signed the will as
witness and that to the best of his knowledge the Testator was at that time of full legal age, of
sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence.

.

oi/4~~

8~ f f v e u

4n.uJ c5u.rz:u,

Lil~ £/. ~ ku.s~
[Print Name]

[Print Name]

r&'tJ:t1NJr5
Resit
5'lfff

Residing at
-.ti~i/Qt'df

;z,,*1-ff,·

Robert Melton

Qd

at

.T()

Section for Notary Public:
Subscribed, sworn and acknowledged before me
said L, 1/12, &I· <, /, t.r..r ~a.- , and
J:1_ day of ~ . , 20.LQ.

I

I,

'

ert.Melton, Testator, and by the
witnesses, this

~~£L.J,.~~...,4-4.,,l..~ic:::;...---'

[Print or stamp oa.me of Notary]
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd.
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BRENT C. FEATHERSTON #4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue

ST,!,TE F IDAHO
COUHTY OF POU!D ARY
GLD!D.~ FO~ TO. !. CLERK
BY- LA,,C,\.
. -... 0

Sandpoint. Idaho 83864

Phone: (208) 263-6866

r:: 1· I ITY

r LERK

.. . Fax: . (208) 266-0400
Atton1ey for Heinz Alt
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON.
dod: 07-04-2013)

Deceased.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

ORDER

)

)
)

This matter having come before the Court on the 151h day of October, 2013> at the time
and place scheduled for hearing on the heir/petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Decree and his
Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised Administration and to Dete1mine Testacy. The
surviving spouse, Jadwiga Melton, was present and represented by her attorney of record,
Bruce Green. The Petitioner Heinz Alt did not attend but was represented by his attorney of
record, Brent C. Featherston.
The Court. having heard testimony, and upon evidence and good cause showiug:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse entered on the matter

herein on or about the 30th day of August, 2013, be vacated and set aside.
2.
D~nid P. Featherston

That the surviving spouse Jadwiga Melton shall not encumber or dispose of any

assets of the Decedent herein and shall preserve the same pending fhrther order of this Court.

Brent C. Peathcnton"'
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman
113 S. Second Mc.

Sandpoint, lb 83864

Phone (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0400
•Lioooscd in ld.,.o & Yh11lini,\10n

ORDER- I
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The Petitioner Heinz Alt1s Motion ·to Convert Proceedings to Supervised

Administration and to Determ_ine Testacy is neither denied nor granted but any ruling on this
Motion is reserved pending further discovery and hearing regarding said Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated thi~

T

day of October, 2013.

~/~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on th~
ay of October, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person( s) in the following manner:
Bruce Greene
Attorney at Law
320 North 2nd Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[,(]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile 208-265-2451
Other: _ _ _ _ _ __

Brent C. Featherston, Esq.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
[o(f Facsimile No. 208-263-0400
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ __

D~iel P. F'eatherston
Brent C, Peather~IOn~
J~my I:'. Poathen;ton

Jeremi L. OssmRn
113 s. SecQnd Ave.
S3lldiioint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866

Fax (208) 263-0400
ORDER - 2
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 FAX
ISB #5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

Deceased.

______________

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE
OF WILLAND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

(1.C. 15-3-402)

PETITIONER, JADWIGA B. MELTON, STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE
COURT THAT:
1.

Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of the spouse of the Decedent.

2.

(a)

The person whose appointment as Personal Representative is

sought is the Petitioner and is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no
person with a higher or equal priority for appointment.
(b)

The status in which such person seeks appointment is as the person

nominated in Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's Will.
3.

The Decedent, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, died on July 4, 2013, at the

age of 81 years, and at the time of his death he owned property in Boundary County,
State of Idaho.
4.

The marital community of ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and HEDWIG

"HEDY" MEL TON was dissolved by the death of HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON on the 11 th
1.

PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135667.DOCX;1/ 20397.100}
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day of August, 2008. HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON died testate, and it is the Petitioner's
understanding the original Will of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON is in the possession of
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. On September 6, 2013, Featherston Law Firm, Chtd ., filed
a Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised Administration and to Determine

Testacy and said Motion contained a true and accurate copy of the Will. At her death,
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON was entitled to all the property of HEDWIG "HEDY"
MEL TON by operation of law because all property owned by HEDWIG "HEDY"
MEL TON was community property, and ROBERT ERNEST MELTON died before any
proceeding had been commenced for the probate of HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON.
Pursuant to I.C. 15-3-111 , the estates of both ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON may be joined for probate in this proceeding.
4.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedents were domiciled

in Boundary County.

5.

The names and addresses of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees of

the Decedents and other persons entitled to notice pursuant I.C. 15-3-403, and the ages of
those who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by
Petitioner are:

2.

NAME & ADDRESS

AGE

RELATIONSHIP

Jadwiga 8. Melton
38 Lilac Place
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805

Legal

Wife

Gerald D. Melton
27402 Sunnyridge Road
Palos Verdes, California 9027 4

Legal

Son

Ernest S. Melton
2008 Silver Crest Drive
Fairfield, California 94534

Legal

Son

Douglas A. Melton
102 Hampton
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030

Legal

Son

PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135667.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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Debra M. Nakkula
PO Box 57
Mohawk, Michigan 49950

Legal

Daughter

Carol A. Soucie
PO Box 923
Centerville, Utah 84014

Legal

Daughter

Legal

Step-Son

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
For Heinz Alt
6.

No Personal Representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere

whose appointment has not been terminated.
7.

Petitioner has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any

probate or appointment proceeding concerning the Decedents other than the demand
received by and on file with the Court.
8.

The time limit for formal probate or appointment has not expired because not

more than three years have passed since Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's death.
9.

The original of the Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's Will, dated

December 17, 2010, is in the possession of the Court.
10.

Petitioner believes that the Will, which is the subject of this application, was

validly executed.
11.

Having exercised reasonable diligence, Petitioner is unaware of any

instrument revoking the Will, which is the subject of this Petition and believes that such Will
constitutes Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's Last Will.
12.

Bond is not required under I. C. 15-3-603.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT:

3.

1.

The Court fix a time and place of hearing.

2.

Notice be given as required by law.

PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135667.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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3.

Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTO N's Will, dated December 17, 2010,

be formally probated.
4.

The Court find that JADWIGA B. MELTON is the only devisee under

Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's Will dated December 17, 2010.
5.

JADWIGA B. MEL TON be formally appointed Personal Representative of

the estate of the Decedents to act without bond.

6.

Upon qu~J~cation and acceptance, Letters Testamentary be issued.

DATED this_~
....:...,____ day of December, 2014.

~:a~ ;t~ e~
VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss
)

County of Boundary

Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the
foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of the Petitioner's
knowledge and belief.

1£;~~

/'%.d/'9e.<.

C JADWIGAiB.MELTON
Petitioner

,,,,,

..........,,,,

t(f-

......, ~ - CUSAc ,,,,
..._\
"".,,, ~

'.l- ,,,#
••••••••• •• •t

~D,. .$, WOR'l\• •
-~·~v
: :

SUBSCRIBES

to \ efore me this

: <:; : ,-

;:.-:. i.•. PU~v
-·- 0.•.i.....o ~
~

~

~

",;,.

~~ ~

,,,,,,.J''h
••••••••
'ATE
O"Y \_V
,,..........

,,,,,,,,. .... ,,,,,
4.

~

~

---

day of December, 2014.

~

S1erwJ-

~

NOTARY PUB
My commission expires on

~(t( ( (t

PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
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F\LED
MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 West Hubbard St., Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 FAX
ISB# 5332

IO\~OEC-9 A \0:1.\ 2
ST;\TE OF l{) f\HO

COlJHTY OF BOUHOARY
GLEHOA POSi ON, CLERK

'J\...Y ~ -

sY or-Pill y (' ~RK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

Deceased .

______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13 -0313
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE
FOR HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE AND

FOR EXEMPT PROPERTY
(I.C. 15-2-402, I.C. 15-2-403)

Claim is hereby made against this estate by:
Name:

JADWIGA B. MEL TON

Address:

38 Lilac Place
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805

as follows:
I am the surviving spouse of ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON.
Basis of Claim

Amount

Homestead allowance pursuant to I.C. 15-2-402.

$50,000

Exempt property pursuant to I.C. 15-2-403

$10,000

SUBMITTED the

a~day of December, 2014.

Cl mant Name:
laimant Address:

1.

J

WIGA B. MELTON

38 Lilac Place
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805

HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPT PROPERTY
{MJT00135748.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

~

,bv'IC.

,

2014,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the !/!::._ day of
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing CLAIM GAINST ESTATE FOR
HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE AND FOR EXEMPT PROPERTY to be served by regular
US Mail, postage prepaid thereon, or by facsimile, and addressed to the following:

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 266-0400 - FAX

2.

HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPT PROPERTY
{MJT00135748.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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ORIGINAL

FI l_ ED

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)

2015 JAN 13 A 10: 33
ST/;J[ (IF ![)!,HO

C~'"·': Yer :1i1!1 l'1AR Y

GLL .,.c.;.. FC.. f ;;:i. LE~K

By~--\_L.(""'\ ·- - - r',
L, nK
1 {

Attorney for Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07-04-2013,
Deceased.

)
)
)

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE
(J.C. 15~3-804)

)

Claim is hereby made against this estate by HEINZ ALT as follows:
Basis of Claim

Amount

Loan
Loan

$75,982.50
26,592.00

TOTAL LOAN AMOUNTS

$102,574.50

Plus interest accrued since said loans at the statutoxy prejudment rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annym.
I hereby certify that my mother, Hedwig Melton, and my step-father, Robert Melton,
borrowed the total smn of $102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the Decedents for the

purpose of acquiring land and building a home in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, which is the subject
of this litigation.
Daniel P. Feathmton
Bieut C. Fealhemon•
Jeremy P. Feathe;rston

I have attached as Exhibit "A" a true and accurate copy of the initial Note in her

Jeremi L . Ossman

113 s. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864

handwriting and signed by my mother, Hedwig E. Melton, certifying that she owes the initial

Phone (208) 263-6866

Fax (208) 263-0400

CLAIM AGAINSf ESfATE • J

.,

'IPage
' •

47 of 438

sum through 1997 of $75,982.50. I am also attaching as Exhibit "B" a second Note in my
mother's handwriting that carries forward the earlier balance of $75,982.50 and adds

additional loan amounts made to Robert and Hedwig Melton from July 3, 2001 through July
1, 2008, in the additional sum of $26,592.00 for a total of $102,574.50. I certify that the
handwritten numbers on Exhibit "B" are also the handwriting of my mother, Hedwig Melton.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and accurate copy of the floor plan and
design of the residence that was to be constructed with the funds borrowed from me by

Robert and Hedwig Melton consisting of three (3) pages. Those three (3) pages are also in
the handwriting of either Hedwig Melton and/or Robert Melton and were provided to me as
part of the above-referenced loan.

It was agreed that the property was initially placed in my name to secure repayment of
the loan.

Subsequently, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton executed Wills in 1998

promising to leave all of their Estate to me, Heinz Alt, their son and step-son, as a means of

full repayment.
I was assured by Robert Melton in the Fall of2012 after his remarriage that his 1998
Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of this loan.
I am owed the sum of $75,982.50 that has been accruing interest at twelve percent

(12%) since June 1, 1997 ($24.98 per diem) and an additional $26,592.00 which has accrued
interest at twelve percent (12%) since July 1, 2008 ($8.74 per diem).
I hereby make a claim against the Estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton for these
principal amounts together with accrued interest.
Daniel P. Fcalhetstcn
Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Featherston
JeremiL.Own,.n

DATEDthis /~ dayofDecember,2014.

113 S. Seoond Ave.
Samlpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208} 263-0400
*Li=d in Idaho&; Wil!lliogton

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE- 2
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)
) ss:
CONSOLATE OF_ _ __ ___,

UNITED STATES EMBASSY

On this ~

day of December in the year 2014, before me, _ _ _ __
~.bi).: ~n'U':'> ht-/1 ?;rf~iC..,
• a Notary Public in and for said Embassy, personally
appeared HEINZ ALT, known or identified to me (or proved to me by or on oath) to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year in this certificate first above
__,- .. r ,··J!"' •.-- .

.,

,• I

'-~

~

It"'

, ..r· • -

-·-

CERT~ATE ~MAILING..{'
I hereby certify that on the <:J:- day of ~ 0 1 ~ I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FlRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[)() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered

[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ ] Other: _

_ _ _ __

_

Daniel P, Fcalllerston
Brent C, Fealllcrsroo*
Jeremy P. Fealhersron
Jercmi L. Ossman
113 S. Secood Ave.
SIIJldpoinl, ID 83864

Phone (208} 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0400
•UcelUtd in Idaho &: Washingloo

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE· 3
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB #5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue , Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 FAX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)

ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

)
)

)

)
)
)
Deceased .

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE
OF WILL AND FORMAL
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

)

______________ )

(I.C. 15-3-401, et seq.)

THIS MATTER HAVING COME on for a duly noted and regularly scheduled
hearing on the 22 nd day of January, 2015, upon the Petition for Formal Probate of Will
and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative, filed with this Court by JADWIGA B.
MELTON on December 9, 2014, before me, the undersigned Judge of the above-entitled
Court.
Mary W . Cusack, of CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC, appeared as attorney for
JADWIGA B. MELTON. Brent C. Featherston, of FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM , CHTD.,
appeared as attorney for HEINZ ALT.

Both JADWIGA B. MELTON and HEINZ ALT

were present and gave testimony at the hearing.
In addition , the Court at that time did hear testimony from LILA M. ROBINSON.
The Court, after hearing the testimony of the parties and argument of counsel, and
based thereon and the papers, pleadings and records on file therein, and being fully
advised in the premises, finds as follows:
1.

ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135672.DOCX; 1/20397.100}
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1.

The required notice has been given or waived.

2.

The proceeding was commenced within the time period provided by law.

3.

The Decedent, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, died on July 4, 2013, at the

age of 81 years, and domiciled in Boundary County, Idaho. The marital community of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON was dissolved by the
death of HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON on the 11 th day of August, 2008 .
"
~

-

..,.

-~·

-·-

ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON died before any

proceeding had been commenced for the probate of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON .
Pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-111, the estates of both ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON may be joined for probate in this proceeding.
4.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedent was domiciled in

Boundary County.
5.

The testamentary instrument to which the Petition relates is the Decedent's

Last Will.
6.

JADWIGA

B.

MELTON

is

entitled

to

appointment

as

Personal

Representative of the Decedent's estate to act without bond .
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

The Will of the Decedent, dated December 17, 2010, is hereby formally

probated .

2.

JADWIGA B. MELTON is hereby formally appointed as the Personal

Representative of the estate of the Decedent to act without bond .
3.

Upon qualification and acceptance, Letters Testamentary shall be issued.

4.

The estates of both ROBERT E. MELTON and HEDWID "HEDY" MELTON

are hereby joined for probate in a single proceeding pursuant to I. C. 15-3-111.

2.

ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135672. DOCX; 1/20397 .100}
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DATED this

~

y of February,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

K Y\~

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the
day of February, 2015, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTAT IVE to be served by regular
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon , or by facsimi le to the following:
Mary W. Cusack
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
JADWIGA MELTON
38 Lilac Place
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805
GERALD D. MELTON
27402 Sunnyridge Road
Palos Verdes, California 90274
ERNEST S. MELTON
2008 Silver Crest Drive
Fairfield , California 94534

DOUGLAS A. MELTON
102 Hampton
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030
DEBRA M. NAKKULA
PO Box 57
Mohawk, Michigan 49950
CAROL A. SOUCIE
PO Box 923
Centerville, Utah 84014
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Featherston Law Firm , Chtd .
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) ~ 0400- FAX

3

GLENDA POS TON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

')

..

By:

~AJJ

o~(L "'---

DEPUTY CLERK

3.

ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135672.DOCX; 1/20 397.100}
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FILED

AFFIDAVIT OF PUBLICATION
State of Idaho

10\S APR l O A tt: Iq

Gout of Bou::ary,

STf\TE OF IOAHO

beind first duly swo~n
he/she is
Bonners

says that
of the

~,L...>.1-J...;'--1:...!.-->µ::...---"-1"''--'--~~"'------

Ferry

NOTICE TO CREt)l'.JW'Rl;Y Of BOUNDARY
CASE NO. CV l&t QID A POSTOl-i. CLERK
IN THE DISTRIC'f COURT OF
. 1 r "'
TH E FIRST Jl8IY!CI~b \Au\-,,~
DlSTRTCTOFTHE STA'Ilnti~~·JTY Cl.ERK
lDAH'O , TN AND FOR THE
COl NTI OF BOUNDARY
ln the Matter of the Estate of:
ROB ~RT ERNEST MELTON

-..:..s-½'""l-"'--'--"='-d-""'--"',+.,,..'1'1,.-'-'-'..4.L;>..£..\~~~

Herald,

a

newspaper

printed

and

,ind

HEDWIG 11 HEDY1 1 MELTON

published at Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho ;

Deceased
'
OTICE JS HEREBY GTVEN
that thf' uudersigrled h, ~ be,~n
ap pointed P r onal
R e pre . enla t ive oI th
abo •e-named De edeul. Al1
P rson having cJaims against
the Dec dent or thc- sta( are
r('.q~ir d to present their claims
Within FOUR (4) MO THS after
th~ date _o f the first publication of

that the said newspaper has been continuously and
uninterruptedly published in

said

Boundary County

during a period of 12 months prior to the first publication
of the hereto attached notice of publication in the case

th1_ No~ce to reditor , or said
d:ums will bt> forevt'r ban-ed.

Claims must be• pres1,nterl to the
~n~ e1s igne cl at lhe .addrt'SS
rnd1 catetl and til e d with th e
Clerk of the ourt.
DATED thi ~ 6 day of •<-"bruarv
2015.
•.

it

JADWIGA B. MELTON
Pei sonal RercSt::ntative

was published in the regular and entire issue of the said
paper

for

a

period

_±_

of

consecutive

9·t ~ay of Q o ~

commencing on

)

ending on the

_st ~ay

of

r:/ o MARYW. CUSACK

CU A.CKLAWFIRM, PLLC

610 West Hubbard 'l, Suite :!OS
Coeur d 1Ale0<·, ID 838]4
BFH Legal 9172

weeks,

February 19. 26, 2015
March5. 2015

, 20J5 and

/'v~ ,

2015 and

that said notice was published in said newspaper.
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263~6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)

T-871

P0002/0011 F-270

FIL ED
1015 HU - ~ P 3: 4 3
STATE Of IOAHO

COUNTY-_OF BOIJNOARY

;~~~~re
:oEPUTY CLE"K

Attorney for Hein2 Alt

-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
· MAGISTRATE DMSION
In the Matter of the Estate of

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07~04~2013,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313
PETITION TO ALLOW CLAIMS

Petitioner, HEIN'Z ALT as Claimant in the above entitled Estate, represents that:
1.
The attached Claim Against Estate was timely filed with the clerk of court on
January 13, 2015 and mailed to the personal representative on January 9, 2015. The Claim
consists of the following loans to the decedents for purchase and development of the real
property held in the estate and is a first priority purchase money loan to the decedents:

Name & Address
Heinz Alt
c/o Featherston Law Finn

Amount

$75,982.50
26,592.00

Priority
Purchase Money-Senior

113 South Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

TOTAL LOAN AMOUNTS

Dnniel P. Featherston

Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston

ll02,574.50

2.
None of these claims have been baxred by time or released or satisfied. The
Personal Representative filed with the clerk of court a disallowance of claim on March 17;
2015 which disallowance mailed to Clawiants' counsel on March 13, 2015. Said
disallowance was unsupported and untirriely, having been mailed sixty three (63) days after
presentation of the claim by the undersigned on January 9, 2015.

Ieremi L. Osunan
113 S. Second Mo.
Sandpoint, ll> 33864
l'honc (.208) 263-68~
l'ax (.208) 263-0'IOO

PETITION 'l'O AU.OW Cl.AIMS- I
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Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a
claimant of action on his claim for sh{ty (60) days after the
time for original presentation of the claim has expired has
the effect of a notice of allowance.
Idaho Code Ann.§ 15-3-806 (2014)

3.
Petitioner believes that each of the claims listed herein is just and valid and
should be given the priority indicated.
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT:
1.

The Court fix a time and place for hearing.

2.
The Court designate what petsons, if any, are to be given notice pursuant to
I.C. 15-3-806.
3.
Notice be given to the persons designated, the Claimant(s) listed, and the
Personal Representative.
4.
indicated.

The Court enter its Order a1lowing the abovewlisted claims in the priority

DATED this

L

day o f ~ 2015

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the _i_~ay of.-2015, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:

~

~=_; r , ~
,· ;.. (<0 ..

.1:'1 ' ·,

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Daniel P. Peathcnton
Brent C. Peathcr&ton•
Jeremy P. FeathetBton
Jc~mi L. Ossmal\

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ) Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
Other:
·

1r1

llJ s. Se<:ond Ave.
Si111dpoint, JD 83864
Phone (ZOS) 26'.!~~66
Fax (208) 263-0400

PETITlON TO Al'...l..OW CUIMS. 1
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~OPY

FF:ATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CSTD.
BRENT C. FBATIIERSTON, lSB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)

FILED
2015 JAN 13 A IQ: 3W
S'YAT( Of ll)Al!O

CO\.!H l Y Qf noutm ARY
GLUiPi\ POSTON, Cl.EHi<
8Y---···-------- --···'
t.i. i·-t: i Y c~rnx

Attorney for Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TUE
STATE _OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COV.NTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07-04-2013,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313
CLAIM'. AGAINST ESTATE

(I.C.15-3-804)

Claim is hereby made against this estate by HEINZ ALT as follows:
BasisofCJ.aun

t,\moont

$75~82.50

Loan

26,592.00

Loan

TOTAL LOAN AMOUNTS

$102,574.~

Plus interest accrued since said loans at the statutory prejudment rate of twelve

percent (12%) per annym.

I hereby certify that my mother, Hedwig Melton, and my step-father, Robert Melt.on,
borrowed the toml s,nn of$102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the Deceden~ for the
purpose of acquiring land and building a home in Bonners Ferry1 Idaho, which is the subject
Dim1al. p;,&alb6ll,Ulll
~C.~llienloll-.
Jorcmy P. ~tbmsloo

J~t..0113 S. Second Ave.
S~lll>oini,m 83844

of this litigation.
I have attached as Exhibit "N' a true and accllt'ate copy of the initial Note in her

bmidwriting and signed by my mothe1\ Hedwig E. Melton, certifying that she owes the initial

l'bolle (208)263-6866
Pu (2.08) ~3.0400
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sum through 1997 of $75,982.50. I am also atta.clm)g as Exhibit "B" a second Note in my
mother's handwriting that cm:ries forward the earli~ balance of $75,982.50 and adds

additional loan an1ounts made to Robeit and Hedwig Melton from July 3, 2001 through July
1, 2008, in the additional sum of $26,592.00 for a total of $102>574.50. I certify that the

handwritten numbers on Exhibit "B" are also the handwriting of my mother, Hedwig Melton.
Attached hereto as Exhibit ..C'' is a true and accurate copy of the floor plan and
design of the residence that was to be constructed with the funds borrowed from me by
Jwbert and Hedwig Melton consisting of three (3) pages. Those three (3) pages ate also in

the handwriting of either Hedwig Melton and/or Robert Melton and were provided to me as
part of the above-referenced loan.
It was agreed that the property was initially placed in my name to secure repayment of

the loan.

Subsequently, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melt.on executed Wills in 1998

promising to leave all of their Estate to me. Heinz Alt, their son and step-son, as a means of
full repayment.

I was assured by Robert Melton in the Fall of2012 after hls remarriage that his 1998
Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment ofthls loan.
I am owed the sum of $75,982.50 that has been accruing interest at twelve percent
(12%) since June 1, 1997 ($24.98 pet diem) and an additional $26.592.00 which has accrued
interest at twelve percent (12%) since July 1. 2008 ($8.74 per di.em).
I hereby make a claim against the Estates of 'R.o~ert and Hedwig Melton for these

principal amounts together with accrued interest
P~lll P, P~a,on
Bn:ot C. PcalbCl'IWll~
1-Y t.~lhmloa
1-lnlL,Oumall

~

l

i

i\

t \l

01

\

11 ..., ,•·
'.. l\•'•
\~l
·
r, - .- ·,1
- •.
I

03$,S~A'VO.
$,odpoint, JD

\

DATEDthis f ~ dayofDeceJJ1bflr, 2014.

\.

-

!', ... ~

HEINZALf': .

83264

PhaD& (208)~~

~ (ll!S) 263--0-IOO

I

I
I

CLAIM AGAJNgr ESTA'I'£ • %

i

!

I
i

.1
I
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)
) ss:

UNITED STATES EMBASSY

CONSOLATB OF_ _ _ _- - - 1

On this /) day of December in. the yea1'2014, before me,--~f..l::>L(;vt1?,,f:, HIN li-r!r·i;ic...,
, a Notary Public in and for said E~bassy, personally
appeared HEINZ ALT, known or identified to me (or proved to me by or on oath) to me to
be the ~rson whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me
that he execured the same.

·c or the nited States Embassy
Residing at U1fi·rlr-i 1.t Hc:..(11i.-t t t
My commission expires I i~efi~~/~

No

.,

'

·-

. ~....

.

.

.

. ·.

. ·~ .. ·.

.::.>, "}~:::/~;}.';}
. .

~ ;}i.'.

C.ERTIF1CATE~MAILING_£

~

l bere~y certify that.on fue
o f ~ O l f , I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the followmg person(s) in the following
manner:

MaryW. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW F1RM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard. Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

..-.

TTO

[~] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
t ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
[ J Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ } qt.her: - - - - - -

,

DaniolP.~lilll

il~t C.Fea1!1amo1i''
fClll!DY'.P, ~ton
Jm:m.i L O&a111.u1
113$, setoodAvs,
SIIIC!poilll, JD 83864
Plloae. (208) 2.63,,6866
Flix (208) 263-04DO

CLAJMAGAJNST~ATE-3
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MARY W . CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC
320 E. Neider, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estates of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased .

__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313
NOTICE OF HEARING AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DENY CREDITOR
CLAIM

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 27th day of July, 2015, at the hour of
9:30 a.m. , or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the courtroom of the
above-entitled court, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, before the HONORABLE JUSTIN JULIAN ,
the Personal Representative in the above-named matter, JADWIGA B. MELTON , will
move this Court to enter a summary judgment against HEINZ ALT and deny in its
entirety the creditor claim filed herein by HEINZ ALT.
The Estate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and said motion being
made and based upon Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon the pleadings
and records on file herein , including the following: Affidavit of Mary W . Cusack, and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Claim .

1. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC001 44317 .DOCX; 1/20397 .1 00}
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The grounds for this motion are that the pleadings, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Oral argument is requested .
DATED this

) . ~ day of June, 2015 .

MARYW.
ACK
Atto~~entative
Jadwiga Melton
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

~

day of June, 2015, I caused a true and

accurate copy of foregoing by the method ind icated below, and addressed to the
following :
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd .
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynth ia@featherston law.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com

MA~

2.

~

NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC00144317.DOCX;1/20397.100}

Page 70 of 438

r:·l,

t L-

'

MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332

ED

i.ul'l JUN 29 P \~ O\
S1 A1E Of 10/\HO R'f

&~~Ji\6!~
OY r~?UTY C:LfRI\

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased .

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313
AFFIDAVIT OF
MARY W . CUSACK

)
:ss
)

MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, being fi rst duly sworn on oath,
deposes and states:
1.

I am rep resenting JADWIGA B. MELTON , Petitioner, in the above-

captioned matter. I am over the age of 18 years and as I am familiar with the facts and
circumstances of this case, I make this affidavit based upon my own personal
knowledge;
2.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "A",

is a true and correct copy of the Warranty Deed, wherein the Grantors were Bobby J.
lnvernon and Heidi L. lnvernon, the Grantees were Robert E. Melton and Hedwig
Melton , which was recorded on April 12, 1996, as Boundary County Instrument Number
0181217.
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3.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "B",

is a true and correct copy of the Gift Deed , wherein the Granto rs were Robert E. Melton
and Hedwig Melton, the Grantee was Heinz Alt, which was recorded on August 10,
1999, as Boundary County Instrument Number 194996.
4.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C",

is a true and correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed, wherein the Grantors were Heinz Alt,
dealing with his sole and separate property, and Christine Alt, his wife, the Grantees
were Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton, which was recorded on November 4, 1999,
as Boundary County Instrument Number 196015.
Further your Affiant saith naught.
DATED this

$- day of June 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of June 2015.

~ ~~

,,,,,,,~~~'~'~';,,,,,,,,

~' ~~...............~0 %

I ./

-

i \

".

· .. ~ ~

$ (J~··

~OTAR J,,

....

\

Pual\C

/

.

~

11
11
i 11.11 1w 111 '

,,,,

~~
~

NOTRY PUBLIC
My commission expires on 05/15/20
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
4fl7'k.-

l hereoy (.;ertify that on the .J.X:>
_~
--

day of June 2015, I caused a true and

accurate copy of the forgoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com

~<4~
MARY W . agiACK
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AFTER Rau:lDilU, Mi\IL 1D (2Rl\,.'ffi::£.
FA'.fCI) #SOC-4/

WARRANTY DEED
_fo, Value Received

BOBBY J.

INVE:lliON and HEIDI L.

I~'VEiL'ION,

ZiUsband c1nd wi f.e

. Httcin.tikr rolled th e Grantor, herclly grants, b:irgains, sells oml conveys unto
ROBERT E . MELTON and HEDiHG i'\EL'.!'ON , husband and w 1. ~c
wb=cddressis: 7170 HOLIDAY DR . , SPRINGH!LL, FL , 31 601:
H::relnancr callc<l lho Unwicc, tho following described premises slLuatc<l in Ooundnry Couniy. ldn!to , 10-wi1:

Lot 4, BLITHE HILL SUBDrvISION, accordi~g to ~ho vlnt
thoroof rocoruod in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, rocorda of
Bo\lllMry County, Idaho.
TO HA Vi'. AND TO HOLD the S!lid premises, w!Ut U1eir appuncnrutces unto LJ,o suld Grantco
and lo the Grun~'s heir; nnd assigns forever. And Ute s:iid Granter docs hcceby co~cnil!ll to md with
the s:i.ld Grnntco Llml t.ce OrJ.olOr I, 11,c owner in fee simple of Sllid premises; ;!uu ,aid prcmfs.<S ure frc.:
from all atcwnbrnnccs except ctmcnt years tu.xcs, lc\'ie..;. Md us.sc.:i.srncurs, llJJd tJ<CCJ)t U. S. Pa1e111
r=tlo11.1, rcstrfe1io!l!l, utstm e,11s of =ni. nnd e35em,11ts visible upon U1c premises, and lhll Gnlntor

will wurn.nl llJld lleicnd Ute same from oil claims wha!Sccver.
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STATE OF IDAHO
1,:
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COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

I ,:

Oo This 11th day of Aoril in the year 1996
before me, a Notary Pub) .ic in and for said State, perscnally
appeared BOBBY J. INVERNON and HEIDI L. INVER.NON, known or
identified ·' :o rr:e to be the persons whose names are
subscribed to the within Instrumen t, ani,&~~nowlcdged to me
that they executed the same.
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194990
Glt-iDEt:D
IN CONSIDERATION of low and affection. ond in addition. in cons1deration of the aid
and assistance grantee has give granto, in the care and maintenance of grantor and the property
hcreinat\cr cles<;ribcd without 1hought or teqUC!ot for remuneration <if any type or kind whatsoever.
Robert E. Melton •ad Hedwig "ltedy" Melton, husband and wire, grantors. does he,cby give.
grant, alien. convey and confirm unto Heinz Alt, 11S his S(,lc and separate propcrty.1,>tantec, whose
current address 1s HC 85 Box 323H, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, 8380.5. the property dcse1 ibcd as
follows:
Lot 4, Blume Hill Subdivision, according to thc plat thereof recorded in Book 2 of
Plats, Page 41, record.~ of Bounda1y Coun!y, Idaho.

RESERVING unlo Grantors the nght to reside thcl'\.'On so I011g as either of said
g:rantors health will pennil them lo reside without the aid. care and ass1sta~ of
trained helllth care prov1ders.
TO HAVE AND TO HO! .D the said prettllscs with the appuru:naoces unto the grantee, its
heirs aoo as.signs forever. And the grantor does hcreh) covenant to and with the said grantee that it
1s lhc o"mcr in foe simple ofsaid premises and that they are free from all i:ncumbranccs and that it
will WARRANT and DEFEND the same from all lawful claims whatsoe\-cr.
11 ·1·'

DATED thi$ J..!!'..._ day of •

.
;~dtt
__ , 1999.

'

STATE OF IDAHO

:ss.
CoWlty of Boundary
)
,
-1ii
.(U-l(li,L<,f
On this J.C._ day o f ~ 1999, before me. a Notaty Public in and fOI' S&ld Sta.le,
peironally appeared Robef1 F,..,Mctt.i, and Hedwig "Hedy" MeftOll, husbaPd and wife, known
to me to be the pcr;,on ~ c IUdlle is subscribed to the foret,'<ling tnstrumcnt and acknowledged to
me !hat thev executed the same.
""""' IN 'WITNESS WJIERP-01', I h>-< " ' " ~"1 my h ~""'"'

~(s~e ofidaho
Residing al Bonne FcIT)·, /.

.
/
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19601.S
QUfTCI..AIM DEED
For value l'C('dvc:d, Hdoz Alf. de.Ung 1'itfl hla Mlle aid aep.rate property. 11.lJd
Chrildr,c Alt, hla ,rife, gtan1.(n, do hertby convey. release. retnisc and fon,'VCT quitclaim unto
Robert Melton aid Rtdwl& Mdtoa, l1111bl&d Hd rie. grantees. whose current address ,s HC
8S Box 323H, Bonners Fcny. Idaho. 8380.S, the foUowing-descnoed real property, to-'t\it:

Lot 4, Blwne Hill Subdiviiion, according to th¢ plat thereof recorded in Boole.
2 (lf Plats. Page 41, records of Boundary County, Idaho.

together with their appurtenances.
DATEDthis _t/_. dayof_fjJ _i- ____ . 19<N.
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MARY W . CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332
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STATE GF l'.1/-iHO
COUNTY OF OOUNDAR Y
GLE~OA POSTOH.~K

BY

,t--/·..,~

nF PUl Y CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased.

______________

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO DENY CREDITOR CLAIM

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON ("Jadwiga") , the Personal
Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record,
MARY W . CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm , PLLC, and hereby submits this Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim.

I.

A

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

On April 11 , 1996, Bobby J. lnvernon and Heidi L. lnvernon signed a

Warranty Deed transferring property commonly called 38 Lilac Place, Bonners Ferry,
Idaho and which is located at what is legally described as Lot 4, BLUME HILL
SUBDIVISION , according to the plat recorded in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, records of

1.
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Boundary County, Idaho (hereinafter the "Residence") to Robert E. Melton and Hedwig
Melton as husband and wife.

Said Warranty Deed was recorded under Boundary

County Instrument Number 0181217 on April 12, 1996.

See Affidavit of Mary W.

,r 2.

Cusack,

On July 10, 1999, Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton , as husband and

B.

wife, signed a Gift Deed transferring the Residence to Heinz Alt, as his sole and
separate property. Said Gift Deed was recorded under Boundary County Instrument
Number 194996 on August 10, 1999. Said Gift Deed was prepared by Featherston Law
Firm . See Affidavit of Mary W Cusack,
C.

,r 3.

On November 4, 1999, Heinz Alt, dealing with his sole and separate

property, and Christine Alt, his wife, signed a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Residence
to Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton as husband and wife. Said Quitclaim Deed was
recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number 196015 on November 4, 1999.
Said Quitclaim Deed was prepared by Featherston Law Firm . See Affidavit of Mary W.
Cusack,

,r 4.

D.

Hedwig Melton (hereinafter "Hedwig") died on August 11, 2008.

See

Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supe,vised Administration and to Determine
Intestacy,

,r 1.

E.

Robert E. Melton (hereinafter "Robert") died on July 4, 2013.

F.

Heinz Alt (hereinafter "Alt") sent a copy of his Claim Against Estate

(hereinafter "Alt's Claim") to Jadwiga's attorney of record on January 9, 2015, and Alt's
Claim was filed with the Court on January 13, 2015.

2.
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G.

Jadwiga was formally appointed Personal Representative on February 2,

H.

On February 19, 2015, Notice to Creditors was first published in the

2015.

Bonners Ferry Herald.
I.

On March 13, 2015, a Notice of Disallowance of Claim was faxed and

mailed to Alt through Featherston Law Firm. The Notice of Disallowance of Claim was
fi led with the Court on March 17, 2015.
J.

On May 4, 2015, the Estate received Alt's Petition to Allow Claims.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONS UNDER I.R.C.P. 56(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
I. R.C.P. 56(c).

The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on wh ich that party wi ll bear
the burden of proof at trial. Ackerman v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 307, 310 (2004) .
In determining whether any issue of material fact exists, this court must construe
all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings, depositions, and admissions,
together with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
I.R.C.P. 56(c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 194, (Ct. App. 1985).
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint
3.
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School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 7 14, 718 (1996) (citation omitted). In ru ling on a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court is not to weigh evidence or resolve controverted
factual issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601 (1983). Should
the evidence reveal no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should
be granted. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718. In any case which will be tried to the court, rather
than to a jury, the trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing a motion for summary judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts . Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518, note 1 (1982).

Ill.

A

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Creditor Claim Rules
A creditor has three years from date of death to file a claim. Idaho Code§

15-3-803.

A personal representative can limit the filing period of creditors to four

months after the date of first publication of a notice to the creditors in the newspaper.
Idaho Code § 15-3-801 (a). Known creditors must be given actual notice of the time by
which to file a claim. Idaho Code § 15-3-801 (b); see also Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (due process requires actual notice be
given to known creditors). Any creditor who does not file its claim within the appropriate
time frame has its claim forever barred . Idaho Code§ 15-3-801 (a), (b).
In order for a claim to be valid, the creditor must file its claim with both (1)
the personal representative and (2) the Court. Idaho Code§ 15-3-804(a). The claim is
deemed to be presented on the later of (1) the delivery or mailing of the claim to the
4.
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personal representative or (2) the filing of the claim with the Court.

Id. (emphasis

added).
Once the claim is filed with the Court, the personal representative can
disallow the claim .

Idaho Code § 15-3-806(a).

Once the cla im is disallowed, the

creditor has 60 days to file a petition to allow the claim with the court. Id.
Failure of the personal representative to mail notice of disallowance to a
[creditor} on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the

claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance. ,!Q. (emphasis added).
Robert Melton died on July 4, 2013. The general three year statute of
limitations would allow a creditor until July 4 , 2016 to file a claim.

In this contested

matter, Letters Testamentary were issued to Jadwiga on February 2, 2015. Jadwiga
filed a notice to creditors in the newspaper, and the date of first publication was
February 19, 2015. Due to this publication, creditors have until June 19, 2015 to file a
cla im or be forever barred.
Prior to Jadwiga being appointed personal representative, Alt sent a
creditor claim to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9, 2015, and filed the same cla im with
the Court on January 13, 2015.

The Personal Representative sent a Notice of

Disallowance of claim to Alt on March 13, 2015, which was within 60 days after he filed
his claim. The Notice of Disallowance was filed with the court on March 17, 2015. The
Notice of Disallowance was timely mailed to Alt.
Despite Alt's argument, all of the above dates are irrelevant. The date of
first publication was February 19, 2015. After publication in the paper, the original time

5.
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for presentment of creditor claims was June 19, 2015 (four months after the date of first
publication). The personal representative has until August 19, 2015 to disallow any
claims that are presented . Alt's argument the disallowance was untimely filed is not in
accordance with Idaho's statute. The Disallowance of Claim was timely issued by the
personal representative.1
B.

Treatment of Alt's Petition to Allow Claims
It is questionable whether Alt correctly filed a claim because the claim was

sent before the personal representative was appointed . A literal reading of Idaho Code
§ 15-3-804(a) requires the claim to be filed with the "personal representative" and with

the court. Alt should have resent his claim to the personal representative once Jadwiga
was appointed. He did not do so. Therefore, this Court should bar Alt's Claim as not
filed in conformance with Idaho law and therefore shall be barred .
If the Court treats this as a validly filed claim, Jadwiga still has until August
19, 2015 to disallow Alt's Claim. Jadwiga disallowed the claim by sending notice to Alt's
attorney on March 13, 2015, well within the timeframe to disallow this claim. Jadwiga
objects to automatically allowing Alt's Claim.
If this Court treats Alt's Claim as validly filed, then Jadwiga requests this
matter be treated as a disallowed claim with a Petition to Allow Claim filed by Alt. This

1 Even assuming that the claim could have been properly presented prior to the appointment by Jadwiga,
it was presented on January 13, 2015, the date the claim was filed with the court (which is later than the
date that it was sent to Jadwiga, who later was appointed Personal Representative) . Jadwiga disallowed
the claim on March 13, 2015, which is the 59 th day after the earliest possible date the claim could be
deemed presented. Thus the disallowance was timely even accepting the premature filing date of
January 13, 2015 as being valid and accepting for the sake of argument that the disallowance had to be
mailed within sixty days of the date when the claim was deemed presented, not sixty days after the four
month notice to creditors period expired as the statute clearly provides.

6.
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would have the result of Alt having to prove his creditor claim, rather than have it
automatically allowed. As a matter of law, this Court should treat Alt's Claim as
defective as filed and therefore should be disallowed in its entirety.
C.

Defects in Alt's Claim as Presented
In addition to the statutory deficiency described above, Alt's Claim is also

defective for the following reasons:
1.

No Original Documents
Attached to Alt's Claim is a document entitled "Folgene Credite Auf

Konto" (which loosely translates to "the following credit on account") signed by "Hedy
Melton" which states in the body "all of this amount was used to built (sic) Loghouse."
When reviewing this claim, it appears that Alt is attempting to treat this document as a
promissory note; a promissory note signed by Hedwig in favor of Alt.
provide the Court with original documents.

Alt does not

Instead, he presents "true and correct

copies" of the purported promissory note. Without the original documents, Alt's Claim
cannot be verified as the best evidence rule prohibits the use of copies except in certain
instances. Idaho Code § 9-411 . The theory underlying the best evidence rule is stated
as follows:
The best evidence rule is designed to foster accuracy in the
presentation of evidence found in writings. No party should
be permitted to prove the contents of a document by
secondary proof when it is within his power to produce the
original. It is a preferential rule limited to documentary
evidence. The application of the rule results in the exclusion
of secondary evidence except when a party is unable,
through no fault of his own, to produce the original.

7.
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Bell , Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer 208 (2d
ed. 1972). Idaho First Nat'I Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256,
261 (1979)
As a condition precedent to the admissibility of a document, Alt must
present "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims." I.R.E. 901 (a). When seeking to admit a writing , which is not selfauthenticating , a party must provide proof of its genuineness separate from the writing
itself before it is admissible. Idaho First Nat'I Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 262 (1979).
The purported signature or recital of authorship on the face of a writing will not be
accepted as sufficient preliminary proof of authenticity for the admission of a writing in
evidence. Id. Idaho Code § 9-405 provides that a writing can be authenticated in the
following ways: (1) by anyone who saw the writing executed; (2) by evidence of
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (3) by a subscribing witness. Idaho
Code § 9-405. Idaho Code § 9-411 is the codification of the best evidence rule in Idaho.
Idaho Code § 9-411 provides in relevant part:

There can be no evidence of the

contents of a writing other than the writing itself, except in the following cases:
1.
When the original has been lost or destroyed; in
which case proof of the loss or destruction must first be
made.
2.
When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and he fails to
produce it after reasonable notice.
Typically, the loan holder will possess the original promissory note until
the debt is paid . When the debt is paid, the original promissory note is returned to the
debtor in satisfaction of payment.

8.

Alt has not provided the Court with any original

MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFSUMMARYJUDGMENT
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documents, and he has not authenticated the copies he has provided to the Court. The
documents Alt provided to the Court are copies and do not specifically name Alt as the
creditor. If Alt does not possess the original documents, this calls into question whether
the debt was paid or not. In addition, even if Alt presented original documents, they
must be authenticated as in Hedwig's handwriting . Without original documents and
without proving the authenticity of the documents, this Court should dismiss Alt's Claim
as filed.
2.

Defective Documents
The documents Alt has provided in Alt's Claim are not evidence of

a debt instrument or promissory note. Robert and Hedwig purchased the Residence
from Bobby lnvernon and Heidi lnvernon on April 11, 1996. Later, on July 10, 1999,
Featherston Law Firm prepared and recorded a Gift Deed transferring the Residence
from Robert and Hedwig to Alt. On November 4, 1999, Featherston Law Firm prepared
and recorded a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Residence from Alt, and his wife
Christine, back to Robert and Hedwig . If there was a debt owed by Robert and Hedwig
on the Residence to Alt, it should have been secured by a Deed of Trust along with a
promissory note in favor of Alt. That was never done.
In addition , the documents in Alt's Claim do not look like promissory
notes. There is no language on the document other than the German phrase "Folgene
Credite Auf Konto" (which loosely translates to "the following credit on account")" that
could be construed as any sort of debt instrument. The documents could just as easily
be a tally for the basis in the Residence for tax purposes. Or, the documents could be

9.
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considered a repayment log from Alt to Hedwig for amounts Alt owed her. There are
too many unknowable facts regarding the documents to determine the true intent. The
documents provided do not show any debt owed by Robert to Alt.

Therefore, Alt's

Claim should be denied in its entirety.
D.

Claim is Time-Barred at Hedwig's Death
As described above, the document entitled "Folgene Credite Auf Konto"

(which loosely translates to "the following credit on account") signed by "Hedy Melton"
which states in the body "all of this amount was used to built (sic) Loghouse" was filed
as a debt instrument in this matter. Even if we treat this document as a promissory
note, it was only signed by Hedwig . Under the facts of this case, a debtor-creditor
relationship existed only between Alt and his mother Hedwig . Robert did not sign the
note, and therefore, was not contractually liable for the debt evidenced by the
documents presented. Only Hedwig signed the document and therefore only Hedwig
would be liable for any debt. Purportedly, the debt incurred by Hedwig was to build a
house which was for the benefit of the community and if so, it would be properly
characterized as a "community debt." See Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 111
Idaho 349, 352 (Idaho 1986). Idaho Supreme Court went on to clarify:
The phrase "community debt" is correct terminology insofar
as it is used to signify a debt incurred for the benefit of the
marital community. However, to the extent the phrase is
used to imply the existence of a "community debtor," the
phrase is imprecise and misleading. The marital community
is not a legal entity such as a business partnership or
corporation. While one may properly speak of a "corporate
debtor," there is no such entity as a "community debtor." To
the extent a lending institution enters into a creditor-debtor
relationship with either member of the marital community or
10.
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with both members, it does so on a purely individual basis.
Thus, the lending institution may have a creditor-debtor
relationship with either spouse separately or with both jointly.
As stated earlier, the community property system does not
affect the fundamental principles governing such a
relationship and the procedures required of a creditor in
order to co llect upon his debt. Rather, the community
property system merely affects the type or kinds of property
to wh ich the creditor may look for satisfaction of his unpaid
debt. Essentially, the community property system merely
makes additional resources (community property) available
to a creditor from which to seek satisfaction of unpaid debt.
Thus, under the community property system in Idaho and
I.C. § 32-912 , [1] which has established a rule of co-equal
management of community assets or property, when either
member of the community incurs a debt for the benefit of the
community, the property held by the marital community
becomes liable for such a debt and the creditor may seek
satisfaction of his unpaid debt from such property . .!.Q.
(Internal citations omitted).
At Hedwig's death , Alt, if he proved the authenticity of a debt, may have
had a claim in Hedwig's estate against Hedwig's assets and the community property
assets of the estate. The statute of limitations to file a claim is three years from date of
death . Idaho Code§ 15-3-803. Hedwig died on August 11, 2008. Alt had until August
11, 2011 to file a claim in Hedwig's estate. He did not do so. After that date, any claim
against Hedwig's estate is statutorily time barred . In addition, at Hedwig's death, there
is no longer any community property. Pursuant to the terms of her Last Will, all of
Hedwig's property became the sole and separate property of her husband Robert.
Robert did not sign the document.

Robert's estate cannot be held responsible for

Hedwig's debt. Alt's Claim should be dismissed by operation of law as barred by the
statute of limitations.

11.
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E.

Equitable Estoppel Does Not Apply
Alt has asserted in Alt's Claim that Robert and Hedwig executed mutual

Wills in 1998 as a means of full repayment of the loan Alt allegedly made to Robert and
Hedwig. Yet, in July of 1999, the Residence was gifted to Alt. That same year, Alt
voluntarily quitclaimed the Residence back to Robert and Hedwig, using Featherston
Law Firm. If a debt was owed to Alt, the typical procedure is to file a Deed of Trust at
the same time the Quitclaim was signed to protect Alt's purported loan. That did not
happen .
After Hedwig died, Alt knew that pursuant to the express terms of her Will
that Hedwig's entire estate was transferred to Robert. Alt still did nothing to protect his
purported loan . Robert married Jadwiga on June 7, 2010. Again, Alt did nothing to
protect his purported loan.
The only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitation defense in Idaho is the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.

J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics lnt'I, Inc., 126 Idaho 532,

534 (1994). The elements of equitable estoppel are as follows: (1) a false
representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge
of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the
truth; (3) that the false representation or con_cealment was made with the intent that it be
relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from
whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or
concealment to his prejudice. !g_. Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend
the statute of limitations. Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540 (2006) . It

12.
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merely bars a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense for a
reasonable time after the party asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have
discovered the truth. !Q.
Put differently, there simply is no evidence establishing or permitting the
Court to reasonably infer that Robert concealed any material facts or made any false
representations which lulled Alt into inaction during the statutory creditor claim period in
Hedwig's estate. Alt is a business person. Alt did not have Robert sign a promissory
note. Alt did not have Robert sign a Deed of Trust. Robert was not related to Alt and it
was foreseeable that Robert would leave his entire estate to his new wife, Jadwiga.
Even if Robert did not execute a Will leaving everything to Jadwiga, by operation of law,
she would receive one-half the estate as an omitted spouse. See Idaho Code § 15-2301.

Alt knew that Robert had married Jadwiga and yet did nothing to protect his

interest in the purported loan to Hedwig . Additionally, there is no evidence before the
Court establishing that Alt relied on any representations by Robert in waiting to file this
action. This Court should dismiss Alt's Claim.
F.

Deadman's Statute
The purpose of the so-called "Deadman's Statute" is to prevent a litigant

from having the benefit of his own testimony when another litigant has been deprived of
the testimony of the decedent.
Idaho Code § 9-202 states in relevant part:
Who may not testify.-The following persons cannot be
witnesses:

13.
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3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding,
or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is
prosecuted against an executor or administrator, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person ,
as to any communication or agreement, not in writing ,
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code § 9-202(3) bars, (1)
certain persons from testifying ; (2) in a specific action; (3) as to certain communications .
Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 547 (1978) . All three portions of Idaho Code § 9202(3) must be satisfied in order for the evidence to be barred . ,!Q. Additionally, Idaho
Code § 9-202(3) prohibits a party who is making a claim against an estate from
testifying as to any unwritten communication with the deceased. Lunders v. Estate of
Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698 , 699 (1998) (emphasis added) .
In this case, all three requirements are clearly met in that: (1) Alt is a party
in this action against the estate; (2) Alt's Claim is against his deceased step-father's
estate; and (3) Alt is offering testimony to a communication or agreement, not in writing ,
occurring before the death of his step-father.
Here, Alt is asserting in Alt's Claim that Robert "assured him in the fall of
2012 that his 1998 Will remained in effect" in order for Alt to have his purported loan be
repaid. This is exactly the type of testimony that is barred under the Deadman's statute.
Alt's Claim should be disallowed in its entirety. 2

2 It is also the type of situation that Idaho Code§ 15-2-701 is designed to protect aga inst assum ing that
Alt makes the claim that Robert's representation amounted to a "will contract. " Alt's oral testimony about
being assured by Robert that Robert's 1998 rema ined in effect in order for his purported loan to be repaid
is not sufficient to prove that there was a will contract since those types of agreements can be established
only by (1) provisions in a will stating material provisions of the contract; (2) an express reference in a will
to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writing signed by the
decedent evidencing such contract. Such proof is missing in this case .

14.
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G.

Attorney Fees Should be Awarded the Estate

In addition, Jadwiga respectfully requests an award of attorney fees under I.C. §§
12-121, 12-123, and 15-8-208. As has already been acknowledged, this estate is very
small . The inventory filed with this court on August 29, 2013 states it contained a
residence of approximately 1,428 square feet, a bank account of approximately $1,700
and a vehicle valued at $1 ,500 . The Estate has been forced to expend funds and
deplete estate assets in order to respond to unfounded assertions, respond to
discovery, and Alt's creditor claims. Attorney fees should be awarded the Estate from
Alt.

Ill. CONCLUSION
Jadwiga respectfully requests this court deny Alt's request to have his creditor
claim automatically held as allowed . Alt's creditor claim was not properly filed, and in
any event, Jadwiga timely disallowed his claim .
If this court treats Alt's Petition to Allow Claims as a valid petition to allow his
claim, Jadwiga respectfully requests this Court to disallow Alt's Claim in its entirety
based on the authority and arguments above.

Finally, Jadwiga respectfully requests

this court for an award of attorney fees in having to defend these matters.
DATED this

:let-- day of June 2015.

Attorney for JADWIGA MELTON
Personal Representative
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

J.,5.,,._

day of June 2015, I caused a true and

accurate copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon,
and addressed to the following:

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd .
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON #4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)
brent@featherstonlaw.com
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Attorney for Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

)
)

CASE NQ, CV~2013-0313

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07-04-2013,

)
)
)

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE AND CONTINUE
ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
and NOTICE OF HEARING

Deceased.

)
)

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel, Brent C. Featherston, Featherston Law Finn,

Chtd., for and on behalf of the Claimant, Heinz Alt, and hereby moves to vacate and continue
the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment set for July 27, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. for the reason
that counsel for the Claimant, Heinz Alt, has been out of the country on a family vacation
since June 24, 2015, and did not return to the office until Friday, July 10, 2015. The

Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment is due Monday, July 13, 2015, and additional
time is ~ecessary for counsel to consult with his client, who lives in Austria, and to prepare
the Response.

This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of Counsel and Claimant's Counsel intends
Daniol l?. Pcathemon
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Peatheraton
Jeremi L . Ossman

to present argument and further evidence in support hereof.

113 S. Secon<I M e.

Sin(lp0int, ID 83864
Phom, (208) 263-6866
fix (208) 263-0400

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO VACATE AND CONTINUE ESTATE'S MOl'ION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTfON TO SHORTEN TIME and NO'l'ICE OF HEARING- I
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DATED this/t!1ay of July, 2015.

Attorney for Heinz Alt, Claimant

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel> Brent C. Featherston; Featherston Law Firm,
Chtd., for and on behalf of the Claimant, Heinz Alt, and respectfully requests the Court,
pursuant I.R.C.P. 6(d). to short.en the time for hearing Claimant's Motion to Vacate and

Continue Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment for the following reasons.
The Claimant's Motion to Vacate Hearing is scheduled for hearing on July 14, 2015,
at 11:00 a.m. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) this Motion and the Notice of Hearing are to be
served no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the time specified for hearing. Due to the
actions of the Estate, and in order to protect the Claimant, this matter must be heard
immediately.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 6(b) and 7(b), this Court may alter the time

prescribed,
There is no prejudice to the Estate by altering the time period prescribed by Rule and
allowing the Motion to Vacate Hearing to proceed on three (3) days' notice as opposed to a
fourteen (14) day notice.
The Court is asked to talce judicial notice of the .file herein and to shorten time for
hearing on the Claimant's Motion to Vacate and Continue Hearing for the reasons set forth in
Da,1iel P. Feath~rston
8rtnt C. PeatherSIOn •
Jeremy P, Pe~themon
Jeremi L. Ossman
ll3 S . Second Avo.
Saruipoloc, ID 83864
.Phone (208) 26'.$-6&66
Fax (208) 263-0400

the Motion and as may be presented at hearing on this Motion.

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO VACATE AND CONTINUE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO SHOR'l'EN TIME and NOTICE OF HEARING- 2
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The undersjgned further gives notice of intent to present further evidence and
testimony at hearing.

DATED this

..,La.iy of July, 2015.

::~z
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Claimant

NOTICE OF HEARING
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Clajmant, Heinz Alt, by a11d through bis
attorney, Brent C. Featherston, will bring his Motion to Vacate and Continue Estate's Motion

for Summary Judgment on for hearing on the 14th day of July, 2015, at 11 :00 a.m., or as soon
thereafter as may be heard, at the B0W1dary County Courthouse, 6452 Kootenai Street,

Bonners Ferry, Idaho, and will present oral testimony thereon.

I 1"

DATED this~ day of July, 2015.

Attorney for Heinz Alt, Claimant

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Fc,.thersron
Jeremi L. Ossman

113 S. Second Avi!J.
SMdpOint, ID 8l864
:Phone (208) 263-6866

Fax (208) 263-0400

CLAIMANT'S MO"flON TO VACATE ANO CONflNtJE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME and NOTlC£0F HEAlUNG• 3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the~~f July, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:

'
i·
I

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM) PLLC
610 W. Hubbard) Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ] U.S. Mail) Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
Other: - - - - ~ - - - -

H

D3niel P, Fea1herston
Bre111 C. Fealhers1on*
Jertflly P. rea1herston
Jeremi L. OS$m~n

113 S. Second Ava.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phon.o (208) 263-6866
Fsx (208) 263-0400

CLAIM.ANT'S MOTION 1'0 VACATE AND CONTINUE ESTATE'S MOflON FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME aod NO'flCE: OF Hli:ARING-4
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FILED

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)
Attorney for Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07-04-2013,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO VACATE AND CONTINUE
ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Bonner
)
I. BRENT C. FEATHERSTON. being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
I am over the age of majority and competent to testify to the matters set forth herein.

I represent Heinz Alt, who is the son of Hedwig Melton and step~son of Robert Melton,

the Creditor Claimant and interest.ed party in the above-entitled matter.
Over one year ago I scheduled a family vacation which caused me to be out of the

office June 24, 2015, through July 9, 2015, traveling in France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
··~-·.

':i --~ ,. .

' \ .·:

•,\

On June 25, 2015, at 4:30 in the afternoon, we received by facsimile and subsequently

~-r~m~~N-'J;Awf:riw.CHto.
}~,.r<>'i_\'X~AT~M.

Daniel P. PoathQtston
Brent C. Poa1hento11*
Jeremy P. Poather&to11
foreml L. Oisma11

by email the Personal Representative's Motion for Swnniary Judgment, Notice of Hearing,
Affidavit of Mary Cusack and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint. ro 83864
Phone (208) 263-68615
Fax (208) 263-0400 .
•l..i¢onacd in Idaho & WUhin;t0a

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VA CAT£
ANO COlNT1NOE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1
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The Notice of Hearing set he matter for hearing on July 27tti at 9:30 a.m., making my client's
response to the Motion due Monday, July 13 th•
I returned home at 2:00 a.m. on Friday, July 10th •
As the Court is aware, my client, Heinz Alt, is a resident of Austria and his adult son,

Daniel Alt. resides in New York City.
Due to my prearranged vacation, I have been unable to meet with either the client or his

son or to review the pleadings.
Counsel for the Estate did not arrange the July 27th hearing date in advance with my
office, nor did she provide me any opportunity or forewarning as to her int.ention to file the
Motion or to set it for hearing on July 27111 , a courtesy that is commonly extended prior to the
scheduling of Motions for Swn:mary Judgment.
There is cU1Tently no hearing set in this matter and, therefore, no prejudice would arise
from the Court vacating the July 27th hearing and resetting it to a later date.
The Court is asked to vacate the July 27th hearing and to set the matter to a later date so

as to allow counsel and his client suffioient time to prepare a response to the Motion and to
conduct any necessary discovery in response to the Motion.
Further, your Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this/0-1af, of July, 201S.

' \

.I

J "\ /"

••,,;

.:

DAnicl P. Peatherston
BreM C. Peatherston*
Jererny P. Featherston
Jcremi L. Ossman

U~ $, S~cond Ave.
S~n<lpoint, ID 83864
PhOne (208) 263-6866
F'Ax (208) 263-0400

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL lN SUPPORT OF MOTlON TO VACATE
AND COINTINOE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

;

J[f-llta,y

I hereby certify that on the
of July, 2015, I caused a true ai1d correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
~ F~csimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Bi2

., •• ··,T •, ,•·

'\ ,

,{I ......I'~·'---------1-----!

..

Daniel P. f.,ather&!01\
Brent C. Feathenton•
Jeremy P. Fer.tMrston
Jeremi L. O~smin
113 S . Second Ave.

Sandpoint, ID 8381S4
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

AFI.-Jl>AVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPO»:r O'F MO'fION TO VACATE
•Liconl<d io Idaho & Wuhioston

AND COINTINUE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JtJl>G'MENT · 3
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB # 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estates of:

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, and
HEDWIG 11 HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased.
_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION TO
VACATE AND CONTINUE
HEARING

COMES NOW, JADWIGA B. MELTON, by and through her attorney of record,
MARY W. CUSACK, and hereby provides the Court with notice that she has no
objection to the cancellation of the hearing by BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, attorney of
record for HEINZ ALT, and has so stipulated.
The hearing Is currently scheduled for July 27, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. at the Boundary
County Courthouse· before the Honorable Judge Julian regarding the Motion for
Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Clalm. Said Motion was timely filed; however, Mr.
Featherston did not notify the Court or this office of his travel plans, and this office was
unaware of Mr. Featherston's unavatlability.
DATED this

_et_ day of July 2015.
· -~
USACK, Attorney for
Personal Representative of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG 11HEDY" MELTON.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG

I hereby certify that on the

[3rJt....day of July 2015>

I caused a true and correct

copy of the following NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION TO VACATE AND CONTINUE
HEARING to be e-mailed> faxed or mailed by regular U.S . Mail, postage prepaid
thereon, in an envelope addressed to:

';

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.

113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83884
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent vie email:
cynth ia@feetherstQnlaw.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estates of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

_____________
Deceased,

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
NOTICE OF HEARING

)

)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 24 th day of August 2015, at the hour of
9:30 a,m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the courtroom of the
above ..entitled court, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, before the HONORABLE JUSTIN JULIAN,

the Personal Representative in the above-named matter, JADWIGA B. MELTON, will
move this Court to enter a summary judgment against HEINZ ALT and deny, in its
entirety, the creditor clalm filed herein by HEINZ ALT.
The Estate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and said motion being
made and based upon Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon the pleadings
and records previously filed herein, including the following: Affidavit of Mary W. Cusack,

and the Memorandum tn Support of Motion for Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor
Claim.

1. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC001448B0.DOCXj1/20;,97.100) '
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The grounds for this motion are that the pleadings, and admlssions on file,

together with the affidavits, show that there Is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Oral argument is requested .

DATED this

f~

day of July 2015.

Attorney for Personal Representative
JADWIGA B. MELTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/Sd,,,,

day of July 2015, I caused a true and accurate

copy of foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd,
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83884
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com

MA~

2. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC00144880.DOCX; 1/20397,100)
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STATE Of IOAHO

couHTY OF BOUHDARY
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Gl~~s~ERK _

~O&J 263-6866

~Q.&) 266-0400 (Fax)
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~MIO

CLERK

· Atto\J)~),'"for Claimant Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TllE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TUE COUNTV OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
fii the Matter of the Estate of

RQ)i}l{R,'.(' ERNEST MELTON.
· d<lo: 01-04-2013~

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

STIPULATION TO
VACATE HEARING

)

COMBS NOW the undersigned counsel> for and OJ\ behalf of the respective parties, and

hei;eby stipulate and agree that the hearing on Petitioner, 1-lein,z Alt1 s, Motion to Continue and
Vacate Estate's Motion fol' Summary Judgment and Motion to Sho11en Time cmtently
~c.hedttled f.or hearil~ Olt Tuesday. July 14. 2015, at 11:00 a.m. in Boundary County shall be

vMated for the reason that counsel for the Estate has agreed to .reschedule tl1e Estate's Motion

I
i_

DATED this ~day ofJuly, 2015.

CUSACK LAW FIRM, Pl.LC

Danld P. l'~lh~r.\on
'ilrini C, l"cMllul1<>n•

fo-cmy P. l'ea1her,1on

.

I.

fQ1' Smnmruy Judgment for a date after luly 27, 2015.

FEATHERSTON LAW Fl~~v..,,,......,... D,
By~~
BRENT C. EATHERSTON
Attorney for Heinz Alt·

)eremi L. 05111\~l\
113 $, $1l(Oftd A~~.
$"'1~p0ln1, 'ID 83864

Pilon~ (208) ~6866
l"al! (208) ilSJ-0100
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, !SB No. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
brent@featherstonlaw.com

FILED
2015 AUG I O p 1.J: J 2
STATE OF IOAHO
COUNTY OF B0UNDARY

GLENDA POSTON. CLERK
\A] ·--\&,(\

BY

fl•'PUT Y CLER K

Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

CREDITOR'S RESPONSE
TO ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW the Ul"'ldersigned counsel, Brent C. Featherston, Featherston Law Fitm,
Chtd., for and on behalf of the Creditor, Heinz Alt, ("Alt") and irt response to the Motion for

Summaty Judgment to Deny Creditor's Claim filed by Jadwiga V. Melton (''Jadwiga"), as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig (''Hedy") Melt.on,
Husband and Wife ("Estate») and hereby responds as follows:

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Titis probate proceeding was filed following the death of Alt's mother, Hedy Melton,

and, subsequently, the death of Robert Melton, Alt's step-father. The testimony previously
presented indicated he was raised by Robert Melton when Hedy and Robert married when Alt
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman
113 S. Secon<I A\11>,
Sanap0in1, ID 83864
Phono (208) 263-6866
Pax (206) 263-04-00

was a teenager. The testimony also proved without dispute that during their marriage,
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Meltons were poor money managers and often borro-wed from their son, Heinz A_lt, for a
variety of purposes.
When moving to Idaho in the late 1990s, Meltons purchased a piece of property, in

part with funds borrowed from Alt and built the home entirely with funds borrowed from Alt.
· Alt's verified Claim Against Estate is unrebutted that Exhibits ''A'\ «B", and "C" are
handwritten and signed by Hedy Melton. The handwritten notes acknowledge a loan of
$102,574.50, in the handwriting of Hedy Melton.

In German, she acknowledges her

obligation for the loan from her son and states that it was used to purchase and/or build the
log home.

Hedy died in 2008 and, as he testified earlier this year, Alt visited and communicated
often with Robert Melton, his step-dad.

In the summer of 2011, Melton married Jadwiga Melton. Within six (6) months. the
Will now submitted for probate allegedly leaves all of his estate to Jadwiga.
The verified Claim contains Mr. Alt's discussion with Robert Melton in the Fall of
2012 approximately a year after the purported Will was signed and less than a year prior to
his death, and Robert stated the 1998 Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of
the loans owed to his step-son, Heinz Alt.

II.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(c) provides that a Summary Judgment may be granted to an adverse property

~'if the pleadings, depositions and admissioru, on file, together with the affidavits, if ru1y, show
Dani~! P. Fcalhenron

Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Pea!hottron
Jett>mi L. Ouman

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c)(2015)

113 S. Second Ave.

Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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When ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment. the trial
court must detennine whether the evidence, when
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, presents a genuine issue of material fact or shows
that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw.
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769,
215 P.3d 485,489 (2009)

The Supreme Court went on to note that the "moving party bears the burden of
proving the absence of material fact" and only once that moving party establishes the

absence of genuine issues of material fact, does the burden shift to the non-moving party to
show the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Id.
Mr. Alt respectfully submits to this Court that the Estate has failed in its burden to
show the absence of genuine issue of material fact. The Estate's Motion for Summary
Judgment is supported strictly by the Affidavit of Counsel, which submits to the Court a

series of deeds, gift deeds and quitclaim deeds. Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibits "N'; "B"
and "C". Although the Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment asserts several
arguments that are unsupported by fact or affidavit, this Court should deny the Estate's
Motion for Summary Judgment, as it has been inadequately supported and the Estate has
failed to carry its burden. 1

For example, the Estate argues that the documents signed by Hedwig Melton attached to
the verified Creditor's Claim raise ' 1too many unknowable facts regarding the docurnents to
detennine the true intent." Memorandum, p. l O The Estate also asserts that the tenn
"credite auf konto" which translates to ''on account" could be just as easily construed as a
·~ally for the basis in the residence for tax purposes". Memorandum, p.9. Neither of these
assertions are supported by any verified allegation, but are simply arguments for trial,
which in fact, defeat the Estate' s own Motion for Summary Judgment.
1

Daniel P. Featherston
Br~nt C. Featherston•
forcm)' P. fci.ch~rston
Jeremi L. Ossman
113 S . Stcond Ave.
Sat1dpoinl, ID 83864
Phon~ (208) 263-6866

Fax (208) 263-0400
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ARGUMENT
A.

Timeliness and Appropriateness of Creditor's Claim

The Estate's argument that the Creditor's Claim was defective or untimely is
unsupp01ted by the evidence. This case was originally filed as a Surviving Spouse Petition

by Jadwiga Melton's former counsel, Bruce Greene. Despite repeated indications that the
surviving spouse statute found at Idaho Code§ 15-3-1205 is inapplicable because Mr. Melton

and Jadwiga held no commtmity property at the time of his dea~ it still took over a year for a
proper Petition to be filed, The Petition for the probate of the Estates of both Robert Melton
and Hedwig Melton was filed December 9, 2014, some fifteen (15) months after the case was
filed as a Summary Adminisu·ation on August 29, 2013.
There is no legal provision for the filing of a creditor's claim in a sununary
administration. Should a spouse proceed u11der § 1205, the surviving spouse '(shall assume
and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the estate of the
decedent, and there will be no administration of the estate of the decedent." LC. § 15-31205(c)(2015). Jadwiga elected to commence this as a Summary Administration, thus Mr.
Alt had no opportunity to file his Claim until the Petition for Fornutl Probate of the Estates of

Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton was filed December 9, 2014.
Counsel for Jadwiga did not serve the Petition until a month later by mail on January
9, 2015. See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit "A". Alt's Claim was served immediately by
mail to Jadwiga's counsel on January 9, 2015. Alt's claim was timely and the Estate's
Daniel P. Peathcrsron
Brent C. Peathe,ston*
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman

Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.

l 13 S. Second Ave.
S~nllp0int, ID 83864
Phono (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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Alt's Claim is deemed Allowed betause the Estate did not timely il)isallow.

The verified Creditor's Claim Against the Estate was filed January 13. 2015, and
served upon counsel for Jadwiga by U.S. Mail on January 9, 2015. See Affidavit of Counsel,
Exhibit ·~B". The Estate filed a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim on March 17, 2015.
On January 9th, the Claim Against Estate was served upon the Estate via U.S. Mail.
Applying the three (3) day mail rule, I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate was served with Mr.
Alt's Claim on January 12, 2015. The Estate did not .disallow th~ Claim until mailing to
counsel a Disallowance on March 13, 2015.
Again, applying the three (3) day timeframe applied to service by mail and the service
of the Disallowance did not occur until March 16th • From January 12th until March 16th is a
span of sixty-three (63) days. In fact, the Estates Disallowance of this Claim was untimely
under I.C. § 15-3-806.
Idaho Code § 15-3-806 provides: "Failure of the Personal Representative to mail
notice to a claimant of action on his claim for 60 days after the time for original presentation
of the claim has expired has the·effect of a notice of allowance." LC. §15-3-806(a)(2015)
The Estate's Disallowance of this Claim sixty-three (63) days after presentation of the

verified Claim is u11ti.mely. Mr. Alt's claim is, therefore, deemed allowed. This Court should
deny Summary Judgment and should deem this Claim allowed.
The remainder of the Estate's argument concerning creditor claim rules is largely
irrelevant to this discussion. Mr. Alt's claim was timely filed just thirty (30) days after filing
D~nlel P. r1:>i1herSton
l'lrtin1 C. Featherston•
Je~my P. f.ia1herston
1eromi L. Ossmnn
113 S. Second Ave,
Sandpoint, ID 83864
l'hono (208) 263,6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

of Petition or Formal Probate of Mr. and Mrs. Melton's estate on December 9, 2014.

CREDITOR'S RESPONSE TO ESTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- S

'Licon>«! in ldo.lu> & W>0hin&ton

Page 108 of 438

08-10- 15 16 : 08 FROM-FEArr· ·~TON LA\JI FIRM
1

2082630400

T-294 P0007 /0033 F-101

Additionally, counsel raises the·false argument that the Estate has W1til August 19,
2015, to disallow presented claims based upon the fonn on publication deadline. This is
contrary to probate law.
Idaho Code § 15-3-801 et seq. sets forth the manner in which claims may be

presented. Idaho Code § 15-3-801 does provide for notice by publication, but also requires a
personal representative to give written notice by mail or other delivety to any creditor known
to the pe!,"SOnal representative.
Regardless of any notice to creditors from the personal representative provided by
subsection 801, a claimant may present a claim against the estate by delivering or mailing to
the personal representative a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, name and
address of the claimant, and the amount claimedJ and file a written statement of the claim in
the form proscribed by rule with the Clerk of Court. I.C. §15-3~804(a). The Creditor's Claim

starts the time for action by the Personal Representative, not the publication deadline.
The Claim is deemed presented upon delivery or mailing of the statement to the

Personal Representative or filing with the Court.
In other words, the timeframe for disallowance of the claim commenced upon service

of the claim on January 9, 2015, by U.S. Mail to attorney M.ary Cusack representing the
Estate. Ms. Cusack did not disallow the claim until sixty-three (63) days later when she
mailed here disallowance on March 13. 2015.
FFATHE::.-r~(.:~{@ ·i~orm

i2~2J,

Daniel}'>, Pca!herston
Brent C. f'eathcrston•
Jeremy P. Pcalhcrston
Jc~mi L . Ossman ·

113 S. Secon<I Av~.
Sait<lpoinl, JD 83864
PhonQ (208) 263-6866
fax (:Z08J 263-0400

The Estate's Disallowance is untimely and under statute, Mr. Alt's Claim is deemed

allowed.
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Jadwiga argues that the Claim should have been resubmitted upon her appointment.
This also is inaq,curate. The statute cited above pennits the claimant to either serve the
personal representative or file with the court, both of which occurred in this particular
instance. The Claim was file stamped January 13th and mailed January 9th to .the Personal
Representative. There is no basis for the Estate's claim that it should have been resubmitted.
C.

The Estate's Claim that original documents must be submitted.

On this argument, the Estate again badly misconstrues the law in Idaho. Counsel for
the Estate argues that the Cotu-t should dispose by Summary Judgment the Creditor's Claim
for the reason that ''original documents" were not produced. Counsel cites the Court to Idaho
Code §9-411.
I.C. § 9-411 is an evidentiary provision that provides as follows:
There can be no evidence o.f the contents of a writing other
than the writing itself except in the following cases;
(1) when the original has been lost or destroyed in which case

proof of the loss or destruction must first be made;
(2) when the original is in the possession of the party against

whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(3) when the original is a record or other document in the
custody of a public officer;
(4) when the original has been recorded and a certified copy of
the record is made evidence by this code or other statutes;

Daniel P. f'eftthcrston
Brent C. f'eathcn;ton•
Jeremy P. Peo.thcraton
Jeremi L . Ossman
113 $, So:,eon<I rwe,
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

(5) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the evidence sought from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
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(6) when the original consists of medical charts or records of
hospitals licenses in this state and the provisions of § 9A20
Idaho Code have been followed.
fu the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3), (4) and (6) a .£fil!Y
of the original or of the record, must be produced and those
mentioned in subdivisions (l) and (2) either- a copy or oral
evid~nc~ of the content.

LC.§ 9-411(2015)
A cursory reading of the entire plain language of I.C. § 9.411 makes it immediately

obvious that counsel's argument is misleading of Idaho law. Nothing in the statute requires
that original documents be presented ~ ' in fact, the statute makes clear that for purposes of
items (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) in the Code Section, a copy is sufficient. Furthennore, a plain
reading of the opening sentence makes clear that this is an evidentiary rule that prevents
testimony as to the contents of a writing when neither a copy nor the original is presented.
Additionally, counsel's argument disregards that this is an evidentiary rule, which
may or may not apply when testimony is presented, but certainly does not apply to a
det.ermination on summary judgment.
The best evidence rule also reproduced in Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 1002,
simply provides for a preference in favor of the original written instrument or document. See
State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 714 P.3d 93 (App.1986).
Regardless, this Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Idaho Code § 9-114 is
misplaced and misrepresents the law in Idaho. The Court should deny the State's Motion for
Summary Judgment on these grounds.
Dlllliel P. Pealhci1lton
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Pealllmton
Je,cmi L. Ossman
113 S. Second Aile.
SanOpOint, lD 83864
Fnonc (208) 263-6866
Pax (1.08) 263-0400
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Defect in Documents.

The Estate's argument here is, frankly, puzzling. It seems that the Estate simply
wants to argue the intent of the written debt obligation signed by Hedy Melton. Counsel for
the Estate argues that there should have been a Deed of Trust to secure any obligation owed
when Alt deeded the property back to Mr. and Mrs. Melton in 1999. Affidavit of Mary
Cusack, Exhibit "B". The Estate concludes this argument by stating there are "too many

unknowable facts regarding the documents to detennine the true intent and this court should
find therefore that the documents do not show a debt owed to Alt and the claim should be
disallowed.'' This is an assertion that is without factual support. The Estate did not submit
any affidavit to reflect a different intent and the Estate concedes that the document signed by

Hedy Melton states in German ·~he following credit on account>' before reciting the amounts
borrowed by the Meltons from Mr. Alt.
The Estate argues that the Quitclaim Deed in 1999 somehow obviates any credibility
to Mr. Alt's claim of a loan. Counsel overlooks the "settled law of this state that a deed,
absolute in form, the tenns of which are not ambiguous, may constitute a mortgage".
Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280, 311 P.3d 292 (2013). Without belaboring this issue, the
existence of the Quitclaim Deed has no legal effect upon the Creditor's Claim here, which is
in writing (th.e handwriting of the debtor) and signed by the debtor decedent.
There is no basis for the Estate's claim that the documents attached to the Creditor's

~~

Claim are defective or reflect a different intent than the obligation stated in the handwriting of

DanielP. Featherston

the decedent, Hedy Melton, and signed by her. The Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment

Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L . O.rnnan

should be denied.

113 S. $10<;ond Ave.
S~ndpoint, lD 83864
Phone (20&) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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The Estate's Claim of Time Barred by Hedy's Death.

TI-le Estate argues that the Claim is time baned because the Claim is against Hedy
Melton and her death in 2008 results in a time bar after three (3) years. Robert did not sign
the document and his Estate is not obligated by the note. Both assertions are unfounded.

Mr. Alt's verified Claim states the funds were lent to "Hedwig Melton and my step~
father Robert Melton'' for the purpose of acquiring land and building a home, the saine home

now at issue in this Estate and titled to Robert and Hedwig Melton at the time of their deaths
and at the time of the filing of the Petitio11 for Joint Probate of their Estates on December 9,
2014.

"A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a community debe' Gardner v,

Gardner, 107 Idaho 650,662,691 P.2d 1275, 1277 (App.1984)
Although the Gardner court went on to note that this is a rebuttable presumption, the
burden is upon the party asserting the loan as separate property to P!ove that the ')lature of
the loan proceeds" were separate property and that must be proven with "reasonable certainty
and particularity". Gardner, supra.

In Winn v. Winn, the court noted that "the proceeds of loans made upon the security
of a spouse's separate estate are separate and those made upon the security of the community
estate are community .••. This rule is based upon the fact that the estate providing the security
is the primary source of repayment." Winn V; Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 814, 673 P.2d 41 1, 414
(1983).
J)~i~I P. Feath~11:ton
Brent C. Feathenton*
Jeremy P. Featherscon
Jiin:rni L. Ossman
113 S . Second Avo.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (2.08} 263-6866
Pax (208} 263-0400

While there may not technically be a ·"security" instrument, it appears that a Gift Deed
was given to Alt initially as security for the loan repayment. Alt subsequently deeded the
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!
property back to the Meltons. It is undisputed that the loan proceeds were used foi· purchase
and development of the real property and home for both Mr. and Mrs. Melton, a.11.d that that
property was titled as community property to the Meltons until their deaths. Therefore, the
proceeds of the loan went to community assets and are community in nature.
As to the debt instrument containing only Hedwig Melton's signature, Idaho Code

makes clear that "either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the
community property and either may bind the community property by contract". Idaho Code §
32-912 (2015).

In short, either Hedwig or Robert had the ability to encumber the community estate
and obligate the community assets to repay Mr. Alt's loan. It does not require both
signatures.

The last section of the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment seems to assert that
because no claim was filed against Hedwig within three (3) years of her death, that the Alt
Claim is time barred. This, again, misstates the law, but also grossly misrepresents the status

of this litigation.
Hedy Melton's Estate was never submitted for probate until Robert Melton's death
and then not until eighteen (18) :months after his dead was the surviving spouse petition
converted to a formal petition for administration of the joint estates of Robert Ernest and
Hedwig "Hedy" Melton on December 9, 2014.
The Estate improperly relies on Twin Falls Banlc v. Holley to argue that the debt was
DAAi~l l>. l'eath.erSton
Brent C. Featherston·•
Jeremy P. Pcitherston
Jeremi L . Onman

113 S. Second ,we.
Sa11dpoi111, ro 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263--0400

solely Hedy's debt. Twin Falls was a bank debt collection after Holleys divorce<l. The
bank's notes were unsecured and incurred solely by Mr. Holley. The bank unsuccessfully
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sought to collect against :Mrs. Holley and her share of the community assets received after she
divorced Mr. Holley. The Holley court held that the bank's collection was restrained by basic
debtor/creditor law. With no judgment against Mrs. Holley for contractual relationship, after
the Holleys' divorce, the bank was only entitled to collect from their judgment debtor's
assets. The District Court also found that an extension agreement between the bank and Mr.
Holley extinguished the prior promissory- note executed while the Holleys were still married.
The facts are distinguishable from this case and the dicta of the opinion unpersuasive.
To suggest the Claim is time barred is simply disingenuous. Hedy Melton:1s Estate

was not admitted for fonnal probate until Petition was filed December 9, 2014. Mr. Alt's
Creditor's Claim was filed and served one (1) month later on January 9, 2015.
It is absurd for the Estate to assert that "Hedwig died on August 11, 2008. Alt had

until August 11, 2011, to file a claim in Hedwig's Estate." There was no "Estate" pending
for probate until Jadwiga filed on December 9, 2014. Further, Idaho Code 15-3-1 11
provides for joint probate in a single proceeding of both husband and wife's estate and further
states that the three (3) year statute oflitnitations probate found in I.C. § 15-3-108 applies
only to the death of the last spouse to have died. Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim is timely and the
Estate's Motion for Summary Jud~ent must be denied.

F.

Equitable Estoppel

It is puzzling at best to understand the Estate's argument of equitable estoppel since
the statute of limitations or time bar does not affect Mr. Alt's Claim for the reasons discussed
D1111iel P. f ea1herston
Brent C, Featherston~

above. This provision is also inapplicable and does not provide a basis for the Summary

Jdrerny P, P~~th~rston
Je1emi L. Onmil.ll
113 S. SocondAve.
Sandpoint , ID 83864
Phone (208) 263.6866
Pax (208) 263-0400
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Judgment Motion, nor is it a necessary consideration in the Court's denial of the Estate's
Motion.
G.

Dead Man's Statute

Once again, the Est.ate in its Motion for Summary Judgment, misconstrues Mr. Alt's
Creditor's Claim and asserts to this Court that the dead man statute somehow prevents the
claim from proceeding. The Estate argues that "Alt is asserting in Alfs claim that Robert
assured him in the Fall of 2012 that his 1998 Will remained in effect .... This is exactly the
type of testimony that is barred wider the dead man statute. Alt's claim should be disallowed
in its entirety." Memorandum, p.14.
Once again, the Estate seems to misconstrue and the posture of the litigation. The
Petition for Joint Administration of Robert and Hedwig's Estates was filed December 9,
2014, and this Creditor's Claim was filed January 9, 2015, one month later. The Claim does
not rely upon whether or not the 1998 Will is valid and currently in effect.
The Claim should be deemed allowed due to the untimely Disallowance by the Estate.
Regardless, the dead man statute contained in Idaho Code§ 9-202(3) has no application in
this instance. I.C. § 9-202 simply provides that ''the following persons cannot be witnesses:
..... 3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, ox persons in whose behalf
an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any communication or agreement not in
writing occurring before the death of such deceased person:" J.C.§ 9-202(3)(2015).
DAniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featheratoo*
Jeremy P. Poath(>l~ton
Jerci:,ii L. Ossman

This Claim is in writing, as evidenced by the attachments to the Claim. It is signed by
the decedentt Hedwig Melton; who by law can bind the marital community. I.C. § 32-912.

11'.J S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Fhonc (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263--0400
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The loan proceeds were for the benefit of the community, i.e., to purchase land and build a
home and the Creditor's Claim is unaffected by conversations that occurred between Mr. Alt
and Mr. Robert Melton after Hedwig's death. At future evidentiary proceedings, the Court
may be required to consider the applicability of the dead man's statute.
The statements contained in the verified Claim may be reflective of Mr. Melton's
acknowledgement of the debt prior to his death, and also may be a basis for challenging the
legitimacy of the Will, should Mr. Alt choose to do so in subsequent proceedings. It is not,
however, a basis for disallowing the Claim, which was a community debt incurred for
Meltons and signed by Hedwig Melton.
This is not a circumstance in which a claim is based upon an unwritten obligation or
oral promise made during the decedent's lifetime. The situation is distinguishable, therefore,
from cases like Kolouch v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 128 Idaho , 186, 911 P .2d 779
(App.1996) [in which a claim is based solely upon an oral communication with decedent.] 2
The Idaho Supreme Court recently opined on the "dead man's statute,, stating first
that the statute contained in J.C. § 9-202(3) is virtually "identical" to I.RE. 60l(b). More
importantly, in the Supreme Court stated that "the Court has not interpreted this provision so
broadly as to bar testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before a
decedent's death.'' A:Qril Begµesse. Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 515, 328 P.3d 480, 495
(2014); quotjng Montgomety v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 8,205 P.3d 650,657 (2009).
2

Daniel P. Peatharoton
Brant C. Peatharston•
Jeremy P. Feath~rston

Jeremi L, Ossman
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoinc, ID 83864

The Estate has not moved to strike any portion of the Claim. The statutory limitations
found in Idaho Code§ 9-202(3) are also contained within the Idaho Rules of Evidence,
Rule 601 (b). As such, the issue here is an evidentiary issue first and foremost and it should
be addressed by the Court, not on summary judgment, but during the court proceedings as
to what testimony may be admitted in support of Mr. Alt's claim.

Phone (208) 263-6866
Pn (208) 263-0400
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The Rammell court noted that the dead man statute and Rule 601 (b) have repeatedly
been rejected as a means to disallow testimony at trial such that the rule and statute have been

strictly construed only where the testimony was offered to "prove" the claim against the
estate. Such testimony may be admissible as proffered by a third party, if it is not a claim
against the estate that is being proven. or where testimony is being offered to defend against a
counterclaim among several examples.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Estate's assertion of the dead man's statute is
inapplicable on a Motion for Summary Judgment and this Court should deny the Motion for
Summary Judgment.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence submitted and available to the Court~ the Court should deny

the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The creditor, Heinz Alt, requests an award of
attorney's fees and costs under I.R.C.P. Rule 11 against counsel and the Estate, as well

as

under I.C. § 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123.
Further, the Court is asked to deny the Motion for SUlllIIUUY Judgment and to deem
the Creditor's Claim allowed by virtue of the Estate's failure to timely disallow the claim.
DATED this

;Aay

of August, 2015.

Attorney for Heinz Alt, Creditor
Daniel P. Pentherston
Brent C. Feathcmon•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. OSBman
113 S. SliCOnd Av~.
Silndpoint, ID 8:,864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Pu (208) 263-0400
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CERTIF~TE OF MAILING

I hereby ce1tify that on the /I) day of August, 2015, I caused a true and conect copy
of the foregoing document to be ~erved upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mall
[ ] Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
Other:

r1

-----~---

Daniol P. F~arhe:sron
Brent C . Fesrlu!,~1011*

Joromy P. FeMhers1011
Je,eml. L , OtSl'nJTI

113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint,Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)

J-

1.-. t__

•

t 15 iuG IO p 4.: 11
STATE OF lf1 ,-\HO

COUNT YOF !30UNDARY
GLENDAPOST~N.CLERK
By

J /\..A.A_~

r.r P'.JTY CLrnK

Attorney for Heinz Alt
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FffiST .nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Est.ate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG ·'HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased.
STATEOFIDAHO
Comity of Bonner

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013w0313

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

)
) ss:
).

I, BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, being fust duly swo:m on oath, depose and say:
I am over the age of majority and competent to testify to the matters set forth herein.
I represent Heinz Alt, who is the son of Hedwig Melton and step-son of Robert Melton.
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A" is a true and accurate copy
of THE Petition for Fonnal Probate of Will and Fonn.al Appointment of Personal

Representative filed December 9, 2014.
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "B" is a true and
accurate copy of Heinz Alt's Claim Against Estate in the sum of $102,574.50 filed January 13,
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Peatheuton•
Jcremy P. Featherston

2015.

Jeremi L. Oesmal\
1!3 S. Sc:con~ A<te.
Smdpoinl, n> 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Pu (208) 263-0400
•LictnB<4 in lo"11o &. W"8tiilltton
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sayeth naught.

DATED tms/6 day of August, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

.

/0 Jl

I hereby ce1tify that on the
day of August, 2015, I caused a true and conect copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
{ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ) Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

047

'.
:.,,
•,. ,\

... ,

..,:.
J3{--::,,~~..c-e~~~,/4.J,.:¼J,.~{l4!!
,,

. <-"':

. ··!' ·

Daniel P. Pealhen;ton
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Feather&ton
Jcrcmi L. Ossmsn

113 S. SecondAVO,
SMdpoint, ll) 63864

l'hone (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0400
•t.ioen.eo tn lo1'llo & W,i;hlni1on

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL - 2
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Caeack Lar.u Ffum, PLLC
Uo \IJ- -l 11 ... LL~,J, O.. ll .. H!J

Cocul* d'Alene, Ictoho 0J014

208·667•0640
FAX: 208•667•0708
MAP.Y

w. CUSACK, J.O., LLM (Toxatlon)

mc\lsack®mcusacl<law .com

SENT VIA FACSIMILE (208) 263-0400 - 7 pages

January 9, 2015

,.

Brent C. Featherston

i

Feathereton Law Firm. Chtd.
110 0. 06.:,.:,"~ Avt11uc.
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864
RE:

Estate of Robert Ernest Matton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton
Boundary Cow,ty Case No. ·1 $-0$1 ~

Dear Brent:

Enclosed are the documenta which I filed with the Court in this matter:
1. Petition for Formal Probate of Wirt and Formal Appointment of Personai
Representative (4 pages):
2. AU6ptanea ~f A~~~il\tl"61\t (1 pc§ii:,-,), e111J
3. Cfaim Against Estate for Homestead Allowance and for Exempt Property (1
page).
It is my understanding that today you are uending me the discovery for which r have a
motion to compel hearing scheduled for next week. In addition, I understand that you
are locating the Melton fUe and are sending me the contents of that file.
If I rPnaiuP thAf infnrmitinn h\t Mnnrlay, I anfiriru1t1i I 1nrill r anral th• hearing current1~1
o"'l1oduloJ (1,11 Join,~•, H) 1 201~ ol 9.~0 a.111.

.:..~rr
, --~
a
''. -i~..,
,
...
:
• ' ' ,I....
'
'
~-~-. ; '. •,.}'
. . ,,
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ttJCOPY
MARYW. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
61 OW. Hubbard I Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene. 10 83614
(lOIS) 66'/w(Jt340
(208) 667-0708 FAX
ISR 1f"1~?
IN THE OltTRICT COURT OF 1'HE Fl~ST JUDICIAL Ul!3 I t<I<.: I Ut- l lit;.

STATE OF ILJAHO. IN /\ND FOR r~; COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
,~ the Metter of the IEatate of!

)

CAS~ NO. CV 1J ..•OJ1::J

)
RO0CI rl l!t (Nl!.l-.: I M~L I UN ona
Ht:UWI~ ''HEDY" MEL TON.

____________
Deceased.

)

PSTITION FO~ FORMAL PROBATE:

)

OF WILLAND
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

)
)
))

(I.C. 15·3-402)

PETITIONCR, JADWIGA 0. MC:LTON, &TATE€ AND REPR~Sl!NTS TO TMe
COURT THAT:
1.

Petitioner's inltmt$l Ir', lhls matter is that of the spouse of the Decedent.

2.

(a)

The pcroon whooo appolntmont a& ?eraonal Representativo is

sought is the Petitioner and is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no
.JJtm;on with a higher or equal priority for appolntme,11l.
(b)

The status ln which such person seeks appointment is as the person

nominated in Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's Will.
3.
AOA

The Decedent. ROBERT ERNEST MELTON. died on July 4, 2013, at the

of A1 Yfmr:;. and at the time of hhl death he own~t;I property in Boundary County,

state of ldf'ho
4.

The marital community of ROBERT ERNt:$'1' MELTON and HEDWIG

'HEOY11 MELTON 'v-.JM, ,·JiMr,lvMI hy th~ rlll\~th nf !ICOWIC "HfOY" fv1Ei.TON o~ tt,o 11 th

1

·f,

tUN t·UK rvkMAL r-ACJeATE l.'iF WILL ANO
ronMAL Afll"'Ol~JTMCNT or, f"ERSONAI. AEP.AESENT/\TIV;

1-"t: 111

(MJT00135667,00CX;1/2030'7,100)
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)

J_, _I.I...~ ..• l, 1111 _ 11111.1111 1111111 1111 mi mn11 II 11 I I .

I ·1 . fl

n l'I'

unoerstanmng me original WIii of HEC,WI~ "HECl'l111 M!LTON hs Ii, ll ,~ ..,v:;:si;:~:slu11 uf
P"UUtrlU[\i\Vll l-UW i-11111, vlllU,

VII ~1:JjJt~111IJ1e11 6, 11!, U,, .... u,.,·.tv11 Ltiw P'l,11,, 81,lJ., lllcJ

a Motion to Convert Proceedings to .Supa,v/.~ad .Arlm1ni.~frr1tinn ,mrl fn nRfRrmlm~
T9stsc}1 ~d-iaid Motion contained a true and accurate copy nf thA WIii At hflr rlAAth.
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON was entitled to all the property of HEDWIG "HEDY"
MELTON by operation of law because all property owned by HEDWIG "HEDY''

MELTON was community property, and ROBERT ERNEST MELTON died before any
pruct:1tjlflr1~ 1i~u 1,~~11

(;ut11111c1

n.c,J fvl' the;, pr¢bate of I ICDWIG '11ICOV" MCL TON.

l"'ursuant to I,\,;, 1~'.h1-111, me. estates or oom f'\uac~ ,

c~1~c\) ,

1v1cL.,

v,..,, ~,,u

HEDWIG 11HEDY11 MELTON may be joined for probate In this proceeding.
4.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedents were domiciled

i" Boundsry County.
The names and addresses of the spouse, ehlldren, heirs, and devisees of

5.

the Decedents and other persons entitled to notice pursuant I.C. 15-3--403, and the ages of
those who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by

Petitlone.r are:
1'111'\IVIC Cll t\LIIJ"C:00

J.oJuul~-· o_'-"·- ll,....
38 LIiac Place

I•

U"'

Legal

Son

l!rnoct S. Molton
2008 Silver Crest Drive
Fairfield, California 94534

L8gsl

Son

OouAlas A. Melton
102 Hampton
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030

Legal

Son

Gerald 0. M"ltun

27402 Sunnyrldge Road
Palos Verdes, California 90274

2.

PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL ANO
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135687.DOCX:1/:20397.100)
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Debr~ M. Nllkkula
PO Box 57

Legal

. Daughtor

Legal

Daughter

IVIOnawK, IVIICntgan '+~!:10U

Carol A. Souole

PO Box 923
Centervllle, Utah 84014
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

Step-Son

For Hflinl Alt
~.

f•Ju l'\u,.uuuul ~uµ1 uuu11lullvu liuu Luu11 Uf.'fJVl11lvJ i11 ll ,i.. .. l.111l• 1.,11 •le.• wlu111qi

whose appointment has not been terminated.
7.

Petitioner has neither received nor Is aware of any demand for notice of any

probate or appointment proceeding concerning the Decedents other than the demand

rnr.Aivoo by and on file with the Court.
8.

The time limit for formal probate or appointment has not expired because not

moM tl'18n three yeers have psgaed slnoo nf.\oodont RORFRT FRNF.ST Mil.TON'r. do:1th.

9.

Tt,e erlaii,al &f the Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MSLTON'c WIii, d~tod

December 17, 2010, Is In the possession of the Court.
10.

Petitioner believes that the Will, which is the subject of this application. was

valldly executed.
11 .

t.iuino nvnrririarl rQiinnihla.

nllloan,-.a.

Patitinnfir l'i t 1nmnrr1rr nf

,mv

il\stru,..ent 1'6Voklng tho WIii, whloh lo the oubjoot of 1hlo Potitlon 3nd believes that such Will
constitutes Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON's Last WIii.

12.

Bond Is not required under I.C. 15-3-603.

WHEReFORE, PETITIONER ~EQUESTS THAT:

3.

1.

The Court fix a time and place of hearing.

2.

Notice be given as required by law.

PErtrroN FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL ANO
J.ORMAL APPOINTMENT 01= Pi!RSONI\L R&PRESENTATIVE
{MJT00135867.OOCX;1/20397.100)
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- Decedent ROBE"T ERNEST MELTON'l) Will, c.Jt1h:J D1:1¢~"ibe1· 1?, 2010,

~.

be formally probated,
4.

The Court find that JADWIGA B. MELTON Is the only devlsee under

"Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MELTON 1s WIU dated Cecember 17, 2010.

JADWfGA B. MELTON be formally appointed Personal Representative of

5.

the estate of the Decedents to act without bond.

8.

Upon qualification And Eu:-.r:r.r,t:tnr.A. I AttAm TAAtBmantery bo issueci,

DATED lhls

~

day of December, 2014.

=~6ud
VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Boundary

)·

: 65

,c:,llllu, lt;I' JAeWl8A 0. MCLTOP~. L-.,;, ,~ qyv~M, !!Y! tl~at ti~~ faet8 oot fo,th in tho
foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of the Petitioner'$
knowledge and belief.
._ / }

~w_,j;c.l,ro((&7..M-3,"=-

/ JADWICA ~EL
Vpetltioner

SUBSC~l§~Q"~D SWORN to before me this
,,,,
'•,
,,.. ~ W, CU,r. ''•,

g!- day of December, 2014.

....!II".•
~ •··•··••·....
~,...,,.,
· ~..
f"'"""·~/~o'fAR..,•\
\
_

i

{

-·-

}

E

l>ue~\C ,1~ !
·
\ .n\
"7'. •••
···,£, . .

4,

NOTARYP
My commisal

IC
expires on

G{((_ ( f1.

Iii, ~1'. ········\)~ -~"
Permd~tlR.~!~>t'
t PROBATE OF WILL ANO
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIV(:
(MJT0013i667,00CX;1120397, 100}
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MARYW. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 West Hubbard St., Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667•0708 FAX

ISB# 5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of:

)

)
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
0

. CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313

)

HEDWIG HEOY" MELTON,

)
)

FOR MOME€TEAD ALLOWANCI: AND

____________

)

FOR EXEMPT PROPERTY

)

(I.C. 16-2-402, I,C. 1S-2-40:5)

)

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE

~l~im ,~ h@rot>v m~Q@ \1r.l~ln§t thl~ ~~t~w ~y:
Name:

JADWIGA B. MELTON

Address:

38 Lilac Place
Sonnen; Ferry,

Idaho 83805

I :im tho £Urviving ~pou.:<i of ROBERT ERNEST MELTOI\L

l:lasls of ~!aim

A111uu11l

Homestead allowance pursuant to I.e. 15-2-402.

$50,000

Exempt property pursuant to I.C. 15"2-403

$10,000

l>UtJIVIII I i,u mo

.

f-

aay or uocomoor, ~uv1.

&,~~

WIGA B, MELrON

4.

1101.f[OT[AO Af40 C)(CMr'T f'l10ric:nrv
(MJT00135746.00CX;1f2.0397.100)
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MARY W. ·CUSACK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In.the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)
)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased.

CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT

)
)

-----------~)
STATE OF IDAHO

)

:ss
County of Kootenai

)

The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to the office of Personal

Representative of the estate of the above-named Decedent and agrees to perform and
discharge the trust of said office. The undersigned hereby submits personally to the
jurisdiction of this Court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by
an interested person as de-fined by the Idaho Uniform Probate Code.
DATED this~ day of December, 2014.

WIGA6.
MAAYW. CUSAC
CUSACK LAW FIRM, Pl.LC
61 oWe&t H11bbard St, Suite 205

.

Coeur d'Aler,e, ID&3814

"',P.:'!!!~·,i'f
/X,,.
SUBSCRIBED,~~. "'v~At)! to before me this ::i:::...·day of December, 2014.
~'' ~..J... •••••••••• C'..t..
'
d
~-·.
~. ~ ~
{ .:#/~o'fAR)'
\ ~
jl~

~ \ -·-" I i
\

\ PuB\." .l~
,;, v'l'. ..........~~~ l

,,.

,,,,, -11'E o?

I

NOTARYPuc
My·commission expires on

q(I<//J.

,,,.~ ,,•'"

1 • ACCEPTANCE OF APPOl1'!ft,tU~~T
{MJT00136871,COCX:1/~oae1.100>
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FF:ATBERSTON LAW .FlRM, CHTD. .
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)

Zij\) JM~ I 3 A \O: 3W
S1\T[ OF :~! ;\ HO

'f t1 ;; ;~:): ·i~:1 !\~{Y
GL C;L,\ P·)::. !'v:;, CLUJ~
~' ...... -- . . ·- _,.. , .,. .... -···-·'- ---- --· .
· .: ·.. ~ :' C•. t :·. r~

CD 1:q;

~--

Attorney for He~ Alt
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TUE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS'IRICT OF TllE
STATE _OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
dod: 07-04-2013,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE
(J.C. 15~3-,804)

)

Claim is hereby made against this estate by ~ Z ALT as follows:

Amount

Basis of Claim,

$15,982.50
26"~2.00

Loan

Loan

TOTAL LOAN AMOUNTS
'·

Plus interest accrued since said loans at the statutory prejudm~t nrte of twelve

percent (12%) per annym.
I hereby certify that my mother, Hedwig Melto~ and my step-father, Robert Melton,

borrowed the total sllIIl of $102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the Decedents for the
p\Jrpose of acquiring land and bnilding a home in Bonners Ferry~ Idaho, which is the subject
of this litigation.
Oanitl P. Fcatllcn.fo11

11,.,t1t C. ~lbeato~•
J=y P. FoillbM;toU
,~J:,.0,,,11181>

113 S. 6ecood Ave.

I have attached as Exhibit "A" a trUe and accurate copy of the initial Note in her
handwriting and signed by my mother) Hedwig E. Melton, certifying that she o~s the initial

&asi<4Jolnt, ll:> 8!864
PIMlM (2.08) 26'3-6866
l'ax (208) zo,.o400

Cl,AIM AGAlNSl' IW'ATE • l

·;.J·,.;.
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;

sum through 1997 of $75,982.50. 1 am also attaching

ftS

Exhibit "B" a second Not.e in my

mother's handwriting that carries forward the earlier balance · of $75,982.50 and adds
additional loan amounts made to Robert and Hedwig Melton from July 3, 2001 through July
1, 2008, in the additional sum of $26,592.00 for a touil of $102,574.50. I certify that the

handwritten .numbers on Exhibit <'B'' are also the handwriting of my mother, Hedwig Melton.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is

atrue and accurate copy of the floor plan and

design of the residence that was to be constructed with the funds borrowed from me by
Robert~ Hedwig Melton cotlsisting of three (3) pages. Those three (3) pages are also in
the handwriting of either Hedwig Melton and/or Robert Melton and were provided to me as
part of the above-rererenced loan.

lt was agreed that the property was initially placed mmy name to secure repayment of
the Joan.

Subsequently, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton executed Wills in 1998

promising to leave all of their Estate to me, Heinz Alt, their son and step-son, as a means of
full repayment.
.
.
I was assured by Robert Melton in the F~ of2012 after his remarriage that his 1998

Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of this loan.
I am owed the sum of $75,982.50 that bas been acc~g interest at twelve percent '·
(12%) since June 1, ]997 ($24.98 per diem) and an addittQDal $26>592,00 which has accrued
interest at twelve percent (12%) since July 1, 2008 ($8.74 :pet diem).
{ hereby make a claim against the Est.ates of Ro~lt and Hedwig Melton for these

principal amounts together with accrued interest.
D,ml.cl P. FealbtrllOD

DATED this / ';;' day ofDe<,ember, 2014.

:Sr,:~C.F,,,.ll)..,.n,~1'

Juemy P. Feammi~
]omult..°'1mA!l

U3S.SOUllldAw.

,\

\t -.

HEINZALT

SIU!dpolil1, 'ID 8,864
j>bono (20~ 1.63-6866
F~ (20~) 263--0400

CUiM AGAnffi' ESfATE· Z
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UNITED STATES EMBASSY

)
) ss:

C0NSOLATE OF_ _ _ _

~.::·•
.:· . '
' ! ~: • . -~.1 .:~

_..J

t ~: ~-.. ·.\· ,;::< : ~-]:'\

':

On this !'\.. day of De~mber in the year 2014, before me. _ _ __
r-.t/N tr(....;, ',-r
•aNotacy Public in and for said Embassy, personally
~ppetu'ed HElNZ ALT. known or identified to me (or proved to me by or on oath) to me to
be the p_erson whose nru:ne is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

fJ)1.,i~'i

-~1::..- t,

. . ..

..··

-.,.

.-.~. . . : ~ :
. ··,:· .. ' :

., _
.

•,

...

,

.

,, ·, , i

··- .

.·;-:· _.-'::':·:·::.3--~J

?i·:~·~.

'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILJNG /

al~

-.Jlhrtt4:ro/._

~J

I hereby certify that on tho '1:.__ day of~~201fI caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoitl.s document to be served upon the followmg person(s) in the following
manner:
Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

['.)91] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

[ ] Overnight Mail

[ l IIand delivered
[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ ] Other: ~ - - ~ ~ -

D~ P, l'elilhantot>
l'!re11t C.Ft4lllm!oo~
Jm,my P. f'e:.thl,mon
!mmi l,, O&mtAO
113 $ . Secood Ave. .
Salldpoillf, ID 83864
P!Joo~ (~08) 263-'i866
Jlax (.208) 263-0400

CLAIM A.GAINfil' ESTAT.E -3
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815

STATE Of IOi\HO y
COUNTY Of BOUN.OAR
GLEHOA POSTON, Ol.'EAA
iY \ LA-A,") ~
-Gfi? UTY CLE l<

(208) 667~0640
(208) 667-0708- FAX
ISB#; 5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tl-IE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

Deceased.

_____________

)
)
)
)

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN -SUPPORT

)

OF

)
)
)

JUDGMENT TO DENY CREDITOR
CLAIM

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
MOT[ON

FOR

SUMMARY

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON ("Jadwiga"), tha Personal

Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record,

MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm,. PLLC, and hereby submits this Reply
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim.
I.

Heinz Alt's Creditor Claim lg D1wtlye and was Tlmely Dlsallowed.

Heinz Alt (hereinafter "Alt") contends that he was unable to file a creditor's cl:im
because this matter began as a summary administration under I.C. § 15-3-105. Alt seems
to argue that he was somehow unable to file a creditor claim until after Jadwrga filed her

Petition for formal probate. What Alt fails to mention is he, himself, could have ot:,ened
the probate as a creditor. That option was available to him under l,C, § 15-3-203{a)(e) .

1.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWCOO147815.DOCX; 1/20397 .100}
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Instead of filing to open a probate, Alt only moved to convert the proceedings to
supervised administration and to determine intestacy. At no time did Aft seek to become
the Personal Representative, which he could have done as a purported creditor any tlme
after 45 days elapsed after the death of Robert E. Melton (hereinafter 11 Robert").
Alt does admit he served his claim "immediately by mail to Jadwiga's counsel on

January 9, 2015" after he was served the Petition for formal probate. What Alt falls to
admit is Jadwiga was not appointed Personal Representative when he filed his claim.
After a contested hearing, Jadwiga was appointed Personal Representative on February

2, 2015. What if Jadwiga had not been appointed Personal Representative?
The Uniform Probate Code provides procedures that must be followed. I.C. § i5-

3-104 provides in relevant part:
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a

decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced

a

before the appointment of person el representative. After the
appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and actions
to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the
··- pro·cedure· prescrl!Yed ·by-this.. chapter:- (emphasis ·added):··-···-·- ·
In order for a creditor claim to be timely filed, the creditor claim must be filed with

the court and the Personal Representative.

I.C. § 15-3-804(a).

The Personal

Representative has four months from date of first publication to receive claim s. I. C. § 153-801 (a). Once the statutory claim period ends1 the Personal Representative has an
additional 60 days to allow or disallow claims. I.C. § 15-3-806(a). The creditor claims are
payable based on the priority as set forth in I.C , § 15-3-805,

Alt's argument is

nonsensical. If it were accurate, then creditors would be paid by whomever filed first
This is absolutely contrary to Idaho's uniform probate code.
2.

REPLY ME:MORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC00147815.DOCX;1/20397 .1 00}
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The Supreme Court of Idaho has stated as follows:

The Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which
we exercise free review. It must begin with the literal words
of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as
a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe It, but slrnply follows the law as written, Unless the
result rs palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature
means what is clearly stated in the statute. If the statute as
written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct
it Is legislative, not Judicial.
In the Matter of the Estate of Bruce G. Miller, Jr., 143 Idaho
5651 567 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
Again, the date of first publication was February 19, 2015·. Creditors has until June
19 1 2015 to file claims. The Personal Representative has until August 19, 2015 to disallow
any claims filed. Alt's claim was not filed with the Personal Representative and the Court.

Even if it is deemed as filed correctly, Jadwiga timely disallowed the claim in its entirety.
Based on Idaho's uniform probate code, Jadwiga timely disallowed the claim and it should

not be treated as automatically allowed. In addition, Alt's claim should faif because it was
-·~..... -······· ··· · .

······-·· - ..... .... ... "··----·--·- ............

'. ·······

. ... ·············-· ··--- . ,... , . ...... ... .. . ·· ·····- ....

' .

··-···-··· ··· ...

··-· ·

..

... ..

.. ·-----·---·---· · .... .

not filed in conformance with Idaho's uniform probate code . This court should grant

Jadwiga's request for summary judgment as a matter of law.
II.

Alt's Claim Is not Supported by Admissible Evidence.

When a party relies on written evidence, Idaho's "best evidence rule," I. C, §
9-411, requires submission of the original writing except in six delineated circumstances,

only two of which could possibly apply under these circumstances1 : (1) if Alt submitted
There is nothing in tile record that remotely indicates that the exhibits attached to Heinz's Claim against
Estate are in the custody of a public officer, are recorded, are too voluminous to be practicably examined,
or contain medical l'ecords. Therefore paragraphs 3 through 6 of§ 9-411 need not be addressed.
1

3.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(MWC00147815.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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proof that the orlglnals were lost or destroyed, or (2) If the Estate had possession of the
originals and refused to produce them at Alt's request. Contrary to Alt's assertions, I.C .

§ 9-411 unequivocally requires the original document unless one of the exceptions
applies, in which case 11either a copy or oral evidence of the contents" is acceptable.
However, Alt has pied neither of these exceptions, so his failure to provide the original
documents renders Inadmissible the exhibits attached to his Claim against Estate. Alt
provides no authority for his assertion that Idaho's evidentiary rules somehow do not
apply to summary judgment proceedings . See I. R.E. 101 ("[The Idaho Rules of Evidence}
govern all actions, cases and proceedings in the courts of the State of Idaho and all
actions,

cases and proceedings to which rules of evidence are applicable, except as

hereinafter provided.").
Alt also ignores entirely the Estate's arguments that the exhibits were not proper!y
authenticated under I.R.E. 901 (a). As discussed in the Estate's Memorandum in Support

of Summary Judgment, Alt has not testified as to having witnessed Hedwig "Hedy"
Melton's (hereinafter "HedwigJI) signature, provided evidence of Hedwig's handwriting, or
Identified a subscribing witness.
circumstances.

The Estate's concerns are serious 1i1nder these

.

Significant portions of Alt's exhibits contain drastic vari~ces in the
\

handwriting, with some portions hand-printed in block lettering and others written in
cursive. Even the languages used are inconsistent.

For instance, without adequate

authentication, the Court cannot be certain as to whether certain portions of Alt's exh ibits
(e.g. the "Folgende Credite auf Konto" language) were added after Hedwig allegedly
signed the document or by another person. Therefore, the Court should disregard the

4.

RE~L Y MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC00147815.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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exhibits attached to Alt's Claim against Estate based on his disregard for Idaho's
evidentiary rules . Even when asked in discovery for addltlonal information, Alt's response

was 11see pleadings and Claim Against Estate filed with Court." Alt has not provided any
admissible evidence to support his claim. This Court should grant Jadwiga's motion for

summary judgment as a matter of law.

Ill,

Heinz Alt's Evidence Is lnvalld on its Face.

Alt 1s documentation

of the alleged

loan to

Hedwig remains

ineffective

notwithstanding the arguments raised in his Response brief. Even if the exhibits attached

to Alt's Claim Against the Estate could be adequately authenticated (whlch they cannot),

they do not contain terms sufficient to bind any person or entity, including the Estate.
None of the exhibits contain terms sufficient to constitute a note, a draft, or any sort of
negotiable instrument, which must contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay

a

fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise
or order" and be payable on demand or at a definite time to the bearer or to order. See

Alt's exhibits do not even satisfy the elements of a valid contract

To be

enforceable, a contract must "be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and
requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be performed and when
performance Is complete.''

Dales Se/Vice Co,, /no. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662 (1975)

(overruled on other grounds by Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655 (1976)) . The Court in

Dales Se/Vice Co. explained:
A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what
it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made

5,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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a contract; they must have expressed therr intentions in a
manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even enough
that they have actually agreed 1 if their expressions, when
interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and
circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what
the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression,
indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms
of an agreement, have been held to prevent the creation of an
enforceable contract.

Id. (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts 394, § 95 (1963)).
Here, Alt relies on a German phrase "Folgende Credite auf Konto" (which loosely

translates to uthe following credit on account") as somehow imposing a contractual
obligation to pay the monetary sums listed on the page plus 12% interest. However,
nothing in Alt's exhibits states any promise to pay, a payor or

a payee,

the time for

compliance, and it certainly does not memorialize an interest rate of 12%. Alt has offered

no evidence of any Idiomatic significance to that German phrase which would Imply
anything more than its obscure literal meaning.

There is simply no evidence of any

manifestations of assent by Hedwig, Robert, or the Estate to be bound by any payment
obligations to Alt that would create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid
summary judgment In the Estate's favor.

IV.

Idaho's Deadman's Statute Precludes Alt from Introducing Additional
Evidence Needed to Prevail at Trial.
Since the exhibits attached to Alt's Claim against Estate are facially insufficient to

create an agreement to pay, and no additional written evidence has been supplied, Alt
cannot establish an enforceable written contract. The only remaining evidence offered In
support of his Claim against Estate is Alt's own testimony alleging the oral agreement of

6.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Robert and Hedwig to devise their estates to Alt. However, such testimony falls squarely

under the prohibitions of the Idaho Deadman's Statute, I.C. § 9-202(3),
The Dead man's Statute, in conjunction with Idaho Rule of Evidence 601 (b),
11

prohiblt[sJ a party making a claim against an estate from testifying as to any unwritten

communication with the deceased.'' Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698-99

(1998). In this matter, Alt cannot circumvent the Deadman's Statute by lntrod clng written
exhibits purporting to somehow corrobor~te his alleged oral agreement with Hedwig and

Robert. In Lunders, a real estate broker sued the estate of a decedent for payment of a

sales commission set forth In a

wrjtten

listing agreement. Id. at 892. The decedent's

estate disputed the claim on the grounds that the broker inter alia sold the property at an
insufficient price. Id. at 695-96. The Court held that the broker's testimony regarding the
decedent's oral authorization to sell the property at a price lower than specified in the
llstlng agreement violated the Deadman's Statute because he was making a claim against
the decedent's estate and was testifying about an unwritten communication wlth the
decedent.

Id. at 698-99. Therefore the Deadman's Statute applies to all unwritten

communications with a decedent, even those that may potentially relate to a written
document.
In his Claim against Estate, Alt insists that 11 [i]t was agreed that the property was
initially placed in my name to secure repayment of the loan" and that "I was assured by

Robert Melton In the Fall of 2012 after his remarriage that his 1998 Will remained ln effect
for the purpose of repayment of this loan.
exhibits

7.

actually

memorialized

such

(Emphasis added).

terms,

his

testimony

Of course, had Alt's
regarding

the

oral
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communications of Hedwig and Robert would not have been necessary. Alt's allegations
of oral representations and agreements by Hedwig and Robert are nothing more than
testimony of unwritten communications by decedents asserted by a claimant against their
estates - precisely the sort of testimony the Deadman's Statute was contemplated to

prevent Alt's citation to April Beguesse, Inc. -v, Remme/I, 156 Idaho 500, 51 5 (2014),
which merely held that the Oeadman's Statute did not apply to claims against parties
other than a decedent's estate, does r;iot change this analysis. Thus, Alt can not testify as
to oral agreements with Hedwig and/or Robert in support of his effort to create a contract
from the clearly insufficient exhibits submitted in support of his Claim against Estate,
V.

Alt's Failure to Timely Enforce his Clalm against Hedwig's E!.tfil.Mi
B@rr1£11he Cl@lm as to Hedwig's Marital Community.

Alt cites to I.C. § 15~3-111 to support the timeliness of his Claim against Estate.
That statute, however, does nothing to validate his claim.

Section 15-3-111 merely

extends the three-year period for bringing an 11 informal probate or appointment proceeding

Joint probates. Alt offers no authority whatsoever for extending the limitations period set

forth 1n I. C. § 15-3-803, which strictly prohibits clarms against a decedent's estate unless
presented within "three (3) years

filter the decedent's death."

(Emphasis added). This

statute contains no special exceptions for based on the date a will is submitted for probate
or in Instances of joint probates. Accordingly, Alt's deadlfne to assert a claim against
Hedwig's estate lapsed three years after her death on August 11, 2008.
As the Estate has already explained, even if Alt's Claim against Estate could be
construed as a "community debt/ it would have no effect on § 15-3-803's three~year
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limitations period commencing on Hedwig's death. Once again, Twin Falls Bank & Trust
Co. v. Holley, 111 Idaho 349, 352 (1986), comprehensively explains the dlstinctict'I the

contractual liability of a married debtor and the collection of the liability from the assets of
the marital community. As the Holley Court noted, "[a] lending Institution may have a
"

creditor-debtor relationship with either spouse separately or with both jointly .. , . [T]ha
community property system does not affect the fundamental principles governing such a

relationship and the procedures required of a creditor In order tq collect upon his

debt. Rather, the community property system merely affects the type or kinds of property
to which the creditor may look for satisfaction of his unpaid debt." Id. (emphasis added).
Alt's attempts to distinguish Holley from the case at hand are outright misleading.

The Holley's divorce had no bearing on the vulnerability o-f their former community
property. The Court even suggested that the lender "could have proceeded by execution

against the community property which had been awarded to [the non-signatory spouse]"
after the promissory note became due. Id. at 353. Although the trial court based its ruling

on an extension agreement executed after the divorce, which was deemed to have
"extinguished" the original promissory note, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly declined
to render a decision on that basis. Id. at 354. Instead, the Court relied on Mr. Holley's
(the signatory spouse) post-divorce bankruptcy, which discharged his obligations to the
lender, including the promissory note that he signed. Id. at 353. Since Mrs. Holley did
not sign the promissory note, "and thus was not personally liable for that obligatior;, " the

Court held that the lender could not go after any portion of her assets even though she
did not, herself, declare bankruptcy. Id.
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The facts of Holley are directly pertinent to the case at hand. Hed wlg 1 like Mr.
Holley 1 was the only spouse alleged to have signed any written agreement. Hence, she
was the only party who could have been personally liable on that purported contract.

Once the limitations period of I.C. § 15-3-803 ran three years after Hedwig's death, the
only potentially liable party had been discharged, just like Mr. Holley's bankruptcy

discharged the only party liable on the promissory note. Accordingly, all contractual
liability that could have conceivably been collected from any separate or community
property assets of Hedwig or Robe rt as a result of Hedwig's signature was extinguished
by Alt' s failure to enforce such liabilities before August 11, 2011.
In his Creditor's Response to Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment, Alt alleges
the 11 property was titled as community property to the Meltons until their deaths," end "the
proceeds

of the loan went to community assets and are community in nature.0 On or

about September 6, 2013, Alt filed

a

Motion to Convert Proceedings to S pervised

Administration and to Determine Testacy (hereinafter the "Motion"), Under Parag·aph 2
of the Motion, Alt asserts "The marital community of the decedent and Hedwig Meiton
was dissolved by the death of Hedwig Melton on 08-11~2008. " Alt has admiite ', and
accepted, that the marital community between Robert and Hedwig was dissolved by

Hedwig's death. Hedwig, by her signature alone, could bind her separate property and
the community property. Yet, at her death, there is no more community property. Alt is
statutorily barred from collecting a purported debt of Hedwig's against the separate
property of Robert. This Court must grant Jadwiga's motion for summary judgment as a
matter of law.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to any
issues raised in the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment and Jadwlga is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Petitioner Jadwiga B. Melton respectfu lly
requests this Court GRANT her Motion for Summary Judgment.
11}1..
DATEDthis f..

dayofAugust2015.

SACK,
Attorney for ADWIGA MEL TON
Personal Representative

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on t h e ~ day of August 2015, I caused a true and
accurate copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon,

·and adcffesse<rto··tfie. toHow,n 9: -· · . . --.. _... ..... . . ·· .... . ..... ·· ..... .........-... . ... ..... · ··· . · ··.... · .... . . . . . .. ..... · . .
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:

cynthia@featherstonlaw.com
brent@featherston1aw.com
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB # 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC

320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

(208) 687-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Ti--lE
SiATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of;

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and

)

HEDWIG 11 HEDY" MELTON,

)
)

CASE NO. CV 13-031 3
NOTICE OF

DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

Deceased.
)
--------------)
TO:

HEINZ ALT

c/o Featherston law Firm , Chtd.
Brent Featherston
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

This office received your Patl~lon to Allow Claims on May 4, 2015, regarding Zhe

Claim Against Estate dated December 15, 2014, in the aggregate amount of
,

•• H• • • - • • - • - • ••• •• •-

-• • • -••••••0 0- • • • • - • •
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• •• •
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•• - • • • - • • •

, ... ,. .

- · - - ·· - - - - · - · -

•• ••••••- • • •• • •

••••• -

• • •• •••.,• •• • • • •••• - - •- - • " • • • • • • •••-

$102,574.50.
The Petition to Allow Claims Is disallowed In Its entirety.
The Personal Representative denies the Claimant's claim in its entirety fot th,';;
following reasons;

1.

The Claimant assert.s his clalm filed on January 9, 2015 was correot!y

filed, but it appears that the claim is defective as filed.

If the Court determine~ the

Petition to Allow Claims is a validly filed claim, the Personal Representative is also

disallowing the Petition in its entirety.
2.

The Petition is not timely filed as it is barred by the statute of i!mitat!one.

Hedwig "Hedy' Melton died on the 11 th day of August, 2008.

1.

Therefore, the c!,Slim
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should have been filed on or before the 11 th day of August, 2011. This claim against
Hedwig "Hedy" Melton's estate is now tlme-barred.
3.

The documentation fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

as there is no promissory note and no evidence of debt owed by Robert Ernest Melton,
4.

The documentation provided has not been authenticated es signed by

Hedwig ''Hedy'' Melton. Therefore, the documentatlon supplied Is Insufficient, and the
Personal Representative has no independent way of determining whethe r tha amount

contained therein is accurate or valid, and therefore disallows this claim in its entirety,
Failure to protest this disallowance by filing a Petition for Allowance with the
above-named Court or commencing a proceeding against the Personal Representative
within sixty (60) days of the mailing of this notice shall result in your claim being forever

barred.

DATED this±_ day of Aug ust 2015.

Representative

SACK, on behalf of
MEL TON,
Personal
of the Estates of

ROBERT
ERNEST MELTON
and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, deceased.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

--· ·····---·-··--····..·---·- ·-······-·-There bf certltythat on ·the -···-@h·--aay of August ZO~ s,·-i- caused a true ·and ·correcr ·- ----- ---·-···--·-copy of the following NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM to be served by facsimile and
electronic mail to the following:
HEINZ ALT

c/o Featherston law Firm, Chtd.
Brent Featherston
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400- FAX
cynthla@featherstonlaw.com - ELECTRONIC MAIL
brent@featherstonlaw.com - ELECTRONIC MAIL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

COURT MINUTES
JUDGE:
REPORTER:
CLERK:

I.

Justin W . Julian
Della A. Armstrong

CASE NO.
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COURTROOM:

CV-2013-0000313
8/24/2015
TIME:
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In the Matter of the Estate of Robert Ernest Melton
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SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS:
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SPEAKER
PHASE OF CASE
Ct
In session, calls case. Cusack present for J. Melton. Featherston
present. Time scheduled for a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
11
the estate on a denial of creditor's claim of H. Alt. Both parties have
il I
filed memorandums and exhibits and the Court has reviewed all those
I
documents. Any resolution?
- - ~ 7
Counsel
No
Ms. Cusack, you may proceed with argument
Ct
Filed motion for summary judgment on creditor's claim . Defective for
Cusack
several reasons , first question is how to file a credit's claim. Have an
illustration for the Court.
- You
may approach
Ct
Cusack
As noted in memorandum, reviews statute of limitations. Cites estate
statutes
Mr. Featherston's response is joint probate, tolled until second probate
Ct
commences. Why is his position wrong?
Cusack
No statute that covers that. Summary administration where spouse
-t
takes all the assets and debts. Real property titled in both spouses,
judicial economy. Otherwise would have to do quiet title. Statute is
clear it is as to the decedent. Says nothing regarding extending the
•
statute of limitations .
You may proceed
Ct
Statute of limitations applies to Mr. Melton's estate. Had until June 1gm
Cusack
to file cla im. Argument is allowed if not denied within 60 days not
correct. Must be filed with personal rep . and Court. Deemed to be filed
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Attorney

Name
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the later of the two dates. Original time would be been between Feb. 19
and June 19. First in line, first riqht
Don't see it that way. Four month time to make claim . Estate's
Ct
responsibility to deny or approve within 60 days. You seem to be
reading it as no action to be taken until end of publication period .
Cusack
How do you allocate claims?
Not allocating priority in that point in time . Allow or deny, wait until they
Ct
all come in, then allocate priority
Cusack
Even if the Estate is not reading correctly the statute of limitations
Seems like there is a missing link. Estate is arguing shouldn't be
Ct
1,
allowed . Mr. Featherston, do not see your filing regarding summary
I
judqment to be heard today
Featherston If deny summary judgment today would file separate motion or
allowance
Ct
Wanted to make sure was not missing operative pleading. Will not rule
on that issue today. Will help focus argument.
Don't understand
Cusack
Ct
Featherston seems to ask Court enter ruling today, but nothing before
the Court to allow to rule on that today
11
Cusack
To say that his claim is automatically allowed?
~• (J
Ct
Yes
,.
Cusack
Statute says have to do both , file with personal rep and the Court and
,1
deemed
to be filed the later of the two. Filed with the personal rep
'
1/9/15 and then 1/13/15 with the Court. Exactly 60 days later.
Ct
Not deciding that issue today. No motion for summary judgment on that
issue.
.
Cusack
Correct
-- - . - - "- -- .~~r
Ct
Will not be addressing that today
Cusack
Two issues. Is that document a debt, and is it collectable. Doesn't meet
I
I j
qualifications to be a debt, reviews reasons. Does not elevate to
11
I
.
negotiable instrument. If it's a contact needs to be definite enough to
ll
LI
I
'I
enforce. Cannot be promissory note, no time compliance. His
I
~ - ~ , .. l
• documentation that he's used as his claim against the estate does not I·
111
elevate to promissory note. If it can be construed as a promissory note,
. I~
1;
is it enforceable? If monies was used as indicated, other remedies
1-.
.--1
were available but did not use. Bankruptcy ended statute of limitations.
Cites case law
~--1 ·•
Ct
Post divorce versus property that is community in nature?
riii""'
-h...C
Had community property together,
Cusack
.
Holly case bank only had contract with one person
Ct
r
Cusack
Exactly what happened here. After death is separate property. Same
things occur in death and divorce.
Ct Wasn't probated. He didn't get it. Estate was not probated. Her estate
owned it.
Cusack
Cannot probate a will after three years. Automatically goes to spouse.
Cites Idaho code. Intestacy estate goes to surviving spouse. Mr. Alt
could have gone after his claim in Heddy's estate. After three years it ,'
I
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became Robert's separate property.
SurvivinQ spouse must assume indebtedness
He didn 't sign for it
He gets more by not probating?
Cannot extend creditor's claim. Set by statute. Did not assume debt.
Continue with argument
Has three yea rs to file claim. Cannot file in Robert's estate. Community
property statute says can bind but ended with her death . Becomes
separate property of Robert. Lost his opportunity to collect
Wish to pursue arguments you 've made in your motion for summary
judgment?
Not authenticated. Does not elevate to promissory note. No claim to be
collected.
Court can only grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material
fact. If ambiQuous Court must rule in favor of the opposinQ party
No one would say this is a promissory note. Four corners of the
document
Do you have authority regarding requirement to stand alone? Within
estate? You are also arguing the dead man's statute
All the rules of evidence in regular civil proceeding apply in estates
In regular civil court you have verbal agreements that are enforceable.
May be supported by testimony. Do you have authority?
Dead man's statute. No one can say that is what occurred
Is there a distinction between him testifying to verbal agreement versus
written document?
Under the dead man's statute he cannot testify to those thinQs b!:
Your position is that dead man 's statute prevents him from
supplementing?
l~ - .
Yes because it is self serving
Everyone is here today because it is self serving . Position is that under
the law, if contact is defective the dead man statute prevents him from
testifying to supplement that document
Yes
Mr. Featherston?
rf
Reviews issues, identifies issues left. Estate was filed jointly.
Expect the answer of the estate is to clear Hedwig's name from the
I I'
title , argument is it doesn't impact three year statute of limitations.
I•
What's your response?
Review statute, does set a bar on creditor's claims. Creditor cannot
~i
make a claim until estate is open
Creditor has standing to open an estate. Client could have opened
l
estate and pursued the claim that way. Why wouldn't claim be barred
now?
Statute of limitations does begin to run until estate is filed . Sole
obligation or community debt. Refers to Holly case, doesn't have
I
bearing in this case. Reviews supreme Court ruling . Joint estate of
Meltons. Three year statute is not a bar aQainst the creditor's claim .
I
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Statute specifically permits what has occurred here.
Point to that section?
Reviews statutes, joint proceeding, three year statute to limitations
applies only to last spouse that dies. Gives extended time. Follow in
probate proceeding we have today. Gave Mr. Alt opportunity to file
claim.
Reviewing statute. Reviews probation limitation. How do interpret that
in light of 803, limitation of claims against estate. Seems as though
they are talking about two separate things here.
Don't follow your question
108 is general statute. 803 also has three year limitation. What is your
argument how the three year extension in 108 by virtue of 108 impacts
803. Which is essentially your argument?
803 gives us the answer, limitation of presentation of claim. Affidavit
states received notice as creditor and then filed a claim in response.
Fall under later provision.
'
Notice to creditors creates a resurrection of time limits
Three years is suspended because joint nature of husband and wife.
Want to be clear. Language under 111 dovetails into 803 where three
year presentation begins upon second spouse's death or when you get
the actual notice
Yes. Counsel's argument suggests that one should defer probating
estate to wipe out creditor's claims.
In most cases the debt incurred by both parties would be collectable or
creditors could open their own estate
Legislature is not granting a carte blanche to wipe out separate debt of
first spouse to die. Debt and assets were all of community nature here.
Believe legislature intended the specific statute should be read to
I
override the general statute. Time frames begin for the first time upon
'I
probate of second spouse. Would like to rebut some arguments. Issue {
about commencement of action. Reviews statute and pleadings.
Don't believe those issues are relevant.
Commencing proceedings on a claim versus proceeding on the filing of
a claim . Will move on. The other issue is argument about whether we
'I
can trust the documents reflect a debt obligation. This is a summary
ll
judgment proceeding. Must prove to the court by clear and convincing
evidence. Has not met that burden. Set of wills done in our office by
Heddy and Robert Milton that leaves everything to Mr. Alt. Signature of
document, money loaned, money used to make payments on house .
Mr. Alt testifies that after Mr. Milton remarried conversation occurred
regarding wills still being in effect. Not sure if estate is still attacking the
document for lack of authenticity
I
Not addressing at this proceeding.
I
'i1 I
Have original.
Not concerned with that at a summary judgment hearing. What is your
position on dead man's statute reQardinQ Mr. Alt's ability to testify?
~'I
No motion to strike.
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Argument in motion for summary judQment
No motion in limine. Didn't read it that was. Would need time to brief.
Larger picture that written documents are not a contact and that Mr. Alt
cannot testify to explain what they mean.
Dead man's statute has been read very narrowly. Pursuant of purely
oral claim or promise to inherit. These items are specifically barred.
Cannot make creditor's claim on oral agreement.
Reviews specific statute to address
Conversation is in the context of documents that date back ten to
twelve years.
Position is that client may testify for purpose of clarifying written
•
documents.
Not barred by dead man's statutes
Supreme Court has ruled that evidence would apply if conflicts with
statute
Haven't looked at that. No motion in limine. My focus is that this
statement doesn't warrant summary judgment. Community obligation.
Testimony is admissible for a variety of reasons or to amplify the
I
understanding of the parties
7
Anything further?
Not sure. Some issues have not been argued here today. Would hope
to have an opportunity to rebut something new
---- r-----.
Ms. Cusack?
Interpretation of general and specific statutes is misplaced. Argument
of counsel is statute of limitations are tolled until second spouse
a_
passes, neQates the purpose. Cites case law
Not exactly the same case. General community debt case. Debt - J
obligation. Does not have statute of limitations and probate issues
Statute of limitations
Understand that distinction between the parties positions. Anything
further?
Going back to the dead man's statutes, documents don't constitute a
debt. Absolutely prohibits testimony. Cites case law. Four corners of
' "
the document
]
Motion in limine instead of summary iudQment issue?
Don't rise to level of promissory note. Statute of limitations has run.
1'11,,,1
Could have opened probation matter 45 days after she died. Nothing
I--'
happened. Rules must be followed.
Struggling with assertion that the instant Heddy died it becomes
Robert's separate property. Community estate must move forward in n
time.
Three years after Heddy died would be community. After three years
there is no more opportunity. No longer community property. Can go
i'1
after community debt but only for short period of time
Anything further?
- - ....
:-- -- ........
- ~"'!
=
No
AnythinQ new touched on that you feel you need to response to?
- ~
----..

L-.lo .....

---

~

~

---~
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I don't think so.
Will answer some issues now and some later.
Written agreement is between mother and son . Other documents
support knowledge of agreement
Discussion on page nine is not what you put in a brief when seeking
summary judgment. You have now said that it is not crystal clear.
Summary Judgment must be denied . Equitable estoppal not applying,
summary judgment usually is used to get something, not to knocking
something out. Things are not crystal clear enough for summary
judgment. Not appropriate to rule on dead man's statute at this time.
Would be appropriate to take up as motion in limine to be filed by either
party. Don't know answer on whether or not the writing indicating the
debt could be supplemented by testimony.
For today's purposes I find there are genuine issues of material fact on
all issues except the one regarding the limitation of filing of claims. Will
take that one under advisement and issue written decision.
Any questions?
. - LJ
-Briefing?
Have focused on one issue. Any value in further briefing that point?
If that is helpful to the Court would offer to make
Not a lot of Idaho authority. May be other states? Would be helpful to
the Court. Would both counsel be interest in taking a try at that?
Ten days or two weeks?
I
Yes
Two weeks for Cusack and Featherston a week later.
~.C•
~-,"'
Featherston to present short order on summary judgment.
Notice of disallowance of claim received . Not sure how to treat this.
Same claim . Says it disallows petition to allow. Don't know that code
I
allows this
That was done because of the timeframe for filing . ~ - --.. _4
. - Being safe by disallowing twice?
Based on court's statements don't believe any action is requ ired . Court
has stated that oriQinal claim was filed correctly
1.,.
Court stated would not rule on that issue today. Done in response to that
The Court is hearing from Ms. Cusack that no action should be taken in
response to August 19th , 2015 document
- ---:_- - j[I
Estate didn't want it to be automatically allowed
,J
Seems as much of an answer as we are going to get.
Court will be in recess.
[.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
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AFFIDAVIT OF MARY W. CUSACK
IN SUPPORT OF SUR-REPLY
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CLAIM
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STATE OF IDAHO
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MARY W . CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and states:

1.

I am over the age of 18 years and am an attorney licensed in good

standing with the State of Idaho. I am representing JADWIGA B. MELTON, Petitioner,
and surviving spouse in the above-captioned matter.

2.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "A",

is a true and correct copy of Senate Bill No. 1318 which was adopted and effective as of
July 1, 2006.
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3.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "B",

is a true and correct copy of Senate Bill No. 1249 which was adopted and effective as of
July 1, 2007.
4.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C",

is a true and correct copy of Utah Code§ 75-3-109.
5.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "D",

is a true and correct copy of Uniform Probate Code Section 3-317 and its comments
thereto.
Further your Affiant saith naught.
DATED this 8th day of September, 2015.
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SENATE BILL NO. 1318
View Bill St?tu1i
View Bill rcxt
View . tat ·in 1\l ir Pt1tpu.{_I i,rn l In i!....1
Text to be added within a bill has b en marked with Bold and Underline. Text to be removed has been
marked with Strikethrough and Italic. How these codes are actually displayed will vary based on the
browser software you are using.
This sentence is marked with bold and underline to show added text.
+his se,•1/e11t't' i.~11H:HWt!+l--wif.H s.'rikt!lhrough tmd ilulit-, imiia,•ling le:xl !O he-RHHtwe-4

Bill Status
S13 1 8 . . .. .. , .. , ............. , ... , ......... , .. ; . . . . ... by JUDICIARY AND RULES
ESTATE - MEDICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS - Amends existing law rela ti ng to estate
property to s et forth provisi o ns applicable to the recovery of me di c al
assistance cos t s by the Depar t ment of Health and Welfare; a nd t o revis e
prov is ions a pplicab 1 e to the re covery of certain medical assista ce.
01/30
01/31
02/ 0 9
02/10
02/14

Senate int ro - 1st rdg - to pri n ting
Rpt pr:: - to Jud
Rpt ou~ - rec d/p - to 2nd rd g
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg
rd rdg - PASSED - 35-0-0
AYES - - Andr ea s on , Brandt , Broadsword, Bunderson, Burke t t ,
Burt e nshaw , Came r on, Coiner , Compton , Corder , Darrington , Davis,
Ful cher , Gannon , Ge ddes , Goedde , Hill, Jorgenson , Kelly, Keough ,
Langhorst , Little , Lodg e , Malepe ai , Marley, McGee, McKenzie, Pearce,
Richardson , Schroeder, Ste gne r , Stennett, Sweet, Werk , Williams
NAYS -- Non
Absent and ~xcuscd -- No ne
Fl oor Spon or - Kelly
Title apvd - to House
02/ 15
House in t ro - i~t r ag - to Jud
03/ 0 6
Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg
03/07
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg
03/16
3rd rdg - PASSED - 64-0 - 6
AYES - Anders on, Andr is , Barraclough, Barrett , Bastian , Bayer, Bell ,
Bilbao, Blac k, Block , Boe , Bolz, Bra c kett , Bradford, Cannon ,
Chadderdon , Cl ark, Collins , Deal , Denney, Edmunson , Ellsworth,
Eskridge, Field( 18), Fiel d(23) , Garrett, Hart, Ha rwood , Henbest,
Henderson, Jaquet , Kemp, Lake, LeFavour, Loertscher , Martinez ,
Mathews , McGeachin, McKa gue , Miller , Mitchell , Moyle, Ni e l sen ,
onini, Pasley- Stuart,
ence, Raybould , Ring , Ringo , Roberts , Rusche,
Ryda lch,
ali , Sayler , Schaefer , Shepherd(2) , Shephe rd(S) , Shirley ,
Sk~ppen , Smith(30) , Smi t h(24), Smyli e , Stevenson , Trail
NAYS -- None
Absent and excused -- Be dke , Cro w, Snodgrass , Will s , Wood, Mr .
Speake r
Floor Sponsor - Smith(24)
Title apvd - to Senate
03/17
To enrol
03/20
pt enrol - Pres signed - Sp signed
03/2 1
To Governor
0 3 /24
Govern o r si g ned
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S e s sion Law Cha pte r 1 7 9
Eff ~ti v e : 0 7/01/0 6

Bill Text
LEGISLATURE Of THE STATE OF IDAHO
Jl l l
Jl J J
Second Regul a r Se ssi on - 2006
Fi f t y - e ighth Le gisla t ure

I N THE SENATE

SENATE BI LL NO. 1318
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

1

7

AN ACT
RELATING TO ES TATE PROPERTY ; AMENDING SECTION 15- 3 -1 2 01, IDAHO CODE,
TO SET
FORTH PROVI SIONS APPLICABLE TO THE RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASS I STANCE COSTS BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECT IO NS;
AMENDI NG SECTION 56-218 , IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO
THE RECOVERY OF CERTAI~ ME DI CAL ASSISTANCE; AND AMENDING SECTION 56-218A,
IDAHO CODE , TO REVI SE A CODE REFERENCE.

8

Be I t

9

SECTION l . Th a t Sectio n 15-3- 1201, Idaho Code, be , a n d the same is here b y
ame nde d to r e ad ciS follows:

2
3

4
5
6

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
?. 5
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40

En acted by the Le gislature of th e Sta te of I daho :

15-3- 1 201.
COLLECTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BY AFFIDAVIT. (a ) Thirty
(30)
days
after the d e at h of a d e c e dent, any person ind e bted to t he decedent or
hav ing poss e s s ion of t a ngible personal propert y or an i nstrument e v idencing a
debt,
obligation,
s tock or chose in action belonging to the decedent s hall
mak e paymen t o f the indebtedness or deliver the tangible personal property or
an instrume nt e v idencing a
debt, obligation, stock or chose i n acti on to a
person or ent i ty claiming to be the succe s s or of the decedent upon b e ing pres e nt e d an affidavit made by o r on b ehal f of the successor stati ng t hat:
(1) tThe fai r ma r ket value of the entire estate of the dece dent which is
s c bj e c t to probat e , wherever l o cat e d, less liens a nd encumbranc es ,
does
not exceed seven t y - f ive thousand dollars ($75,000);
(2) ~Th i. ty (30 ) da ys h a v e elapsed since the death of the dec e den t ;
(3)
-R~o
a ppl ic at i on or petition for th e appointmen t of a p r s onal r e p r e sentative o r for summary administration is pending or has be e n granted in
any jurisdiction; and
(4) t,'.!'.he claimi n g successor is entitled to payment or delivery of the
property, inc l ud i.ng enti tl ement as a trust pur s uant to a wil l of the dec e d e nt.
(b) A transfer ag e nt of any security sh a ll change t he re giste re d ownership on the books of a corporation from the d ecedent to the s u c c essor or successors upon the presentat i on o f an affidavit as provided in s u bsectior (a ) o f
th i s section .
(c)
For the purpos es of this section, for the recovery of medical assistance , the department of health and welfare shall be deeme d a successor to the
estate p r ovided:
(1)
Prior to the p resentation of the affidavit, the department shall give
notice, by regula r mail, to any person known to the dep artment to be an
heir, successor or creditor of the estate, and the department shall certify such notice in writing to the oerson described in subsection (a) of
this section.
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(2) Within sixty (6 0) days of mailing the notice , any person who claims
the righ t
to reimbursement for priority estate expense s , as permitted by
section 15-3-805(a) (1) through (4) , Idaho Code , may sub mit a written
2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
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14
15
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l 7

18
19
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40
41
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43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52
53

demand for payment of such expenses, toqether with any documentation of
the expenses, to the department. Upon receipt of the funds, and up to the
a.mount received, the department shall pay priority claims which it determines would be allowed in a probate proceeding, if any.
The department
shall notify each claimant of the disposition of his claim. The provisions
of chapter 52 , title 67, Idaho Code, shall apply to determinations made by
the department under this section.
SECTION 2. Th a t
Section
amended to read as follows:

56-218, Idaho Code, be, and th e same is he reby

56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASS I STANCE. (1) Except wh e re exempted
or waived in accordance with federal law medi cal a s s istance p urs uant to this
chapte r
paid on behalf of an individual who wa s fifty-fi v e (55) y ea rs of age
or ol d e r when th e indi vi dual r eceiv ed such a ssistan ce may be recove red from
the individual's est a te,
and the estate of the spouse, if a ny, for such aid
paid to either or both ; f1-e,.,-.k/,-'4,--l~:,-~A-a-l:-T."'+rl·i-ffl.--H'H:-£1wh lilL'tH,-'dl c1u,,.it>
+--,,,+n:-t,--,_,~~~--p~ Lv L!lt.' Hti:H '.'l-t11,id .l 111ay be? L' <; !.abl i . i/-1<>, t tltJtN /l t> t I,' ,,: c!!" I .7-h"
of ci t!wr spouse, but.:...
(a)
T4=he re shall be no ad justment or recovery thereof until after the
dea th of both the individual and the spouse, i f any, and only at a t ime
when the individual has no surviving child who is under twenty- one
(21)
years of age or is blind or permanently and totally di s abled as defined in
42 U.S.C . 1382c.
(b) While one (1)
spouse survives, except where joint probate will be
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111 , Idaho Code, a claim for recovery
under this section may be established in the estate of the deceased
spouse.
(c)
The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be
made within the time provided by section 15-3-80l(b), Idaho Code, if the
estate is administered and actual notice is given to the director as
required by subsection (5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate of the first deceased spouse, or if no actual
notice is given to the director as required by subsection {5) of this s e ction, no claim shall be required until the time provided for creditor
claims in the estate of the survivor.
(d) Nothinq in this section authorizes the r ecovery of t he a.mount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that
the need for aid resulted from a crime committed aga i n st the recipient.
ill Transfers o f r e al or personal property, on or after the look-back
da tes define d in 42 U. S .C . 1396p, by recipients of such aid, o r the i r spouses,
withou t ade quat e consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action
in the district court.
(-2-~)
Except where t here i s a surviving spouse, or a surviving c hild who
is under twenty-one (?.l) year s of age or is blind or permane ntly and totally
di s abled as defined i n 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance
paid under t his chapt e r on behalf of an individual who was tifty-five
(55)
years of age or older when the individual r e ceived such assistanc e is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship p r oceedings and may
be p a id f rom the e stat e .
1 n Ii'.±.> ce;1ticn cit1-t:fl-&1 . i1:..::s t/10 1.een•.-,.,.~ ! t·f;o amount o t an y
a .1. ~->-t-':tf>J c!tll I II i l ,0 , ;>,.+€-1+/---f-+in+---Hk·
11 ,
i r ,,>+--TH-n---+<='-~4-.H.'El111 ,<i er i fflt' a, 111ffl-±+.t<:"tl--,d·ffo1 11,c t l 111:..~h:"-::'-,i,f~ + t .-,+-4---fJ,,~-f.-JH.+m

~-J.::.eHi-'-fW- t!.'i L, ; 1/2---0±----BiH?,,'· w-:i:+lt'1-1:'-r+tf!"I<! 01

(4)

For purposes o f thi s section, the term "estate" sha ll i n cl ude :
(a)
All re al and personal property and other as~ c ts i ncluded within

http://legislature.idaho.gov/1egislation/2006/S 1318.html

Page 161 of 438

9/7/2015

SENA TE BILL NO. 1318 - Medical asst costs, recovery

Page 4 of 7

3
1
?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
?2
?.3
?.4
25
?. 6
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
46
49
50

51
52
53
54

55

the individual ' s estate, as defined for purposes of state probate
law; and
(bl Any other real and personal property ar ,d olher c1ssets in which
the individual had any legal title or in teres t at the time of de ath
(to the extent of such i nterest), includ ing such ass e ts conveyed to a
survi vor,
heir,
or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, ten a n c y in corrmon, survivorship , life estate,
living trust
or other arrangeme nt .
(5)
Claims made pursuant to this section s h all b e classified and paid as
a d e bt with preference a s defin ed i n sec t ion 15-3- 8 0 5(5), Idaho Code . Any d is tribution o r t r a nsfer of the es t ate prior c o satisfying such ~lajm is voidab l e
and may b e set aside by an ac t ion in the district cour t. The pe r sona l repre sentative of e ver y estate subject to a claim under this section must ,
within
thirty (3 0) days of thP appointment, give notj_ce in 1vriting to the director o f
hiu or her appointme nt to administer the estate. However, if a~ exempt property allowance claim i s made i11 an estate subject to a claim unde r this sect ion by one (1) o r more persons not described in subsect~on (2) of this sect i on, t~en, to the exte nt such exempt property allowance claim e xceeds the
fair market value of the actual personal property of the d ecedent held by the
estate subject to a claim under this section (includi ng, but not limited to,
such items as household furniture , automobi l es, furnishings, app liances, and
personal effe cts), the persons making such exempt property allowance claim
must file with the court , and with the personal represe n lalive or admi nistrator of the est a te, and with the department , a wr i tten statement under oath
containing the fol l owing:
( d ) A state ment that no personal property of the decede nt has been transferre d wi thout
ade quate consid eration to any person or ent i t y , includi n g
any one (1 ) or more of the persons mak i ng the exempt property a llowance
claim,
to the actual kno wledge of any of the per so n s making the exempt
property allowance c laim, within a time period commenc1nq one
(1)
year
prior to the death of the decedent and ending on t h ~ d a t e of the s tatement ; or
(bl A statement t hat persor:a l property of the decedent has been trans fe rred without adequate consideration to any person or entity, including
one (1 ) or more oi the persons making the exempt property allowance cl aim,
within a t i me period commencing one (1) year prior to the death of the
d eceden t
and ending on the date of the statement, to Lhe actual knowledge
of any of the persons making the e xempt property allowance claim,
and
stating the fair market value of the personal property so trans fe rred, and
stating a reasonable description of such p r opert y , and slating the method
o f determining th e fair market value of the personal prnper.ty so transferred.
If the wr itten s t atement indicates that there has b een such a transfer o f personal pro pe r ty , t h en the fair market value o f t h e persona l p r operty so transferrcd s hall b e s ubtracted from the remaini n g e x empt property allowance claim,
after subtraction of t he personal property he l d by the estate,
as described
above ,
and only any still remaining portion of the exempt p =operty claim may
be paid by the estate t o the persons making the exempt pr ope rty al lowance
clajm.
The stateme nt s ubmi tted under paragraph (a) or {b) of this subsection,
must b e signed unde r oath by all persons making the exempt property claim .
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property ot any
est at e subject to a claim under this section.
(a)
In order to perfecl a lien against real or persona l proper t y , the
department shall, with in n inet y (90) days after the personal reprcscntative or succe ssor makes a written request f or prompt action to the direc 4

1
2

to r, or three ( 3) years from the death of the +m~~4+1rH-H-+-~H1--trr..... !+..,.;-J.
h'J,' 1··r:-l-ttt*-l,:-1-;-/ ~ r J t ~ decedent , whichever is soo n er, file

--.;n 1 .·1 /oJ111 >,·
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a notice of lien i n the same general f orm a nd manner a s p rovided in section 56-218A(J) (a), Idaho Code, in the office of ~he s e c~e tary of st ate,
pursuant t o section 45-1904 , Idaho Cod e . Failure t o fil e a notice of li en
does not affect thP. validi t y of claims made pursuant to thi s section.
(b)
The depar tment may release the lien in whol e or in part to permit the
estate property to b e administered by a court-aepointed personal representative.
(c)
The depar tment may foreclose its lien , without probate , in any of the
f ollowing c i rcumstances:
{i)
Where no personal representative has been appointed after one
(1) year from the date of death of the survivor of both the individual and spouse , if any;
(ii) Where the property has been abandoned by the decedent's heirs
or successors , if any;
(iii) Where t he real property taxes that are due and payable have
remained unpaid for two (2) years and, after demand by the department,
the he irs or successors, if any, have fail e d to seek appointmentor pay t he property taxes; or
(iv) Where all parties interested in the estate consent to foreclosure of the 1ien.
(7 ) The director s hal l promulgate rules reasonably necessa r y to implement
thi s section including , but not limited to , rules establ i shi ng undue hardship
waivers for t h e following circumstances:
(a)
The oR.2y asset of the estate subject to recovo:ry is income- producing
p r operty that pro v ide s the primary source of s upport fo ::: o the r family members; o r
(bl
The estate has a value b e low an a mount specified in the rules; or
(c)
Recov e ry 1,mde r
the lieR by the depa rtment w.ilJ eneitle cause the
heirs of the dece as ed ind.i.vidual to be eligible for public: ass i s t ~
(8) The cause of action to void a transfer without ade quat e c onsideration
established in thi s section shall not be deemed to have a ccrued u nti l
the
department discovers, or reasonably could have di scovered , the f act s constit uting th e t r ansf e r wi thout adequate consideration .

36
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SECTION 3. That Section 56-218A, Idaho Code, be, and t he same
amended to read as follows:
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56-218A. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE LIENS DURING LIFE OF RF:CTPIENT. (1) The
dApartment may r e cove r and may impose a lien agains t the r e a l prope rty of any
individual prior to his death for medical assis t: an c e paid or about to b e paid
under l his chapter on be ha l f of an individual :
(a)
Who is an inpu ticnt in a nursing facili ty , intermediate care f acilit y
f or t h e mental ly r e tarded, or other medical institution, if such i.nd i v i d 11al is required, a s a condition of receiving servi ces i n such insti t uti on
unde r the state pl a n, to spend for costs of me dical care a l l but a mi nimal
amo u nt of his income requir e d for pers onal needs; a nd
( b) With r espect to whom the department has d e termined , a f te r n o tice a nd
opportunity for h e aring, that he cannot reasonably b e expected to b e discharged from th e me dical ins titut i on and t o return home.
(2)
No lien may be imposed on the home of an i ndiv.i dua l und er s ubs ect i on
(1) o f thi s section if any of the following is lawfully resi ding in such h ome:
(a)
The spouse of such individual;
(b)
Such individua l's c h ild under age twenty-one (2 1 ) y ea rs;

8

9

10
11
12
13

14

is

hereby

5

1
2

3
4
5
6

(c)
Such individual's child who is blind or p e rmanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382 c; or
(d) A sibling of s uch individual who holds an equity inte rest in s u c h
home and who was resid i ng in such home for a period o f a t least one (1)
year prior to the individual 's admission to the medical institut io n .
(3)
(a) The lien shall be perfected by filin g in the office o f the s e cre-
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tary of state a notice of lien pursuant to section 45-19 0 4,
I daho Code .
'l'hc notice of lien shall include, in addition to the inforrr,ation required
by section 45- 1904, Idaho Code, the amount paid o r abou t to h~ paid by the
department on behalf of the individual , and, if appl icable, t he fact tr.at
the amount of the lien may i ncrease over time.
(b ) The department shall file any noti ce of lien under this section
within ni n ety (90 ) days of the final determina tion of the department,
after hearing if a ny, required in subsection (1) {bl of t~is sect ion, with
the except i on of property against which the d e partment is prevented from
filing a lien pursuant to subsection (2) of Lhi s section. With respect to
th e prope rty d e scri bed in s ubsection (2) of this section,
the depa r tment
shall file a not ice of lien within ninety (90) days aft e r the uepa r tment
is notified in wri ting that subsection (2) of this section ceases to apply
to the property.
(4) Any lien imposed in a cLordance with subsection (1)
of this section
shall dissolve upon the indivi dual's discharge f rom the medical institution
and return home .
(5) No recovery shall be made under this section for medi c al assistance
correctly paid except from such individual ' s estate as define d in subsection
(4) of section 56-218, I daho Code , and s ub j ect to subsec tions (~!) (d), (5) and
(6) of section 56-21 8 , I daho Code, or upon sale of the prope rty subject to a
lien a n d may be made only after the death of such ind~vidual's surviving
spouse , i f any, and only at a t ime:
(a) When he has no surviving child who is unde r age twenty - one
(21)
years , or wh o is blind or permanently and toLally disabl e d as defined in
42 U.S.C. 138?.c; o r
{b)
In the case of a lien on an indi vidual ' s home under subsection (1) of
th is section, when none of the following i s lawfully residing in such home
who has lawfully resided in such home on a c ontinuous basis since the date
of the individual ' s admission to the med i cal ins t ituti o n :
{i)
A sibling of the individual, who was · residing
in
the
indivi dua l' s home for a period of at least one ( 1) ye ar i mmediately
before the date of the individual ' s admission to the medical institution; or
(ii) A son o r d aughter of the individual , who was res iding in the
individual ' s home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately
before the date of the individual's admission to ~he medical institut ion and who e stablishes to t he sat i sfact·on of the state that he or
she provided care to such individual which permitted such individual
to reside at home rather t han in an institution.
(G)
The director shal l promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement
this section i n cluding, but n o t limited to , rul es establishing undue hardshi p
waivers,
as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code , and a procedure for
notice and oppo r tun ity for h earing on the depa r tme nt ' s determinat ion that an
individual cann ot re a sonably be e x pected to b e discharg ed from a medical
institution and to r e turn home.

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact
STATEM~NT OF PURPOSE
RS 15741
Thi s bill clarifies how the Medicaid Estate Recovery division of
Health & Welfare can recover a ssets from the estate of a dec edent
and clears up a number of unce rtain areas of law.
Sect i o n One covers the Small Estate Aff i davit, which allows a
" successor" of the decedent t o obtain personal property a sset s
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held by third parti e s (bank accounts, stocks, etc.) by use of an
af fidavit, within the limits set forth in the statute. Thi s bill
allows the Department of Health & Welfare to be a successor if:
1
The 8epartment has a claim for estate recovery against
the decedent;
2. the Department gives notice , by regular mail , to any
person known to the depa r tment to be an he ir, successo r , or
creditor of the estate, a nd the department certifies chat
no tice in wri t i ng t o the person described in paragraph (a)
of the sect .i on, the norma l successor; and,
3. The Department r e imbur ses all priority claims under the
probate code which are p res ented within sixty days after the
notice .
Use of t his procedure is far. less expensive than filing a full
probate proceeding.
Section Two amends Idaho Code 56 - 218 to clarify the presentation
and collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. A
number of c la ri fications are made by repositioning language or
stating the existing concept more clearl y. Under existing law,
if the institutionalized spouse , who received Mecicaid, dies
l eaving a survivi ng spouse, no nctual collection is made, but a
"claim" must be sent to the personal representative of the estate
of deceased jnstitutionalized s pouse , or i f no probate is done ,
to the surviving spouse. This can be very frighte ning to the
surviving spouse , who often does not understand that no curr~nt
reimbursement is bei ng demanded. Therefor, the bill both
clari fies that no recovery is made until both spouses are
deceased and also removes the requirement to send a claim i f no
probate is filed at the f irst death.
The bill also clarifies how the lien filed by the Department with
the Se8retary of State may be release d , in order to a llow s a le of
the property by the esta t e, or foreclosed, to expedite estate
recovery wher the real estate has been abandoned or has real
property taxes overdue which may be foreclosed upon or where no
probat e has bee n filed and all heirs agree to the procedure as an
alternative to probate.
Section Three only corrects a cross-reference.

FISCAL NO'l'E
'l'his bill will have no fis c al 'mpact , except that it may reduce
the costs of estate recove ry to the Department of Health &
We l =are.

Contact
Name: Robert L. Aldridge , Trus t & Estate Professionals of Idaho, Inc.
Phone : 208-336-9880
Cell: 208-631 - 2481
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE
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. _by JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

PROBATE - Amends existing law relating to probate to provide that certain t ime limitations
for commencement of proceedings and specified limitations shal l not apply to the collection
of persona l property by affidavit or the summary administration of estates In wh ich a
surviving spouse Is the sole beneficiary.
01/27Introduced; read fi rst time ; referred to JR for Printing
01/28Reported Printed; referred to Judiciary & Rules
02/04Reported out of Committee with Do Pass Recommendation; Flied for second read ing
02/0SRead second time; flied for Third Reading
02/06Read third time In full - PASSED - 33-0-2
AYES -- Bair, Bayer, Brackett, Buckner-Webb, Cameron, Fulcher, Goedde, Guthrie,
Hagedorn, Heider, Hill, Johnson, Keough, Lacey, Lakey, Lodge, Martin, McKenzie,
Mortimer, Nonlnl, Nuxoll, Patrick, Pearce, Rice, Schmidt, Siddoway, Stennett,
Thayn, Tippets, Vick, Ward-Engelking, Werk, Winder
NAYS -- None
Absent and excu sed -- Bock, Davis

Floor Sponsor • Hagedorn
Tit le apvd - to House
02/07Received from the Senate, Flied for First Reading
Read First Time, Referred to Judiciary, Rules, & Administration
03/14Reported out of Committee with Do Pass Recommendation,
Flied for Second Reading
03/17Read second time ; Flied for Third Read ing
Rules Suspended: Ayes 68 Nays o Abs/Excd 2, read three times - PASSED - 67·
0-3
AYES·- Agldius, Anderson(0l), Anderson(31), Anderst, Andrus, Barbieri , Barrett,
Bateman, Batt, Beil, Bolz, Boyle, Burgoyne, Chew, Clow, Collins, Crane, Dayley,
DeMordaunt, Denney, Erpelding, Eskridge, Gannon, Gibbs, Hancey, Harris, Hartgen,
Henderson, Hixon, Holtzclaw, Horman, Kauffman, King, Kloc, Loertscher, Lu ker,
Malek, McDonald, McMillan, Meline, Mendive, MIiier, Monks, Morse, Moyle, Packer,
Palmer, Pence, Per ry, Raybould, Ringo, Romrell, Rubel, Rusche, Shepherd, Sims,
Smith, Stevenson, Trujillo, Vanorden, Vander Woude, Wills, Wood(27), Wood(35),
Woodings, Youngblood, Mr. Speaker
NAYS -- None
Absent -- Gestrin, Nielsen, Thompson
Floor Sponsor - Horman
Title apvd - to Senate
03/18Returned From House Passed; referred to enrolling
Reported enrolled ; signed by President; to House for signature of Speaker
03/19Received from Senate; Signed by Speaker; Returned to Senate
Reported signed by the Speaker & ordered delivered to Governor
03/20Reported delivered to Gover nor on 03/20/14
03/26Signed by Governor on 03/26/14
Session Law Chapter 264
Effective : 07/01/2014

Legislative Services Office• P 0 . Box 83720 • Boise, ID • 83720-0054
208/334-2475 • FAX 208/334-2125
(;0,.1, , ~1•11 l 1 1 1 r 208/332-1000 (Session Only)
Maintained by lsoweb@lso.ldaho.gov
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
S i xty-seco nd Legislature
Second Regular Se s sion - 2014
IN THE SENATE

SENATE BILL NO. 1249
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

6

AN ACT
RELATING TO PROBATE; AMENDING SECTION 15-3-108, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT
CERTAIN TIME LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIFIED
LIMITATIONS SHALL NOT APPLY TO THE COLLECTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BY
AFFIDAVIT OR THE SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN WHICH A SURVIVING
SPOUSE IS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

7

Be It Enacted by the Legi slature of the State of Idaho:

8

SECTION 1. That Sec ti on 15-3-108, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
ame n ded to read as follows:

1
2

3
4

5

9
10
11

12
13
14
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16
17
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27
28
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30
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32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39
40

15-3-108.
PROBATE -- TESTACY AND APPOINT;)llEN'l ' PROCEEDINGS -- ULTIMATE
TIME LIMIT. No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy
or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previ ously probated at the tes tator' s domicile and appointment p r oceedi ngs relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment or proccedings under section 15-3-1201, Idaho Code, or section 15-3-1205, Idaho Code ,
may be commenced more than t hree (3) years after the d e cedent ' s death, except_:_
{ 1) 4:-_f.f a previous p r oceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the
fact of the decedent's death, appropr iate probate, appointme nt or testacy
proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that the
decedent 1 s death occurred prior to the initiation of the previ ous proceeding
and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in initia t ing the subsequent proceeding;
(2) a~ppropriate probate, appointment or testacy proceedings may be
maintained in relation t o the esta te of an absent, disappeared or missing
person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time within
three (3) years after the conservator becomes able to establish the death of
t h e p r otected person; and
( 3) -a-~ proceeding t o contest an informally probated will a nd to secure
appoint ment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event
the contest is successful, may be commenced wi thin the later of twelve (12)
months from the informal probate or three (3) years from the decedent's
death.
These limi tatio ns do not apply to proceedings to construe probated wills or
determine heirs of an intestate or to proceedings under section 15-3-1201,
Idaho Code , or section 15-3-1205 , Idaho Code. In cases under s u bsection {1)
or (2) of this section, the date on which a testacy or appo i ntment proceeding
is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the decedent's death
fo r purposes of other limitations provisions of this code which relate to the
date of death.
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS22512
Summary Administration under section 15-3-1205, Idaho Code, and the Small Estate Affidavit
tinder section 15-3-1201, Idaho Code have for many years been thought by the practicing bar and by
courts to be exempt from the three year limitation on probate proceedings under section 12-3-108,
Idaho Code. This has allowed those two procedures to be an easy, efficient, and inexpensive way
to pass property to the correct heirs if a standard probate is barred by the three year limitation.
However, recently some courts have held to the contrary, and in some districts j udges in the same
district have ruled differently on that question. This bill eliminates that confusion by clearly stating
that the two procedures are not subject to the three year limitation.

FISCAL NOTE
This bill will have no fiscal impact.

Contact:
Robert L.Aldridge, Trust & Estate Professionals of Idaho, Inc.
(208) 336-9880

Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note
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§ 75-3-109. Letters upon several estates jointly.
Utah Statutes
Title 75. Utah Uniform Probate Code
Chapter 3. Probate of Wills and Administration

Current through Chapter 437 of the 2014 General Session

§ 75-3-109. Letters upon several estates jointly
(1)

Upon petition by any person interested in two or more estates, the court may, after notice
and hearing, grant letters upon these estates jointly if administration has not commenced
with respect to any such estate and if:
(a)

All or any part of the estate of one decedent has descended from another
decedent; or

(b)

Two or more decedents held any property during their lifetimes as tenants-incommon and if the persons entitled under the wills of these decedents or under the
law of intestate succession to receive the estates of these decedents are the
same.

(2)

If letters are granted upon two or more estates jointly under this section, these estates
shall be administered the same as if they were but one estate except that claims may be
enforced only against the estate to which they relate.

Cite as Utah Code§ 75-3-109
History. Enacted by Chapter 194, 1977 General Session
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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Table of Contents

ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS, DEFINITIONS AND PROBATE JURISDICTION OF
COURT
PART 1. SHORT TITLE, CONSTRUCTION, GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section
1-101.
1-102.
1-103.
1-104.
1-105.
1-106.
1-107.
1-108.
1-109.

Short Title.
Purposes; Rule of Construction.
Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable.
Severability.
Construction Against Implied Repeal.
Effect of Fraud and Evasion.
Evidence of Death or Status.
Acts by Holder of General Power.
Cost of Living Adj ustment of Certain Dollar Amounts.

PART 2. DEFINITIONS

Section
1-201.

General Definitions.

PART 3. SCOPE, JURISDICTION AND COURTS

Section
1-30 I.
1-302.
1-303.
1-304.
1-305.
1-306.
1-307.
1-308.
1-309.
1-310.

Territorial Application.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Venue; Multiple Proceedings; Transfer.
Practice in Court.
Records and Certified Copies.
Jury Trial.
Registrar; Powers.
Appeals.
Qualifications of Judge.
Oath or Affirmation on Filed Documents.

PART 4. NOTICE, PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION IN ESTATE LITIGATION
AND OTHER MATTERS
Section
Notice; Method and Time of Giving.
1-401.
Notice; Waiver.
1-402.
Pleadings; When Parties Bound by Others; Notice.
1-403.
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Comment

This section is the substantive provision (I) declaring the successors to be distributees
and (2) to have the powers of owners so far as dealing with the estate assets subject to the
obligations to others.
Details concerning the status of distributees under UPC Section 3-908 and the power to
deal with property are provided in UPC Section 3-910.
Although one state cannot control the law of another, the universal successor should be
recognized in other states as having the standing of either a foreign personal representative or a
distributee of the claim to local assets. Paragraph (3) attempts to remove any limitation of this
state in such a case.
SECTION 3-317. UNIVERSAL SUCCESSION; UNIVERSAL SUCCESSORS'
LIABILITY TO CREDITORS, OTHER HEIRS, DEVISEES AND PERSONS ENTITLED
TO DECEDENT'S PROPERTY; LIABILITY OF OTHER PERSONS ENTITLED TO
PROPERTY.

(a) In the proportions and subject to the limits expressed in Section 3-321, universal
successors assume all liabilities of the decedent that were not discharged by reason of death and
liability for all taxes, claims against the decedent or the estate, and charges properly incurred
after death for the preservation of the estate, to the extent those items, if duly presented, would
be valid claims against the decedent's estate.
(b) In the proportions and subject to the limits expressed in Section 3-321, universal
successors are personally liable to other heirs, devisees, and persons entitled to property of the
decedent for the assets or amounts that would be due those heirs, were the estate administered,
but no allowance having priority over devisees may be claimed for attorney's fees or charges for
preservation of the estate in excess of reasonable amounts properly incurred.
(c) Universal successors are entitled to their interests in the estate as heirs or devisees
subject to priority and abatement pursuant to Section 3-902 and to agreement pursuant to Section

359
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3-912.
(d) Other heirs, devisees, and persons to whom assets have been distributed have the
same powers and liabilities as distributees under Sections 3-908, 3-909, and 3-910.
(e) Absent breach of fiduciary obligations or express undertaking, a fiduciary's liability is
limited to the assets received by the fiduciary.

Comment
The purpose of succession without administration is not to alter the relative property
interests of the parties but only to facilitate the family's expeditious settlement of the estate.
Consistent with this, the liability arising from the assumption of obligations is stated explicitly
here to assist in understanding the coupling of power and liability. Subsection (b) includes an
abatement reference that recognizes the possible adjustment that may be necessary by reason of
excess claims under UPC Section 3-902.

In succession without administration, there being no personal representative's notice to
creditors, the short non-claim period under UPC Section 3-803(a)(l) does not apply and creditors
are subject to the statutes of limitations and the limitation of three years on decedent's creditors
when no notice is published under UPC Section 3-803(a)(2). The general statutes of limitation
are suspended for four months fo llowing the decedent's death but resume thereafter under UPC
Section 3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issuance of the
Statement of Universal Succession is deemed to be by operation of law and does not operate to
extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to run against the decedent. The result
is that creditors are barred by the general statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the
shorter.
The obligation of the universal s uccessors to other heirs, devisees and distributees is
based on the promise to perform in return for the direct distribution of property and any
limitation or !aches begins to run on issuance of the statement of universal succession unless
otherwise extended by action or assurance of the universal successor.
It should be noted that this statute does not deal with the consequences or obligations that
arise under either federal or state tax laws. The universal successors will be subject to
obligations for the return and payment of both income and estate taxes in many situations
depending upon the tax law and the circumstances of the decedent and the estate. These tax
consequences should be determined before electing to utilize succession without administration.
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MARY W . CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND·FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

)
)

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,
Deceased.

- --

- - --

-

-

-

CASE NO. CV 13-0313

)
)
)
)
)

SUR-REPLY
MEMORANDUM
IN
SUPPORT
OF
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DENY
CREDITOR CLAIM

---- )

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON ("Jadwiga"), the Personal
Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record ,
MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits this Sur-Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim.

I.

Procedural Background.

On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga moved for Summary Judgment to deny a creditor claim
against the above-captioned estate submitted by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"). The Court heard
oral argument on Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 24, 2015. At the
hearing the Court invited the parties to submit additional briefing on the issues of (A)
whether I.C. § 15-3-111 extends the three-year limitations period on t he presentation of

1.

SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC00149030.DOCX;1/20397 .100}
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creditor claims under I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1), and (B) whether Jadwiga waived a limitations
defense to Heinz's claim by failing to provide timely notice of disallowance.

II.
I.C. § 15·3-111 does not Toll the Three.Year Statute of Limitations of
I.C. § 15-3-803 on Claims against an Estate.
As Jadwiga has previously clarified, I.C. § 15-3-111 expressly allows for joint
probate when the martial community of a couple ended at the death of the first spouse,
and the surviving spouse was entitled to all of the deceased spouse's property by will,
law or both, and no probate had been commenced on the death of the deceased spouse.
The reason this rule is needed is I.C. § 15-3-108 only allows th ree years for the probate
of a Will in Idaho.
In Idaho, it is common to find many instances wherein the first spouse dies and the
surviving spouse does not open a probate. When all the assets are titled in joint names
and the surviving spouse is not hindered in his or her ability to gain access or have control
over the remaining assets, the surviving spouse may not view a probate as necessary.
However, to transfer real property, a legal action must commence.
When real property is held in the joint names of the husband and wife until the
death of the second spouse, three options are available to enable the real property to be
transferred to beneficiaries. The first and most favorable option is to jointly probate the
estates. The other two options are to commence a quiet title action or to open another
case to determine the heirs of the first spouse who died. Allowing the use of I.C. § 15-3111 saves time and judicial economy by probating both estates in one proceeding. This
process is used almost exclusively to transfer real property, such as in this case.

2.

SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{MWC00149030. DOCX; 1/20397.100}
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I.C. § 15-3-111 makes no mention of or reference of any kind to I.C. § 15-3803(a)(1 )'s three-year limitations period for bringing a creditor claim. At the same time,
I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1) does not cross-reference I.C. § 15-3-111 or any other exceptions to
its plain and clear-cut rule that "[a]II claims against a decedent's estate which arose before
the death of the decedent" must be presented no later than "three (3) years after the
decedent's death." (Emphasis added). The statute does not create special exceptions
for joint probates and does not expand the definition of "the decedent's death" to
encompass more than its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e. , the death of the decedent
subject to the creditor claim at issue irrespective of his/her marital status.
I.C. § 15-3-803 has a strict creditor claim limitations period. The longest time frame
is three years after the decedent's date of death; however, this time frame can be shorted
to four months by publishing a notice to creditors. Construing I.C. § 15-3-111 to enlarge
the creditor claim limitations period of I.C. § 15-3-803 of the first spouse who died to three
years after the death of the surviving spouse, solely based on the executor's choice to
probate both estates jointly, is not supported by the plain language of the statute, and is
not warranted from any reading of the statutes when taken together. Construing statutes
to produce such an absurd result runs afoul of standard Idaho canons of construction.
See Idaho v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 178 (2012) ("Constructions of a statute that would

lead to an absurd result are disfavored."). The only logical use of this statute is not to
enlarge the cred itor claim limitations period but to save judicial economy when real
property is held in joint names at the death of the surviving spouse.

3.
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There is only one exception to the statute of limitations as set forth in I.C. § 15-3803. This exception is found in the Idaho counterpart of the federal Medicaid Law at I.C.

§ 56-218, which provides for the recovery of certain assistance provided by Medicaid.
For many years, the statute provided that recovery could be made from the individual's
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both, but there
would be no adjustment or recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. In 2006, the
statute was updated to provide that no claim needed to be filed on the death of the first
spouse, unless actual notice was given of the probate, or if a joint probate were opened
under I.C. § 15-3-111. See Senate Bill No. 1318 which is atta ched as Exhibit "A" of the
Affidavit of Mary W . Cusack In Support Of Sur-Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion
For Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Claim (hereinafter "Cusack Affidavit") and
incorporated herein by this reference. The reason for the change was given as follows:
Section Two amends Idaho Code§ 56-218 to clarify the presentation and
collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. A number of
clarifications are made by repositioning language or stating the existing
concept more clearly. Under existing law, if the institutionalized spouse,
who received Medicaid, dies leaving a surviving spouse, no actual collection
is made, but a "claim" must be sent to the personal representative of the
estate of deceased institutionalized spouse, or if no probate is done, to the
surviving spouse. This can be very frightening to the surviving spouse, who
often does not understand that no current reimbursement is being
demanded. Therefor[e] [sic], the bill both clarifies that no recovery is made
until both spouses are deceased and also removes the requirement to send
a claim if no probate is filed at the first death.
If either Hedy or Robert had received Medicaid, the State of Idaho would be able
to claim their recovery in this probate (because I.C. § 15-3-11 1 was utilized) even though
Robert left a surviving spouse, Jadwiga. There is no other provision in Idaho Code that
allows for the extension of a creditor's claim limitations period for fil ing a claim .
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I.C. § 56-218 was amended in 2006 to provide for an expanded recovery for estate
recovery claims for Health and Welfare. I.C. § 15-3-803 was not amended to allow for
expanded recovery when a joint probate is commenced. When two statutes are in
conflict, the one enacted later in time governs and the specific statute will control over the
general statute. Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544
(1980). I.C. § 56-218 is both the later-enacted statute and the specific statute. It therefore
controls over the provisions contained in I.C. § 15-3-803. In re Estate of Wiggins, 306
P.3d 201 , 209, 155 Idaho 116 (Idaho 2013).
Similarly, I.C. § 15-3-108 was amended, effective July 1, 2014, to provide that the
three year statute of limitations on probate proceedings does not apply to Summary
Administration under I.C . § 12-3-1205. See Senate Bill No. 1249 which is attached as
Exhibit "B" of Cusack Affidavit and incorporated herein by this reference. Under I.C. §
12-3-1205, the statute expressly provides that "the surviving spouse shall assume and be
liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the estate of the
decedent." I.C. § 15-3-111 has no such express language. The legislature's omission of
any such express language in I.C. § 15-3-111 (stating the three year ultimate limit on
presenting claims is tolled) is a clear indication that in a joint probate, the surviving spouse
is not assuming the liability of the deceased spouse. Jadwiga used the joint probate
process to transfer real property held in the joint names of Hedwig and Robert, not to
expand a creditor's recovery period.
After a review of other states who have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, Idaho
is the only one that has adopted the unique language found in I.C. § 15-3-111. However,
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Utah has adopted Utah Code§ 75-3-109 which provides for joint administration of estates
but clearly provides that "claims may only be enforced against the estate to which they
relate." This is consistent with the Estate's argument set forth above. See Utah Code§
75-3-1 09 which is attached as Exhibit "C" of Cusack Affidavit and incorporated herein by
this reference.
Statutes of limitations are laws passed by each state to set the maximum time after
an event when legal proceedings may be initiated. When the period of time specified in a
statute of limitations passes, a claim can no longer be filed. The intention of these laws is
to faci litate resolution in a reasonable length of time. These statutes are designed to
prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after
the facts have become obscure through the passage of time or the defective memory,
death, or disappearance of witnesses.
Accordingly, Idaho's Uniform Probate Code applies a maximum three-year
limitations period on the presentment of creditor claims which beings to run on the
decedent's death and not upon the death of his or her successors, except in the case of
Medicaid recovery as noted above. This rule is also stated in the official comment to
Uniform Probate Code§ 3-317 explains:
In succession without administration, there being no personal representative's
notice to creditors, the short non-claim period under UPC Section 3-803(a)(1) does
not apply and creditors are subject to the statutes of limitations and the limitation
of three years on decedent's creditors when no notice is published under UPC
Section 3-803(a)(2). The general statutes of limitation are suspended for four
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under UPC Section
3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issuance
of the Statement of Universal Succession is deemed to be by operation of law and
does not operate to extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to
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run against the decedent. The result is that creditors are barred by the general
statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the shorter.
(Emphasis added). See Comment to Uniform Probate Code which is attached as
Exhibit "D" of Cusack Affidavit and incorporated herein by this reference.
Idaho Code at§ 15-3-111 provides a means of effectively passing property of joint
estates and contains no tolling provisions on the presentment of creditor claims for the
first spouse who died . Thus, the Idaho Code plainly limits the presentation of creditor
claims against an estate to a maximum of three yea rs after the decedent's death
regardless of whether the surviving spouse's estate exercises the right to jointly probate
the estates of both spouses. Jadwiga is entitled to summary judgment to deny Heinz's
creditor claim against Robert's estate because it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Ill.

Jadwiga's Disallowance of Heinz1 Claim was Timely.
On August 27, 2015, the Court sent the parties a letter requesting their respective

positions on whether Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's claim was timely, and if not,
whether Jadwiga effectively waived any statute of limitations defense against Heinz's
claim.
Throughout these proceedings, Heinz has continuously insisted, without support,
that J.C. § 15-3-806(a) requires a personal representative to disallow a creditor claim
within 60 days of the presentation of its creditor claim , ignoring the plain statutory
language that states: "[f]ailure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant
of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the cla im
has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." (Emphasis added). The statute's
use of the word "for" clearly indicates that the personal representative has 60 days after
the claimant's four-month period for original presentation of claims, which begins after the
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publication of the notice of creditors under I. C. § 15-3-801 . The analysis would only favor
Heinz if I.C. § 15-3-806(a) had instead stated "[f]ailure of the personal representative to
mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time of the
original presentation of the claim ."
I.C. § 15-3-806(d) also uses the identical language found in I.C. § 15-3-806(a) to
determine when to calculate interest on allowed claims. I.C. § 15-3-806(d) provides:
Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court entered against
the personal representative, allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate
for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original
presentation of the claim has expired unless based on a contract making a
provision for interest, in which case they bear interest in accordance with
that provision. (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals of Idaho in Bingham Mem. Hosp. v. Boyd , found that the
Personal Representative filed his notice to creditors which started the four month period
for creditors to file their claims. Bingham Mem. Hosp. v. Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674 (Ct.
App . 2000). The Court of Appeals held that interest cou ld not begin to accumulate until
six months after the Personal Representative first published his notice to creditors. Id.
The Court held the "time for original presentation of the cla im" is the four month period for
creditors to file their claim and therefore, interest would not begin to accumulate until 60
days after that period ended (i.e. six months after date of first publication). Id. Here, the
notice to creditors was filed on February 19, 2015. Under Idaho law, Jadwiga clearly had
until August 19, 2015 to disallow any creditor claims that were validly fi led. Accordingly,
Jadwiga timely disallowed Heinz's claim.
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IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner Jadwiga B. Melton respectfully requests this
Court GRANT her Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim, in part, as it is
barred by operation of law due to the running of the statute of limitations.
DATED this

-5!!2._ day of September 2015.
MARYW. C SACK,
Attorney for JADWIGA MELTO N
Personal Representative

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

~

day of September 2015, I caused a true and

accurate copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon,
and addressed to the following:

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd .
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynth ia@featherston law.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com
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(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
brent@featherstonlaw.com

rn 5 ~ EP l b

A 9=0 2

Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG 11HEDY" MELTON
Deceased.

)

CASE NO. CV-2013~0313

)
)
)
)
)

CREDITOR'S POST HEARING
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMAR\' JUDGMENT

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel, Brent C. Featherston, Featherston Law Finn,
Chtd., for and on behalf of Heinz Alt, ("Alt"), a creditor and interested party in the above-

referenced Estate of Robert Emest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy'' Melton, ("Estate") and hereby
submits Post Hearing Memorandum in Response to Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment.
At hearing on August 24, 2014, the Court asked for additional post-hearing b1iefing on the
Estate' s statute of limitations argument asserted under Idaho Code 15-3"803 and
subsequently the Court notified counsel by correspondence dated August 27th that the parties

should also brief the issue of whether the Estate timely disallowed Ml', Alt's Creditor's Claim

and, if not, the Claim would be deemed allowed rendering a waiver of the statute of
Dan!el P. Fea1hecs1on
Brent C, Peathtrston*
Jc:J'OJI\)' l', 'feath~rston

limitations argument.

leremi l.. Os~man
113 S . Second Aw,.

Sandi:,oln1, ID 83864
Pl>on¢ (208) 263,6866
f i,x (208) 263--0400
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For these reasons. the undersigned will address first the issue of untimely
disaltowance of Mr. Alt's claim followed by the statute oflimitations argument.
I.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Estate bas failed to timely disallow Mr. Alt's claim and the Claim is
deemed allowed by operation of law.

The Estate's Reply filed September 8th asserts that Alt provides no basis for his
assertion that a personal representative's failure to disallow a creditor's claim within sixty
(60) days results in allowance of the claim. The Estate ignores Idaho Ptobate Code. which
provides as follows:
(a)
As to claims presented in the manner described in
§15~3-804(a) of this part within the time limit described in
§15-3-803 of this part, the personal representative may

mail a notice to any claimant stating that the claim has
been disallowed ..... Failure of the personal representative
to mail notice to a claimant of actio:p. on his claim for sixty
(60) days after the time for original presentatiol1 of the
claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance.

LC. §15-3-806(a)(2015)
In examining the language "time for oliginal presentation of the claim" found in
subsection 806> note that LC. 15-3-802(c) provides''. . .the proper presentation of a claim
under §15-3-804, Idaho Code, is equivalent to the commencement of a proceeding on the
claim." I.C. §15-3-802 (2015)
Idaho Code§ 15-3-804 spells out the manner in which a creditor may present a
claim including that a ''claimant shall deliver or mail to the personal representative a
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C, PcatbcrSton"
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jen:mi L. Os5man

written statement of the claim indicating its basis and name and address of the claimant and

U3 $ . Second Av~.
Sandpoint, JD 83864

PhOn~ (208) :?63-6866
fax (208) 263,0400
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the amount claimed and file a written statement of the claim in the form proscribed by rule
with the Clerk of the Court.'' LC. §15-3-804(a)(2015)
The Code Section goes on to state that the claim is deemed presented on the last to
occur of either delivery or mailing of the claim to the personal representative or filing of
the claim with the court.
The phrase "after the time for original presentation of the claim" is consistent
throughout the Code and refers to the process and presentation of "the" specific creditor's
claim, not some general timeline for claim presentation, as argued by the Estate.1

In this case. the undisputed evidence establishes that Mr. Alt's Claim was filed
Januaty 13, 2015. It was served upon counsel by U.S. Mail on January 9th . See: Affidavit
of Counsel filed August 10, 2015, Exhibit "B;'.
Measuring the time from January 9th , and pennitting three (3) day mail rule for
service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for disallowance purposes began on
January 12th . (Applying a filing date of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not
change the outcome.)
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a Disallowance on

Ma1·ch 13th • Again, applying a three (3) day mail rnle provided for in I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l).
the Estate's Disallowance was not served upon counsel for Alt until March 161\ sixty-three
(63) days after service of the Claim. (Sixty~two (62] days after court filing of the Clajm,]

D~iel P. Featheraton

Brent C. F~atherston•
Jeremy P, Festhetston
Jcr1>mi L , Ossmao.
113 S . Second Ave.
Sa ndpoint, ID 83864
PhoM (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

1 If the

Estate's interpretation is cotrect, it is curious that the Personal Representative
attempted clisallowance so close to the 60 day timeframe, though not timely.
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Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely disallowed. Under
LC. §15~3~806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow the claim has the effect of deeming the
Claim allowed. This result renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot.
The Estate argues that its sixty (60) day time period did not begun to run until after
the time for presentation of all claims (four months following publication) has expired.
The Estate extrapolates from the language "for original presentation of the claim'' that this
must mean a general timeline for all creditors to submit claims, but provides no supporting
case law.
The Estate seeks to support its interpretation ofidaho Code §15-3-806(a) by
referring the Court to J.C. §15~3-806(d) and the case ofBingham_Memorial Hospital v.
Boyd, 134 Idaho 669 (App.2000). Both the Bingham Memorial Hospital and subsection
806(d) deal strictly with when interest is to be applied or computed upon a claim against
the Estate, when the contract supporting the claim does not provide for interest.
Perhaps more relevant is the plain language of the statute's subsection in question:
''Failure of the Personal Representative to mail notice of disallowance or partial allowance

on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of!!)& claim has
expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." 1.C, §15-3M806. The use of"the' in the
sentence makes clear that this provision is specificJo the specific creditor's claitn; not a

general four (4) month provision applicable to "any,, or "all" claims, language that should
be prese;nt (but is not) for the Estate;s argument to make sense.
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston~
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman
I 13 S. $<,Cond Ave.
Sandpoint, ID &3864
Phone (208) 263-68()6
Fax (208) 263-0400

The Court should find that the Estate has failed to timely disallow Mr. Alf's claim
and by operation oflaw it is deemed allowed under I.C §15-3-806. The allowance of Mr.
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Alt;s claim requires the Court to deny the Estate 1 s Motion for Summary Judgment in its
entirety.
B.

The Estate's statute of limitation iu--gument is inapplicable in light of

Idaho Code 15..3.. 111.
The Estate asserts that Mr. Alfs claim is barred by a statute oflimitations found in
I.C. §15~3-803 . The Estate's brief argues that LC. §15~3-111 does not "toll'' the statute of
limitations found h1 section 803. The logic of the Estate's argument bears further scrutiny.
First, the facts are that this Estate consists entirely of the marital community property
of Hedwig Melton and Robert Melton. It is undisputed that all of the Estate assets, namely
the home and property were titled in their names, Robert and Hedwig Melton, husband and
wjfe, at the time of Robert's death. No probate was filed of Hedwig's estate when she died.
If it had been, the p1'oceeding would have been eithel' a sununaiy administration unde1; I.C.

§15-3-1205, with Robert required to "assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness" ora
full blown probate of the wills would have been performed, with Mr. Alt being notified as
both a creditor and heir under het 1999 Last Will and Testament of Hedwig Melton.
Affidavit of Counsel filed August 26, 2014, Exhibit ''G". Neither occurred.
Second, Hedwig Melton died August 11, 2008 and Robert Melton died July 4, 2013 .
Mr. Alt's claim is against both estates and is timely as filed immediately upon the filing of the
joint probate Petition.
Third, :tvfr. Alt's claim is a conununity property debt as a loan incurred by Mr. and
Mrs. Melton in purchasing and building the real property that was held in their names at the
Daniel P. Feathei~lon
Brent C. Peatherston•
Jeremy P. Feathcnton
Jcromi L. Ossman
113 S. S;,cond Ave .
S1111dpoin1, ID 83864
Phone (208) 26'.3-6866
FIIX (208) 263-0400

time of Mr. Melton's death in 2013. Verified Creditor's Claim filed January 13, 2015.
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Fourth, Mr. Alt's claim was filed January 13, 2015, less than two (2) years following
the death of Robe1t Melton and immediately upon the proper filing of a joint probate of
Hedwig and Robert's estates under IC. 15-3-111.2

The Estate urges that Mr. Alt' s claim is barred by a "statute of Hmitations" resulting

from LC. §15-3-803. Subsection (a)(l) requires that ''claims against a decedent's estate
which arose before the death of the decedent, ... ifnot barred earlier by another statute of
limitations or non-claim statute, are baned against the estate, the personal representative, and
the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the following
dates: (1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or (2) within the time provided in §15-380 I (b), Idaho Code, for creditors who are given actual notice. and within the time provided in
§15-3~80l(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by publication''. I.C. §15-3803(a)(2015)[emphasis added]. LC. §15-3-803(a)(l)(2015)

The Estate argues that Alt was required as a creditor to file probate of his mother's
estate by 2011 to preserve his credito:es claim against both Robert and Hedwig Melton. (No
explanation is offered as to how §803 bars Alt's claim against Robert's Estate.)
When interpreting a statute) the Comt is to give it its plain meaning if the language is
unambiguous. "The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed

legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." St. Luke's
!{egional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board ofCom'rs of Ada County, 203 P.3d 683,685, 146
~~f..:~iJ ann
Daniel P, F~~1nerston
Brcn1C.fca1hent<>A*
Jeremy l', l'eaiMrst0n

Jercmi L Ossman
113 S. Second Ave.

Idaho 753~ 755 (2009) As discussed below, the Estate's argument leads to absurd results.
2 For some

inexplicable reason, Jadwiga and her former counsel initially filed this a 1205
summary administration though the property was titled community property of Robert and
Hedwig at Robert's death.

Sandpoint, 1D 83864
PhOn~ (20~) U3-6866
F~x (2Q8) U3-0400
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At the outset, the plain language of §803(a) establishes a time limit for filing claims

within a pending estate. The legislature's use of phrases presumes that an estate has been

filed:
1. "All claims against a decedenf s estate... "

2. "if not barred earlier by another statute of limitations or non-claim statute... "
3. ''are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent ... " I.C. §15-3-803(a)(2015)
To adopt the Estate's interpretation, the Legislative language of section 803 should

read: ''All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death ... are barred against
the ~cedent, the personal representative ...". That is not the language adopted by the
legislature and the language adopted is unambiguous that the time limit on claims applies
after an estate is opened for probate.
The Legislature did not impose an obligation upon the creditor in section 803 to file
the probate in order to preserve his claim, only the obligation to file a timely claim once the
probate is filed. That timely claim must be within three (3) years of the decedent's death or
within the time provided for creditor's actual notice or publication. The claim must be
"presented within the earlier of' these two (2) dates. In other words, even where an estate is
filed for probate and no notice to creditors given, it is incumbent on a creditor to file the
claim within three (3) years of death.
" , . •.. ,
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Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Ju=y P. Featherston
JeremiL. Onman
113 S. Second Ave,
SllI!dpoint, !D 83664
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

It is well established that generally a probate will not be permitted more than three (3)
years after the decedent's date of death, thus barring claims. but also barring any probate
proceeding. Idaho Code §15-3-108 establishes a three (3) year "statute oflimitation'' from
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the decedenf s date of death on filing for probate of the estate. The exception is I.C. §15-3111 that establishes: "In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death
of either spouse at any tune, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property of the
decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been
commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates
of both may be Joined for probate in a single proceeding_ ... The three (3) year provision of
§15-3-1 08, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last."
I,C. §15-3-111 (2015).

This exception to the three (3) year statute ofli.m.itation on filing of probate is equally
applicable to the three (3) year limitation on filing of claims in an estate, for several reasons.

First, the Cotut's obligation is to give effect to the plain legislative intent as expressed
in the statute. "To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words
of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the
statute, and its legislative history." St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of
Com'rs of Ada County, 203 P.3d 683,685, 146 Idaho 753, 755 (2009) Since the plain
language of section 803 discussed above contemplates a deadline for filing claims within an
open estate, not a statute of limitation on claims against decedents, the claim limitations
necessaiily follow the limitations on filing of a probate proceeding.

It makes no sense to require a creditor to assert his claim within three (3) years of the
first spouse to die or risk losing the claim when section 1205 requires the surviving spouse to
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Feathcrsion
Jcremi L. Ossman

113 S. S..cona Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phono (208) 263-6&66
Fu (208) 263-0400

assume the liability and J.C. 15-3-111 permits filing of a joint probate upon the second
spouse's death. The foolishness of forcing creditor initiated probates for debt owed by the
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surviving spouse is obvious.

i
t
I

Second, "[i)t is a basic tenet of statuto1y construction that the more specific statute or
section addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general." 'Wheeler v, ldah,Q
De12t. of Health and Welfare, 207 P.3d 988,995, 147 Idaho 257,264 (2009).
The Estate asserts the general statute that a claim must be presented in an open estate
within three (3) years of the decedent's death under §803. This is consistent with §108 that
prohibits filing of an estate more than three (3) years after decedent's death. Both sections
are general provisions that apply to filing of probate and presentation of creditor claims
within probate proceedings. The more specific provision found in J.C. §15-3-111 pennits
filing of a joint probate wider specific circumstances (marital community, survivor entitled to
all of estate, and survivor dies before any probate of spouse's estate is comme.1.1ced). This

more specific statute "controls over" the more general statute~s asserted by the Estate. To do
otherwise renders a nonsensical result.
Third, the Estate argues that Alt lost his right to assert this claim by failing to file a
probate of Hedwig's estate by 2011 but provides no explanation for how this affects the claim
against this joint probate of Robert and Hedwig's estates.
Robert could have taken ownership of the community assets in 2008 subject to the
deceased spouse's debts and liabilities, under a 1205 surnnwry administration~ or full blown
probate with notice to creditors. Since he took no action and Jadwiga has now filed a joint
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Jertrny P. Featherston
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113 S . Second Ave.
Sandpoint. 1D 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fu (208) 263-0400

probate under I.C. §15-3-111, her right to inherit (if any) is subject to Alt's creditor's claims,
Robert never pmbated Hedwig's 1999 Will. He did not acquire clear title to the property by
not probating the estate, but he also did not expunge the community obligation incurred by
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Hedwig and Robert when they borrowed funds from him.
The Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Lastly, the Estate engages in a wandering discussion of recent changes to the
Medicaid recovery statute found at LC. 56-218 asserting that it is more recent and somehow
controlling ovel'the effects ofI.C. 15~3~111. None of this is relevant. The Medicaid

recovery statutes are dictated by Federal law and are designed to recover funds on behalf of
the "payor of last resort" the federal Medicaid assistance program funded by tax payer
dollars. See: In re: Estate of Melvin Peterson 157 Idaho 827,340 P.3d 1143 (2014). The
Medicaid recovery rules are also unique in that the Department is prohibited from recovering
from the recipient's estate on death until the surviving spouse has died. J.C. 56-218
(l)(a)(2015). This argument is ilTelevant to this case.

The Estate also argues that recent amendments to I.C. 15-3-1205 providing that such
summary proceedings are NOT subject to a three (3) year filing limitation is also irrelevant.
Counsel argues that the legislature's failure to also amend 1.C. 15-3-111 reflects a legislative
intent to not extend the creditor claim period as the Estate construes section 803. This is

simply silly. A plain reading of the Statement of Purpose for RS22512 attached to counsel's

affidavit makes clear the legislative intent was to clarify the application of the three (3) year
limitation because "some coitrts have held to the contrary, and in some districts judges in the
same district have ruled differently on that question. This bill eliminates that confusion by
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clearly stating that the two procedures [including small estate affidavits] are not subiect
to the
J
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three year limitation."
The Estate argues nonsensicaJly that it was always Jadwiga's intent to utilize the joint
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probate procedure Wlder section 111 to "transfer real property... not to expand a creditor's
recovery period." This foolishly ignores that both Robert and Hedwig's estates are subject
to creditor claims once the joint probate is filed, whether she likes this or not. Jadwiga cannot
manipulate ownership of property she claims on the basis of a will purportedly signed just six
(6) months after marriage to Robert and after just three (3) years of marriage that is titled to
her predecessor and Robert Melton and was constructed and purchased with Mt. Alt' s funds.
Finally, the Estate argues that Utah code and the conunent to the Unifonn Probate
Code suppo1ts its position. The argwnent regarding Utah's statute does not help the Estate.
Alt's claim "relates", or is asserted, against both Robert and Hedwig's estates. Further,
Utah's statute cited by the Estate is not specific to married couples and community property.
It refers to joint tenants or tenants i11 common.
The Estate's reference to the Uniform Probate Code comments is also inapplicable as
the portion quoted states it is addressing "universal succession" or "succession without
administration" where no notice to creditors, etc... This is not the circumstances in this
proceeding and the comment is inapplicable.

II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should fmd as a matter of law that the

Estate failed to timely disallow Alt's claim and it is deemed allowed under I.C. §15-3-806(a).
Further, the Estate's Motion for Summazy Judgment based upon I.C. §15~3-803(a)
~ - ' ·w~arni

should be denied as a matter oflaw.

"$!'l8,~n1 .. .
DaniclP. Fcathmcon

Mr. Alt is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs based l.lpon Idaho Code§§

Brent C. Featherston~
JercmyP. Fealhcrston
Jeremi L. Qggman
113 S. SeCOn(\ AV<).
Sandpoin1,lb 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0400

12-120, 12-121 and 12-123 and based on Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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/~y of September, 2015.

BRENT C. FEATHERST
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Creditor
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I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2015, I caused a true and conect
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

( ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667·0708
Other: ~~-------

~~

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Je,emi L . Oaama11
ll.3 S. S1ieon<1 /\YQ ,
Sandpoint, J)) 83864
Phono (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIALl.iDIStm@F,O ..
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY G~f!~~ 6j-~
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF )
) Case No: CV-2013-0000313
Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig Melton )
)

DECEASED,

_ _ _ _ __ _ __ _

MEMORANDUM OPINION

)
)

Brent C. Featherston
Attorney for Heinz Alt
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Mary Cusack
Attorney for Jadwiga Melton
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

I.
INTRODUCTION
This cause was called to hearing on the personal representative's motion for summary
judgment on August 24, 2015. Ms. Cusack represents Jadwiga Melton, the surviving spouse of
Robert Melton and personal representative of the estate. Mr. Featherston represents Heinz Alt,
the claimant against the estate, son of Hedwig ("Hedy") Melton, and step-son of Robert Melton.
Hedy and Robert were married until her death on August 11, 2008. Robert then remarried the
personal representative, Jadwiga, in July 2010.
Heinz filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $102,574.50, alleging an
unsecured loan to his mother "Hedy" and Robert to purchase the residential real property owned
by the estate. The personal representative argues on summary judgment that the claim against
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 1
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Hedy' s estate is untimely as a matter of law and must be denied. Heinz argues that the
disallowance of his claim was untimely, and the claim has therefore been allowed by operation
oflaw. Alternatively, Heinz argues that his claim against Hedy's estate is not untimely and can
proceed to trial.
The court ruled at summary judgment hearing that issues of fact regarding "the dead
man's statute" and other theories advanced by the personal representative required denial of
summary judgment. The issues regarding timeliness of the disallowance of claim and Heintz's
claim against Hedy's estate received additional briefing post-hearing. Those briefs are now on
file and have been reviewed by the court. The remaining portions of the summary judgment
motion are now ripe for determination.

II.
STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for summary judgment where there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In order to make that determination, the court looks to "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any ... "
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts in the record are to be liberally construed
in favor of the party opposing the motion. If the record contains conflicting inferences or if
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied. Roell

V City ofBoise, 130 Idaho 199, 938 P.2d 1237 (1997); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808
P.2d 876 (1991)
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine if there are factual
issues to be resolved by the trier of fact. It is not the function of the trial court to weigh the
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evidence or resolve controverted issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, l 05 Idaho 600, 671
P.2d 1063 (1983); Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co. , 82 Idaho 410, 353 P.2d 657 (1960).
If there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, the court must enter summary judgment. Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin,
113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1987)

III.
UNDISPUTED FACTS

The following facts are either undisputed by the parties in their affidavits, or those
proposed by the non-moving party, which are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.
Hedy was Heinz's mother. Hedy married Robert Melton when Heinz was a teenage child.
Hedy and Robert were not financially successful, so in 1996 and 1997, Heinz made a series of
loans to Hedy and Robert totaling $102,574.50 for the purpose of purchasing land and building a
log home residence in Boundary County. The loan is documented in detail in Hedy' s
handwriting and signature, copies of which are attached to the Claim Against Estate as exhibits
A and B. Exhibit C shows the detailed floor plan of the residence, and is written in the
handwriting of Hedy and/or Robert Melton. Exhibit C was provided to Heinz by Hedy and
Robert as part of the loan process.
Hedy and Robert initially agreed to secure Heinz's loan by deeding the real property in
his name. Subsequently, it was agreed that Heinz would quitclaim the property to Hedy and
Robert, in exchange for their promise to name Heinz as their sole beneficiary in their wills. Hedy
and Robert subsequently executed valid wills in 1998 which did in fact name Heinz as their sole
beneficiary so he would ultimately inherit the property purchased and built with his loan money.
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Hedy died in 2008, and Robert remarried to Jadwiga in July 2010. Jadwiga is now the
personal representative of Robert's estate. In December of 2010, Robert executed a new will
which omitted Heinz and named Jadwiga as his sole beneficiary. In 2012, Heinz inquired of
Robert's will and was assured by Robert that his current will was the 1998 will which still
honored the agreement that Heinz be his sole beneficiary.
Robert died on July 4, 2013. Hedy's will was not probated following her death in 2008.
The residential real property purchased and constructed with Heinz' s loan proceeds is the only
significant estate asset. Ultimately, the estates of Hedy and Robert Melton were joined together
for probate in this proceeding pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 in 2015. Heinz filed a
claim against both estates on January 13, 2015. On March 17, 2015, the Personal
Representative filed a Notice ofDisallowance, and on May 4, 2015, Heinz filed his Petition to
Allow Claims.

A. WAS THE DISALLOWANCE TIMELY?
Heinz argues that the Personal Representative's March 17, 2015, Notice of Disallowance
exceeded the 60 day time limit and his claim is therefore allowed as a matter of law pursuant to
IC§ 15-3-806. While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim against the
estate within 60 days, a close reading of the controlling provision reveals the following:
"Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his
claim for sixty (60) days after the time/or original presentation of the claim has
expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." ( emphasis added)
Thus, it is clear from a close reading of the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of
a claim does not accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for original
presentation of the claim". Heinz argues that the focus of the statute is on "the" claim at hand,
meaning that the 60 day time limit runs from date of its presentation. Heinz' s interpretation of
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the statute is not entirely without logic, and likely explains local practice and understanding.
However, the court concludes that the specification of "the time for", which precedes and
modifies the reference to "the" claim, means that the estate's duty to disallow begins running
after expiration of the deadline for presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the
statute as Heinz urges, it would simply read" ... 60 days after presentation of the claim . ...",
without any need for reference to "the time for original presentation" having expired.
In this probate, the personal representative filed her Notice to Creditors on February 61\
and published it for the first time on February 19, 2015. Idaho Code §15-3-801 (a) and (b)
provide that creditors have four (4) months to present their claims from the date of first
publication of notice in a newspaper of general circulation. In those instances where a creditor
has received personal delivery of the "Notice to Creditors", those claims must be presented
within 60 days. It is not clear in the record whether Heinz received personal delivery of the
Notice to Creditors under subsection (b). Ifhe did, he had until about April 8th to file his claim,
meaning that the estate had until about June 8th to deny it. If Heinz fell into the category of
creditors served by publication of the notice, the original time for presentation of those claims
did not expire until about June 19th, giving the estate another 60 days to effectively deny that
class of claims. Under either scenario, the Personal Representative's March 1th disallowance
was clearly timely.

B. IS HEINTZ'S CLAIM AGAINST HEDY'S ESTATE TIME-BARRED?

The personal representative argues that Robert's claim against Hedy's estate is time
barred by IC § 15-3-803, which provides in relevant part as follows:
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LIMITATIONS ON PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS

(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent,
including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof (except claims for state taxes),
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of
limitations or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal representative,
and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the
following dates:
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death;
Hedy died in 2008 and Heinz did not file his claim against her estate until early 2015 . As
that span of time far exceeds three years following Hedy's death, the Personal Representative
argues that the claim is barred.
Heinz argues that because Hedy's estate was not probated until 2015, there was no estate
within which he could have filed his claim, so the three year limitation did not begin to run until
Hedy's estate was opened. The court is not persuaded. IC§ 15-3-203 provides in relevant part:
PRIORITY AMONG PERSONS SEEKING APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

(a) Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons who are not disqualified have
priority for appointment in the following order:

***

(6) forty-five (45) days after the death of the decedent, any creditor;
Heinz, as a creditor of Hedy's estate, therefore had the clear remedy to probate her estate
as the personal representative and prosecute his claim within three (3) years of her death.

Heinz also argues that IC§ 15-3-111 supports his contention that the three year limitation
on presenting claims is tolled when spouses' estates are probated jointly. Again, the court is not
persuaded. IC § 15-3-11 provides:
JOINT PROBATE ON DEATH OF SURVIVOR OF MARRIAGE DISSOLVED BY DEATH

In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death of either spouse at
any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or
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both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both decedents may be joined for
probate in a single proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose
death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to
the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The initial application or petition filed in any
such joint proceeding shall contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is
based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be made therein.

There is nothing in this section that states or suggests any tolling of a creditor' s deadline
to present a claim, just because the estate is subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section
specifically exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the first spouse,
as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates the legislature's ability and willingness to
make special exceptions within this particular provision where warranted and intended. As there
is no exception made to the three (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be
implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was not filed or "presented" within
three years of her death and is now barred by IC§ 15-3-803(a)(l).

IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes that the Personal Representative' s
disallowance of Heinz's claim is not untimely. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by
IC 15-3-803, and therefore subject to summary judgment dismissal. Heinz may still proceed with
his claim against Robert's estate.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular mail,
postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this ~ day of October, 2015, to:
Brent Featherston
113 South Second A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864
Mary Cusack
320 E. Neider Aver, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased .
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313
JUDGMENT
I.R.C.P. 54(b)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt's claim , filed

March 17, 2015, in the above referenced estate was timely filed .
2.

Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred

pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-8~
DATED this

1.

.

S.;..-- day of December

MELTON JUDGMENT
{MWC00153249.DOCX; 1/20397.100}
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment or Order, it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a Final Judgment and that the Court has
and does hereby direct that the above Judgment or Order shall be a Final Judgment upon
which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
DATED this

t(:}

~

day of December

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

3

day of December 2015, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed via Regular U.S . Mail or faxed to :
MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider, Suite 206
Coeurd' Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0708 - FAX

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DMSION

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON
Deceased.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, JADWIGA MELTON, AND TO
YOUR ATTORNEY, MARY CUSACK
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
l.

The above-named Appellant, HEINZ ALT, appeals against the above-named

Personal Representative, JADWIGA MELTON, to the District Court of the First Judicial
District from the JUDGMENT entered in the above-entitled matter on December 3, 2015, by
the Honorable Justin Julian, Magistrate Judge, presiding.
. 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the Judgments or
Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho
~RSION lA'!_\'_FlRM.O@
AlTO~ Nl1"5 AT I.AW

Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman••

Code § 1-705(3), Idaho Code § 17-201 and I.R.C.P 83.
3. (a) IsaClerk'stranscriptrequested? Yes.

113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

NOTICE OF APPEAL - l
• Licensed in Idaho & Washington

**Licensed in Idaho & Michigan
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(b) These proceedings were electronically recorded by the Clerk of the Court and

are in the custody of Clerk of the Court, Boundary County, Idaho.
4. This Appeal is brought both on matters oflaw and matters of fact.

5. Appellant will separately file a statement of the issues on appeal.
6. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of the Court,
and upon the court reporter, if one was present at these proceedings.
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative agency will be promptly

paid upon notice of the Clerk's estimate.
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
the Idaho Criminal Rules.
DATED this

/'7

I

day ofJanuary, 2016.
FEATHER~

~

; IRM

-

By BRENTC.FEAfHERST
Attorney for Appellant
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Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jererni L . Ossman**
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
*Licensed in Idaho & Wo.shington
**Licensed in Idaho & Michigan
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I hereby certify that on the /J~day of January, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
Glenda Poston
Boundary County Clerk of the Court
215 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

[ ]
[ ]
~]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile
Courthouse Mail
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
~ Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of

)

CASE NO. CV 2013"313

)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and )

HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON

)
)

Deceased.

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT

)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above matter is reassigned to the Honorable
Jeff Brudie. Administrative District Judge for the Second Judicial District. for the
reassignment to a District Judge from the Second Judicial District for all further
proceedings, Pw·suant to the Idaho Supreme Court Order for Assignment of Second
Judicial District Judges to the First Judicial District dated June 17. 2015. this
reassignment shall be considered an appointment by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l )(l)(iii).

. ._,_./,'

-:---

DATED this

IS

day of

.J:3n ,2016.
LANSING L. HAYNES
Administrative District Judge for the
First Judicial District · · ·
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby ce11ify that on the &.:> day of ~CX..(\ · , 2016i a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was sent via facsimile, to the following:
Honorable Jeff M. Brudie
Faxed: 208-799-3058
Honorable Barbara Buchanan
Interoffice mail
Brent C. Featherston
Attorney at Law
Fax: 208-263-0400

Mary Cusack
Attorney at Law
Fax: Q.o~ - lR.(Q1- C>lob

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

B~ ' \ ~~
Deputy Clerk

-(

.

)

'---...
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Mitrhe] l, Haynes, Friedlander, Pele
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
ASSIONMBNT OF SEGOND J\JDICIAL DISTRICT
JUDOllS TO 'rt-ti! FIRST JUDICIAL ll!STIUCT
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)
)

Oll.OBR .

WHl!lt2AS, lh!s Court havi~s dolermlned a. rtctd for addU!onil'Judlcl,I uei,tanto In lho Flll8t.
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'

0

bRUl>llt JOHN 81.lmNl!II. JAY GASKILL &lld ORl!OORY _fl'TZMAIJRICB
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n~ouaq-:. an4 w_UI

j)t'(ln1o1, tho efllclanl admlnltu-,llon ofJuillco; theroforo, good ol\lS6 appearing.

IT HB.RBBY lS ORDBRED ·rhll Seoond Judlolal Dl,t~« Court )udgt.1 JllPP BIWDJB, JOHN
STl!GNQR, Jr,Y GASKILL pntl GRl!OORY PITZMAURTCB 1,o,·o.nd li~b}' an,, ASSIONED lo tho FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRlCT and eppoln<ed lo pN111do In eny ~!lffl u mq bo d~ign~l~ by Ille Adml~_lair.1lvo
Olftrict Judge 111 thD Pl~ JUDICIAL DISl'RIC'f and_wlgl!Cd by •.~o Admlnhtntlvo Dl11r'!cl 111dgo lrt \he
Seeond Jtldlottl District to <Odduct •II prooeedll\&ll n ~ to, lh_olt ll~_•I di~jlf?llllon dwlllg, lho ptrlod
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c'

; •
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•
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•.f

40(d)(IJ(l)(III) o(th, Idaho Ruloa of Civil P~ul'O, lho~ shall bo no rlsfiJ tq dltqutlll}' lhosoJlldllfll wlthDlll
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11'. •FURTH nit
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. .
• • ·- ·
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DATijDtbit~cl-.yofJune,20lS.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
)

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNFST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" lvfELTON

Deceased.
_ _ _______

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2013-313
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE

It is ORDERED that Judge John Stegner, whose chambers are located in Moscow,
Idaho, is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
DATED this :2-hl:ay of January 2016.

·e

cfnc!~l.trtrffive District Judge

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1

- - -- - - - -- -- - -- -

......

________ -- -- - - - -- - - -- -- - - -- Page 214 of 438

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete
and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER AffilGNING JUDGE was delivered to:
Brent Featherston: Fax 20~263-0400

Mary Cusack: Fax 208-667-0708
Hon John Stegner: fax 208-883-5719

on this ~(:)...--.day of January 2016.
,____y-..._ --··· ----·

~ ~

~

----/

\

~ eputy G:lerk

-

)

.

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE-2

- - - - - - - - -··- ·

·····----

-
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602
Attorney at Law

113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864
(208) 263-6866

FILED
2016 HAR -2 PH ~: 03
STATE OF lOAHG ·
COUNT Y OF BOUNDARY

GLEH~ ~~?1TC~LERK
BY

(208) 263-0400 (Fax)

~~

--::i.

.- n-:··
u.,._,. . IJ r:-,-Cl
T
_:e
f'\ _1

brent@featherstonlaw.com

Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON
Deceased.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, JADWIGA MELTON, AND TO
YOUR ATTORNEY, MARY CUSACK
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, HEINZ ALT, appeals against the above-named

Personal Representative, JADWIGA MELTON, to the Distiict Court of the First Judicial
District from the n.JDGMENT entered in the above-entitled matter on December 3, 2015, by
the Honorable Justin Julian, Magistrate Judge, presiding.
. 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the Judgments or

· Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rule 17(m) and I.R.C.P. Rule 83(a).
Daniel P. Pea1heralon
Brent C, Fcatheralon*
Jeremy P. Fcathelllton
)m:mi L. Ossman**

3. (a) Is a Clerk's transcript requested? Yes.

113 S. S<>C<>n<1Avc,

S:lndpoint, lD 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fa.-: (208) 263-0400

AMENDED NOTlCE OF APPEAL. 1
•!.,jc.,n,,.d in ldaha I,_ WWlh\tlOO
• •Lic<n""1 in l<hlho It 'Michl£an
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(b) These proceedings were electronically recorded by the Clerk of the Court and

are in the custody of Clerk of the Court, Boundary County, Idaho. Hea~ing on Motion for

Summary Judg.nent held August 24, 2015.
4. This Appeal is brought both on matters of law and matters of fact.
5. Appellant will separately file a statement of the issues on appeal.

6. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of the Court,

and upon the court reporter, if one was present at these proceedings.
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative agency will be promptly

paid upon notice of the Clerk1s estimate.
(c) lb.at service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
the Idaho Rules of Civil ,edure and Idaho Code.

DATED this

~

day of March, 2016.

Attom.ey for Appellant

Ditniel P. Peathc:.rston
Brent C. Penthc:.rston*
Jeremy P. Feathcnaon
Jcremi L. Os&man•¥

113 S. Second Ave.
s~ndpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 26~-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

AMENDED NOTICE OF Al'PEAL. 2

•Lioco,cd io ldilha k. W..hintton
..L1ocn1c~ In Id.Iha & Michrs•n
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

n# ·

I hereby certify that on t h e ~ day of March, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following

manner:
Glenda Poston
Boundary County Clerk of the Court
P.O.Box419
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805

Mary W. Cusack, Esq_
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ] U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight_Mail
[ ] ijand delivered

[W Facsimile
[ ] Courthouse Mail
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
U.S. Mail, Posmge Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
Other: - - - - - - - ~

D&lliel P. Fealhcmlon
Bn:ni C. Fealhonton*
Jeremy P. Foatherslon
krcnti L. Ossman*~
11~ S. Soicond Ave.

S6ildpoin1, ID 83864
Phomi (208) 263-6866
f',1)( (208) 263-0400

AMENDEO NOTJCE OJt Al'PEi\L · 3

<l,io,,n,.d in 14'11o 8t W..hlnj.10ft
"Lic.on,od 101~111lo & Mielusan
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FILED
2016 HAR -3 AH IQ: 16
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNT Y OF BOUND/\ RY

GLEND~CLERK
8Y~~-:-------OEPUTY CLf.R!';

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF,
ROBERT E MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON

)
) Case No: CV-2013-0000313
)
) ESTIMATE OF TRANSCRIPT COST
)

DECEASED,

You have filed a Notice of Appeal in the above entitled matter. Unless otherwise
ordered , a transcript is required and the transcript fee must be paid within fourteen (14)
days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. It is estimated that the cost of the transcript is
$120.25.
·c.,l

DATED this

3

day of March, 2016.

GLENDA POSTON
Clerk of the District Court

ESTIMATE OF TRANSCRIPT COST -1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, regular mail, and/or delivered, this ::t~ay of March, 2016 to:

Brent C. Featherston
Attorney at Law
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint ID 83864

Deputy Clerk

I

\

ESTIMATE OF TRANSCRIPT COST -2
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FILED
2016 HAR f S PH I: oa
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
GLENDA POSTON. CLERK

BY

•

1

oE~rrtr!f'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

)
)
)
)
)
)

In The Matter Of The Estate Of
Robert Ernest Melton, etal.
Deceased

Case No: CV-2013-0000313
NOTICE OF LODG ING
OF TRANSCRIPT

TO: THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED OR THEIR ATTORNEYS :
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(0) that the transcript
previously ordered in the above entitled matter has been lodged with the Clerk of the
District Court, Magistrate Division, of Boundary County, State of Idaho.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have twenty-one (21) days from the date
of this Notice to secure your copy of the transcript from the Clerk of the District Court, and
to file any objections.
DATED this

(5~") dayof '-iY7t.. ,·c l1,20 1(.{.;) .
GLENDA POSTON
Clerk of the District Court

. By

l~7a VVJ ,,L L0J~if)
°

Deputy Clerk
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NOTICE OF LODGING TRANSCRIPT-1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fo egoing was mailed, regular
mail, postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this ~
~day of ~\.
· ,c
, 20 f (.._-, , to:

Mary W Cusack
Attorney at Law
320 East Neider Avenue , Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene ID 8381 5
Brent C. Featherston
Attorney at Law
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint ID 83864

)

)/4 \ ~
/

l0'-~\.~.r \

Deputy Clerk
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FILED
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STATE OF lOAHO
rou!HY Of BOUNDARY
GLE l P, JSTOH, CLERt\

ll~CllIVEJD

MAR 17 2016
Featherston L

aw .FY;r'nl, Obtd,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF,
Robert Ernest Melton, etal.

)
)

Case No: CV-2013"0000313

~

RECEIPT OF TRANSCRf~r t·

)
-----~--------)
DECEASED,

I, Brent Featherston, hereby certify that on the

/f~t March, 2016, I received

a copy of the Clerk's Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment held in the above
matter on August 24, 2015, before the Hon. Judge Justin W. Julian.

RECEIPT OF TRANSCRIPT.- 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
)

In the Matter of the Estate of

)

Case No. CV-2013-313

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON

_______________

)
)
)

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT

)

On January 13, 2016, the Appellant, Heinz Alt, filed a Notice of Appeal with
this Court. The appeal is taken from the Judgment entered by the Magistrate Judge
on December 3, 2015, after granting a motion for summary judgment filed by the
estate's personal representative, ,Jadwiga Melton. The transcript of the motion for
summary judgment hearing was filed with this Court March 15, 2016. Consequently,
a briefing schedule is appropriate.

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT

Page 1
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Good cause appearing,
It is ORDERED that:
(1) Appellant's statement of issues on appeal is due no later than May 4,

2016;
(2) Appellant's opening brief shall be filed and ser'ved no later than June 8,

2016;
(3) The personal representative's response brief shall be filed and served no

later than July 6, 2016;
(4) Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served no later than July

27, 2016;
(5) Oral argument will be conducted on August 19, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. by

telephone with the Court placing the call.
Dated this

l..'o/'l:; of April 2016.

~l-"""-- "--~~'~
Joh n R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT
Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING ORAL
ARGUMENT were delivered in the following methods to:
Brent Featherston
Attoniey at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[ ]
[ ]
[ X]
[ ]

Mary Cusack
Attorney at Law
320 E. Neider Aver, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

[
[

on this ~

day o~

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
Fax .;l Oc ~ 3 .QL.-~CX)
Hand Delivery

] U.S. Mail
] Overnight Mail
[X ] Fax d-~ ' <.R&,l .(Jl{¾'
[ ] Hand Delivery

CLERK OF THE COURT

2016.

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT

Page 3
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2082630400

I
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ORIG11~AL

fff

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South _Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
prent@featherstonlaw.com

r

I!
I

!
I

Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

APPELLANT'S STATEMENT
OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

COMES NOW· the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz
Alt, and pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral

Argument. hereby submits a Statement ofissues on Appeal as follows:
1.

Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment determining that

the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the Personal Representative?
2.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that Appellant's

Creditor's Claim is time barred as against the Estate of Hedwig Melton?

3.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law holding that Idaho Code § 15-3-111,

does not toll or extends the time within which A.P!)ellant'$ Creditor's Claim may be asserted
DanM P. Pcath,:,rston
Brent C. Pcathersl(ln*
Jeremy P. FeatheritOn
Jeremi L Osstn3Jl ••

against the joint estate of Robert and Hedwig Melton?

113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (i08) 263-6866
F~ (i08) 263-0400

APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL. I
•Lic.-c,..i io ld>ho & Wash~oon
••Licen""' ii\ Ic!AAo & Mich,s•n
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Did the trial court err as a matter of Jaw in granting summary judgment based

upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's
estate when that state is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint estate

permitted by Idaho Code § 15-3-111?
DATED this

Lj/? dayofMay, 2016.

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

~

I hereby certify that on the
day of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
Hon. John R. Stegner

Second Judicial District Judge
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 883-5719
[ ] Courthouse Mail
( ] Other: - - - - - - - -

~

[ ] U.S. M.ail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ ] Other: - - - -- -- -

w

Dsniel P. PeathcrS!()n
Bront C, f1,~1hen,1on·•
Jeremy P. Feathesston
fo~ml L. Ossman..
113 S . Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phono (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

A.Pl'£L~N1''S ST-'TEMENT OF lSSU£S ON APPEAL - 2

•Licc,ised !~ IOaho & Washing1on
"'Li=iildin ld,Jto&MJClut>ll
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2082630400
r T'! 4

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint.Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
brent@feathei·stonlaw.com
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Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG '~HEDY" MELTON

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

CO:tvfES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz
Alt, and pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral

·Argument, hereby submits Appellant's Brief as follows:
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Appellant in this matter, Heinz Alt, (''Alt") is the son of Hedwig Melt.on

("Hedy") and step-son of Robert Emest Melt.on (''Robert"). This ca<,e commenced with the
filing _o f a Petition for Summary Administration of Estate on August 29, 2013, by Robert's
wife of just over three years, Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Robert married Jadwiga in 201 0
,after Hedy died in 2008.
DMiel P. Feath=ton
Brent C. Fealh<lrston*
Jeremy P. FestheritOII
Jcremi L . Ossmsn*'

It is undisputed that all assets of the Estates of Robert and Hedy, primarily consisting

of the personal property and contents of a home and the log home and real property in

113 S. Second Ave.
Sllndpoint, ID 83864
~hone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

APPELLANT'S BRJEF · l

•lio¢n<¢d tn Id.ho & Waahinttcn
..l.loen1td In Idaho & Miohis•n
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Boundary County, Idaho are community property. It is also undisputed that the real property
was purchased, and the log home built, by Robert and Hedy with funds lent to them by :Mr.
Alt. 1 Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim and affidavits and testimony estabiish that Robert and Hedy
were spendthrifts. The total loan funds are itemized in attachments to Alt's Claim against the
Estate filed January 13, 2015 signed by Hedy. The totals of $102,574.50 and Hedy's own
writing acknowledges that the initial $75,982.50 was utilized to purchase and build the log
house in Boundary County, which) at time of death, was titled to Robert and Hedy as
community property.

The property was initially titled to Mr. Alt and his wife as

acknowledgement or security of the loan. Subsequently, the Meltons executed Wills leaving
all of their estates to Mr. Alt. The real property was deeded back to Meltons. See: Creditor's

Claim and Affidavit of Mary W. Cusack filed June 25, 2015, Exhibits "A'\ "B'' and C''.
Hedy died on August 11, 2008, and no pi-obate was filed. Alt maintained continuing
cont.act with his step-father, Robert~ visiting Idaho from his home in Austria on a number of
occasions from 2008 until 2012 and maintaining contact by phone and email.

In the summer of 2010, Robert apparently manied Jadwiga, who now submits for
pl'obate a purported Last Will and Testament of Robert executed in December, 2010, just six
(6) months following their marriage. Robert died on July 4, 2013.

Jadwiga originally filed

a Petition for Swnmary Administration which was ultimately abandoned in favor of Petition
to jointly probate the Estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton filed December, 2014. Because
the 2010 "Will" was not self~authenticating) Mr. Alt challenged it and filed a Motion to
Convert Proceedings and to Strike Petition for Summary Administration.
Daniel P. Fea11\anton
Brcnl C. Foaihertton*
Jeremy P. FMthemon
Jcretni L . O$$m~n•·•
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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TI1e 2010 Will is not self-authenticating and was challenged at the hearing for
appointment of Jadwiga as Personal Representative in a Fonnal Probate proceeding.

Jadwiga's counsel introduced the testimony of Lila Robinson, a bank employee, who recalled
Robert coming in to. sign a Will. Robert's signature was purportedly witnessed by Ms.
Robinson and Kristina Russell on Page 5 of 5. However, a separate, un-numbered page was
attached to the 2010 Will as filed with the Court which is titled "SELF·PROVING
AFFIDAVII'' in which Ms. Russell purports to notarize the signatures of Robert, Lila
Robinson and a third party, Annie Swift, with Ms. Robinson and Ms. Swift being identified
as "witnesses,' to Robert's signature and execution. Neither Ms. Russell or Ms. Swift

verified the 2010 Will.
Following the December 9, 2014, filing by Jadwiga of the Petition for Formal Probate
of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative, Mr. Alt filed his Claim against
the Estate, which was served upon Jadwiga's counsel by mail on January 9, 2015. On March
13, 2015, Jadwiga's counsel mailed a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim.
Alt timely filed a Petition to Allow the Claim on May 4th noting and preserving the
untimely disallowance by Jadwiga, sixty-three (63) days after presentation of the Claim.
On June 25, 2015, Jadwiga's counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
Affidavit of Mary Cusack and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment covered a plethora of issues.

Alt filed his

Response to Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 10th • At hearing on August
24, 2015, the Court dispensed with, and declined to grant, Summary Judgment on all of the
Danitl P. Ptatherston

Brtnt C. Ftatherston•
J,iremy "P. Featherston
fr.remi l.. Ossman..

Estate's argument, except taking under advisement the issue of the Estate's Disallowance and
whether Mx. Alt's Claim is time baned.

113 S. Secon<I Ave.

S~poin1,JD 83864
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Subsequently, the trial court issued a Memorandum Opinion on October 8, 2015,
concluding that Alt's claim was timely disallowed by the Est.ate and :further concluding that
Alt's claim as against Hedy's Estate is barred by Idaho Code § 15-3-803, but not barred as to
Robert's Estate.
The trial wurt enteted Judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) on December 3, 2015. Alt
timely appealed by filing his Notice of Appeal on January 13, 2016, and Amended Notice of
Appeal on March 2, 2016.
II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Did the trial court err in granting Partial Summary Judgment m its

determination that the Estate had timely disallowed Alt's claim?
8.

Did the trial court err by granting Summary Judgment for the Estate

determining that Alt's creditor's claim is baned as against Hedy Melton's Estate.
1.

Did the Trial court err as a matter of law that Idaho Code § 15-3-111

does not toll period for Creditor's Claim when asserted against a joint community property
estate of Robert and Hedy Melton?
2.

Did the Trial Cowt en as a matter of law by holding that Idaho Code §

15-3-803(a) necessruily bars all claims against Hedy Melton's Estate when her Estate was
filed as a community property joint probate under Idaho Code § 15-3-111, more than three (3)
years after her death and as pem1itted by I.C. § 15-3 111?
M

Daniel P. Feathoraton
Bren! C. Festh!ltston*

Jeremy P. FGOthers.ton
foremi L. Ossma11n
113 $. Second Ave.
Sandpoinl. ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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ARGUMENT
A.

Did the Trial Court err in granting Partial Summary Judgment in its
determination that the Estate had timely disallowed Alt's Claim?

The Estate asserts that Alt provides no basis for his assertion that a personal
representative's failure to disallow a creditor's claim within sixty (60) days results in
allowance of the claim. The Estate ignores Idaho Probate Code, which provides as follows:
(a)
As to claims presented in the manner described in §15M
3-804(a) of this part within the time limit described in §15-3803 of this part, the personal representative may mail a notice
to any claimant stating that the claim has been disallowed .....
Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a
claimant of action on his claim for _sixty (60) days after the
time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the
effect of a notice of allowance.

r.c. §15-3-806(a)(2015)
In examining the language "time for odginal presentation of the claim" found in
subsection 806, note that I.C. §15-3-802(c) provides " ... the proper presentation of a claim
under §15-3-804, Idaho Code, is equivalent to the commencement of a proceeding on the
claim." J.C. §15-3M802 (2015)
Idaho Code §15-3-804 spells out the manner in which a creditor may present a claim
including that a "claimant shall deliver or mail to the personal representative

a written

statement of the claim indicating its basis and name and address of the claimant and the
amount claimed and file a written statement of the claim in the form proscribed by rule with

the Clerk of the Court." I.e. §15-3-804(a)(2015)
The Code section goes on to state that the claim is deemed ptesented on the last to
Da~iel P. l"eathcrston

Brent C. l'eathcrston•

occur of either delivery or mailing of the claim to the personal representative or :filing of the

Jercrn;y l>. Featherston
Jt>remi L. Ossmsn••

claim with the court.

113 S. Second Ave,
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The phrase "after the time for original presentation of the claim" is consistent
throughout the Code and refe.rs to the process and presentation of "the', specific creditor's
claim.

In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes that Mr. Alt's Claim was filed

January 13; 2015. It was served upon counsel by U.S. Mail on January 91h_ See: Affidavit of
Counsel filed August 10, 2015, Exhibit "B".
Measuring the time from January 9th, and permitting three (3) day mail rule for
service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for disallowance purposes began on
January 12th • (Applying a filing date of January 13, 2015, one (l) day later, does not change
the outcome.)

The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a Disallowance on March
13 th • Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule provided for in I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l); the
Estate's Disallowance was not served upoll counsel for Alt until March 1611\ sixty4hree (63)
days after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two [62) days after court filing of the Claim.]

Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely disallowed. Under
J.C. §15-3r806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow the Claim has the effect of deeming the

Claim allowed. This result renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot.
The Estate argues that its sixty (60) day time period did not begun to run until after
the time for presentation of all cJaims (four months following publication) has expired. The

Estate extrapolates from the language ''for original presentation of the claim" that this must
mean a general timeline for all creditors to submit claims, but provides no supporting case
Dsnlel P. Feather£lOII

Brem C. Fea!h~r, ton•
J~y P. Fea1hers1on

law.

J~rtrni t,, OS$mMH
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263,6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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Perhaps more relevant is the plain language of the statute's subsection in question:
'Failure of the Personal Representative to mail notice of disallowance or partial allowance on

1

his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired
has the effect of a notice of allowance." LC. §15-3-806. The use of "the" in the sentence
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's cJaim, not a general four
(4) month provision applicable to Han.y" or "all" claims, Janguage that should be present (but

is not) for the Estate's argument to make sense.
The Court should find that the Estate has failed to timely disallow Mr. Alt' s Claim
and by operation of law it is deemed allowed under I.C. §15-3-806. The allowance of Mr.
Alt's Claim required the Court to deny the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment in its
entirety and deem the Claim allowed as against the Estate.
B.

Did the trial court err by granting Summary Judgment for the Estate
determining that Alt's creditor's Claim is barred as against Hedy
Melton's Estate?

Should the Court uphold the Trial Court's determination that the Estate timely
disallowed Alt's Creditor's Claim, then the true crux of the issue on appeal from the Trial

Comi's grant of Summary Judgment is the application ofldaho Code §15-3-803 (a) to joint
probates filed more than three (3) years after one spouse's death pursuant to §15-3-111 and ·
the effect upon an otherwise timely Creditoi·'s Claim.
. Section 111 essentially extends the normal three (3) year statute of limitations
found in Idaho code §15~3-108. "No informal probate or appointment proceeding or

f01mal testacy or appointment proceeding, ... may be commenced more than three (3) years
Daniel P. Feath~rston
Brent C . Fo.,th8l'ston*
Jeremy P. Foathenton
Jeremi L. Ouma11n

after the decedent's death ... ." Idaho Code §15-3-108 (2015) By its terms, Section 108's

113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0400
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t~ee (3) year time limit on probate filings does not apply to summary administrations

i

under Idaho Code §15-3-1205.

t

i
(

I

The Summary Administration procedures set forth in section 1205, also provides
that the debts of the deceased spouse pass through to the surviving spouse:
... (c) In the event that the survivjng spouse (or person
claiming through or wider the surviving spouse) shall elect to
proceed under this section. the surviving spouse shall assume
and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a
claim against the estate of the decedent and there will be no
administi:ation of the estate of the decedent.
Idaho Code§ 1S-3-1205 (2016)
Jadwiga initially elected to proceed under 1205 by filing a summary administration
petition and then applied for a joint probate of the estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton
under Idaho Code § 15~3~111. The Trial Court found that Alt's Creditor claim, though

timely filed in the jojnt probate proceeding, is barred as a matter of law wider Idaho Code§
l 5-3-803(a).
1.

Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law that Idaho Code § 153-111 does not also toll the period for ~reditor's claim when
asserted against community property Estate of Robert and Hedy
Melton?

The Idaho Supreme Court has been clear about interpreting legislation: "When
considering the interpretation of a particular provision, particularly one containing
ambiguities, a court should look to the surrounding provisions for proper context. Idaho
Dept. Of Health & Welfare v. McCormick. 283 P.3d 785, 793, 153 Idaho 468, 476
(Idaho,2012); See: State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (20ll)
Daniel P. Featherston

Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Feathen ton
Jeremi L. Ossman**

["Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the
entire [statute].")
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As discussed above, the legislative scheme establishes several things:
First, probate of an estate is usually barred three (3) years following the death of
the decedent, except in §1205 Summary Administrations where the estate is community
property and will pass to the spouse subject to the debts of the decedent;

ruuJ.,

when the

estate is community property in nature and the surviving spouse is entitled to inherit the
property, then the marital estates may be filed jointly for probate upon the death of the
surviving spouse. The three (3) year provision ofldaho Code §15-3-1 08 only then applies
to the death of the surviving spouse. Again, it is essentially a tolling of the statute of
limitations for probating the estate of the first spouse to die.
This case presents both circumstances. Jadwiga initially filed this as 1205 summary
administration in August, 2013. Under that petition, Hedy's interests would pass to Robert
but together with the obligation owed to her son, Mr. Alt. However, this did not effect a
transfer of assets to Jadwiga. since she is not the surviving spouse of Hedy and all of the
Estate assets were community assets of Robert and Hedy Melton.
Ryalizing this, Jadwiga then filed a joint administration of both Hedy and Robert's
Estates in December, 2014. This filing provided Mr:. Alt the first opportunity to assert his
Claim for repayment of the $102,000.00 loan to Robert and Hedy.
. Second, it is clear that the legislative intent has to be ignored in order to accept the
Trial Comt's reasoning in applying section 803(a) as a bar to Alt's Claim in Hedy's estate.

If the legislature provided an exception to the three (3) year statute of limitations on
DJr1iel P. Pc~thersron
Brent C. Poatherston~
Jeremy l>. :Pcathcrston
Jercmi L. Ossman• •

probates for summary administrations and joint probates of husband and wife where the
assets are comnmnity property, it is logical that that same extension of time must be

113 S. Seco11dAYe.
Sandpoin1, ID 83864
Phonb (i08) 263-6866
F~ (208) 263-0400
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applied to creditor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary administration and joint
probate upon surviving spouse's death. The summary administration, by definition, would
have passed the log home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities,
just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of both decedents' debts
and obligations to creditors.

Any other interpretation renders the legislative scheme

absurd.
The Trial Court's Memorandum Opinion adopts Jadwiga's argument that 1 as a
creditor, Alt was required to seek appointment as personal representative under Idaho Code
§15-3-203 to advance and protect his Creditor's Claim against Hedy's estate. This would
also practically require that Alt necessruily bring suit against his step father, Robert, during
his lifetime.
The assertion is now that the debt owed by botl1 Robert and Hedy to Mr. Alt is time
barred as a creditor against Hedy's Estate, under Idaho Code §15-3-803(a), hut that Hedy's
community interest passes to Robert's Estate by operation of her death in 2008, free of that
obligation to Alt.
A more logical reading of subsection 803(a) on which Jadwiga and the Trial Court
rely, is that the legislature intended that upon opening of an estate and appointment of a
personal representative, the time limits for submission of a claim are triggered. Since the
presumption under I.C. §15-3-108 is that most estates must be opened within three (3)
years, that is the presumptive timeframe found in subsection 803(a):

Daniel P. Feathc,rston
Brent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Feather11on
Jeremi L. Ottman"'"
113 S. Second Ave.
SiUldpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263·0<!00

(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before
the death of the decedent ... if not barred earlier by another
statute of limitations or nonclaim statute, are barred against
the estate. the personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier
of the following dates:
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(1) three 0) years after the decedent's death; or
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-80I(b), Idaho
Code, for creditors who are given actual notice, and within
the tjme provided in section 15-3-80l(a), Idaho Code, for all
creditors barred by publication.
Idaho Code §15-3J803 (2016)
However, the Supreme Court has been clear that the Courts are to construe statutes
by considering the surrounding provisions. If one is to strictly apply subsection 108 there

would be 110 right to joint probate of Hedy's Estate as her death was more than three (3)
years prior to filing. However, subsection 111 pennits an exception to that three (3) year
statute of limitations, which necessarily extends to the filing of creditor claims against both
spouses. Both Estates are subject to probate and Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim. It makes no
sense to bar the Claim as against one spouse, but permit it against the Estate of the spouse
who survived but inherits the earlier spouse's share of the community property subject to
her debts and liabilities.
The Trial Court found that this provision had no exceptions and required Mr. Alt
had to have filed for probate of Hedy's Estate within three (3) years of her death jn order to
preserve his Creditor's Claim. Having failed to do so, the Court found that Alt's Claim is
barred as against Hedy's Estate in this joint probate of both Robert and Hedy's community
property Estates.
The Trial Court's finding is in error as a matter oflaw and must be reversed.

Dsniel P. Fea1herston
.Btent C. FcathetSton"
Jeremy P, f,;~therston
Jeremi l.. Ossmnn•+
113 S. Second Ave.
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Fax (208) 26J,0400

APPELLANT'S BR1:£F, 11
•U~nted in Idaho & W.,hin,<;Con
~ticentad in ld>ho 8z. Micluz,n

Page 239 of 438

06- 08-' 16 16:24 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM

2.

2082630400

T-817 P0014/0020 F-213

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by holding that Idaho
Code § 15-3-803(a) bars Alt's Claim against Hedy Melton's
Estate when her Estate was submitted for joint probate in
December, 2014 under Idaho Code§ 15-3-111.

First, there existed at the time of summary judgment a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the claim "arose before the death of the decedent" (Hedy) that precluded

entry of Summary Judgment.
Idaho Code §15-3-803(a) only applies to claims that arose prior to the death of the
decedent. The Claim against Estate is signed by Mr. Alt under oath and provides that at the
time of the loan, he initially took title to the property and house to secure repayment but
subsequently Robert and Hedy executed Wills leaving all of their Estate to Mr. Alt "as a
means of full repayment". The ''debt1' , therefore, did not become due and payable until
after Hedy and Robert's death and did not ~tarise" before Hedy's death.

This is

corroborated by the Affidavits of Counsel and related documents submitted with Alfs
Motion to Strike Petition for Summary Administration and to Convert Proceedings to
Formal Administration.
For this reason alone) the provisions of subsection 803 are not applicable or are in
dispute and the Court was required to deny Summary Judgment.

Second, the legislature clearly did not intend the result found by the Trial Court.

Daniel P. Feathe<S!On
Bl'<!l\t C. Featl1.i,s1on•
Juemy l'. F(<3U\(jf$t0n
Je.emi L. Ossman~•

113 S . Second Ave.
Sandpoint. ID 83864
Phone (208) U3-6866
Fu (208) 263-0dOO

The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent
of the legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory
interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be
interpreted in the context of the enti.re document. The statute
should be considered as a whole, and wot·ds should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted
that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions
of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the
clearly expressed inte11t of the legislative body must be given
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effect. and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction.
Statev. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,
264 P.3d 970, 973(2011)
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that the three (3) year statute of limitations in
probate proceedings does not prohibit creditor claims, recognizing the effect ofldaho Code
§15-3-111 in Medicaid recovery claims where Medicaid is prohibited from enforcing
recovery until the surviving spouse's death under Idaho Code §56-218. Idaho DeI?t. Of
Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790, 153 Idaho 468, 473 (2012)
Mr. Alt's Claim was filed January 13, 2015, less than two (2) years following the
death of Robert Melton and immediately upon the filing of a joint probate of Hedwig and
Robert's Estates under I.C. 15-3-111.2
The Estate urges that Mr. Alt' s Claim is barred by a "statute of limitations"
resulting from I.C. §15-3-803. Subsection (a)(l) requires that "claims against a decedent's
estate which arose before the death of the decedent, .. .if not baned earlier by another
statute of ]imitations or non-claim statute, are barred against the estate. the personal
representative. and the heirs and devisees of the decedent 1 unless presented within the
earlier of the following dates: (1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or (2) within
the time provided in §15-3-80l(b), Idaho Code, for creditors who are given actual notice,
and within the time provided in §15-3~80l(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by

FEA1m}#$~ '-:" '•?'~on-o.
. •;ro·-- ~~~~

publication''. I.C. §15-3-803(a)(2015)[emphasis added]. J.C. §15-3-803(a)(1)(2015).

Daniel P. Featherston
:Brent C. l'eatberston•
Jeremy P. Pcalheraton
Jeremi L. Ossman••

11 3 S. Second Ave.
Sandf>oin1, JD 8J864
Phooe (20$) 263-6866

For some reason, Jadwiga initially filed this as a 1205 Summary Administration, though
the property was titled as community property of Robert and Hedy.
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At the outset, the plain language of §803(a) establishes a time limit for filing claims
within a pending estate. The legislature's use of phrases presumes that an estate has been

filed:
l.

"All claims against a decedent's estate .. ."

2.

"if not bmred earlier by another statute of limitations or non-claim
statute ... "

3.

"are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent .. .'' J.C. §15-3-803(a)(2015)

The language adopted is unambiguous that the time limit on claims applies after an
estate is opened for probate. Though Hedy's death was more than three (3) years prior to
the Estate being opened, that is permitted by I.C. § 15~3-111.
The Legislature did not impose an obligation upon the creditor in section 803 to file
the probate in order to preserve his claim, only the obligation to file a timely claim once the
probate is filed. That timely claim must be within three (3) years of the decedent's death or
within the time provided for creditor's actual notice or publication. The claim must be
"presented within the earlier of' these two (2) dates. In other words, even where an estate
is filed for probate and no notice to creditors given, it is incumbent on a creditor to file the
claim timely.
. It is well established that generally a probate will not be permitted more than three
(3) yeai·s after the decedent's date of death, thi•s barring claims, but also barring any

~Ell~.J~rorm.
Daniel P. Feathatston
Brent c . Feath4n ro11~
)eremy P. Feathecston
Jeremi L. Own•n**

probate proceeding. Idaho Code §15-3-108 establishes a three (3) year ~(statute of
limitation" from the decedent's date of death on filing for probate of the estate. The
exception is LC. §15-3-111 that establishes:
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In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by
the death of either spouse at any time, the survivor was then
entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will. law, or
both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been
commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose
death occurred first, the estates of both may be joined for
probate in a single proceeding .... The three (3) year provision
of §15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the
spouse wh~se death occurred last.
J.C. §15-3-111 (2015).
This exception to the three (3) year statute of limitation on filing of probate is

equally applicable to the three (3) year limitation on filing of claims in an estate, for several
reasons.
The Courf s obligation is to give effect to the plain legislative intent as expressed in
the statute. "To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words
of the statute, but the i-easonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the
statute, and its legislative history." St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of
Com'rs of Ada County. 203 P.3d 683, 685, 146 Idaho 753, 755 (2009). Since the plain
language of section 803 discussed above contemplates a deadline for filing claims within
an open estate, not a statute of limitation on claims against decedents, the claim limitations
necessarily follow the limitations on filing of a probate proceeding.

It makes no sense to require a creditor to assert his claim within three (3) years of
the first spouse to die or risk losing the claim when section 1205 requires the surviving

spouse to assume the liability and LC. §15-3~ 111 pe1mits filing of a joint probate upon the
second spouse's death. The foolishness of forcing creditor~initiated probates for debt owed
Dlllliel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ouman**

by both spouses is obvious.
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Also. "[i]t is a basic tenet of statuto1y construction that the more· specific statute or
section addressing the issue controls ovet the statute that is more general." Wheeler v.
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 207 P.3d 988, 995, 147 Idaho 257, 264 (2009).
Jadwiga asserts the general statute that a claim must be presented in an open estate
within three (3) years of the decedent's death under §803. This is consistent with §108 that
prohibits filing _of an estate more than three (3) years after decedent's death. Both sections
are general provisions that apply to filing of probates and presentation of creditor claims.
However, the more specific provision fmmd in LC. §15-3~111 permits filing of a

joint probate undet specific circumstances (marital community, survivor entitled to all of
estate, and survivor dies before any probate of spouse's estate is commenced). This more
specific statute "controls over" the more general statute's asserted by the Estate. To do
otherwise renders a nonsensical result.
Lastly, the Estate argues that Alt lost his right to assert this Claim by failing to file a
probate of Hedwig's Estate by 2011 but provides no explanation for how this affects the
claim against this joint probate ofRobe1t and Hedwig's estates.
Robert could have acquired full ownership of the community assets in 2008
(subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities) through a 1205 Summary Administration. Since he
took no action, and Jadwiga has now filed a joint probate under I.C. §15-3-111, her right to
inherit (if any) is subject to Mr. Alt's Claim against both Robert and Hedy's Estate. Robert

did not acquire clear title to the property by not probating the Estate, but he also did not
expunge the 5tommunity obligation incurred by Hedwig and Robert when they borrowed
Daniel P, Peather.aton
Brent C, Featherston*
J~remy P. Featherston
J~temi L. Ossman*"'

funds from him.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court erred in granting Partial Summary

Judgment finding that Mr. Alt's claim is time barred as against Hedy's Estate but not
against Robert's. The estate is a joint estate consisting wholly of community property.
The community estate had not been submitted to probate upon Hedy's death and therefore
Hedy's interests (as with Robert's) were subject to the liability of Mr. Alt's claim. This
Court is asked to reverse the Trial Comt's ruling.

Further, the Trial Court erred in finding that Jadwiga timely disallowed Mr. Alt's
Claim. The Court is asked to reverse that finding and remand with instruction to deem Mr.
Alt' s Claim allowed as provided by law.
The Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs.

DATED this
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day of June, 2016.
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BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney fot Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of,

)
)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and )
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
)
)
Deceased.
)

_______

Case No. CV-2013-313
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING
ORAL ARGUMENT

)

In order to accommodate the Court's calendar,

It is ORDERED that the oral argument currently scheduled for August 19, 2016, is
vacated and rescheduled to be conducted by telephone conference call, to be initiated by
the Court, at 9:30 A.M. on Friday, the 26th day of August 2016, at which time all counsel
for the respective parties shall be available to participate in the conference call.

.,~ ~i'l.'

Dated th.is _ _
\ _ day o ~ 2016.

ohnl~e~

District Judge

ORDER VACATING AND
RESETTING ORAL ARGUMENT - 1
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Mary Cusack
Attorney at Law
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,
Deceased .

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

)
)
)
)

JADWIGA MELTON'S BRI EF ON APPEAL
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary

Honora ble John R. Stegner, presiding

Mary W . Cusack ISB# 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX

Brent C. Featherston ISB #4602
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113 South Second Avenue
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(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 - FAX
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MARY W. CUSACK ISB# 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased .

)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313

)

)
)
)
)

RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL

)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON (hereinafter "Jadwiga"), the
Personal Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits her
Respondent's Brief as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION

The above-referenced Decedents, ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON (hereinafter
"Robert") and HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON (hereinafter "Hedy") were married in the
1970's. Hedy had a son, HEINZ ALT (hereinafter "Alt") prior to her marriage to Robert.

4.
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Hedy died in 2008, leaving her entire estate to Robert. After Hedy's death, Robert did
nothing to probate her estate, even though they owned their home together. Two years
later, Robert married Jadwiga. Robert died in 2013, leaving his entire estate to Jadwiga.
After Robert's death, Jadwiga began the probate of Robert's estate.

Through this

process, Alt is trying to assert he has an interest in Robert's estate through Hedy, his
deceased mother, claiming she owed him money.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND OBJECTION

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83, on appeal from a magistrate court's decision, the district
court, must hear appeals as an appellate proceeding and a transcript must be prepared
as provided in Rule 83(g). I.R.C.P. § 83(f)(1 ). The district court must review the case on
the record and determine the appeal in the same manner and on the same standards of
review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and
law of this state, and the Idaho Appellate Rules. Id.
Jadwiga objects to certain representations made by Alt in the Procedural History
portion of his Brief, which Alt alleges are "undisputed."
a.

Alt states "It is also undisputed that the real property was purchased,

and the log home built, by Robert and Hedy with funds lent to them by Mr. Alt." 1 There is
no evidence to support this statement, nor have we agreed or concurred this to be factual.
In addition, no footnote was provided in the Brief, as noted .
b.

"Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim and affidavits and testimony establish that

Robert and Hedy were spendthrifts."

5.

The assertion that Robert and Hedy were

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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"spendthrifts" isn't factual. In the Creditor's Response to Estate's Monon for Summary

Judgment, Alt alleges Robert and Hedy were poor money managers, a statement that is
not supported with any factual proof; rather Alt's allegations, affidavits, and testimony are
purely self-supported by Alt and are barred by I.C. § 9-202. No factual proof has been
offered to support this allegation.
c.

"The property was initially titled to Mr. Alt and his wife as

acknowledgement or security of the loan." This statement is completely false. The home
was purchased by Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton, as husband and wife, and titled
accordingly in the Warranty Deed recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number
0181217 on April 12, 1996. It wasn't titled to Alt and his wife until July 10, 1999. See

Affidavit of Mary W Cusack, dated 06/25/2015,

,r 2 and ,r 3 a·n d incorporated herein ·by

this reference (hereinafter ''Cusack Affidavit").

Ill.

UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

On April 11, 1996, Bobby J. lnvernon and Heidi L. lnvernon signed a

Warranty Deed transferring property commonly called 38 Lilac Place, Bonners Ferry,
Idaho and which is located at what is legally described as Lot 4, BLUME HILL
SUBDIVISION, according to the plat recorded in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, records of
Boundary County, Idaho (hereinafter "Residence") to Robert and Hedy as husband and
wife. Said Warranty Deed was recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number
0181217 on April 12, 1996. See Cusack Affidavit,r 2.

6.
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B.

On July 29, 1998, both Robert and Hedy each executed a Last Will and

Testament prepared by Featherston Law Firm, naming the survivor of them as sole
beneficiary.
C.

On July 10, 1999, Robert and Hedy, as husband and wife, signed a Gift

Deed transferring the Residence to Alt, as his sole and separate property. Said Gift Deed
was recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number 194996 on August 10, 1999.
Said Gift Deed was prepared by Featherston Law Firm. See Cusack Affidavit ,r 3.
D.

On November 4, 1999, Alt, dealing with his sole and separate property, and

Christine Alt, his wife, signed a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Residence to Robert and
Hedy as husband and wife. Said Quitclaim Deed was recorded under Boundary County
Instrument Number 196015 on November 4, 1999. Said Quitclaim Deed was pre·pared
by Featherston Law Firm. See Cusack Affidavit ,r 4.
E.

On August 11, 2008, Hedy died.

F.

On June 7, 2010, Robert married Jadwiga. See Petition for Summary

Administration of Estate Where Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary,

,r

4 and

incorporated herein by this reference.
G.

On December 17, 2010, Robert executed a new Last Will and Testament

(hereinafter "Robert's 2010 Will") See Petition for Summary Administration of Estate

Where Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary,

,r

5 and incorporated herein by this

reference.
H.
7.

On July 4, 2013, Robert died.
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I.

On August 26, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Summary Administration

of Estate Where Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary.
J.

On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was

entered by this Court, and was recorded in Bonner County as Instrument No. 850805.

K.

On September 6, 2013, Alt filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to

Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy, which the Court did not grant or
deny.
L.

On December 9, 2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will

and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative.
M.

On January 9, 2015, Alt sent a copy of his Claim Against Estate (hereinafter

"Alt's Cla1m") to Jadwiga's attorney of record . On Janua·ry 13, 2015, Alt's Claim ·was filed
with the Court.
N.

On January 22, 2015, the Court heard Jadwiga's Petition to formally probate

Robert's 2010 Will and the Court formally admitted Robert's 2010 Will to probate.
0.

On February 2, 2015, an Order for Formal Probate of Will and Formal

Appointment of Personal Representative was entered and Letters Testamentary were
issued by the Court to Jadwiga.
P.

On February 19, 2015, the Notice to Creditors was first published in the

Bonners Ferry Herald.
Q.

On March 13, 2015, a Notice of Disaflowance of Claim was faxed and

mailed to Alt through Featherston Law Firm. The Notice of Disal/owance of Claim was

8.
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filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. The Notice of Oisallowance of Claim provided the
claim was disallowed in its entirety for the following reasons 1) it was not timely filed and
barred by the statute of limitations; 2) it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted; and 3) its documentation was insufficient and the Personal Representative had
no independent way of determining whether the amount contained therein was accurate
or valid .
R.

On May 4, 2015, the Estate received Alt's Petition to Allow Claims.

S.

On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga moved for Summary Judgment to deny Alt's

creditor claim.

IV.

ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the Trial Court correctly held the estate's disallowance of Alt's

Claim was timely disallowed.
B.

Whether the Trial Court correctly held Alt's Claim is barred by the statute of

limitations as against Hedy's estate.
C.

Whether the Trial Court correctly held as a matter of law that I.C. § 15-3-

111 does not toll or extend the statute of limitations for a creditor to file a claim against
the joint estate of Robert and Hedy.
D.

Whether the Trial Court correctly held that all claims are barred against

Hedy's estate because three years have elapsed even though a joint probate was
commenced for Hedy and Robert under I.C. § 15-3-111.

9.
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V.

ARGUMEN T ON ISSUES RAIS ED ON APPEAL
1.

The Court Correctly Held the Estate's Disallowance of Alt's Claim was

Timely as it was Not Supported by Admissible Evidence, it was Not Filed Correctly,
and the Time for Disallowance Begins Four Months After the Date of First
Publication.
A.

Alt's Claim is not supported by admissible evidence because his own
testimony is barred by I.C. § 9-202 and the purported agreement is
unenforceable on its face.

For nearly two decades, the appellate courts of this state have consistently
held that the trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a "threshold
question" to be answered before addressing the merits of motions for summary judgment.
In re Estate of Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6 (Idaho 2009)(internal citations omitted). When
considering evidence presented in support of, or opposition to, a motion for summary
judgment, a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial. Id. Thus,
if the admissibility of evidence presented in support of a motion for summary judgment is
raised by objection by one of the parties, the court must first make a threshold
determination as to the admissibility of the evidence "before proceeding to the ultimate
issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate." Id.
Here, Alt's Claim fails because the only evidence he proffered was his own
testimony, which is barred by the I.C. § 9-202 (the so-called "Deadman's Statute"). The

10.
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purpose of I.C. § 9-202 is to prevent a litigant from having the benefit of his own testimony
when another litigant has been deprived of the testimony of the decedent.
I.C. § 9-202 states in relevant part:
WHO MAY NOT TESTIFY.
cannot be witnesses:

The following persons

3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or
proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or
proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or
administrator, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of a deceased person, as to any communication
or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the death
of such deceased person.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 9-202(3) bars, (1) certain persons from
testifying; (2) in a specific action; (3) as to certain communications. Argyle v. Slemaker,
99 Idaho 544, 547 (1978). All three portions of I.C. § 9-202(3) must be satisfied in order
for the evidence to be barred. Id. Additionally, I.C. § 9-202(3) prohibits a party who is
making a claim against an estate from testifying as to any unwritten communication with
the deceased. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698, 699 (1998) (emphasis

added).
I.C. § 9-202, in conjunction with Idaho Rule of Evidence 601(b), "prohibit[s] a party
making a claim against an estate from testifying as to any unwritten communication with
the deceased." Id. In this matter, Alt cannot circumvent l.C. § 9-202 by describing his
written exhibits as corroborating his alleged oral agreement with Hedy.

11 .
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In Alt's Claim, he insists that "(i]t was agreed that the property was initially placed
in my name to secure repayment of the loan." If Alt's exhibits actually memorialized such
terms, his testimony regarding the oral communications with Hedy would not have been
necessary. Alt's allegations of oral representations and agreements by Hedy are nothing
more than testimony of unwritten communications by a decedent, asserted by a claimant,
against the estate - precisely the sort of testimony I.C . § 9-202 was contemplated to
prevent. Thus, Alt cannot testify as to any oral agreements with Hedy and/or Robert in
support of his effort to create a contract from the clearly insufficient exhibits submitted in
support of his claim against the estate.
The exhibits attached to Alt's Claim do not contain terms sufficient to bind any
person or entity, including the Estate. No'ne of the exhibits contain terms sufficient to
constitute a note, a draft, or any sort of negotiable instrument. A document must contain
"an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest
or other charges described in the promise or order" and be payable on demand or at a
definite time to the bearer or to order. See f.C. § 28-3-104.
Alt's exhibits do not satisfy the elements of a valid contract. To be enforceable, a
contract must "be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it
can be determined what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete."

Dales Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662 (1975) (overruled on other grounds by
Peavey v. Pelfandini, 97 Idaho 655 (1976)). The Court in Dales Service Co. explained:

12.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
{MWC00163393.DOCX; 1/20397.100}

Page 260 of 438

A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what
it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made
a contract; they must have expressed their intentions in a
manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even enough
that they have actually agreed, if their expressions, when
interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and
circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what
the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression,
indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms
of an agreement, have been held to prevent the creation of an
enforceable contract.
Id. (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts 394, § 95 ( 1963)).

Nothing in Alt's Claim or exhibits state any promise to pay, a payor or a payee, the
time for compliance, and it certainly does not memorialize an interest rate of 12%. There
is simply no admissible evidence of any manifestations of assent by Hedy, Robert, or the
Estate, to be bound by any payment obligations to Alt.
Alt cannot establish an enforceable written contract. The exhibits attached to Alt's
Claim are facially insufficient to create an agreement to pay, and no additional written
evidence has been supplied. The only remaining evidence offered in support of Alt's
Claim is his own testimony alleging the oral agreement of Hedy and Robert to devise
their estates to Alt. However, such testimony falls squarely under the prohibitions of I.C.
§ 9-202(3).

Alt was able and legally free to bring in third party affidavits to support his position.
He did not. Alt had an obligation to come forward with admissible evidence that provided
a factual dispute. He did not. Without any credible admissible evidence, Alt's Claim must

13.
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fail.

The Court properly denied Alt's creditor claim against Hedy's Estate based on the

[lack of] admissible evidence before the Court.
8.

Alt's Claim should not be automatically allowed because he did not
properly follow the Statutory Process for Filing a Creditor Claim .

Idaho's Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter "UPC") provides the statutory
framework for procedures that must be followed after a person dies in the administration
and distribution of that person's estate. This includes the process for filing creditor claims.
I. C. § 15-3-104 provides in relevant part:

No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of
a decedent or his successors may be revived or
commenced before the appointment of a personal
representative.· After the appointment and until
distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a
claim against the estate are governed by the procedure
prescribed by this chapter. (Emphasis added).
Jadwiga filed her Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of
Personal Representative, along with Robert's 201 O Will, with the Court on December 9,
2014. Said Petition was opposed by Alt who argued that Robert's 2010 Will was invalid
and should not be probated. The Court, after hearing argument and testimony, found
Robert's 2010 Will to be valid and admitted it to probate. The Order formally probating
Robert's 201 O Will was entered on February 2, 2015 and on the same day, Letters
Testamentary were issued to Jadwiga appointing her as Personal Representative.
Jadwiga caused a Notice to Creditors to be first published on February 19, 2015. Based
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on that publication, a creditor had four months, or until June 19, 2015 to file a claim. I.C.
§ 15-3-801 (a).

There are two ways for a creditor to present a claim against an estate. The first
option is for a creditor to file a claim in an open probate matter. I.C. § 15-3-804(a). In
order for a cla im to be considered valid , the creditor must file its claim with both (1) the
personal representative and (2) the Court. Id. The claim is deemed to be presented on
the later of (1) the delivery or mailing of the claim to the personal representative or (2) the
filing of the claim with the Court. Id. (Emphasis added).
The second option is for a creditor to commence a proceeding against the personal
representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to
jurisdiction, to obtain payment of his claim against the estate, but the commencement of
the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting the cla im. /.C. § 15-3804(b).

In this instance, Alt failed to correctly file his claim. On January 13, 2015, Alt filed
his claim with the Court, but never filed it with the Personal Representative. In order for
a creditor claim to be timely filed, the creditor claim must be filed with the court and the
Personal Representative.

I.C.

§

15-3-804(a) (emphasis added).

A Personal

Representative was not appointed until February 2, 2015. Subsequent to the January 13,
2015 filing of Alt's Claim, Alt filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim on May 4, 2015, which
was within the statutory notice period.
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"commencing a proceeding" as outlined in I.C. § 15-3-804(b). Alt's Claim was never
properly filed and therefore cannot be deemed to be automatically al lowed.
C.

Alt's Claim is not automatically allowed as Jadwiga clearly
disal!owed All's Claim and sent him notice of that disallowance.

Alt insists, without support, that I.C. § 15-3-806 requires a personal
representative to disallow a creditor claim within 60 days of its presentation, ignoring the
plain statutory language that states: "[f]ailure of the personal representative to mail notice
to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original

presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance."

(Emphasis added). The statute's use of the phrase "time for original presentation of the
claim" clearly indicates that the personal representative has 60 days to disallow a
creditor's claim after the four-month period for claim presentation.

The four-month

presentation time period begins after the first publication date of the notice of creditors
under I.C. § 15-3-801 . The first publication date of the Notice to Creditors was February
19, 2015. ( See Affidavit of Publication filed April 10, 2015.) This publication date allows
creditors four months (in this case, until June 19, 2015), to present their claims against
the estate. Then estate then has sixty days from the end of the presentation period (in
this case, until August 19, 2015) to disallow any claim presented against the estate.
If Alt's interpretation was accurate, then by way of example, if an estate had twenty
five creditors , then the Personal Representative would have to keep track of at least one
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hundred different dates, just relating to the creditor claims alone - 1) the date the creditor
filed its claim with the Personal Representative; 2) the date when the creditor filed its
claim with the Court; 3) the date on which the claim is deemed to be valid; and 4) the date
by which a disallowance should be filed. This could not be what the legislature intended
given the purpose of the UPC.
The goal of the UPC is to make the probate process simple and quick. As stated
by Idaho's Supreme Court "[t]his code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies." Subsection (b) states that, "[t]he underlying
purposes and policies of this code are: (1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the
affairs of decedents . . .; (3) to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the
estate of the decedent and· making distribution to his successors. In Re Estate of Elliott,
141 Idaho 177, 181 (2005); See a/so J.C.§ 15-1-102{b). Jadwiga's interpretation is much
more logical and in keeping with the purposes and policies of the UPC. The Personal
Representative only has to keep track of the date of first publication, and then count out
4 (four) months from the date of first publication to determine when a creditor can file a
claim. The Personal Representative then has 60 days after the four-month period to
disallow claims.

Jadwiga's interpretation would make the process simple and

streamlined, while Alt's interpretation would be unduly burdensome and complex for the
Personal Representative's administration of the estate.
If the Court should deem the filing of the claim on January 9, 2015 to Jadwiga's
counsel (prior to Jadwiga being appointed personal representative) as meeting the criteria
17.
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for filing a claim under Idaho law, and if the Court accepts Alt's argument as to when the
disallowance is due, then the Estate had until March 13, 2015 to send a disallowance to
Alt (the later of the filing with the Court or the Personal Representative). The Estate faxed
its disallowance to Alt on March 13, 2015 and mailed the disallowance on the same day.
Alt received notice within 60 days of filing his claim with the Court that the claim was
disallowed.
This distinction is moot, however, because even if Jadwiga has "allowed" Alt's
claim, affirmatively or through inaction, she was permitted to (and did) effectively revoke
that allowance by sending a Notice of Disallowance to Alt. The permissibility of revoking
a notice of allowance (even where it is caused by the personal representative's inaction)
has been conclusively established in other UPC jurisdictions.
In Estate of Krichau, 501 N.W. 2d 722, 726 (Neb. 1992), a Nebraska appellate
court explained:
If the statute is interpreted to cause the personal
representative to irrevocably allow the claim by not giving
notice of disallowance within 60 days of its filing, personal
representatives will be forced to deny all claims except those
claims that are unquestionably good. If the personal
representatlve can change his or her mind and disallow a
claim that was once allowed, the worst that could happen is
that the claimant would be in a state of uncertainty. If certainty
is an important element to a claimant, that claimant can
always petition the court to allow the claim. In this regard, the
claimant would be in no greater state of uncertainty than any
other litigant doing business with a dilatory party and would
suffer no greater disadvantage than a claimant who has
received notice of allowance when the personal
representative still has the power to disallow the claim.

18.
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska later endorsed and agreed with the holding in In
re Estate of Krichau stating, " We agree with the Court of Appeals interpretation" and '"We

believe that [our statute] permits a personal representative to disallow a claim that has
been allowed by the failure to object. We also believe that public policy is best served by
this interpretation of the statute and not

by a restrictive

interpretation of the statute." In

re Estate of Dickie, 623 N.W .2d 667, 670, (Neb.2001 ); see also In re Gaytan Estate, 591

N.W.2d 310,314 (Mich.Ct.App. 1998) (holding a similar provision "permits a claim that
has been deemed allowed as a consequence of the personal representative's failure to
disallow it within the statutory period to be disallowed subsequently by the personal
representative").
The Supreme·Judicial Court of Maine· similarly upheld a personal representative's
disallowance of a creditor claim, even though it was served more than 60 days after the
running of the four-month creditor claim period. Swett v. Estate of Wakem, 490 A.2d 679,
680 (Me. 1985). The Swett Court further elaborated:
Had the legislature intended the provision to have the
consequence advocated by the claimants, instead of
providing "the personal representative may furnish a notice"
and "has the effect of a notice of allowance, " the legislature
could have employed the language used in section 5-428
[which is the identical language contained in I.C. § 15-5-428],
which governs claims against protected persons. That section
provides in relevant part:
"A presented claim is allowed if it is not disallowed by
written statement mailed by the conservator to the
claimant within 60 days after its presentation."
Id.

19.
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Accordingly, Jadwiga did not allow Alt's claim, either affirmatively or by operation
of Idaho law. Alt was not disadvantaged in any way as he filed his Petition for Allowance
of Claims during the statutory period for notice. Alt's Claim is not automatically allowed
as Jadwiga sent him a Notice of Disallowance, to which Alt responded .
D.

Time for Disallowance is After the Four Month Creditor Claim
Period.

While Idaho does not have any case law interpreting I.C. § 15-3-806(a), its
Court of Appeals has interpreted I.C. § 15-3-806(d) which uses the identical language
found in I.C. § 15-3-806(a) to determine when to calculate interest on allowed claims.
I.C. § 15-3-806(d) provides:
Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court
entered against the personal representative, allowed claims
bear interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty
(60) days after the time fo r original presentation of the claim
has expired unless based on a contract making a provision for
interest, in which case they bear interest in accordance with
that provision. (Emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals of Idaho found that the Personal Representative published
his notice to creditors, which started the four month period for creditors to file their claims.
Bingham Mem. Hosp. v. Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674 (Ct. App. 2000). The Court of Appeals
held that interest could not begin to accumulate until six months after the Personal
Representative first published his notice to creditors. Id. The Court held the "time for
original presentation of the claim" is the four month period for creditors to file their claim
20.
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and therefore, interest would not begin to accumulate until 60 days after that period ended
(i.e. six months after date of first publication). Id. Here, the notice to creditors was first
published on February 19, 2015. Under Idaho law, Jadwiga clearly had until August 19,
2015 to disallow all creditor claims that were validly filed. Accordingly, Jadwiga timely
disallowed Alt's Claim. Therefore, Alt's Claim is not deemed to be automatically allowed.
The Disallowance of Claim was timely issued by the personal representative and
Alt's Claim is not automatically allowed.

The Court properly found the Estate's

Disallowance of Claim was timely filed .

2.

The Court Correctly Held the Three Year Statute of Limitations has Passed

Regarding Claims Against Hedy's Estate.
Statutes of limitations are laws passed by a legislative body in common law
systems to set the maximum time after an event when legal proceedings may be initiated.

See Black's Law Dictionary. After the time period set out in the applicable statute of
limitations has run, no legal action can be brought regardless of whether any cause of
action ever existed. Id. The intention of these laws is to facilitate resolution of legal claims
in a reasonable length of time. These statutes are designed to prevent fraudulent and
stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost, or after the facts have become
obscure through the passage of time or the defective memory, death, or disappearance
of witnesses.

21.
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Under Idaho's UPC, the statute of limitations to file a claim is three years from date
of death. /.C. § 15-3-803. See also Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165 (Idaho 1986) (Claims
against the estate of a decedent are controlled by I.C. § 15-3-803, which provides . .. (b)
All claims against the decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent,
including claims ... founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against the
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented within three (3) years after the decedent's death whether or not notice to
creditors has been published ."). I. C. § 15-3-803 has a strict creditor claim limitations
period of three years; however, this time frame can be shorted to four months by
publishing a notice to creditors. J.C.§ 15-3-801(b).
Alt's argument that he was precluded from filing a claim in Hedy's estate is false.
Alt could have, at any time 45 days after the death of his mother, opened a probate as a
creditor of her estate. I.C. 15-3-203(a)(6). Alt claims in his Appellant Brief "This would
practically require Alt necessarily bring suit against his step father, Robert, during his
lifetime." Again, it is more appropriate to bring suit against Robert during Robert's lifetime,

as Robert was a party to the alleged actions between Hedy, himself and Alt. This is
exactly the reason there are statutes of limitation - to avoid situations where the witnesses
are no longer available.
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Alt had until August 11 , 2011 to file a claim against
Hedy's estate. He did not do so. After August 11, 2011, any claim against Hedy's estate

22.
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is statutorily time barred. The Court properly found the three year statute of limitations
had run regarding any claims against Hedy's estate.

A.

I.C. § 15-3-111 does not Toll a creditor claim period.

Alt is confusing the process to probate an estate with the time to file creditor
claims . A probate may only be opened within three years of the decedent's death. J.C.

§ 15-3-108. If the decedent owned real property at his death, and more than three years
elapses without opening a probate, the heirs must employ another method to transfer the
real property out of the decedent's name.
In Idaho, it is common to find many instances wherein the first spouse dies and the
surviving spouse does not open a probate. When all the assets are titled in joint names
and the surviving spouse is not hindered in his or her ability to gain access or have control
over the remaining assets, the surviving spouse may not view a probate as necessary.
However, to transfer real property, a legal action must commence.
When a surviving spouse needs to transfer real property during the surviving
spouse's lifetime, and more than three years have passed since the death of the first
spouse, the surviving spouse cannot probate the Will of the deceased spouse. However,
a surviving spouse may use the Summary Administration process as provided under I.C.

§ 15-3-1 205 . The legislature amended I.C. § 15-3-108, effective July 1, 2014, to provide
that the three year statute of limitations on probate proceedings does not apply to
Summary Administration under I.C. § 15-3-1205. See Senate Bill No. 1249 attached as

23.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
{MWCOO 163393.DOCX; 1/20397 .100}

Page 271 of 438

Exhibit "8'' of the Affidavit of Mary W Cusack in Support of Sur-reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim (hereinafter "Cusack
Affidavit II").
The marital community of Hedy and Robert was dissolved at Hedy's death. By
Will and by law, Robert was entitled to all Hedy's property, and the need for probate was
not necessary.

I.C. § 15-3-111 expressly allows for joint probate when the martial

community of a couple ended at the death of the first spouse, and the surviving spouse
was entitled to all of the deceased spouse's property by will, law or both, and no probate
had been commenced on the death of the first spouse. If Robert had commenced a
proceeding under I.C. § 15-3-1205 after Hedy's death, then Robert would have taken
Hedy's estate subject to her debt. Robert did not probate Hedy's estate nor did he pursue
Summary Administration under I.C. § 15-3-1205.
Upon Robert's death, Jadwiga commenced a joint probate under I.C. § 15-3-111 .
There is no statutory or case law that supports Alt's contention that opening a joint probate
somehow tolls or extends the statute of limitations imposed upon the creditors of the first
spouse to die. Jadwiga jointly probating the estates of Robert and Hedy most certainly
did not create an opportunity for the estate to be subject to Hedy's debt, as Hedy's debt
was barred due to Robert's actions and Alt's inaction.
When real property is held in the joint names of a husband and wife until the death
of the second spouse, there are only three options available to remove the first spouse's
name from the real property to enable the real property to be transferred to beneficiaries.

24.
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The first option is to commence a quiet title action. The second option is to petition the
Court to determine the heirs of the first spouse who died. The third and most favorable
option is to jointly probate the estates of both spouses in one action. See I.C. § 15-3-111.
As pointed out by Alt, a Summary Administration cannot be used by a new spouse
because that process would not clear the former spouse's name from lhe property. See
Appellant's Brief, page 9,

,r2.

I.C. § 15-3-111 states in relevant part "The three (3) year provision of section 153-108, I.C., applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last." Th is
means that although both spouses' names are included in the probate caption, only the
Will of the last spouse to die is used to probate the assets. Allowing the use of I.C. § 153.:.111 saves time and judicial economy by probating both estates in one proceeding. This
process is used almost exclusively to transfer real property, such as in this case.
I.C. § 15-3-111 makes no mention of or reference of any kind to I.C. § 15-3803(a)(1 )'s three-year limitations period for bringing a creditor claim. At the same time,
I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1) does not cross-reference I.C . § 15-3-111 or any other exceptions to
its plain and clear-cut rule that "[a]II claims against a decedent's estate which arose before
the death of the decedent" must be presented no later than "three (3) years after the
decedent's death ." (Emphasis added). The statute does not create special exceptions

for joint probates and does not expand the definition of "the decedent's death" to
encompass more than its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., the death of the decedent
subject to the creditor claim at issue irrespective of his or her marital status.
25.
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After a review of other states who have adopted the UPC, Idaho is the only one
that has adopted the unique language found in I.C. § 15-3-111. However, Utah has
adopted Utah Code § 75-3-109 which provides for joint administration of estates but
clearly provides that "claims may only be enforced against the estate to which they relate."
This is consistent with the Estate's argument set forth above. See Utah Code§ 75-3-109
attached as Exhibit "C" of Cusack Affidavit II.
Choosing one process or another to probate an estate does not enlarge the time
for cred itor's to file a claim. As a creditor, Alt could have, at any time 45 days after the
death of his mother, opened a probate as a creditor of her estate. /.C. 15-3-203(a)(6).
By his inaction, the statute of limitations had run against his mother's estate. The Court
correctly held the statute of limitations had run, regardless of the process Jadwiga chose
to probate her husband's estate.
B.

Creditors must present their claims within three years of date of death no
matter which process is chosen to administer an estate.

I.C. § 15-3-803 has a strict creditor claim limitations period. The longest time frame
to present a creditor's claim is three years after the decedent's date of death; however,
this time frame can be shorted to four months by publishing a notice to creditors.
Construing I.C. § 15-3-111 to enlarge the creditor claim limitations period of I.C. § 15-3803 of the first spouse who died to three years after the death of the surviving spouse,
solely based on the executor's choice to probate both estates jointly, is not supported by
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the plain language of the statute, and is not warranted from any reading of the statutes
when taken together. Construing statutes to produce such an absurd result runs afoul of
standard Idaho canons of construction . See Idaho v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 178 (2012)
("Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored."). The
only logical use of this statute is not to eh large the credito r claim limitations period but to
save judicial economy when real property is held in joint names at the death of the
surviving spouse. If the legislature had intended to allow creditors an extended period of
time (beyond the three years provided under I.C. § 15-3-803) to file claims in the joint
probate, it would have added that language as it did under I.C. § 15-3-1205. It did not.
As stated by the Magistrate Court in its Memorandum Opinion:
"There is nothing in this section [I.C. § 15-3-111] thaf states or
suggests any tolling of a creditor's deadline to present a claim,
just because the estate is subsequently jointly probated .
Indeed , this section specifically exempts the three (3) year
limitation on probate following the death of the first spouse, as
found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates the
legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions
within this particular provision where warranted and intended.
As there is no exception made to the three (3) year creditor's
bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be implied by the Court."
There is only one exception to the statute of limitations as set forth in I.C. § 15-3803. This exception is found in the Idaho counterpart of the federal Medicaid Law at I.C.
§ 56-218, which provides for the recovery of certain assistance provided by Medicaid.

For many years, I.C. § 56-218 provided that recovery could be made from the individual's
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both, but there
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would be no adjustment or recovery until the death of th e surviving spouse. The issue of
timely filing a creditor claim came before the Supreme Court in 2005. See In the Matter
of the Estate of Joe Kaminsky, Deceased, 141 Idaho 436 (Idaho 2005).

In the Estate of Kaminsky, Mr. Kaminsky applied for, and was approved for,
Medicaid assistance and received $54,067.59 in Medicaid assistance during his lifetime.
Id. at 437.

At the time of his death, Mr. Kaminsky was survived by his wife, Clara, and

his three adult children. Id. On March 5, 2003, approximately two years and eight months
after Mr. Kaminsky's death, his Last Will and Testament was informally admitted to
probate. Id. The Will, executed January 13, 1998, directed that Mr. Kaminsky's entire
estate be distributed to his three children. Id. Prior to the probate filing, the Department
had written to an attorney for the Kaniinskys, stating a claim against the Estate in the
amount of $54,766.79 for recovery of the Medicaid assistance received by Decedent. Id.
The letter, dated January 23, 2003, then stated that no demand for payment would be
made as long as Clara survived but that, upon Clara's death, demand for payment would
be made upon her estate. Id. On March 11, 2003, the Kaminskys' attorney responded
to the Department's letter, stating that the Department's claim against Decedent's Estate
was disallowed because it was not presented within two years of his death. Id. On April
3, 2003, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim (Petition) in the Decedent's
probate. Id. The Estate objected to the Petition and a hearing on the matter was held on
April 24, 2003. Id. The magistrate denied the Petition as untimely under I.C. § 15-3803(a)(1 ). Id.
28.
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In response to the ruling in the Kaminsky case, in 2006, the legislature updated
I.C. § 56-218 to provide that no claim needed to be filed on the death of the first spouse,
unless actual notice was given of the probate, or if a joint probate were opened under I. C.
§ 15-3-111. See Senate Bill No. 1318 which is attached as Exhibit'/'.\" of Cusack Affidavit
//. The reason for the change was given as follows :
Section Two amends I.C. § 56-218 to clarify the presentation
and collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare.
A number of clarifications are made by repositioning language
or stating the existing concept more clearly. Under existing
law, if the institutionalized spouse, who received Medicaid,
dies leaving a surviving spouse, no actual collection is made,
but a "claim" must be sent to the personal representative of
the estate of deceased institutionalized spouse, or if no
probate is done, to the surviving spouse. This can be very
frightening to the surviving spouse, who often does not
understand that no current reimbursement is being
demanded. Therefor[e] [sic], the bill both clarifies that no
recovery is made until both spouses are deceased and also
removes the requirement to send a claim if no probate is filed
at the first death.
If either Hedy or Robert had received Medicaid, the State of Idaho would be able
to claim their recovery in this probate (because I.C. § 15-3-111 was utilized) even though
Robert left a surviving spouse, Jadwiga. There is no other Idaho statutory provision that
allows for the extension of a creditor's claim limitations period for filing a claim.
The legislature has never amended I.C. § 15-3-803 to allow expanded recovery
for creditor claims when a joint probate is commenced. However, I.C. § 15-3-108 was
amended, effective July 1, 2014, to provide that the three year statute of limitations on
probate proceedings does not apply to Summary Administration under I.C. § 12-3-1205.
29.
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See Senate Bill No. 1249 which is attached as Exhibit "B" of Cusack Affidavit II. Under
I.C. § 12-3-1205, the statute expressly provides that "the surviving spouse shall assume
and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the estate of the
decedent." I.C. § 15-3-111 has no such express language. Again , the legislature's
omission of any such express language in I.C. § 15-3-111 (stating the three year ultimate
limit on presenting claims is tolled) is a clear indication that in a joint probate, the surviving
spouse is not assuming the liability of the deceased spouse. Jadwiga used the joint
probate process to transfer real property held in the joint names of Hedy and Robert, not
to expand a creditor's recovery period.
Accordingly, Idaho's UPC applies a maximum three-year limitations period on the
presentment of creditor claims which beings to run on the decedent's death and ·not upon
the death of his or her successors, except in the case of Medicaid recovery as noted
above. This rule is also stated in the official comment to UPC§ 3-317 and explains:
In succession without administration, there being no personal representative'~
notice to creditors, the short non-claim period under UPC Section 3-803(a)(1) does
not apply and creditors are subject to the statutes of limitations and the limitation
of three years on decedent's creditors when no notice is published under UPC
Section 3-803(a)(2). The general statutes of limitation are suspended for four
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under UPC Section
3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issuance
of the Statement of Universal Succession is deemed to be by operation of law and
does not operate to extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to
run against the decedent. The result is that creditors are barred by the general
statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the shorter.
(Emphasis added).

See Comment to UPC which is attached as Exhibit "D" of Cusack Affidavit II.

30.
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I.C. § 15-3-111 provides a means of effectively passing property of joint estates
and contains no tolling provisions on the presentment of cred itor claims for the first spouse
who died. Thus, the statutory language of the UPC adopted by Idaho plainly limits the
presentation of creditor claims against an estate to a maximum of three years after the
decedent's death regardless of whether the surviving spouse's estate exercises the right
to jointly probate the estates of both spouses. The Court correctly ruled the statute of
limitations to present claims is not enlarged when a joint probate is filed under I.C. § 153-111 .

VI.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner, Jadwiga B. Melton, respectfully requests this

Court · uphold Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim, in part, as it rs barred by
operation of law due to the running of the statute of limitations and is not tolled by filing a
joint probate. In addition, Jadwiga respectfully requests this Court to uphold the Summary
Judgment whereby Alt's Claim was timely disallowed and therefore, not automatically
allowed.

lih

DATED this Ji__ day of July, 2016.

MARY vy. USACK,
Attorney,J r JADWIGA MEL TON
Personal Representative
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certi_
f y that on the

/J' tl--h day of July, 2016, I caused a true and accurate

copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon, and
addressed to the following:

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com
brent@featherstonlaw.com

Boundary County Court Clerk
Sent via email:
courts@boundarycountyid.org

Honorable John R. Stegner
(208) 883-2259 - FAX
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Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON

Deceased.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz
Alt, the creditor of the joint estates of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton, and
pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral Argument, does
hereby submit Appellant's Reply Brief as follows!

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Appellant, Heinz Alt. ("Alt") will not restate all of the procedural or factual

history in this Reply Brief and will rest upon the Appellant's Opening Brief filed June 8,

2016.
However, it bears noting some obvious misrepresentations in the record m
Daniel P. Fca1h~rston
Brent C. Fe~lhenaon•
Je;emy P. Featherston

Respondent's Brief filed July 6, 2016.

Jereini L. Ossman••
113 S . Scco,1d AVe.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (20&) 263-6866
Fax (20$) '.?63-0400
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SpeciftcaUy, Respondent, Jadwiga Melton e'Jadwiga"), states in Respondent's Brief
"through this process, Alt is ttying to assert he has an interest in Robert's Estate through

Hedy, his deceased mother, claiming she owed him monei'. This misstates the Creditor's
Claim, which was a claim against both the Estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton. The
Creditor's Claim on file is clear and unequivocal in that it asserts a claim by Alt against both
his mother and step-father's estates. It js not a claim that is restricted to Hedy and the
Respondent's Bdef misstates the record in that regard.
Specifically, the verified Claim Against Estate states as follows: "I hereby certify that
my mother, Hedwig Melton, and my step-father, Robert Melton, borrowed the total swn of
$102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the decedents for the purpose of acquiring land
and building a home in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, which is the subject of this litigation." Claim
Against Estate, p. l.
Further, the claim concludes by stating: "I hereby make a claim against the estates of
Robert and Hedwig Melton for these principal amounts together with accrued interest Dated
this 15 th day of December, 2014. Heinz Alt". Claim Against Estate, p.2
Furthennore, the Respondent, Jadwiga, "objects to certain" undisputed facts as

follo-ws:
a.

"That the real property was purchased and the log home built by Robert and

Hedy with funds lent to them by Mr. Alt."
b.

''Mr. Alt>s Creditor's Claim and Affidavits and testimony establish that

Robert and Hedy were spendthrifts."
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Fea1h~.iston•
Jeremy P. Fea(bo:rston

Jeremi L, Ossman••

C.

''The property was hutially titled to Ml.-. Alt and his wife as aclmowledgment

or security of the loan." Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6 ..

113 s. Second twe.

Slllldpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (20&) :263,0400
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Apparently, Jadwiga wishes to dispute these three (3) facts established by sworn
testimony at the Summary Judgment proceeding now in her Appellate Brief.
"On appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment, this court employs the
same standard as used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Summary
judgment· is proper if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, if any, show that the1-e is no genuine as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled_to judgment as a matter of law." Shawver v. Hucklebeny Estates, LLC, 140

Idaho 354, 359, 93 P.3d 685, 690 (2004).
Although Jadwiga appears to now dispute these three (3) facts summarized above1 it
should be noted that they are facts that were undisputed in the Summary Judgment
proceeding and are reflected in the filings of record. Jadwiga filed her Motion for Summary
. Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment on or about June 25, 2015.
The Motion was supported by the Affidavit of Mary Cusack, which contained as attachments
an initial Warranty Deed of the real property to Robert and Hedy Melton and subsequent Gift
Deed from Meltons to Mr. Alt in 1999 followed by a Quitclaim Deed from Mr. Alt dated
November 4, 1999, back to Robert and Hedy Melton. See Affidavit of Mary Cusack,
Exhibits A, B and C.

By compaiison, Exhibits A and B attached to the verified Creditor's Claim Against
Estate. indicate in decedent, Hedwig Melton's, own hand writing that the debt to Mr. Alt was
incurred :from 1996 through 2001. Verified Claim Against Estate.
Also not surprising is the juxtaposition of the Quitclaim Deed from Alt back to
Daniel P, Featherston

Bronc C. l"e~the.rston•
Jero,ny l'. FcMheraton
J.:romi l'... Ossman••

Robert and Hedwig Melton on November 4, 1999. Affidavit of Mazy Cusack, Exhibit C as

compared to the Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton leaving all of

113 S. S.,,;ona Me,
Sand_pos.,,, lD 83864

Phone ('i08) 263-6866
f;,.it (:ZOS) 263-0400
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their estate to Mr. Alt dated and executed July 29, 1998. Affidavit of Counsel filed August
26, 2014, Exhibits "F" and "G''.
When applying the applicable standard for summary judgments, that is, whether or
not any genuine issue of material fact arises from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits on file, it is clear that th.e three (3) facts ·'disputed'' in Respondent's Brief filed July
6, 2016, are in fact undisputed in the material record before the Court.

In point of fact, if the record is in dispute on these matters and they are material facts,
that dictates a result against the Respondent and this Court must overturn the Trial Court's
Grant of Summary Judgment. I.R.C.P. 56 (2016)
In any event, these particular matters are undisputed in the record before the Court.
Appellant filed affidavits and a verified claim, which were matters of record before the Trial
Court and were not disputed by any affidavit submitted by Jadwiga. Further, these sworn
affidavits were not subject to any motion to strike.
Like it or not, the points made in Appellant's Brief are undisputed fact for purposes of

the record on Summary Judgment.
The remaining assertion of"Undisputed Facts and Procedural Background'; contained
in Respondent's Brief beginning at page 6 through 9, section Ill, are unimportant to the
Court's disposition of this appeal.
II.

. ARGUMENT

Appellant is truthfully puzzled by Respondent's Brief in its discussion of the issues
on appeal and argument section. It appears that Respondent has simply reiterated all of the
Doniel P. Fe~rherston
Brent C. Fea1htrSton•

Jemmy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman••

claims set forth in her original Swnmary Judgment briefing, which were rejected by the Trial
Court and on which Summary Judgment was denied, Notably; Respondent did not file a

113 S. Second A~e.
Sandpoint , ID 83S64
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263--0400
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Cross Appeal in this matter and, therefore, does not have the light to raise these new issues
on an appeal in her own right. The Respondent is limited to the Appellant's issues on appeal

which are set forth in Appellant's Opening BdeffiledJune 8, 2016.
A.

The Trial Couii incorrectly held that Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely
disallowed.

For some reason> in this section of Respondent's Brief, counsel argues that ''the trial
courts must detennine the admissibility evidence as a threshold question to be answered

before addressing the merits of the motions for summary judgment". Respondent's Brief,
p.10. What follows in Respondent's Brief is a lengthy discussion of the ''dead man's statute''
in Idaho Code § 9-202. Respondent's Brief, beginning at the bottom ·of page 10 and
continuing through the top of page 14, spends great length discussing the admissibility or
inadmissibility of the Creditor's Claim or statements contained therein.
Notably missing in the record on any level is a motion by Respondent to strike the

contents of Alt's Creditor's Claim. Furthennore, these are matters that were dispensed with
by the Trial Court sununarily and withot1t much discussion during oral argument.

Court:

Well, you say those - those written documents,
they could evidence anything, but isn't that
exactly why the Court would not be able to
grant you swnmary judgment on that issue,
because the CoUit can only grant summary
judgment when it' s abundantly clear and crystal
clear and there's no dispute of genuine issue of
material fact as to what the documents do or do
not show?

Ms. Cusack:

But your Honor ...

Court:

And when there's ambiguity then the court has
t.o rule in favor of the non~moving party on
summary judgment.

Daniel P. l"cathenton
Brent C, l"cnthcrston•
1eremy P. Featherston
1cremi L. Ossman**
113 $. S~cond Ave.
Sandp0int, ID 83564
Phon& (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0400

Tr. 8/24/2015, p.10
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The Court in its finding on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment stated as
follows:
Court:

Daniel P. Pesthen ton
Brent C . Peatherslon•
Jeremy P. P~atherston

Jeremi L. Ossman~~
ll 3 S. Second Ave.
SanOpoint, ID 83864
?hone (208) 263-6866

Alright then. Let me walk through some of
this. I'm going to be able to answer some of
these issues here and now and others I will not
be able to answer here and now. The - what
I'm going to take as the primary~ I think,
argument (indiscernible - inaudible) between
the parties is this interrelationship between 15~
3-111 and 108 and the creditor claim statute
under 15-3-803. I think is really what's going
on here, to put it bluntly. That's, um, that's the
cmx of this - this case, whether or not Mr. Alt
can proceed with his claim against the Estate
when that claim is based on an agreement
which was - seems to be a bit of a combination
between verbal and written between his mother,
Hedy, and himself, which Robert did not
sign ... .With respect to the rest of the Estate's
issues on suminary judgment. I will say that,
perhaps unlike many Magistrate's on the bench,
that I actually have practiced - did a lot of
summruy judgment work and, at least at one
point in time, I had a very good understanding
of what does fly on summary judgment and
what does not fly and just how high that hurdle
is to get beyond any genuine issue of material
fact. The discussion at page nine by the Estate
regarding defective documents is exactly not
the kind of thing one wants to put into a brief
when you're seeking suinmruy judgment.
That's actually what you put into a brief when
you're opposing summary judgment and which
is, basically, the document could mean this or it
could mean that. As soon as that bell in (sic)
nu1g no Court that understands summary
judgment would ever grant one. Because what
you have basically said there is that this is not
crystal clear, there are two reasonable - or
multiple ways that this evidence can be
interpreted and you can - such issues can never
be resolved on summary judgment.
So
regarding whether or not the written

FAA (208) 263-0400
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documentation means one thing or means the
other or whether it's, uh, what weight it carries,
that is not appropriate for summary judgment.
Tr. 8/24/2015, pp.29~31
Respondent did not file a Cross-Appeal and, therefore, the Trial Court's Summary
Judgment on the variety of issues raised in her Motion for Summary Judgment is not for
this Court's review on appeal.
The only matters before this Court on appeal are the issues raised by Appellant on
appeal from the Trial CoUit,s Judgment dated Decembet 3, 2015. As a result, Appellant
will not reply to Respondent's Brief beginning at Section V, pp.10-14.
This failure to Cross-Appeal similarly applies to subsection B of Respondent's
Brief beginning on page 14. In fact, Respondent's Brief truly makes no sense in light of
the Trial CoUit's ruling. Respondent appears to be arguing that Alt's claim should not be
automatically allowed because of some perceived impropriety in the manner of its filing.

If Respondent is asserting affirmatively that the claim is defective and should have
been disallowed, that argument must have been raised at the trial level or the Respondent is
ban·ed from asserting the claim on appeal. "To properly raise an issue on appeal, there
must either be an adverse ruling by the Court below, or the issue must have been raised in
the court below. an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Garner v. Bartschi,
139 Idaho 430, 436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003); quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho
391,397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003).
Respondent's argument set fo1th in Subsection B of Respondent's Brief is quite
Daniel P. F~afhbr,tOn
Brei1t C. Fe3therston~
J,;re1r1y P. feather$10n

puzzling because (a) Respondent prevailed on the issue of the timeliness of their

Jertmi L. Ossman..·

disallowance and, therefore, there is no adverse ruling for her to assert in regard to Mr.

113 S . Second Ave.
Sandpoint , ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
F3.X ('208) 263,0400
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Alt's claim; and (b) this perceived issue of a "defect'' in the Alt claim was not raised before
the Trial Court or, if the issue was raised, the Court ruled against Respondent and she has
not appealed.
This Court is asked to disregard Respondent's Brief and the arguments contained in

Subsection B, pages 14 through 16.
Respondent's Brief begins, for the first time, to address the issues on appeal at page
16, Subsection C.

Unfortunately, Respondent simply does not address the statutory

construction issues raised in Appellant's B1ief, Section A. It appears to be Respondent's

position that no matter when a creditor's claim is submitted, the Estate has until sixty (60)
days after the time period for all creditor's claims to be filed within which to aUow or
disallow the specific creditor's claim received earlier. This defies logic and appears to
arise from Respondent's misunderstanding of allo\\ing or disallowing claims versus paying
claims, which seems to be the source of Respondent's confusion as reflected in the record

at oral argument:

Court:

Dani,jl P. ~..~1heISton
Il~nt C. F1,~1hers1on~

I- I don't understand Mr. Alt to be making that
argument. I think what he's saying, in that
situation, and I think he's interpreting the
statute correctly, which is, yes you - when you
do publication there's a four-month time for
creditors to step fotward and make their claims.
But when someone does step fotward and make
the claim then it triggers the estate's
responsibility to either allow it or disallow it
within sixty days. I think you're in - you're
misinterpreting that statute to say the no (sic)
action has to be taken on a claim once filed,
until the fouHnonth publication period, which
is a service of ptocess statue, expires. And I I've never understood it to work that way.

Jertm}' P. Peatherston
Jen:mi L. Ossm~n ·•
113 S . SccondAvh.
Sandpoint, lD 83864

Phone (208) 263-6866

f~ (208) ~63--04-00
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Ms. Cusack:

Well if that is not the correct interpretation. the
Estate's interpretation of that, Your Honot, how
can you allocate claims? .....

Court:

It's--that's--that's in:elevant.

it's
whether the claim is valid or not. You're no
(sic) allocating priority at that point in time.
You're - you're just because you allow a claim,
doesn't mean you have to pay it at that time ....
It's -

Tr. 8/24/2015, p.3,U.10-24 1
In ruling on the timeliness of the disallowance, the Trial Court held that it is ·~iocal
practice" to disallow a claim within sixty (60) days of submission, but that "a close reading
of the controlling provision reveals the follows: "Failure of the personal representative to

mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for 60 days after the time for original
presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance.',
Memorandum Opinion, p.4. In reading this provision, the Court concluded that that
language "time for original presentation of the claim" extended Alt's time to have filed his
claim as late as April 8th and the Estate' s time to respolld until June 8th • Memorandum
Opinion, p.5. Based upon this· finding, the Court ruled that the disallowance was timely.
This ruling disregards Alt's arguments that his early filing of the Creditor's Claim
triggered the sixty (60) day time for the Estate to allow or disallow the claim or face a
result that the claim is deemed allowed by the Estate's untimely response.

Interestingly, the Court repeatedly stated it would not make a determination of whether
the Estate timely disallowed Alt's claim since there was no Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment pending before the Court from Mr. Alt. Sl1bsequently, the Court issued a letter
on August 27, 2015, stating that the Court first needed to determine whether the
disallowance was timely since an untimely disallowance would operate as a waiver of the
statute of limitations defense.
1

baniel P. Feather,ton
:Srenc C. Feathe~ton•
Jeremy P. Fe.1the<$lOll
Jeremi L. Os~rnan• •
U S S. SwondAve.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phom~(208) 263-6866
Prut (208) 263-0400
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The Trial Court's MemorandUUI. Opinion is in error for the reason that it interprets
the phrase "time for original presentation of the claim" as necessarily tying the Estate's
deadline for disallowances to the publication period. First, it is undisputed that Alt' s claim
was filed January 13, 2015, before the Estate had even conunenced publication on
February 19th • Second, publication is not required under the Idaho Probate Code and,
therefore, the time for disallowance is triggered by Alt's filing of a Creditor's Claim.
Unless notice has already been given under this section, a
personal representative upon his appointment may publish a
notice to creditors once a week for three successive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation .. . notifying creditors of
the estate to present tl1eir claims within four months after the
date of the fh·st publication of the notice or be forever barred.
l.C. § 15-3-80l(a)(2016)

Notably> the personal representative is not required at all to publish notice to

creditors and creditors may be given notice by other means (mail or other delivery). In the
instant case, Alt filed his Creditor's Claim a full month prior to the publication even
commencing. The ~st.ate did not timely disallow the claim, and it is deemed allowed by
operation of statute.
The Trial Court erred in its Memorandum Opinion of finding that Alt's Creditor's

Claim was timely disallowed giving account for the publication period which commenced
February 191\ a full month after Alt's Creditor's Claim was filed and sei-ved upon the
Estate. This Court is asked to reverse and remand with instruction to the Trial Court that

FEA'I'HElf~~

Alfs Creditor's Claim is deemed allowed due to the Estate's untimely disallowance.

Daniel P. Pea1bemon
B~n! C. Featherston•
Jerem~ P. Feathe.rston
1ere mi l... Ossman• •
113 S. Second Aw.
Sandpolni, JD 83864
Pho11e (Z08) Z63-6866
F;,x (l08) 263-0400
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The Trial Court erred in its ruling that the three--year statute of
limitation applies to Alt's Creditor's Claim against the Estate of Hedwig
Melton.

Respondent's Brief cites the Court to Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165 (1986) for the
premise that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all Creditor's Claims from the date
of death. Respondent's Brief, p.22.
However, Witt v. Jon.es is inapplicable to this circumstance because it does not
specifically address the delay that is permitted in filing a joint probate of community property
of a husband and wife until the second spouse dies and as allowed under Idaho Code§ 15-3~
111.

Witt v. Jones did not involve community property being jointly probated after the second
spouse is dead beyond the three-year statute of lhnitations. As a consequence, Witt v. Jones
is inapplicable and unhelpful to the analysis of this issue.
It appears to be Respondent's position that they can absolve both Robert and
Hedwig's estate from any liability under the Alt Creditor's Claim by having it both ways.
To explain, the Estate has taken advantage ofldaho Code§ 15-3-111 by waiting until
Robert's death to probate the community estate of Robert and Hedwig and then filing it as a
joint probate of Robert and Hedwig's assets as provided by subsection 111. Furthermore, any
earlier probate of the Est.ate prior to Robert's death would necessarily have been a summary
administration under Idaho Code§ 15-3-1205.2

It is undisputed that any passing of the colnrnunity interest from Hedy to Robert in
the community estate is under Section 1205 subject to the separate and community debts of
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston•
J~remy P. Fcathe11wn
J'eremi L . Ossman•*
ll3 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phom, {208) 263-6866 .
Pax {208) 263-0400

Hedy at the time of her death. J.C. § 15-3-1205(c)(2016).

2

In fact, this proceeding was commenced under the summary administration provisions of
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The Estate would argue to this Court that she can assume the community interest of
Hedy into Robert's estate expunging any debts of Hedy thereby passing title to Robert free
of the Alt loan.3
In fact, the Estate at oral argument argued that Hedy's death had the legal effect of
extinguishing" a community interest and passing all title to Robert free and clear of the

'1

Creditor's Claim at the time of Hedy's death regardless of any proceeding or lack of

probate proceeding or subsequent Creditor's Claim by Mr. Alt.
Ms. Cusack:

..... So this idea of filing in Robert's estate is
really, uh, it doesn't matter because there is no
claim. Anything that he would have had ended
three years after Hedy's death. I don't see how
we can - under the community property statute
it does say that spouses can bind the community
property. but at her death that ended. And then
three years after her death the1·e was no
opportunity, again, for Mr. Alt to say that there
was any more community property. Because it
just became separate property of Robert. So by
- by waiting he lost his opportunity to collect, if
there was one.

Tr. 8/24/2015, pp.9"10
The Court clearly did not accept Respondent's position:
Court:

Daniel l:'. Featherston
arent C. Featherston*
Jeremy P. Fcathoniton
Jercmi L. Ossm8.I\**

113 S. Second Ave.
SIUldp<>int, ID &3864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

I have - I'm struggling with your assertion, and
I don't really know that it's particularly
germane to the issue I have to decide, but your
assertion that essentially, and correct me if I'm
misunderstanding it~ at the instant Hedy died
there was no more community property, it all
became Robert's separate property. I don't
know that I - that that makes sense that the

I.C. § 15r3-1205.
3 It should be noted that Alt's Creditor's Claim is asserted against both Robert and Hedwig.
At no time has the creditor limited his claim to only that of his mother's estate.
Al'l>ELLANT"S REPLY llRJEF - 1l
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transfer would be a~o automatic. It seems
to me that there is a community estate that
would move forward in time until it's

terminated either by operation of the three-year
statute oflimitation or by a probate decision.
Tr. 8/24/2015, p.28, 11.8~14

While it is clear the Court did not accept the Estate's argument that community
property deed of the real estate simply evaporated on Hedy's death. It is also clear that the
Court ened to the extent the quote above contains a finding that the right to probate and}
therefore, submit Creditor's Claim terminates either by the three~year statute of Jjmitations
or by a probate decision on Hedy's Estate alone. It is clear that Subsection 111 pennits a
spouse or their family to defer any probate proceedings witil the second spouse dies and
then a joint probate may be filed. It is equally clear that that joint probate leaves open the
opportunity for creditor's claims against both or either of the deceased spouses. If the
legislative intent was othenvise, it would have so stated.
The Respondent has put forth no argument to substantiate their position that
Subsection 803, which is a general bar to creditor's claims three years following the date of
death, could act as a specific bar to one creditor's claim as to one spouse in a joint probate
permissible under Subsection 111. The more specific timeframe variations contained in
Subsection 111 override the more general time limitations of Subsection 803.
The plain meaning of the statute, therefore, will prevail Wlless
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or Wlless plain
meaning leads to absurd results.
St. Luke's Regional Medical Center v. Board of
Commissioners of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753,
755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)

Oaoiel J>. Featherston
Brent C. Peatherston~
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jc.n:mi L Ossman••

113 S. Second Aw.
Sal)dpolnt, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
F;,.x (208) 263-0400
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The Respondent's interpretation of Subsection 803 in light of the specific
pennission found in Subsection 111 leads to an absurd result and requires the Court to
overlook the plain legislative intent which was to pennit joint probate of community
estates subsequent to the_three-year statute of limit.ations for probate following death.

·Furthennore, the debt in question is a community debt.

It was by the plain

language of the claim a loan to ·Robert and Hedwig for the purchase of their property and
construction of their log home which was titled as community property at the time of their
death.
Pursuant to the rules applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court

was required to assume those facts set forth in the Creditor's Claim are true when ruling on
the Motion for Sununary Judgment.
In doing so, the Trial Court should have presumed that the community debt of
Robert and Hedwig was not, and could not be. expunged by some manipulated
interpretation of Section 803 in light of the joint probate permitted under Subsection 111.

III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court erred in granting Partial Summary

Judgment finding that Mr. Alt' s claim is time barred as against Hedy's Estate but not
against Robert's. The Estate is a joint estate consisting wholly of community property.
The community estate had not been submitted to probate upon Hedy•s death and therefore
Hedy's interests {as with Robert's) were su~ject to the liability of Mr. Alt's claim. This
Court is asked to reverse the Trial Court's ruling.
DMiel P. Featherston
Brent C. Fealhon ton*
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jercmi L . Ornnanu

113 S, Second Ave.
SaodpOint, ID 83864

Phonl! (.208) 263-6866
PiUt (,208) 263-0400
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Further, the Trial Court erred in findi ng that Jadwiga timely disallowed Mr. Alfs

Claim. The Court is asked to reverse that finding and remand with instruction to deem Mr.
Alt's Claim allowed as provided by law.

The Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs.
DATED this~day of July, 2016.

FEA-»~W FIDM,C
By~~~~-7~=======---=----=
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the a{ /J~y of July, 2016, I caused a true and co11ect copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner;
Hon. John R. Stegner
Second Judicial District Judge
P.O. Box 8068

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 883-5719
Courthouse Mail
[ ] Other: _ __ _ _ _ __

Moscow, ID 83843

M

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
Other:

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

r1

~-~- ----

Dsniel P. F~ 1hcm on
Brent C. F~atherston~
foremy P, Ptathcrston
J~tni L, O.sman•~
113 S. Socond Aw,
Sandpoint, 10 83864
Phone ('.!08) 263-6866

Fax (208) 263-0400
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
- COURT MINUTES Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: Z: 3/2016-08-26
Time: 9:32 A.M.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
Date: August 26, 2016
In the Matter of the Estate of,

)
)

Case No. CV-2013-313

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appearances:

Deceased.

Subject of Proceedings:

Brent Featherston, Sandpoint, ID
appearing on behalf of the appellate
Mary Cusack, Coeur d'Alene, ID
appearing on behalf of the respondent

Appellate Argument by telephone pursuant to IRCP 7.2

This being the time fixed pursuant to written order of the Court for the hearing of
appellate argument in this case, Court noted the participation of counsel in this conference
call.
Court questioned whether it had jurisdiction over this matter, indicating that it
appears that the judgment that was appealed from only relates to Hedwig Melton. Counsel
concurred. Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding this Court's jurisdiction.
Court indicated that it believed it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over this case and
send it back to Judge Julian for a determination of all of the claims made by Mr. Alt against
the Estates of Hedwig Melton and Robert Melton. Court informed counsel that it would like
more authority supporting this Court's jurisdiction over this matter and afforded Mr.
Featherston until September 9, 2016, to submit authority, and afforded Ms. Cusack until
September 23, 2016, to respond. Court scheduled further hearing for 3:00 P.M. on October
7, 2016, by telephone conference to be initiated by the Court.
Court recessed at 9:45 A.M.
APPROVED BY:

~ -M l ' ~

JOHN R. STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

[Following the hearing, at the request of Ms. Cusack, there being no objection from
Mr. Featherston, the hearing time on October 7, 2016, was changed to 10:00 A.M.]

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES

ORIGINAL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
)

In the Matter of the Estate of

)

Case No. CV-2013-313

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON

)
)
)
)

_ ______________ )

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULEAND
RESCHEDULING ORAL
ARGUMENT

On January 13, 2016, the Appellant, Heinz Alt, filed a Notice of Appeal with
this Court. The appeal is taken from the Judgment entered by the Magistrate Judge
on December 3, 2015, after granting in part a motion for summary judgment filed by
the estate's personal representative, Jadwiga Melton. On August 26, 2016, this Court
conducted a telephonic hearing. Prior to hearing argument on the substance of the
appeal, this Court questioned counsel regarding whether this Court had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. Counsel requested additional time to brief the issue.

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT

Page 1
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Good cause appearing,
It is ORDERED that:
(1) Appellant's brief regarding this Court's jurisdiction shall be filed and
served no later than September 9, 2016;
(2) The personal representative's response brief shall be filed and served no
later than September 23, 2016;
(5) Oral argument will be conducted on October 7, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. by
telephone with the Court placing the call. All pending issues will be addressed at
that time if this Court concludes it would be appropriate to proceed to hear the
pending appeal.
';>~
Dated this _l_ day of September 2016, nunc pro tune to August 26, 2016.

John R. Stegner
District Judge

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT
Page 2
Page 298 of 438

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING ORAL
ARGUMENT were delivered in the following methods to:
Brent Featherston
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

c:p<J

Mary Cusack
Attorney at Law
320 E. Neider Aver, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

f::::,]( U.S.Mail

[
[
[

[
[
[

U.S.Mail
] Overnight Mail
] Fax
] Hand Delivery

] Overnight Mail
] Fax
] Hand Delivery

GLENDA f·OSTUr\
on this

\ 'St- day of September 2016. CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT
Page 3
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FILED
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CllTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON) ISB No. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
brent@featherstonlaw.com

2CfS SEP -9 PM 2: 29

Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
RE: JURISDICTION

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz
Alt, and pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Rescheduling Oral

Argument issued September 1, 2016, hereby submits Appellant's Brief Re J\µ'isdiction,as
follows:

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Appellant in this matter, Heinz Alt, ("Alt") is the son of Hedwig Melton

(''Hedy") and step-son of Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert"). This case commenced with the

filing of a Petition for

summary Administration of Estate on August 29, 2013, by Robert's

wife of just over three years, Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga1)). Robert married Jadwiga in 2010
baniel P. Fea1hust.o11
Brent C. Feathorslon*
Jeremy P. Fe3tharston
Jereml L. Ossm31\*•
113 S . Second Ave.
SAndpoint. 1D 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-04()0

after Hedy died in 2008.

A.l'PEl..LAN'l''S BRIEF R£: JORISDICTION-1
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Subsequently, the trial court issued a Memorandum Opinion on October 8, 2015,
'

.

concluding that Alt's claim was timely disallowed by the Estate and further concluding that
Alt's claim as against Hedy's Est.ate is barred by Idaho Code§ 15-3-803, but not barred as to

RoberCs Estate.
The trial court entered Judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) on December 3, 2015. Alt

timely appealed by filing his Notice of Appeal on Janumy 13, 2016, and Amended Notice of
Appeal on March 2, 2016. The appeal is taken pursuant to Idaho Code §1-705(3). Idaho
Code §17-201 and IRCP 83, IAR 17 (m) and Idaho case law.

JI.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Does this Court have jurisdiction on appeal from the Trial Court's

JUDGMENT, I.R.C.P. 54(b) dismissing Alt's creditor claim against the estate of Hedwig_
Melton as time barred?
Ill.

ARGUMENT
A.

Does this Court have jurisdiction on appeal from the Trial Court's
JUDGMENT, I.R.C.P. 54(b) dismissing Alt's creditor claim against the
estate of Hedwig Melton as time barred?

1.

The form of the judgment is torred and appealable.

First, Idaho Code §17-201 provides that appeal may be taken from a 'judgment, or order of
the magistrates division of the district court in probate matters: .... 7. Refusing, allowing or
directing the ... payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share."
Fwther, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
i

The court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
Daniel P. Fea1henaon
Brent C. FeatheUtoa•
Jetemy P. Feather!ton

Jeferni L. Ouman••
113 S . Socond Ave,
Sandpoint, JP 83864

more. but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly det.e1mines that there is no just reason for clelay.
Otherwise, any judgment, however designated, that adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the

l

i

I
t
I

Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

l

l
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claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties' rights arid.liabilities.
·
In the event the ttial court determines that a partial judgment
should be certified as final undet· this Rule 54(b), the court
must execute a certificate which must immediately follow the
court's signature on the partial judgment and be in substantially
the form found in Appendix B.
I.R.C.P.,Rule 54 (2016)
The Judgment prepared by opposing counsel and signed by the M~gistrate contains
the certificate and complies with the requirements of IRCP 54 (b). Further, the legislature
provided in Idaho Code §17-201 that such a decision in a probate matter is appealable.
The document appealed from in this case fits the criterion of a partial judgment

certified as final and appealable under IRCP 54 (b). Subsection (a) of rule 54 requires that a

Judgment ''state the relief' to which a party is entitled on one or more of the claims and must
be a separate document, as opposed to the memorandum decision.

Further, it must contain certain words in a particular format: "A judgment or partial
judgment must begin with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: .. ," and it
must not contain any other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment may
include any findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute~ rule, or
regulation." IRCP Rule 54 (20 I 6)
. The Judgment appealed from in this case perfectly fits the criterion of Rule 54, both

~*tl~r

parts (a) as to the form of Judgment, and (b) certifying the partial judgment as final and
appealable. This Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Daniel P. FC31Mtst.Qn
Brent C. Fcathor<ton*
Jeremy P. Feather&(Oll
Joremi L. Omr,a11••
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint.10 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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Alt hus a statutory right to appeal this judgment.

~e right to appeal this ruling is of statutory origin granted by the legislature in Idaho
Code §17-201, specifically in probate matters. Further, the right to appeal a judgment in a
special proceedin_g such as probate case, has been acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court
recently.
'~Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(a)(6), "any order, judgment or decree by a magistrate in a
special proceeding in which an appeal is provided by statute'' is a judgment or order rendered
by a magistrate that can be appealed to the district judges division of the district court."

In re Estate of McKee, 283 P.3d 749, 754, 153 Idaho 432,437 (2012)
fu discussing Idaho Code § 17-201, the Court noted:
"Subsection (7) of LC. § 17-201 lists as appealable, orders or
judgments H[r]efusing, allowing or directing the distribution or
partition of an estate, or any part thereof, or the payment of a
debt, claim, legacy or distributive share." Decisions by courts
in these areas are subject to review regardless of whether they
are final judgments."

Inre Estate of McKee, supra; citing: Est.ate of
Keeven, 716 P.2d 1224, 1227, 110 Idaho 452,455 (1986)
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

3.

This appeal is not a "piece meaP' appeal under 54 (b).

The District Court at the time originally set for oral argument raised the question as to
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The Court specifically raised the question of whether the
Trial Court's Judgment was contrary to the objective to avoid piece meal appeals.
It is significant that Idaho Code §17-201 and Rule 83 specifically permit appeals from
specific rulings, regardless of whether it may be perceived as piece meal. Therefore, the
Daniel P. F<,~lhtrSCOn
Bi-¢lll C. F<iath~rscon·•
J1>r¢my ?. PoalherSton
]ciremi L. Ossmrui*"'

113 S. Second /\Ve.
Sandpoint, ID 83864

PhMe ('208) 263-6866
F~i (,08) 263-0400

statutory provision would override any limitations of the trial court's discretion under Rule 54
(b) to certify the judgment as final and appealable.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF RE: JURISDICTION- 4

•Ue.n~ in Idaho & w..hin31<1n
••Lic;cnii,d in ld.lllo. & Mlthlt,tu"

Page 303 of 438

09- 09 -' 16 14 : 22 FHOM-FEATPri:~ STON LA\11 FIRM

2082630400

T-3 29

P0006/0009 F- 322

'~The language ~f a statute should be .given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning.
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous. the expressed intent of the legislature shall be
given effect without engaging in statutory construction." Idaho Code § 73-113 (2016)
~'When a statute and lule "can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict
between them. they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a

i

I
I

II
II

!
;

conflict." State v. Johnson, 188 P.3d 912,916, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008)

I

I
I

To suggest that IRCP 54 (b) does not permit appeal of the judgment dismissing Mr.
Alt's creditor claim against the estate of Hedwig Melton is to disregard the provisions Idaho
Code §17-201. The Court is obligated to read the statute applying the plain meaning of the

I
I

I

ii
I

I

I
I

words contained therein which permit this appeal, and further to construe rule 54 so as to

carry out that plain meaning. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code §17-2014.

If the statutory rights of appeal conflict with 54 (b), Mr. Alt's
substantive rights·under the statute prevail.

If the Court determines rule 54 and the statute, Idaho Code §17-20 I, conflict, then the
statute prevails as a substantive right of appeal granted to Mr. Alt by the legislature.
~1

[L]egislation is a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact substantive law

[and] that legislation is to be given due deference and respect" State v. Johnson, 188 P.3d
912,916, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008)

By contrast, the powers of the Court in rule making are limited to procedural. "A
careful reading of the Constitution of the Stat.e of Idaho and the legislature's codification of
the Idaho Supreme Court's rule making power, reveals that this Court's rule making power
D.mlel P, Feath.erston
Brt1nt C. Fea1hm1on~
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jercmi L. Ossman"•
113 S . Second AYO,
Sandpoint, ID 8l864
Phone (208) '.!63-6866
Fsx (108) 26:J-0400

goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules." State v. Beam, 828 P.2d 891,892, 121
Idaho 862, 863 (1992)
APP:ELLANT'S BRIEF RE: JURISDICTION- 5
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''Substantive law presc1ibes norms for societal conduct and punishments for
violations thereof. It thus creates,.defiries; and regulates primary rights . .In contrast, practice
and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." State v. Currington, 700 P.2d 942, 944,

108 Idaho 539, 541 (1985) _
. The Legislature clearly provided a substantive right of appeal from specific orders in
a probate case as set out in Idaho Code §17-201. Any contrary provision of Rule 54 is
superseded by Mr. Alt's substantive right of appeal provided by the legislature.
5.

Even under the "piece meal" appeal analysis, the 54 (b) certificate
was proper.

Finally~ should this court choose to make an analysis of the Magistrate's exercise of

discretion in dismissing Mr. Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig Melton, it should be
noted that decision effectively disposed of all of Alt's claims against Mrs. Meltons' estate.
While it is true these claims survive against the community property interests of Ml-. Melton,
it is nonetheless a final disposition as against Hedwig Melton's estate and, therefore,
appealable.
This fact is distinguishable from those cases where the appellate court dismissed the
appeal as improper rule 54 (b) certification. In Bishop v. Capital Financial Services. the
appellant had five (5) different claims against multiple parties. The Court entered partial
summary judgment in favor of Capital Financial on Bishop's claims and certified the

judgment. As in this case, the Judgment was prepared by counsel with a rule 54 certificate.
In dismissing the appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that ordinarily such a certificate
Daniel P. Feath<:>rSton
Bn,nt C. fea1horston~
Joremy P. Featherston

requires the Court to "weigh the overall policy against piecemeal appeals against the

Jcrcmi L. Ossman• •

113 S. Second Ave,
Sandpoint, ID &3864
l'hone (208) 263-6866
PAx (208) 263-0400

exigencies the case at hand may present" and the Supreme Court noted that multiple claims
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and multiple parties to the suit dictated against the certificate unless "the interests of justice"
are served by an immediate appeal. Bishop~- Capital F1_nancial Services, 712 P.2d 567, 569,

109 Idaho 866., 868 (1985)
Here, there is but one claim again$t the joint estate of Mr. and Mxs. Melton. With no
applicable case law or authority, the magistrate dismissed the claim against Mrs. Melton's
estate. Even if the Magistrate's discretion ~n issuing a 54 (b) certificate is subject to scrutiny
· as to piece meal appeals (disregarding the appeal as a matter of right m1der Idaho Code 1720 I), the certificate was properly issued. The Judgment dismissed a significant portion of
Alt's claim overall and all of his claims against Hedwig Melton. Further, the decision was
issued without benefit of any case law or authority to support the decision. These facts
support the Magistrate's issuance of the Judgment and 54 (b) certificate. This Court properly
has jurisdiction of this appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The

Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs.
DATED this ~ a y of September, 2016.

Daniel P. Fealherston
Brent C. Featherston~

Jeremy P. foalher$tOn
Jcrcmi L. Ossmann
113 S , Second Ave.
Sandpoint. ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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MARY W. CUSACK ISB# 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue , Suite 206
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,
Deceased.

__________

CASE NO. CV 13-0313

)
)
)
)
)
)

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
RESPONSE BRIEF

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON (hereinafter "Jadwiga"), the
Personal Representative of the above-captioned estate, by and through her attorney of
record , MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits her Personal
Representative's Response Brief as follows:

I.

INTRODUCTION
This case concerns one claim against the estates of ROBERT ERNEST MELTON

(hereinafter "Robert") and HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON (hereinafter "Hedy"). These
estates are being probated jointly. Appellant, HEINZ ALT (hereinafter "Alt") has made the

3.
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same claim against each of these estates. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Personal Representative by disallowing Alt's claim against Hedy's estate.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND OBJECTION

The decision to grant or deny a 54(b) certificate rests in the sound discretion of the
trial judge who is best able to evaluate the situation. Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974,

978, 739 P.2d 273, 277 (1987) . Therefore, this Court must give broad discretion to the
trial court judge's decision to grant the certificate.
Ill.

ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, regarding the dismissal of
Alt's claim against Hedy's estate?
IV.

ARGUMENT ON ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the summary judgment
disposed of all of Alt's claims against Hedy's estate. This case concerns one claim against
two separate estates. Alt has raised a claim against both Robert and Hedy's estates. The
summary judgment issued at the Trial Court disposed of all of Alt's claims against Hedy's
estate.
Jadwiga supports Alt's brief regarding the Court's Jurisdiction, and is issuing this
brief to further clarify the Court's jurisdiction.

4.
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A.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the summary

judgment resolved Alt's claim against Hedy's estate.
So long as an order granting partial summary judgment resolves one or more of
the claims between the parties, it may be certified as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Toney v. Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 117 Idaho 785, 786, 792 P.2d 350, 351
(1990) . A trial court, however, may not issue any interlocutory order as final under Rule

54(b) if the order does not resolve one or more of the claims. Toney v. Coeur D'Alene
Sch. Dist. No. 271 . 117 Idaho at 786, 792 P.2d at 351; Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer. 135
Idaho 596, 599 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001); Rife v. Long. 127 Idaho 841, 844, 908 P.2d 143,
146 (1995). Furthermore, the decision to grant this 54(b) certificate rests in the sound

discretion of the trial judge, who was best able to evaluate the situation. Swope v. Swope.
112 Idaho at 978, 739 P.2d at 277.

In this case, there is one claim against two estates. The Trial Court's summary
judgment wholly disposed of Alt's claim against Hedy's estate, but did not dispose of Alt's
claim against Robert's estate. Accordingly, the summary judgment resolved the claim
between Alt and Hedy's estate, and may be certified as a final order pursuant to Rule
54(b). This is not piecemeal because one of the claims between the estates has been
wholly decided and resolved, and is therefore ripe for appeal. Therefore, this Court should
give discretion to the trial court judge's decision to grant this Rule 54(b) certificate, and
hear this appeal.

5.
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V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing , this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal as it deals

with a claim that has been fully resolved between Alt and Hedy's estate. In addition ,
Jadwiga respectfully requests th is Court for an award of attorney fees and costs .

·)r·St--

DATED this _d-__ day of September 2016.

Attorney for
Personal Representative
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

Ji Sf-day of September 2016, I caused a true and

0

accurate copy of the forgoing PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE BRIEF to
be served by facsimile and via email thereon , and addressed to the following :

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd .
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
Sent via email:
cynth ia@featherston law. com
brent@featherstonlaw.com

Boundary County Court Clerk
Sent via email:
courts@boundarycountyid .org

Honorable John R. Stegner
(208) 883-2259 - FAX

7.

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE BRIEF
{MWC001661 53.DOCX; 1120397.100}

Page 314 of 438

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
- COURT MINUTES John R. Stegner
District Judge

Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: Z: 3/2016-10-07
Time: 10:00 A.M.

Date: October 7, 2016
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV-2013-313

Appearances:
Brent Featherston, Sandpoint, ID
appearing on behalf of the appellate

)

)
)
Subject of Proceedings:

Mary Cusack, Coeur d'Alene, ID
appearing on behalf of the respondent

Appellate Argument by telephone pursuant to IRCP 7.2

This being the time fixed pursuant to written order of the Court for the hearing
of appellate argument in this case, Court noted the participation of counsel in this
conference call.
Court stated for the record that it had afforded counsel an opportunity to brief
the issue of whether there is an appropriate basis to hear an appeal in this case. Mr.
Featherston argued on the jurisdiction issue. Ms. Cusack argued on the jurisdiction
issue. Both counsel concurring that this case has jurisdiction to hear the appeal and
for reasons articulated on the record, Court stated that it would hear the appeal.
Mr. Featherston presented argument on behalf of the appellant. Call was
dropped at 10:13 A.M. and replaced. Back on the record at 10:17 A.M., Court and
counsel participating in the hearing by telephone as before. Mr. Featherston resumed
his appellate argument and responded to inquiI·ies from the Court. Ms. Cusack
presented argument on behalf of the respondent and responded to inquiries from the
Court. Mr. Featherston argued in rebuttal.
Court considered the matter as having been fully submitted and informed
Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 1

ORIGINAL
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counsel that in due course it would render a written opinion.
Court recessed at 10:58 A.M., subject to call.
APPROVED BY:

q,~"~
J6~NR. STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
)

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON,

)

Case No. CV-2013-313

)
)

)
Deceased,

OPINION ON APPEAL

)
)

________________ )

This is an appeal brought by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"), the Appellant, in which he
challenges the Magistrate Judge's decision granting partial summary judgment in
favor of Jadwiga Melton, the personal representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest
Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. The Magistrate Judge held that the personal
representative's rejection of Heinz's claim was timely and that because Heinz failed
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig Melton ("Hedy"), within
three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate.
BACKGROUND
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband,
Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert"). Appellant's Br., p. 1. Heinz alleges that he loaned
OPINION ON APPEAL
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money to his mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a
log home in Boundary County. Id. at 2. At some point, the property was deeded to
Heinz. Id.; see also Gift Deed (Ex. B attached to the Aff. of Mary W. Cusack). Heinz
alleges that the property was deeded to him as security for the money he loaned to
his mother and step-father. Appellant's Br., p. 2. Subsequently, Heinz claims Hedy
and Robert executed wills in which they bequeathed all of their respective property
to him. Id. Following the signing of the wills by Hedy and Robert, Heinz and his
wife deeded the property back to Hedy and Robert. 1 Id.
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Id. At the time of her death, Hedy had a will
directing that all of her property would pass to Robert, and, in the event that Robert
preceded her in death, to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton
(Ex. G attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Hedy's will was
never probated. Appellant's Br., p. 2.
In 2010, Robert married Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Id. Robert died on July
4, 2013. Id. At the time of his death, Robert had a new will directing that all of his
property would pass to J adwiga. Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton (Ex. B
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Robert executed the new
will in December of 2010 after marrying Jadwiga. Id. Prior to December 2010,

The timeline of events regarding when the property was deeded to Heinz, when the Meltons executed
their wills, and when Heinz deeded the property back to the Meitons are disputed facts. In the
Appellant's Brief, Heinz claims that "[t]he property was initially titled to [me] and [my] wife as
acknowledgment or security of the loan. Subsequently, tl1e Meltons executed Wills leaving all of their
estates to [me] . The real property was deeded back to Meltons." Appellant's Br., p. 2. However, the
personal representative claims that the property was originally titled to Hedy and Robert, and was not
titled to He:inz until July 16, 1999, after the Meltons' wills were executed. Resp' t's Br., p . 6; Aff. of Mary
W. Cusack.
1
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Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will in that if he preceded her in death, all of his
property would pass to her, and, if she preceded him in death, all of his property
would pass to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Robert Ernest Melton (Ex. F
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)).
On August 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Summary Administration of
Robert's estate pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-1205. The only assets of the estate are the
land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz maintains that Hedy and
Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with money he loaned to
them. On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was
entered.
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to
Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is
entitled to repayment of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the real
property and construct the home at issue. On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting
Aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was entered. On December 9,
2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment
of Personal Representative. Because Hedy's will was never probated, Jadwiga
requested that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate in one
proceeding. This was done pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-111.
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate
based on I.C. § 15-3-804. Heinz submitted several documents to support his claim.
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On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of
the estate of Robert and Hedy Melton. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice
to Creditors with the Court. The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry
Herald on February 19, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. The Notice of Disallowance was filed
with the Court on March 17, 2015. In that notice, Heinz was informed that his
claim was being disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely
because Heinz failed to bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed
to provide documentation that Robert owed a debt to him, and (3) Hedy's signature
on some of the documents submitted by Heinz had not been authenticated. Notice of
Disallowance of Claim, p. 1-2. On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow
Claims.
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny
Creditor Claim. A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. On October 8, 2015,
Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Specifically, Judge Julian
concluded that Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and
that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz
failed to bring his claim within.three years of Hedy's death. Mem. Op., p. 4-7. The
Magistrate Judge expressly stated that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim
against Robert's estate." Id. at 7. On Decembe1· 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge
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entered a Judgment on the above two issues and certified it as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 2
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. An Amended Notice of
Appeal was later filed on March 2, 2016, and Appellant's Statement of Issues on
Appeal was filed May 4, 2016. Heinz identifies the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment

determining that the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the
Personal Representative?
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that
Appellant's Creditor's Claim is time barred as against the Estate of
Hedwig Melton?
3. Did the trial court err as a matter oflaw holding that Idaho Code §
15-3-111 does not toll ·or extends (sic) the time within which
Appellant's Creditor's Claim may be asserted against the joint estate
of Robert and Hedwig Melton?
·
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting summary
judgment based upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all
claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's estate when that state
[sic] is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint
estate permitted by Idaho Code§ 15-3-111?
Appellant's Statement of Issues on Appeal, p. 1- 2.
Oral argument was heard by this Court on October 7, 2016. Brent
Featherston appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Heinz. Mary Cusack .
also appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Jadwiga. The case is now ready
for a decision to be issued.
Because the Magistrate Judge concluded that Heinz could still pursue his claim against Robert's estate,
this Court questioned whether the Magistrate's decision could be appealed even with a Rule 54(b)
certification. Briefing on the issue of jurisdiction was requested. Counsel for both Heinz and Jadwiga
argued that this Court had jurisdiction on two independent bases. First, because of J.C.§ 17-201 which
states an appeal may be brought from a "judgment, or order of the magistrates division of the district
court in probate matters: ... 7. Refusing, allowing or directing the ... payment of a debt, claim, legacy or
distributive share." And second because Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal to be brought under the
following circumstances: "When an action presents more than one claim for relief . .. or when multiple
parties are involved." It appears that jurisdiction is arguably afforded under the statute and Rule,
therefore, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to proceed.
2
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on summary
judgment, it employs the same standard as that properly employed by the trial
court when originally ruling on the motion. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho
1, 5, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009).
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavit s, and discovery
documents on file with the court, read in

alight most favorable to the non-moving

party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d
612, 617 (2001) (citations omitted); Idaho R. Civ. P . 56(c) (2015). "A material fact is
one upon which the outcome of the case may be different." Peterson v. Romine, 131
Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (citation omitted). "If the evidence is
conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different
conclusions, summary judgment is not appropriate." Id. "The burden of proving the
absence of mate1·ial facts is upon the moving party." Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677, 39
P.3d at 617 (citations omitted). However, when a motion -for summary judgment is
supported by affidavits, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response , by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2015).

OPINION ON APPEAL

- 6Page 322 of 438

An appellate court "exercises free review over questions of law and matters of
statutory interpretation." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924
(2014) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I.

Did the trial .court err in determining that Heinz's claim was
disallowed in a timely way by Jadwiga?
Heinz mailed his Claim Against Estate to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9,

2015, and filed his claim with the Court on January 13, 2015. Appellant's Br., p. 6.
On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed personal representative of the estate.
Letters Testamentary, p. 1. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed her Notice to
Creditors with the Court and on February 19, 2015, the notice was first published
in the Bonners Ferry Herald (with the last publication on March 5, 2015). Notice to
Creditors; Aff. of Publication. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 3. That Notice of
Disallowance was filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. On these facts, Judge
Julian concluded that Jadwiga's Disallowance of the claim had been timely filed.
Mero. Op., p. 5. Heinz appeals from this adverse determination. Heinz contends
that because the disallowance was untimely, the claim should have been allowed.
Appellant's Br., p. 7.
Heinz argues that Jadwiga did not disallow his claim within the statutory
sixty day time period set forth in I.C. § 15-3-806(a). Id. at 5-7. Heinz wrote the
following in support of his argument:
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Measuring the time from Janua;ry 9th [the date Heinz mailed
his claim to Jadwiga's attorney], and permitting three (3) day mail rule
for service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for
disallowance purposes began on January 12th. (Applying a filing date
of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not change the outcome.)
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a
Disallowance on March 13th. Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule
provided for in I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate's Disallowance was not
served upon counsel for Alt until March 16th, sixty-tp.ree (63) days
after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two (62] days after court filing of the
Claim.)
Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely
disallowed. Under I.C. § 15-3-806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow
the Claim has the effect of deeming the Claim allowed. This result
renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot.
Appellant's Br., p. 6.
Heinz's argument is predicated on his claim that a personal representative
must disallow a creditor's claim within sixty days of its presentation. Id. at 6-7.
Heinz relies on LC.§ 15-3-806(a), which states: "Failure of the personal
representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days
after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a
notice of allowance." Heinz argues "[t]he use of 'the' [before claim] in the sentence
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's claim, not a ·
general four (4) month provision applicable to 'any' or 'all' claims." Appellant's Br.,
p. 7.

In granting Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, the
Magistrate Judge wrote the following:
While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim
against the estate within 60 days, . .. it is clear from a close reading of
the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim does not
accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for
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original presentation of the claim." ... '[T]he time for," which precedes
and modifies the reference to "the" claim, means that the estate's duty
to disallow begins running after expiration of the deadline for
presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the statute as
Heinz urges, it would simply read ".. . 60 days after presentation of the
claim . . .", without any need for reference to "the time for original
presentation" having expired.
Mem. Op., p. 4-5. Judge Julian concluded that the "disallowance was clearly
timely." Id. at 5.
The Magistrate Judge's finding that the "disallowance was clearly timely"
will be affirmed for two reasons.
First, the plain language of I.C. § 15-3-806(a) makes clear that the personal
representative has sixty days after the time for the original presentation of the
claim has expired to mail a notice of disallowance to a claimant.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins
with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body m-qst be given effect, and the Court need not
consider rules of statutory construction.

State u. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber u.
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (italics added).
If Heinz's interpretation were to be employed, the words "the time for

original" and "has expired" found in I. C. § 15-3-806(a) would be rendered
superfluous. If the legislature intended the statute to require a personal
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representative to deny a creditor's claim with sixty days of its presentation, the
statute could simply read: "Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to
a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after presentation of the claim
has the effect of a notice of allowance." Instead, the legislature added the verbiage
"the time for original" and "has expired." Consequently, those words must be given
effect so that they are not rendered superfluous.
This interpretation is consistent with Idaho Court of Appeals case law. In
the case In re Estate of Boyd the Court of Appeals wrote the following in
determining when interest on a creditor's claim would begin to accrue:
John filed his notice to creditors in compliance with LC. 15-3-801 on
August 5, 1994, thus starting the four-month period for creditors to file
their claims. J.C. § 15-3-803. Idaho Code § 15-3-806(d) provides that
"allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period
commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of
the claim has expired." Therefore, the interest on BMH's claim could
not begin to accumulate until six months after John first published his
notice to creditors.
In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674-75, 8 P.3d 664, 669- 70 (Ct. App. 2000)
(italics added). Section (d) of LC.§ 15-3-806, the provision interpreted by the Court
of Appeals in In re Estate of Boyd, contains language identical to that found in
section (a). Section (d) states: "Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in
another court entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear
interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for
original presentation of the claim has expired . ..." I.C. § 15-3-806(d) (italics added).
Based on this statutory language, the Court of Appeals concluded that interest on a
creditor's claim (filed on August 8, 1994) could.not begin to accumulate until six
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months after the first notice to creditor's was published on August 5, 1994.3 In re
Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho at 675, 8 P.3d at 670. This interpretation is consistent

with the Magistrate Judge's holding that "the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim
does not accrue upon its filing, but rather .upon expiration of 'the time for original
presentation of the claim."' Mem. Op., p. 4.
Heinz had to present his claim within four months of the date of the first
publication of notice to creditors or within sixty days after the notice was mailed or
delivered to him. 4 LC. § 15-3-803(a); I.C. § 15-3-B0l(a) & (b). The first publication
of the notice occurred on February 19, 2015. Heinz therefore had until June 19,
2015, to present his claim. The estate then had sixty days after the time for original
presentation of the claim had expired (i.e., sixty days after June 19, 2015) to mail a
notice of disallowance. I.C. § 15-3-806(a). Because the Notice of Disallowance of
Claim was mailed to Heinz's attorney on March 13, 2015, it was timely.
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Heinz's interpretation
is correct, Jadwiga did, in fact, mail a timely notice to Heinz that his claim had been
disallowed. Heinz's claim was deemed presented on January 13, 2015, the day he
Although not at issue in the case, U1e timeline analyzed in Boyd strongly suggests that Heinz' s
interpretation of the 60 day time period is incorrect. In Boyd, the personal representative first published
notice to creditors on August 5, 1994. On August 8, 1994, the creditor filed its claim. Notice of
disallowance of the claim was not filed until January 25, 1995, some 170 days after the creditor's claim
was filed. However, the disallowance was filed within 60 days after the time for original presentation of
the claim had expired (i.e., 173 days, or within 60 days after the four month period for presentation of
creditors' claims had expired).
4 It is unclear from the record whether notice was mailed or delivered to Heinz. (There is not a certificate
of service attached to the Notice to Creditors filed with the Court on February 9, 2015.) However, even
assuming that Notice was mailed to Heinz at the beginning of February, the Estate's disallowance of his
claim was nonetheless timely. Heinz would have been allowed to present his claim within 60 days of the
Notice, giving him until the beginning of April, and the estate would have been afforded an additional 60
days after the time for presentation of the claim had expired to disallow the claim (i.e., the beginning of
June).
3
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filed it with the Court. LC. § 15-3-804(a) (A "claim is deemed presented on the last
to occur of: (1) delivery or mailing of the written statement of claim to the personal
representative; or, (2) the filing of the claim with the court."). On March 13, 2015,
fifty-nine days after Heinz's claim was deemed presented, Jadwiga mailed a Notice
of Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 6. Pursuant to the
plain language of LC.§ 15-3-806(a) a personal representative does not have to
serve, but rather need only mail, a disallowance within sixty days after the time for
original presentation of the claim has expired. LC. § 15-3-806(a) ("Failure of the
personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty
(60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the
effect of a notice of allowance.").
Consequently, Heinz's assertion that the disallowance was untimely because
it was not served upon counsel until March 16, 2016, is unpersuasive. Had the
legislature intended.that service must be complete within sixty days after the time
for original presentation of the claim, the term "serve" could have easily been used
in place of the term "mail" in LC. § 15-3-806(a).
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Heinz's claim was timely
disallowed by Jadwiga. Summa1·y judgment was appropriately granted on this ·
issue because there is not a genuine issue of material fact and the estate was
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this
issue will therefore be affirmed.
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II.

Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim against
Hedy's estate is barred by I. C. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring
his claim within three years of her death?
LC. § 15-3-803(a) provides in relevant part that:
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of
the decedent, ... whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of limitations
or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented within the earlier of the following dates:
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, for
creditors who are given actual notice, and within the time provided in
section 15-3-801(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by publication.

The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) parallels the general
time limit for probating an estate. LC. § 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or
appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding ... may be
commenced more than three (3) years after the decedent's death."
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be commenced within
three years of an individual's death, there are two exceptions to the rule. First,
pursuant to LC. § 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a surviving spouse
as the sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving spouse (or any person claiming title
to any property through or under such surviving spouse) may file a petition for a
decree vesting the property in the surviving spouse, or other claimant, with the
condition that the surviving spouse (or person claiming entitlement through the
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surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any and all i~debtedness that might be
claimed against the estate of the decedent. 5
Second, pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be commenced to
administer the estates of two deceased spouses. That provision reads:
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death
of either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the
property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died
before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both
decedents may be joined for probate in a single proceeding in any court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred
last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code,
applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The
initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding shall
contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is
based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be
made therein.

r.c.

§ 15.3.111.
Heinz argues that I.C. § 15-3-111 tolls the normal three year statute of

limitations found in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) because it extends the three year statute of
limitations for probating an estate found in I.C. § 15-3-108. Appellant's Br., p. 7, 11.
Heinz contends that
[i]f the legislature provided an exception to the three (3) year statute of
limitations on probates for summary administrations and joint
probates of husband and wife where the assets are community
property, it is logical that the same extension of time must be applied
to creditor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary
administration and joint probate upon surviving spouse's death. The
summary administration, by definition, would have passed the log
s J.C.§ 15-3-1205 does not state a time limit for the summary administration of estates in which a
surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, and there is no reference to LC.§ 15-3-108 within the provision.
Therefore, it appears to be an exception to the general rule that a will must be probated within three years
of the decedent's death since it is not a typical probate _proceeding. See 1.C. § 15-3-1205 ("there will be no
administration of the estate of the decedent.").
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home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities,
just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of
both decedents' debts and obligations to creditors.

Id. at 9-10.
In rejecting to this argument when it was made previously, Judge Julian
concluded that:
There is nothing in [LC. § 15-3-111] that states or suggests any tolling
of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just because the estate is
subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section specifically
exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the
first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates
the legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions
within [I.C. § 15-3-111] where warranted and intended. As there is no
exception made to the three (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803,
one shall not be implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's
estate was not filed or "presented" within three years of her death and
is now barred by IC § 15-3-803(a)(l).
Mem. Op., p. 7.
LC. § 15-3-111 was added to Idaho's probate statutes in 1973. In 1995 the
statute was amended to add the following language: "The three (3) year provision of
section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death
occurred last." The statement of purpose reads as follows:
This legislation amends existing Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 to clarify
when a joint probate may be used at the second death of a husband
and wife. Some courts have held that the three year limit on probates
in Idaho Code Section 15-3-108 applies to the first death and therefore
bars a joint probate unless both spouses died within three years of the
time of commencement of the joint probate. This legislation makes the
Code Section clearly state that only the second death need be within
the time periods of Idaho Code Section 15-3-108.
S.B. 1166, 1995 First Reg. Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (Id. 1995).
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A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or

section addressing an issue controls over the statute that is more general. Marshall

v. Dept. of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation
omitted). "[T]he more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an
area already covered by one which is more specific." Id. (citation omitted). It is
undisputed that LC. § 15-3-111 extends the general three year timeframe in which
to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, LC.§ 15-3-111 is
the specific statute, while LC. § 15-3-108 and LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) are general
statutes. Because the three year provision of LC. § 15-3-108 only applies to the
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, it would follow that the three year
timeframe set out in LC.§ 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of the
spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuant to LC. § 15-3111.

Additionally, interpreting I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring creditors' claims
against the "estate of the spouse whose death occurred first" in probate actions
commenced pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111 simply because the death occurred more
than three years prior to the commencement of the probate action would produce an
absurd result. This is· because LC. § 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of both
decedents [to] be joined f<?r probate in a single proceeding" within three years of the
"death of the spouse whose death occurred last." If the statute oflimitations for the
first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second
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to die. "Constructions of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).
The Magistrate Judge therefore erred in determining that Heinz's claim
against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring his
claim within three years of her death. Summary judgment was consequently
inappropriately granted on this issue. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this issue
will be reversed.
CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim was timely disallowed by
Jadwiga and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that issue is
AFFIRMED.

The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is
barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that the. estate was entitled to summary judgment on
that basis is REVERSED. This issue is REMANDED for further proceedings.
Dated this

f"~'1 day of November 2016.

District Judge
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APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM
OF FEES AND COSTS
PURSUANT TO I.A.R, 40

Purs·uant to I.A.R. 40, the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant,
Heinz Alt, hereby submits his Memorandum of Fees and Costs as provided for in the
Court's Opinion on Appeal filed November 1, 2016.

COSTS:
81.00

Filing Fee:

2.

Cost of Reporter's Transcript:

3.

Cost for Production of Appellant's Brief
18 pages@$6.00 per page

· 108.00

Cost for Production of Appellant's Reply
Brief - 15 pages @ $6. 00 per page

90.00

4.
5.
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Peatheraton•
Jeremy P. Featherston
Jeremi L. Ossman**

$

1.

120.25

$ 48'.oo

Cost for Production of Appellants' Brief
Re Jurisdiction - 8 pages @ $6.00 per page

TOTAL COSTS:

$

447.25

113 S, St:e0nd Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (20S) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400
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ATTORNEY FEES:

!

•'

Brent C. Featherston
Paralegal-Cynthia

t

'

•

19.95 hows at $250.00 per hour
2.50 hours at$ 90.00 per hour

$4,987.50
225.00

i

I

I

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES
RECAPTITULATION:
$

TOTAL COSTS:.
TOTAL FEES:

447.25

$5,212.50

I
I!
l
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AMOUNT OWING:
The foregoing Costs were actually incurred by the Appellants in this ·action and is in
compliance with Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellat.e Rules. The foregoing statement of
attomey's fees is supported by the Affidavit of Brent C. Featherston, filed herewith,
pursuant to Rule ~4(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Memorandum of Fees and Costs is filed pursuant to Civil Rule as the
Appellant is entitled to award of attorney's fees and costs.
It is anticipated Respondent may object to this Memorandum of Fees and Costs.
Appellant reserves the right to recover fees and costs incurred in response to Respondent's
objection at the rate of $250.00 per hour for counsel and $90.00 per hour for paralegal

time.
DATED this

di

of December, 2016.

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Appellant Alt
D~ri!el P. Pealhmton
llrent C. Featherston*
Jeremt P, Ft,a'*ton
Jcromi L. Ossmllll~*
113 S. Second Ave.
S~dpolnt, ID 83864
PhoM (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-0400

APPlLLANT'S BRIEF "2

•Liun,od in Idaho & Wa!hmfron
uu..n..d in Idaho & MichigM

Page 336 of 438

I
I

12-14-'16 14 :55 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM

2082630400

T-782 P0004/0010 F-215

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Bonner
)
BRENT C. FEATH1?RSTON, b~ing first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
That Brent C. Featherston is the attorney for Appellant, Heinz Alt; that I have read
the contents of the foregoing Memorandwn of Fees and Costs; that to the best of my
knowledge and belief, the items therein are true and correct, and that the costs claimed are
in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the items in the
attached bill have been reasonably and i1ecessarily incurred in this action related to the
Appellant's claim. The attorney's fees and costs represented herein are dated from January
11, 2016, to December 14, 2016, for a total award herein of$5,659.75.
Further, I certify, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) that the fees and costs incurred meet
the following criterion:
(A)

The time and labor required: It is significant due to a high volume of other

cases and counsel did forgo taking other matters as a result of this representation.
(B)

The novelty and difficulty of the questions: Highly difficult/novel in that no

case law existed directly on point in Idaho.
(C)

The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience

and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law: I have over 24 years' practical
experience in this type of litigation.
(D)

The prevailing charges for like work: The charges set forth above are

reasonable and consistent with charges of other similarly experienced or qualified attorneys
practicing in this area of law.
(E)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: The fees charged are a combination

ofhoudy fixed fee and contingent.
(F)

The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case:

Significant due to the novelty of issues raised or submitted by the Estate.
(G)
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Feath~rslon•
Jeremy P. Fe~lhenton
Joromi L. Ossman**
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208} 263-6866
Fax (20g) 263-0400

The amount involved and the results obtained: The decision of the Estate to

disallow the Appellant's claim required defense of summary judgment and appeal of the
issue. The results obtained were very favorable.
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The undesirability 'o f the case: There are many attorneys who refuse to take

this type of case for the r~asons dis~usse~·above. '
(I)

The nature and lepgth ~f the professional relationship with the client. This

is counsel's first case for the Appellant, Heinz Alt.

(J)

Awards i~ similar·cases: Comparable

(K)

The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal

Research) if the court finds it was reasonably.necessary in preparing a party's case: N/A
(L)

Any other factor

which the court deems appropriate in the particular case:

/Jj.

None
DATED this

.

-1----f- day of December. 2016.
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Hon. John R. Stegner
Second Judicial District Judge
P.O. Box 8068
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[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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[ ] Hand delivered
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
)

)
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY' MELTON,

Case No. CV-2013-313

)

)
)
)
)

_ _ ___ Deceased,
__________ __ )

ORDER DENYING
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL

This Court's Opinion on Appeal in this case was filed on November 30, 2016.
In that decision, this Court did not award either party attorney's fees on appeal,
and did not address the issue of costs. On December 14, 2016, the Appellant, Heinz
Alt, filed Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to I.A.R. 40. Alt
requests that this Court award him his costs in the amount of $447.25 and
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,212.50. Alt claims that he "is entitled to award
of attorney's fees and costs" pursuant to ''I.A.R. 40" "as provided for in the Court's
Opinion on Appeal filed November 1, 2016." 1 Appellant's Memo. of Fees and Costs
Pursuant to I.AR. 40, p. 1-2.
Alt is not entitled to an award of attorney's fee. "Any party seeking attorney
fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first
1

This Court's Opinion on Appeal was filed on November 30, 2016, not on November 1, 2016.

ORDER DENYING
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appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Rule 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." I.AR.
41(a). I.A.R. 35(a)(5) provides that "[i]f the appellant is claiming attorney fees on
appeal the appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that
appellant is claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim." In addition,
"simply requesting an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41,
without citing any statutory or contractual basis for the award, is insufficient to
raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149
Idaho 437, 448, 235 P.3d 387, 398 (2010) (citing Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 371,
128 P.3d 897, 908 (2005)).
Here, Alt did not assert a claim for attorney's fees in his Statement of Issues
on Appeal or in his Appellant's Brief. Additionally, Alt has failed to cite any
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees. Alt has simply cited I.AR. 40, which
deals with costs on appeal, and this Court's Opinion on Appeal, which did not
address attorney's fees because neither party asserted such a claim in their initial
briefs as required by I.A.R. 41(a). Since Alt failed to do that which is required to
obtain attorney's fees on appeai, his request for attorney's fees will be denied.
Alt also requests his costs on appeal. "Costs shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the
Court." I.A.R. 40(a). Any party claiming costs must file a memorandum of costs
with the court within 14 days of the filing and announcement of the opinion. I.AR.
40(c). The opposing party may file an objection to the claimed costs within 14 days
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of the date of service of the memorandum of costs. I.A.R. 40(d). Because the time for
the Estate to object to Alt's claimed costs has not expired, this Court will defer a
decision on the issue of costs until the 14 day time for objection has passed.
Good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Appellant's request for attorney's fees on appeal
is DENIED.

tJQ

Dated this

;JZ day of December 2016.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing
ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL were delivered by the following methods to the following:
Brent Featherston
Attorney at Law
113South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

(
~
[
[

]
]
]
]

Mary Cusack
Attorney at Law
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

(

] E-Mail
U.S.Mail
] Fax
] Hand Delivery

on this

N
[
[

E-Mail
U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivery

~ day of December 2016.
~ u n t y Clerk of the Court

By:~~~~:::::::.~_..-:::::::.::::::=r:.::..---Deputy Clerk
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CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815

STATE Of IOAHO

COUNTY OF 80U~DI\RY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO.

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

)

Deceased.

_____________

)
)
)
)

)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF
FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO
I.A.R. 40 AND MOTION TO DISALLOW

COMES NOW, Petition, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, by and through her attorney of
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC. and PURSUANT TO I.AR. 40
(d) and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), objects to Appellant's Memorandum of Faes and Costs
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and respectfully move~ the Court for an order disallowing fees and
costs.
The Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs
Pursuant to I.A. R. 40 and Motion to Disallow is made for the reason and upon the grounds
that Appellant is not the prevailinQ party in all issues under I.A.R. 40, has failed to cite any
statutory or contractual provision, law, or authority authorizing an award of attorney fees

and costs, and such attorney fees and costs are unreasonable.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

'2--~ day of December, 2016.

M~~~

Attorney for JADWIGA B. MELTON

1.

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MEMO OF FEES AND COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

z_,,;p(Z(

day of December, 2016, I caused a true

and correct copy of the foregoi!')g RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO I.AR. 40 AND MOTION TO
DISALLOW to be served by facsimile or regular U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and
addressed to the following:

HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN STEGNER
LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
PO Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-2259 - FAX

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

(208) 263-0400 - FAX

LEEANN M. ST. CLAIR

2.

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MEMO OF FEES ANO COSTS
MOTION TO DISALLOW
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)
)
)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON ,

)
Deceased.

_ _ ____________

)

)
)

CASE NO. CV 13,.0313
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS OBJECTION TO
APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF
FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO
I.AR. 40 AND MOTION TO DISALLOW

INTRODUCTION
COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON, (hereinafter "Petitioner", or
"Respondent"), and pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and I.R.C.P 54(d), hereby submits her

Memorandum In Support of Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Memorandum of Fees
and Costs Pursuant

to I.AR. 40 and Motion to Disallow opposing the Memorandum of

fees and costs filed by Brent Featherston on behalf of his client, Alt Heinz (hereinafter
u

Appellant").

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.

A Judgment was Issued In the above entitled action, the Honorable Justin

Julian presiding, dated and filed with the Clerk on the 3 rd Day of December 2015 granting
1. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION
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summary judgment in favor of the Personal Representative/Respondent on the following
issues:
a. The Personal Representative's dlsallowance of Heinz Alt's claim, filed
March 17, 2015 in the above entitled estate was timely filed ; and

b. Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred
pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-803.

2.

On appeal, Appellant and Respondent briefed the issues and oral argument

was heard before this Court on October 7, 2016. This Court issued on Opinion on Appeal
dated November 29, 2016 and filed with the Clerk on November 30, 2016 affirming the
Judgment issued by the Magistrate court in part and reversing in part.

This Court

concluded as follows:
a. The Magistrate's decision that Heinz's claim was timely disallowed by
Petitioner and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that

issue is affirmed.
b. The Magistrate's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is
barred by LC. § 15-3-803 and that the estate was entitled to summary
judgment on that basis is reversed. That issue being remanded for
further proceedings.

3.

On December 14, 2016, Appellant filed his Memorandum of Fees and Costs

pursuant to I.AR. 40, which is incorporated herein by reference.

2 . MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION
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ARGUMENT

1.

Obiection is Timely.
Petitioner's objection to the opposing party's Memorandum of Costs is filed in

accordance with I.A.R. 40(d). Under the rule, "any party may object to the claim for costs
of another party by filing and serving on the adverse party and objection to party or all of
such costs, stating the reasons in support thereof." I.A.R. 40(d). An objection must be
made no later than fourteen (14) days after the date of service of the memorandum of
costs. Id. An objection to costs is deemed filed upon mailing. Id.
In this matter, Petitioner filed her objection pursuant to 1.A.R. 40(d) In a timely
manner. Petitioner was served Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to

I.AR. 40 (hereinafter '1Appellant's Memorandum") via facsimile on December 14, 2016.
Petitioner is required to file her petition by December 28, 2016. Petitioner submitted
Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to
I.A.R. 40 and Motion to Disallow (hereinafter "Objection") on December 23, 2016
contemporaneously with this memorandum. The Objection is filed within the statutory
period of 14 days of service of Appellant's Memorandum and is timely.
2.

Appellant is Not Entitled to Fees or Costs.
Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees because he failed to clalm attorney's

fees in accordance with I.AR. 41 and I.AR. 35. In the alternative, Appellant is not entitled
to his fees or costs because he provides no authority upon which an award for fees or
costs may be granted and he is not the prevailing party.

2.1.

I.A.R. 41 and 35(s)(5) require a claim for attorney's fees to be asserted

as an Issue presented on appeal.
3. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION
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Appellant waived his claim for attorney's fees by failing to argue his claim for
attorney's fees in his opening brief. The Idaho Appellate Rules require an appellant to
both assert and argue for attorney's fees in their opening brief. The Idaho Appellate Rules
state in pertinent part:
"[a] party seeking attorney's fees on appeal must assert such
a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate
brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and
35(b)(5), provided, however, the Supreme Court may permit
a later claim for attorney's fees under such conditions as it
deems appropriate."

I.AR. 41 (a). More specifically, "[iJf the Appellant is claim Ing attorney's fees on appeal the
appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is claiming
attorney's fees and state the basis for the claim." I.A.R. 35(a)(5).
Appellant's only mention of attorney's fees in his opening brief Is his closing
sentence simply requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Appellant's Brief
Is incorporated herein by reference. The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that:
"a party must make argument in the argument section of Its
brief to receive attorney's fees on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
[The Supreme Court] has held that when attorney's fees are
requested, but are not discussed in the argument portion of
the brief, the request will not be considered."

Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,768,992 P.2d 751, 763 (1999)
(citing, W9aver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d 381 , 387 (1998)). The
Appellant's issues on appeal do not state a request for attorney's fees in the argument
portion of Appellant's Brief and no basis for the claim is argued. Because Appellant did
not argue attorney's fees in his opening brief, the Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and
Costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40(a) as it relates to attorney's fees should not be considered.
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I.A.R. 40(a) requires an Independent basis for awarding costs.

Appellant provides no basis for an award of fees or costs. The right to recover
costs is statutory and no cost can be granted unless provided for by law or order of the
Court. Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639
P.2d 442,448 (1981), see also, Agrodyne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342,348, 757 P.2d
205, 211 (Ct. App. 1988) (Pet. Rehearing denied). The Appellant states he was the
prevailing party and relies solely on I.AR. 40 and I.R.C.P. 54(e), neither of which provide
for his fees and costs.

Appellant submitted his Memorandum of Fees and Costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40(a),
including attorney fees. I.A.R. 40(a) states that "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevatling party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court."
I.A.R. 40(a). I.AR. 40(a) provides for the awarding of costs on appeal and I.A.R. 41
specifies the procedure for requesting an award of attorney's fees on appeal, but neither
provide the authority for such an award. Edwards v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys.,
154 Idaho 511, 520, 300 P.3d 43, 52 (2013); (citing, Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599,603,

67 P.3d 78, 82 (2003) (declining to address the issue of attorney fees)); see also, Camp
v. East Fork Ditch Co. Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002). An authority must be

cited or proved to the Court in order to receive such an award. Appellant has not met the
requirements of I.A.R. 40(a).
Idaho courts require a party requesting fees to submit the statutory basis for
requesting fees. Capstar Redio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 425 (2012);

see also, Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009). Moreover,
a party waives his issues and arguments on appeal when the request is not supported by
5. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION
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legal authority or the record . Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 375 P.3d 282,
297 (2016); Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). Appellant
has waived his right to request fees and costs because he did not argue It In his brief, nor
did he do so on the record .
In this matter, no order for attorney's fees was issued by this Court. Without
reference to a separate statutory provision or order providing for fees and costs, the
Appellant's fees and costs may not be awarded.
2.3.

Appellant does not meet the requirements for awarding attorney's fees

under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) or (2).

Appellant's attorney's fees may not be awarded pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e) because
he is not entitled by contract, statute, or based upon a frivolous or unreasonable defense.
Appellant relies upon IRCP 54(e) as the basis for the award, but the Rule itself requires
a contractual, statutory basis, or showing that the appeal was defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Appellant cannot meet any of the three additional
requirements.

I.R.C.P. 54(e) states, in pertinent part:
"[l]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney
fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as
defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract...Attomey's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be
awarded by the court only when it finds that the case was brought,

pursued or defended frlvolously, unreasonably or without
foundation, which finding must be in writing and include the basis and
reasons for the award. No attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-121 on a default judgment."
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and (2) (emphasis added).
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Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees because does not meet the requirements
of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1 ). First, Appellant cannot rely upon the existence of a contract as the
basis for attorney fees.

The existence of a contract in this matter is in dispute and

unresolved by the Magistrate court. Further, the documents submitted by the Appellant
in support of the existence of a contract contain no language allowing for an award of
attorney fees.

Second, the Appellant has failed to provide any applicable statutory

authority for awarding attorney fees. Thus, Appellant fails to fulfill the requirements laid
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and must rely solely on I.R.C.P 54(e)(2).
To succeed on his request for attorney's fees under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2} and pursuant
to I.C. 12-1 21 , the Appellant must be the prevailing party as well as demonstrate to this
court that Respondent's defense was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). By statute, this Court has discretion, "in any civil action, [to] award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party .. ." I.C. 12-121. However, under this

section, an award of _attorney's fees is only appropriate where the court has "the abiding
belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.

Wagner v. Wagner, 160 Idaho 294, 371 P.3d 807 (2016) (citing

Minich v. Gem State Developers Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979)).
"Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to

second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the
district court incorrectly applied well-established law." Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641,
645-46, 289 P.3d 43, 47-48 (2012).
In the matter of the appeal, the Respondent reasonably defended the appeal. This
Court acknowledged in its Opinion that Respondent's position as to the first issue was

7. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION
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grounded in established Idaho Appellate case law, which Appellant failed to cite or
distinguish.

The second Issue, by contrast, is one of first impression for the Court.

Respondent is then reasonable In bringing a defense a,:td attorney's fees may not be
awarded to Appellant under Idaho Civil Rule 54(e)(2).

2.4.

Appellant Is not entitled to the fees and costs requested because he

is not the prevailing party as to all issues.
If this court should find that Appellant is entitled to fees and cost, the award must
be apportioned. A party is entitled to only those fees and costs related to issues on which
he prevails. I.AR. 40(a); I.R.C.P. 54(e); see a/so, BBale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521,903

P.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, under I.R.C.P. 54, even if the Appellant is entitled
to attomey's fees, he Is entitled only to those attorney's fees as to the claims upon which
he prevailed. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(B); sea also, Ramco v. H-K Contractors, 118 Idaho 108,
113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990). Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure address apportionment
of costs a party prevails In part, stating:

"The trial court may determine that a party to an action
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and on so finding
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a
fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues
and claims involved in the action and the resulting judgment
or judgments obtained."
I.R.C.P 54(d)(1 )(B). The court has a duty to apportion to each party only the attorney's
fees related to the claims upon which the party prevailed under section I.R.C.P. 54.

Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471 , 478-79, 259 P.3d 617, 624-25 (2011).
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court reversed the Magistrate's decision that
Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that the estate was
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entitled to summary judgment on that basis, the Appellant is not entitled to his full fees
and costs. By reversing the Magistrate's decision, this matter is not final. and it is not
certain whether appellant will be the prevailing party on that Issue.

3.

Appellant's costs are unreasonable.
Appellant's costs are unreasonable because they are excessive.

The costs

referenced are the Cost for Production of Appellant's Brief, Reply Brief, and Brief re:
Jurisdiction. The cost for production of Appellant's three briefs totals two hundred and
forty six dollars ($246.00) for forty one (41) pages at six dollars ($6.00) per page. There
is no explanation or support for such cost as opposed to the cost of production with a
standard office copy machine. Appellant's cost for production is unreasonable and should

be disallowed.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing , Appellant failed follow the procedure for requesting fees
and costs or to provide an adequate basis upon which Appellant's fees and costs may be
granted. Therefore, Petitioner Jadwiga Kinast respectfully requests this Court GRANT
her Motion to Disallow and Objection to Attorney's Fees and Costs.
DATED the

2JJ"-

day of December, 2016.

ACK

r JADWIGA B. MELTON
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12:25 Cusack Law Firm. PLLC

(FAX)l 2086670708

P.013/013

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

lflv/.

day of December 2016, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT
TO I.AR. 40 AND MOTION TO DISALLOW was mailed via Regular U.S. Mall or faxed

to:

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN STEGNER
LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
PO Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-2259 - FAX

L/JLQ

LEEANN M. ST. CLAIR

(
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avent\e
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263~6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
brent@featherstonlaw.com
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Attorney for Appellant, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Fil{ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG ~'HEDY,, MELTON
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

APPELLANT'S REPLY
TO RESPONDENT'S
OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM OF FEES
AND COSTS

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz
Alt, and hereby submits Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Objection to Memorandum of
Fees and Costs as follows:
The matter of fees was addressed by the Court's Order Denying Appellant's
Request for Attomey's Fees on Appeal issued December 22, 2016, received in this office
December 27th • The remaining issue of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40(d) was left open by the
Court's Order. The Court's Order indicates that the Court had not received Respondent's
Objection at the time of the Order's issuance.
The time for Respondent's Objections has now passed, that deadline being
December 28, 2016, fourteen (14) days following the filing of Appellant's Memorandum
Daniel P. F~alherstru>.
Btent C. ~atherston*
JetBmy P. FeatherttOA
Je,em.i L. Oi~m~n..
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (208) 263-04-00

of Fees and Costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION
TO MEMORANOUM OF FEES AND COSTS· J
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The Respondent objects

2082630400

T-814 P0003/0004 F-307

that Appellant's costs are .unreasonable or excessive and

Respondent's assertion that ''there-.i~ no explanation or support" for a $6.00 per page cost
for production of briefs. I.AR. 40(b) provides that costs shall include the following items:
1.

F_i)ing Fee

2.

Costs of Reporter's Transcript

3.

Costs of Clerk's or_Agency's.Record

4.

Costs for the production of Appellant's briefs, Respondent's briefs, reply

brief and briefs in support of

.. .

Ol'

:

in opposition to Petitions for Rehearing or Review

including covers, but excluding appendixes at the rate of $6.00 per page. LA.R. 40(b)
Appellant's Memorandum of Costs itemizes exactly those costs recoverable under

I.A.R. 40 and also attaches and incorporates a slip list itemizing the Boundary County
Clerk Appellant's filing fee and estimated transcript costs.
Appellant is entitled to $447.25 as costs as a matter ofright.
There is no basis for Respondent's assertion that Appellant did not prevail and is
not entitled to costs on appeal. The Court's Memorandum of Decision on Appeal makes
clear that the Appellant did prevail on one (1) of the two (2) alternative issues on appeal.
Prevailing on either issue results in the Appellant prevailing on the underlying issue.
Appellant appealed the Trial Court's ruling that the disallowance of their creditor's claim
was untimely, but also appealed the Court~s ruling on Summary Judgment that the
creditor's claim was barred as to the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton.

Appellant

prevailed on the latter issue and is therefore the prevailing party on appeal and entitled to
Daniel P. Featherston
Brent C. Featherston"
Jeremy P. Peathouton
foremi L. Ou man**

his costs as a matter of 1ight in the amount of $44 7.25.

113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, JD 83864
Phone (208) 263 -6866
Pax (208) 263-0400
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DATED this

X

.

T-814 P0004/0004 F-307

2082630400
.

·

.

day of Jamiary, 2017 .

. BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Appellant Alt

CERTIFIC1TE OF MAILING
·
1 Jlt?(
I hereby certify that on the _,.Jc.,___ ·ctay of January, 2017, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following

manner:
Ho11. John R Stegner
Second Judicial Distdct Judge
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Maii
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 883-5719
[ ] Courthouse Mail
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Mary W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coe\u· d'Alene, ID 83 814

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivefed
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
Other: - - - - - - - - -

~~

14

~. ...' .:
.....,n..~
.
D3nlel P. Feathet11on
Brent C. Fe•lherSIOn~
Jeremy P. F1;,a1hemon

Jcremi L . Ossman~~
113 S. Se,;ond Ave.
Sandpoint. ID 83864

Phone (208) 263,6866
Fax (208) 263"0400
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,
Deceased .

)
)

CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313

)

)
)
)

______________ )

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Idaho Appellate Rule 17

JADWIGA MEL TON'S NOTICE OF APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary

Mary W . Cusack ISB# 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX

Brent C. Featherston ISB #4602
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM , Chtd
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 - FAX

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

1.

MELTON RESPONDENT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL
{LMH00169642 .DOCX;1/20397 .100}
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TO: ALT HEINZ, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BRENT C. FEATHERSTON OF
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD, 113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE, SANDPOINT,
IDAHO 83864 , AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The appellant, JADWIGA B. MELTON, the Personal Representative of the

above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record , MARY W . CUSACK, of
Cusack Law Firm , PLLC, appeals against the above named Respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Opinion on Appeal , entered in the above entitled action, entered
on the 30 th day of November, 2016, Honorable John R. Stegner presiding . A copy of the
opinion being appealed is attached to this notice as well as a copy of the final judgment
as this is an appeal from an Order entered after final judgment.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

opinion described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(2) and (b) .
o This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.AR. 12.2.
3.

Appellant provides the following preliminary statement of the issue on

appeal, which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary
statement, however, provides only a preliminary issue and shall in no way prevent the
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issue on appeal is:
a.

Did the district court err in reversing the Magistrate Judge's decision

that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by Idaho Code § 15-3-803?
4.
2.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
{LMH00169642.DOCX; 1/ 20397 .100}
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5.

a.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes

b.

The Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript as defined

in Rule 25(c), I.AR. , including preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript in [ ] hard copy [X] electronic format [ ] both (check one) :
i. Oral argument on appeal by the parties heard October 7, 2016.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

6.

Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR. : All pleadings
filed in this case on or after April 1, 2015 .
No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are

7.

requested in this Appeal.
8.

I certify the following:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter
of whom a transcript has been requested , as named below at the
address set out below:
1.

Name and Address: Sheryl Engler; P.O. Box 6068, Moscow, Idaho
83843;

b.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid ;

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

3.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
{LMH00169642.DOCX;1/20397 .100}

Page 365 of 438

DATED this

qVI\

day of January, 2017.

ACK,
Attorney for
DWIGA MEL TON
Personal Representative, Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the q~day of January, 2017, I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method and to the addresses
indicated below:

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
brent@featherstonlaw.com
Sheryl Engler
Latah County District Court
PO Box 6069
Moscow, ID 83843
(208)883-2559 - FAX

4.

Sent via e-mail and U.S. Mail:

Sent via fax

NOTI CE OF APPEAL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
)

In the Matter of the Estate of
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON,

)

Case No. CV-2013-313

)
)

)
)

Deceased,

OPINION ON APPEAL

)

________________ _ )
This is an appeal brought by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"), the Appellant, in which he
challenges the Magistrate Judge's decision granting partial summary judgment in
favor of Jadwiga Melton, the personal representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest
Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. The Magistrate Judge held that the personal
representative's rejection of Heinz's claim was timely and that because Heinz failed
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig Melton ("Hedy"), within
three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate.
BACKGROUND
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband,
Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert"). Appellant's Br., p. 1. Heinz alleges that he loaned
OPINION ON APPEAL
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money to his mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a
log home in Boundary County. Id. at 2. At some point, the property was deeded to
Heinz. Id.; see also Gift Deed (Ex. B attached to the Aff. of Mary W. Cusack). Heinz
alleges that the property was deeded to him as security for the money he loaned to
his mother and step-father. Appellant's Br., p. 2. Subsequently, Heinz claims Hedy
and Robert executed wills in which they bequeathed all of their respective property
to him. Id. Following the signing of the wills by Hedy and Robert, Heinz and his
wife deeded the property back to Hedy and Robert.1 Id.
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Id. At the time of her death, Hedy had a will
directing that all of her property would pass to Robert, and, in the event that Robert
preceded her in death, to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton
(Ex. G attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Hedy's will was
never probated. Appellant's Br., p. 2:
In 2010, Robert married Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Id. Robert died on July
4, 2013. Id. At the time of his death, Robert had a new will directing that all of his
property would pass to Jadwiga. Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton (Ex. B
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Robert executed the new
will in December of 2010 after marrying Jadwiga. Id. Prior to December 2010,

The timeline of events regarcling when the property was deeded to Heinz, when the Meltons executed
their wills, and when Heinz deeded the property back to the Meltons are disputed facts. In the
Appellant's Brief, Heinz claims that "[t]he property was initially titled to [me] and fmy] wife as
acknowledgment or security of the loan. Subsequently, the Mel tons executed Wills leaving all of their
estates to [meJ. The real prope1-ty was deeded back to Meltons." Appellant's Br., p. 2. However, the
personal representative claims that the property was originally titled to Hedy and Robert, and was I).Ot
titled to Heinz until July 16, 1999, after the Meltons' wills were executed. Resp't's Br., p. 6; Aff. of Mary
W. Cusack.
1
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Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will in that if he preceded her in death, all of his
property would pass to her, and, if she preceded him in death, all of his property
would pass to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Robert Ernest Melton (Ex. F
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)).
On August 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for -Summary Administration of
Robert's estate pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-1205. The only assets of the estate are the
land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz maintains that Hedy and
Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with money he loaned to
them. On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was
entered.
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to
Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is
entitled to repayment of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the real
property and construct the home at issue. On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting
Aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was entered. On December 9,
2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment

of Personal Representative. Because Hedy's will was never probated, Jadwiga
requested that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate in one
proceeding. This was done pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111.
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate
based on LC. § 15-3-804. Heinz submitted several documents to support his claim.
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9'n February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of
the estate of Robert and Hedy Melton. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice
to Creditors with the Court. The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry

Herald on February 19, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice- of
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. The Notice of Disallowance was filed
with the Court on March 17, 2015. In that notice, Heinz was informed that his
claim was being disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely
because Heinz failed to bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed
to provide documentation that Robert owed a debt to him, and (3) Hedy's signature
on some of the documents submitted by Heinz had not been authenticated. Notice of
Disallowance of Claim, p. 1-2. On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow
Claims.
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion fo1· Summary Judgment to Deny
Creditor Claim. A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. On October 8, 2015,
Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Specifically, Judge Julian
concluded that Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and
that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz
failed to bring his claim within.three years of Hedy's death. Mem. Op ., p. 4-7. The
Magistrate Judge expressly stated that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim
against Robert's estate." Id. at 7. On December 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge
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entered·a Judgment on the above two issues and certified it as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 2
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. An Amended Notice of
Appeal was later filed on March 2, 2016, and Appellant's Statement of Issues on
Appeal was filed May 4, 2016. Heinz identifies the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment

determining that the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the
Personal Representative?
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that
Appellant's Creditor's Claim is time barred as against the Estate of
Hedwig Melton?
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law holding that Idaho Code§
15-3-111 does not toll or extends (sic) the time within which
Appellant's Creditor's Claim may be asserted against the joint estate
of Robert and Hedwig Melton?
·
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting summary
judgment based upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all
claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's estate when that state
[sic] is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint
estate permitted by Idaho Code§ 15-3-111?
Appellant's Statement of Issues on Appeal, p. 1-2.
Oral argument was heard by this Court on October 7, 2016. Brent
Featherston appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Heinz. Mai·y Cusack .
also appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Jadwiga. The case is now ready
for a decision to be issued.
Because the Magistrate Judge concluded that Heinz could still pursue his claim against Robert's estate,
this Court questioned whether the Magistrate's decision could be appealed even with a Rule 54(b)
certification. Briefing on the issue of jurisdiction was requested. Counsel for both Heinz and Jadwiga
argued that this Court had jurisdiction on two independent bases. First, because of IC. § 17-201 which
states an appeal may be brought from a "judgment, or order of the magistrates division of the district
court in probate matters: .. . 7. Refusing, allowing or directing the .. . payment of a debt, claim, legacy or
distributive share." And second because Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal to be brought under the
following circumstances: "When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple
parties are involved." It appears that jurisdiction is arguably afforded under the statute and Rule,
therefore, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to proceed.
2
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on summary
judgment, it employs the same standard as that properly employed by the trial
court when originally ruling on the motion. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho
1, 5, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009).
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d
612, 617 (2001) (citations omitted); Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2015). "A material fact is
one upon which the outcome of the case may be different." Peterson v. Romine, 131
Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (citation omitted) . "If the evidence is
conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different
conclusions, summary judgment is not appropriate." Id. "The burden of proving the
absence of material facts is upon the moving party." Harwood, 136 Idahq at 677, 39
P.3d at 617 (citations omitted). However, when a motion·for summary judgment is
supported by affidavits, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2015).
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An appellate court "exercises free review over questions of law and matters of
statutory interpretation." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P .3d 918, 924
(2014) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I.

Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim was
disallowed in a timely way by Jadwiga?
Heinz mailed his Claim Against Estate to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9,

2015, and filed his claim with the Court on January 13, 2015. Appellant's Br., p. 6.
On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed personal representative of the estate.
Letters Testamentary, p. 1. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed her Notice to
Creditors with the Court and on February 19, 2015, the notice was ffrst published
in the Bonners Ferry Herald (with the last publication on March 5, 2015). Notice to
Ci-editors; Aff. of Publication. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 3. That Notice of
Disallowance was filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. On these facts, Judge
Julian concluded that Jadwiga's Disallowance of the claim had been timely filed.
Mem. Op., p . 5. Heinz appeals from this adverse determination. Heinz contends
that because the disallowance was untimely, the claim should have been allowed.
Appellant's Br., p . 7.
Heinz argues that Jadwiga did not disallow his claim within the statutory
sixty day time period set forth in LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Id. at 5- 7. Heinz wrote the
following in support of his argument:
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Measuring the time from January 9th [the date Heinz mailed
his claim to Jadwiga's attorney], and permitting three (3) day mail rule
for service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for
disallowance purposes began on January 12th. (Applying a filing date
of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not change the outcome.)
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a
Disallowance on March 13th. Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule
provided for in LR.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate's Disallowance was not
served upon counsel for Alt untii March 16th, sixty-t_h ree (63) days
after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two [62] days after court filing of the
Claim.)
Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely
disallowed. Under LC. § 15-3-806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow
the Claim has the effect of deeming the Claim allowed. This result
renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot.
Appellant's Br., p. 6.
Heinz's argument is predicated on his claim that a personal representative
must disallow a creditor's claim within sixty days of its presentation. Id. at 6-7.
Heinz relies on LC.§ 15-3-806(a), which states: "Failure of t4e personal
representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days
after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a
notice of allowance." Heinz argues "[t]he use of 'the' [before claim] in the sentence
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's claim, not a ·
general four (4) month provision applicable to 'any' or 'all' claims." Appellant's Br.,
p. 7.

In granting Jadwiga's Mot~on for Summary Judgment on this issue, the
Magistrate Judge wrote the following:
While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim
against the estate within 60 days, ... it is clear from a close reading of
the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim does not
accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for
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original presentation of the claim." ... "[T]he time for," which precedes
and modifies the reference to "the" claim, means that the estate's duty
to disallow begins running after expiration of the deadline for
presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the statute as
Heinz urges, it would simply read" ... 60 days after presentation of the
claim ... ", without any need for reference to "the time for original
presentation" having expired.
Mem. Op., p. 4-5. Judge Julian concluded that the "disallowance was clearly
timely." Id. at 5.
The Magistrate Judge's finding that the "disallowance was clearly timely"
will be affirmed for two reasons.
First, the plain language of I.C. § 15-3-806(a) makes clear that the personal
representative has sixty days after the time for the original presentation of the
l

claim has expired to mail a notice of disallowance to a claimant.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins
with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body m-qst be given effect, and the Court need not
consider rules of statutory construction.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber v.
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (italics added).
If Heinz's interpretation were to be employed, the words "the time for
original" and "has expired" found in I. C. § 15-3-806(a) would be rendered
superfluous. If the legislature intended the statute to require a personal
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representative to deny a creditor's claim with sixty days of its presentation, the
statute could simply read: "Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to
a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after presentation of the claim
has the effect of a notice of allowance;" Instead, the legislature added the verbiage
"the time for original" and "has expired." Consequently, those words must be given
effect so that they are not rendered superfluous.
This interpretation is consistent with Idaho Court of Appeals case law. In
the case In re Estate of Boyd the Court of Appeals wrote the following in
determining when interest on a creditor's claim would begin to accrue:
John filed his notice to creditors in compliance with LC. 15-3-801 on
August 5, 1994, thus starting the four-month period for creditors to file
their claims. LC. § 15-3-803. Idaho Code § 15-3-806(d) provides that
"allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period
commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of
the claim has expired." Therefore, the interest on BMH's claim could
not begin to accumulate until six months after John first published his
notice to creditors.

In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674-75, 8 P.3d 664, 669-70 (Ct. App. 2000)
(italics added). Section (d) of LC. § 15-3-806, the provision interpreted by the Court
of Appeals in In re Estate of Boyd, contains language identical to that found in
section (a). Section (d) states: "Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in
another court entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear
interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for

original presentation of the claim has expired . ... " I .C. § 15-3-806(d) (italics added).
Based on this statutory language, the Court of Appeals concluded that interest on a
creditor's claim (filed on August 8, 1994) could.not begin to accumulate until six
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months after the first notice to creditor's was published on August 5, 1994. 3 In re
Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho at 675, 8 P.3d at 670. This interpretation is consistent

with the Magistrate Judge's holding that "the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim
does not accrue upon its filing, but rather _upon expiration of 'the time for original
presentation of the claim."' Mem. Op., p. 4.
Heinz had to present his claim within four months of the date of the first
publication of notice to creditors or within sixty days after the notice was mailed or
delivered to him. 4 I.C. § 15-3-803(a); I.C. § 15-3-801(a) & (b). The first publication
of the notice occurred on February 19, 2015. Heinz therefore had until June 19,
2015, to present his claim. The estate then had sixty days after -t he time for original
presentation of the claim had expired (i.e., sixty days after June 19, 2015) to mail a
notice of disallowance. LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Because the Notice of Disallowance of
Claim was mailed to Heinz's attorney on March 13, 2015, it was timely.
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Heinz's interpretation
is correct, Jadwiga did, in fact, mail a timely notice to Heinz that his claim had been
disallowed. Heinz's claim was deemed presented on January 13, 2015, the day he
Although not at issue in the case, the timeline analyzed in Boyd strongly suggests that Heinz's
interpretation of the 60 day time period is incorrect. In Boyd, the personal representative first published
notice to creditors on August 5, 1994. On August 8, 1994, the creditor filed its claim. Notice of
disallowance of the claim was not filed until January 25, 1995, some 170 days after the creditor's claim
was filed. However, the disallowance was filed within 60 days after the time for original presentation of
the claim had expired (i.e., 173 days, or within 60 days after the four month period for presentation of
creditors' claims had expired).
·
4 It is unclear from the record whether notice was mailed or delivered to Heinz. (There is not a certificate
of service attached to the Notice to Creditors filed with the Court on February 9, 2015.) However, even
assuming that Notice was mailed to Heinz at the beg.inning of February, the Estate's disallowance oflris
claim was nonetheless timely. Heinz would have been allowed to present his claim within 60 days of the
Notice, giving him until the beg.inning of April, and the estate would have been afforded an additional 60
days after the time for presentation of the claim had expired to disallow the claim (i.e., the beginning of
June).
3
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filed it with the Court. LC. § 15-3-804(a) (A "claim is deemed presented on the last
to occur of: (1) delivery or mailing of the written statement of claim to the personal
representative; or, (2) the filing of the claim with the court."). On March 13, 2015,
fifty-nine days after Heinz's claim was deemed presented, Jadwiga mailed a Notice
ofDisallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 6. Pursuant to the
plain language of I. C. § 15-3-806(a) a personal representative does not have to
serve, but rather need only mail, a disallowance within sixty days after the time for
original presentation of the claim has expired. LC.§ 15-3-806(a) ("Failure of the
personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty
(60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the
effect of a notice of allowance.").
Consequently, Heinz's assertion that the disallowance was untimely because
it was not served upon counsel until March 16, 2016, is unpersuasive. Had the
legislature intended.that service must be complete within sixty days after the time
for original presentation of the claim, the term "serve" could have easily been used
in place of the term "mail" in LC. § 15-3-806(a).
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Heinz's claim was timely
disallowed by Jadwiga. Summary judgme.n t was appropriately granted on this ·
issue because there is not a genuine issue of material fact and the estate was
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this
issue will therefore be affii·med.
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II.

Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim against
Hedy's estate is barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring
his claim within three years of her death?
LC. § 15-3-803(a) provides in relevant part that:
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of
the decedent, . .. whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of limitations
or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented within the earlier of the following dates:
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-B0l(b), Idaho Code, for
creditors who are given actual notice, and within the time provided in
section 15-3-B0I(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by publication.

The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) parallels the general
time limit for probating an estate. LC. § 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or
appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding . . . may be
commenced more than three (3) years after the decedent's death."
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be commenced within
three years of an individual's death, there are two exceptions to the rule. First,
pursuant to LC. § 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a surviving spouse
as the sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving spouse (or any person claiming title
to any property through or under such surviving spouse) may file a petition for a
decree vesting the property in the surviving spouse, or_other claimant, with the
condition that the surviving spouse (or person claiming entitlement through the
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surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be
claimed against the estate of the decedent. 5
Second, pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be commenced to
administer the estates of two deceased spouses. That provision reads:
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death
of either spouse at any time, the sU1·vivor was then entitled to all of the
property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died
before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both
decedents may be joined for probate in a single proceeding in any court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred
last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code,
applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The
initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding shall
contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is
based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be
made therein.
LC. § 15-3-111.
Heinz argues that LC. § 15-3-111 tolls the normal three year statute of
limitations found in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) because it extends the three year statute of
limitations for probating an estate found in LC.§ 15-3-108. Appellant's Br., p. 7, 11.
Heinz contends that
[i]f the legislature provided an exception to the thi·ee (3) year statute of
limitations on probates for summary administrations and joint
probates of husband and wife where the assets are community
property, it is logical that the same extension of time must be applied
to creditor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary
administration and joint probate upon surviving spouse's death. The
summary administration, by definition, would have passed the log
s I.C. § 15-3-1205 does not state a time limit for the summary administration of estates in which a
surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, and there is no reference to I.C. § 15-3-108 within the provision.
Therefore, it appears to be an exception to the general rule that a will must be probated within three years
of the decedent's death since it is not a typical probate.proceeding. See l.C. § 15-3-1205 ("there will be no
administration of the estate of the decedent.").
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home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities,
just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of
both decedents' debts and obligations to creditors.

Id. at 9- 10.
In rejecting to this argument when it was made previously, Judge Julian
concluded that:
There is nothing in [LC. § 15-3-111] that states or suggests any tolling
of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just because the estate is
subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section specifically
exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the
first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates
the legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions
within [I.C. § 15-3-111] where wananted and intended. As there is no
exception made to the three (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803,
one shall not be implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's
estate was not filed or "presented" within three years of her death and
is now barred by IC § 15-3-803(a)(l).
Mero. Op., p. 7.
I.C. § 15-3-111 was added to Idaho's probate statutes in 1973. In 1995 the
statute was amended to add the following language: "The three (3) year provision of
section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death
occurred last." The statement of purpose reads as follows:
This legislation amends existing Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 to clarify
when a joint probate may be used at the second death of a husband
and wife. Some courts have held that the three year limit on probates
in Idaho Code Section 15-3-108 applies to the first death and therefore
bars a joint probate unless both spouses died within three years of the
time of commencement of the joint probate. This legislation makes the
Code Section clearly state that only the second death need be within
the time periods of Idaho Code Section 15-3-108.
S.B. 1166, 1995 First Reg. Sess. of the 53 rd Leg. (Id. 1995).
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A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or

section addressing an issue controls over the statute that is m9re general. Marshall

v. Dept. of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation
omitted). "[T]he more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an
area already covered by one which is more specific." Id. (citation omitted). It is
undisputed that I.C. § 15-3-111 extends the general three year timeframe in which
to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, I. C. § 15-3-111 is
the specific statute, while LC. § 15-3-108 and I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) are general
statutes. Because the three year provision of I.C. § 15-3-108 only applies to the
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, it would follow that the three year
timeframe set out in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of the
spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuant to I.C. § 15-3111.
Additionally, interpreting LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring creditol'S' claims
against the "estate of the spouse whose death occurred first" in probate actions
commenced p--u rsuant to LC. § 15-3-111 simply because the death occurred more
than three years prior to the commencement of the probate action would produce an
absurd result. This is.because LC.§ 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of both
decedents [to] be joined f<?r probate in a single proceeding" within three years of the
"death of the spouse whose death occurred last." If the statute of limitations for the
first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second
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to die. "Constructions of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004) .
The Magistrate Judge therefore erred in determining that Heinz's claim
against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring his
claim within three years of her death. Summary judgment was consequently
inappropriately granted on this issue. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this issue
will be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim was timely disallowed by
Jadwiga and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that issue is
AFFIRMED.
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is
barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that the estate was entitled to summary .judgment on
that basis is REVERSED. This issue is REMANDED for further proceedings.

Dated this

f'

2.'f day of November 2016.

District Judge
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB # 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,

)
)

)
Deceased.

CASE NO . CV 13- 0313
JUDGMENT
I.R.C .P. 54(b)

)

----,-- - - - )
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS :
1.

The Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt's claim, filed

March 17, 2015, in the above referenced estate was timely filed .
2.

Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred

pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-8~.

DATED this

..~----·····

5-· day of Dece/15.

~

( ,,.---;·---\

~--rn:IP ~ ·
,\_USTI N _JlJ(IAN
MAGHsTRATE

1.

MELTON JUDGMENT
(MWC00153249.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment or Order, it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a Final Judgment and that the Court has
and does hereby direct that the above Judgment or Order shall be a Final Judgment upon
which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
DATED this

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

6

day of December 2015, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed via Regular U.S. Mail or faxed to :
MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider, Suite 206
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667- 0708 - FAX

BRENT C . FEATHERSTON

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM , CHTD.
113 S . Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY:

2.

MELTON JUDGMENT
{MWC00153249.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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)
)
)
) .

A NOTICE OF APPEAL v as filed in the District Court on Janua1y l 0, 2017. from the OPINJO
N APPE L entered by District Judge John R. Stegner and file stamped on Novemb r 30. 2016 . A
JUD MEN

I.R.C.P. 54(b) v ith a Rule 54(b) 'ERTIFI 'ATE attached. was entered by Magi"trate Judge

Ju tin Julian and filed on December 3, 20 l 5, a. this an appeal upon judicial review.

It appears the

JUDGME T I.R.C.P. 54(b) with a Ruic 5-l b) CERTIFI ATE is not in compliance v ith Idaho Rule: < f
C'i vil Procedure 54(a) in that it contains a c nc lusion of law, i.e. '·I.

The Personal Repre cntati c·:

di ·allo, an c of Heinz Airs claim. filed 1ar h 17. ~015. in the abo e referen~ed e. taw was timely tiled .''
Thcrcf re,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal hall be CO DITIO 'ALLY D.ISMI

D as the

JUDGM ENT LR.C.P. 54(b) with a Rule 54(b) CERTIFICAT is not in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(a);
however, proceedings in this appeal SHALL BE SUSP NDED FOR TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS

F TI I ·,

DA TE OF THI ORDER for entry of a final judb"lllcnt in the Magistrate C9urt, pursuant to I.R. .P. 54(a ).
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that in the event proceeding in this appeal continu , coun. el for
pp llant shall tile an AME OED NOTICE OF APP AL with the Di trict Court Clerk in order t rcncct
the Jina I judgment entered i~ the Magistrate Court.
DATEDthi

/'D

dayofFebruary.201 7.
For the Supreme Comt

Stephen W. K nyon ~
cc:

ounsel f Record
District ,ourt Clerk
Court Reporter
Magistrate Judge Justin Julian
istrict Judge John R. Stegner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIST
. .T
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDAR
MAGISTRATE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF,

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,
DECEASED,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

F

CaseNo: CV-2013-0000313
AMENDED JUDGMENT
I.R.C.P.54 (a)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt' s claim, filed
March 17, 2015, is sustained.

DATED THIS

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-1

Z iiday of F

ruary, 2017.
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is
hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has
determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that
the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by
the Idaho Appellate Rules.
Dated this

7~

of February, 2017,.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular mail,
postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this ·1- day of February, 2017, to:

MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
BRENT FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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In the Supreme Court of the State of lfJ#leQ4
rn the Matter of the Estate of ROBERT

)

· RN :ST MELTON and 1-l DWIG ''HEDY"
MELTON . D ceas d.

)
)
)
)
)

JADIGWA MELTON. Personal
Representative,

ORDER TO WlTHDRA W
COND ITIONAL DISMISSAL
AND REL STATE APPEAL

)

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
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Supreme Court Docket No. 447 18-2017
Boundary County o. CV-2013-313

)
)

lIEINZ ALT

) .
)
)

Defendant-Respondent.

On February 1, 2017. thi. Coui1 issued an ORDER CO DITIONALL Y DISMISSI G

APPEAL and proceedings in this appeal were S SP : DED for entr of a final judgment in th
Magistrate Court that complied with J.R.C.P. 54(a).
I.R.C.P . 54(a) was entered by Magistrat

Thereafter. an AME OED J 'DGM ENT

Judge Justin Julian and filed on February 7, _OJ 7·

therefore.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISML SI G APPEAL

i sued by thi Court on February I, 2017, shall be WITHDR.A WN and pr ceedings in this appeal

shall be REIN STATED.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTIC E OF
APPEAL in the District Court in order to specif the judgment from which this appeal is takc.n.
DATEDthis

\t\:

da ofFebruarv,2017.
For the Supreme

cc:

ourt

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Repolier
District Judg John R. Stegner
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of:

)

)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON ,
Deceased.

CASE NO. CV

13- 0313

)
)

MOTION REGARDING

)

AMENDED JUDGMENT

)

- -- - - -- -- - - - -- )

COME NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON, by and through her attorney of
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby moves the Court for
the entry of an Amended Judgment as attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated
herein by this reference.
DATED this

J~ day of February 2017.

MARYW.

ACK
Cus::=:rm, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner

1.

MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE
{MJT00175404.DOCX: 1/20397 .100}

Page 393 of 438

02/22/2017

(f Al()12086670708

13:45 Cusack Law Firm. PLLC

P.013/016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on t h e ~ day of February 2017, I caused a true and
accurate copy of the MOTION REGARDING AMENDED JUDGMENT to be served by
facsimile thereon, and addressed to the following:

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

MAR~~~

2. MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE
{MJTOO 175404.DOCX; 1/20397 .100}
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON;
Deceased.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
NOTICE OF HEARING

- - - - - - - -- - - -- ~ )
NOTICE !S HEREBY GIVEN that on February 27, 2017, at the hour of 10:00 a.m .,

or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the courtroom of the above-entitled
court, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, before the HONORABLE JUSTIN JULIAN, the Petitloner in
the above-named matter, JADWIGA B. MELTON, will cal! on a for hearing the Motion

Regarding Amended Jf!dqment. Oral argument [s requested .
_~
_ day of February 2017.
DATED this _

MAR~~
Attorney for Petitioner

1. NOTICE OF HEARING
{MJT00175399.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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13:44 Cusack Law Firm, PLLC

(FAX)l 2086670708

P.003/016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ d a y of February 2017, I caused a true and
accurate copy of the NOTICE OF HEARING to be served by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid

or by facsimile thereon, and addressed to the following ;

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

2. NOTICE OF HEARING
{MJT00175399.DOCX; 1/20397,100}
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CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332

""'TY Cf BOL'HJ.'.i:Y
r J\, ._._
, t :. --( i!
i" >..... .

._t

,

I

r'1'•

,. J ,~

,

•, ,-l ... ,

I

~
~.:.,

, I

f ~- .•

- --

-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased.
_ _ __ __ __
_

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

COMES NOW, Petition, JADWIGA B. MELTON, by and through her attorney of
record, MARY W . CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P.
7(b)(3), respectfully moves the Court for an Order to Shorten Time to hear the following
motions: (1) Motion to Shorten Time; and (2) Motion Regarding Amended Judgment.
The Motion to Shorten Time is made for the reason and upon the grounds that
there is not sufficient time to give statutory notice; the parties will not be disadvantaged

in any fashion as there is already a hearing set at that time and date in this matter; and
further that It would be in the interest of economy and justice.
Oral argument is requested.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that JADWIGA B. MELTON will bring this Motion to
Shorten Time on for hearing on February 27, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable
Justin Julian.
DATED this

,J,..

~

day of February 2017.

MARM~

Attorney for JADWIGA B. MELTON

1.

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
{MJT00175400.DOCX; 1/20397.100}
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J,,1./{ day of February 2017, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MO~O SHORTEN TIME to be served by
facsimile or regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed to the following:

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

2.

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
{MJT00 175400.OOCX;1/20397 .100}
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208} 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)

)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,

)
)

)
Deceased.

- - --

CASE NO. CV 13-0313
MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALL Y

)

- - -- - - - -- - )

COME NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON, by and through her attorney of
record, MARY W . CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby moves the Court,
pursuant to I.R.C .P. 7(2), for an Order allowing counsel to appear telephonically at the
hearing set for February

27, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Justin Julian.

__ day of February 2017.
DATED this_~

MARYW.
ACK
cu=::::rm,PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner

1. MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y
{MJT00175401 .DOCX; 1/20397.100}
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

zz,,J..day of February 2017, I caused

a true and

accurate copy of the MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Yto be served by facsimile
thereon, and addressed to the following :

Brent C. Feetherston
Featherston Law Firm , Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue

Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

MAR~Cwatld.

2. MOTION ro APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY
{MJT00175401 .DOCX;1/20397 .100}
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
ISB#: 5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON,

)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313

)
)

ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME

)
Deceased.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

)

- )

On the 27 th day of February 2017, at 10:00 a.m. came 'to be heard a Motion to

Shorten Time on the Motion Regarding Amended Judgment, by JADWIGA B. MELTON,

by and through her attorney of record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC.
The Court, after reviewing the documents filed herein, and after hearing argument
presented by counsel , and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

The Motion to Short;.e "1e is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED this

1.

:c£+ day of E

ruary 2017.

ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME
{MJT00175403.OOCX;1/20397 .100}
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

",LCM.-

l

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the O'
day of February 2017, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME to be served by facsimile
or regular U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed to the following:

MARY W . CUSACK
Cusack Law Firm, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815

(208) 667-0708 - FAX
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

I.

GLENDA POSTON
CLERK OF THE COURT

By:

Gt~LJJ~
DEUTYCLERK

2.

ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME
{MJT00175403.DOCX;1/20397.100}
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MARY W. CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815

(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708- FAX
ISB#: 5332

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)

ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON ,
Deceased.

_ __ _ _ _ _ __
re1 ewe h
and good cause appearing ther fore,
THE COURT, havin

IT IS HEREBY ORDER D
GRANTED.

All Counsel will c

February 27, 2017, at 10:00

[ ]

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY

)

e ·1; r € 4n to Appear Te/ephonica//y,

AT P . ·oner's Motion to Appear Telephonical/y is

·nto the Courthouse at the start of the hearing on

.in.

Counsel will call into courtroom# _ ~

ENTERED this

.52$ay

of February

1. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y
{MJT00175402.OOCX;1/20397 .100}
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(FA>:)12086670708

P.011/016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the d lf"- day of February 2017, I caused a true and
accurate copy of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Yto
be served by facsimile thereon , and addressed to the following:

Mary W. Cusack
.
Cusack Law Firm, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

GLENDA PO STON
CLERK OF THE COURT

By:

Q ~dJJ~~
pu Clerk

2. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY
{MJTOO 175402.DOCX;1/20397 .100}
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, COTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON !SB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 (Fax)
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Attorney for Appellant, Heinz Alt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

)

)
)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON,
)
dod: 07-04-2013,
)
_ __ _ _ _ _. . .:D=ec=e=as=e=d.,_
. _ _ __ )

CASE NO. CV-2013-0313

NOTICE OF JOINDER IN
MOTION

COMES NOW, Brent C. Featherston, the undersigned counsel, for and on behalf of
the Appellant, Heinz Alt, and hereby joins in Respondent, Estate's, Motion regarding
Amended Judgment, fax filed February 22, 2017.
Counsel for Appellant is unable to appear in person at 10:00 A.M. on February 27,
2017 (though he could appear telephonically).
Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal
ent~red Febrnary 1, 2017. It is the Appellant's position that the Court should enter an
amended judgment that either:
a) Strikes language the Supreme Court objected to, which reads as follows : ''The
Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt's claim filed March 17, 2015 in the
above .referenced Estate was timely filed .'' Merely striking that language from the original
judgment entered December 3, 2015 would seem to comply with the Coui.i's Order
conditionally dismissing the appeal.
b) Alternatively, the Respondent has no objection to the Court entering the
Owid P. })oatherston
Brent C. Fcatht:rston~

proposed Second Amended Judgrne11t prepared by Respondent's counsel and submitted to

Jeremy P. Peathcrstoo
Jeremi L . Ossman°

the Court by cover letter dated February 7, 2017, which is also submitted with the Motion

113 S. Se(Ond AW.
San<lpOln!, ID 8)864
Phone (208) 263-6866
Fax (.208) 263-0400

for Status Conference. The Amended Judgment appears to comply with Idaho Supreme

•L\lltMod

n LJctn~

in Idaho & w,,hin.s•••
in ldoha &: M..,big.,,

NOTICE OF JOINDER IN MOTION• 1
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Court's Order of Conditional Dismissal, yet still adequately preserves the issues that are on
appeal.
DATED this 27 th day of February, 2017.

D.

FEATHERS

By----e:;~+-~=.,.!'.__--- --=---BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Heinz Alt

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9--1 day ofFebtUary, 2017, I caused a true and co1tect copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

Mru.y W. Cusack, Esq.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
610 .W. Hubbard, Suite 205
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[ ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
[/1 Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708
[ ] Other: _ _ __ _ _ __

By:~
- -~ -

bllniel P. Peathonlon
:Srent C. Peathor&1on*
Jeremy P. Peatllers.ron
Jeremi L. Ossma~••
113 S. Second Ave.
Shndpoinl. ID 83864
Fhone (208) 263-6866
Pax (208) 263-0dOO

NOTICE OF JOl'NDf;R JN MOTION
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
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Justin W. Julian
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CV-2013-0000313
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TIME:
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• In the Matter of Robert Ernest Melton & Hedwig "Hedy" Melton
Party

Name
Robert Ernest Melton
Hedwig "Hedy" Melton
Jadwiga B. Melton
Heinz Alt
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Juvenile
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PHASE OF CASE
Ct
In session . Calls case. Mary Cusack here for the Personal
Representative. Featherston not present. Joinder filed. What is wrong
with the amended judgment entered and why does counsel need
another one?
Cusack
Not familiar with appeals. Mr. Kenyon sent Supreme Court appeal back
down saying had included findings of fact. Thought it was counsels job
to create a new judgment. Where at in the case is that there were two
•
I
issues before the court ruled upon. Timeliness of disallowance and
statute of limitations. Appealing the limitations issue not the
disallowance. Spoke to Mr. Featherston and he stated had gone before
Supreme Court and stated if the judgment isn't exactly on point with the
.
argued issue that - he was trying to weigh the Supreme Court in his
argument. Concern is that appealing statute of limitations. Claim barred
as to Hedy's estate - sentence #2 on initial judgment. Amended
judgment entered last did not include that sentence. Concerned that
the issue a ealin is not clear in the amended ·ud ment.
The amended judgment was made brief because referencing a statute
Ct
in a judgment is beginning to sound like a legal conclusion. Cannot
have that in a judgment according to rule. Wanted to stay away from
that and just affirm the PR's disallowance of the claim. If Supreme
' J
Court wonders why the judgment affirms the disallowance, it would see
I
that information in the memorandum and opinion. Think that's how they
want it to be. The Judgment just does a thing and the reason behind it
is in a separate opinion. The concern is that if say in the judgment that
bein done ursuant to a statue it looks like a le al conclusion and will
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Ct

be bounced back a ain.
Appreciate the input. Have no idea. Just wanted to include the statute
of limitations issue on the appeal. Deferring to the Court. Trying to err
on side of caution . Do not want to be bounced back from SC for not
havin the wordin re limitation
Understand the catch 22. Supreme Court does not seem to like
specificity in a judgment or if want them to take minimalist approach .
Anything beyond there seems to be a problem with. Why worded the
wa I did
Had drafted a judgment and sent to Mr. Kenyon . He said would meet
the standard .
Ok. Even if the one done by the Court is satisfactory there wouldn't be
any harm in signing the one presented now if approved by Mr. Kenyon .
Sur rised the are willin to ive le al advice.
Because unfamiliar asked if the purposed judgment would meet the
standard and he said it would .
That gives the Court come comfort if have already gotten that
res onse. That's this ·ud ment here?
Yes
Will go ahead and enter as a second amended judgment in light of the
information that preapproved by Mr. Kenyon. Rule 54A is the form of
the judgment rule. Reviews rule and the items not to be included in the
judgment. If included it is a poison pill and not a judgment. Find
interesting that the judgment approved by Mr. Kenyon provides what
sounds like a conclusion of law. But if they say they'll accept it so I'll
si n it.
Do not know the exact rule but if stopped with the wording "is barred"?
Don't know.
Saying barred pursuant to the statute of limitations is a conclusion of
law. That is why go away from that in the judgment and just stated that
affirmed disallowance. Reasons are in memorandum opinion. Your
ballgame. The Court will sign. Just having difficulty reconciling how the
Su reme Court a roved ·ud ment is not a conclusion of law.
May be speaking to liberally to say approved by Supreme Court. In Mr.
Ken on's o inion he said it would be oka
Think he holds a lot of sway. It is his job. It is between you and Mr.
Featherston. Goin to o ahead and si n the second ·ud ment
Ad'.
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MARY W . CUSACK, ISB # 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON ,
Deceased .

)
)

CASE NO. CV 13- 0313

)
)
)

SECOND
AMENDED JUDGMENT

)

______________ )
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred

pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-803.
2.

Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment to Den Creditor Claim is hereby

granted.
DATED this

1.

__£12

day of _ _~ - - - - - - - - r - -

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
{MJT00174254 .DOCX; 1/20397.100}
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE

With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment or Order, it is hereby
CERTIFIED , in accordance with Rule 54(b) , I.R.C .P., that the Court has determined that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a Final Judgment and that the Court has
and does hereby direct that the above Judgment or Order shall be a Final Judgment upon
wh ich execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho
Appellate Rules .
DATED this

7?

day of---=---~.:..-.,,.'--,£-- --

-

-,,,,--~- - -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

;;rr--

day of

F&YJD<.v<j:

a true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDG

2017 ,

NT was mailed

via Regular U.S. Mail or faxed to:

MARY W . CUSACK
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC
320 E. Neider, Suite 206
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83815
(208) 667-0708 - FAX

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEAT HERSTON LAW FIRM , CHTD .
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX

GLENDA POSTON
CLERK OF THE COURT

Q,~f J 1),Z0(

BY:

DE

2.

TY CLERK

v

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
{MJT00 174254.DOCX;1/20397 .100}
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Mary W. Cusack ISB# 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX
mary@mcusacklaw.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,
Deceased .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 44768-2017
Boundary County Case No. CV 13- 0313
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
Idaho Appellate Rule 17

JADWIGA MEL TON'S AMENDE D NOTICE OF APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary

Mary W. Cusack ISB# 5332
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 667-0640
(208) 667-0708 - FAX

Brent C. Featherston ISB #4602
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 266-0400 - FAX

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

1.

•

L .. ~ .. "'-. ' . .'

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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TO: ALT HEINZ, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BRENT C. FEATHERSTON OF
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD, 113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE, SANDPOINT,
IDAHO 83864, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The appellant, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, the Personal Representative of the

above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record, MARY W . CUSACK, of
Cusack Law Firm , PLLC , appeals against the above named Respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Opinion on Appeal , entered in the above entitled action, entered
on the 30 th day of November, 2016, Honorable John R. Stegner presiding. A copy of the
opinion being appealed is attached to this notice as well as a copy of the Second
Amended Judgment as this is an appeal from an Order entered after final judgment.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

opinion described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(2) and (b) .
o This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.A. R. 12.2.
3.

Appellant provides the following preliminary statement of the issue on

appeal, which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary
statement, however, provides only a preliminary issue and shall in no way prevent the
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issue on appeal is:
a.

Did the district court err in reversing the Magistrate Judge's decision

that Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred by Idaho Code
§ 15-3-803?
2.
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4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

a.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes

b.

The Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript as defined

in Rule 25(c), I.AR. , including preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript in [ ] hard copy [X] electronic format [ ] both (check one) :
i. Oral argument on appeal by the parties heard October 7, 2016.
6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 , I.AR.:
a. The Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative filed on December 9, 2014;
b. Claim Against Estate filed on December 15, 2014;
c. Order for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative filed on February 2 , 2015;
d. Notice of Disallowance of Claim filed March 17, 2015;
e. All pleadings filed in this case on or after April 1, 2015.
No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are

7.

requested in this Appeal.
I certify the following :

8.
a.

That a copy of this amended notice of appeal has been served on each
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested , as named below at
the address set out below:

3.
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i. Name and Address: Sheryl Engler; P.O. Box 6068 , Moscow, Idaho

83843;
b.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid including the additional documents requested herein;

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

DATED this

~

day of March, 2017.

MA~
Attorney for JADWIGA MEL TON
Personal Representative, Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lf"-

day of March , 2017, I caused a true and accurate
I hereby certify that on the
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method and to the addresses
indicated below:
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm , Chtd.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-0400 - FAX
brent@featherstonlaw.com
Sheryl Engler
Latah County District Court
PO Box 6069
Moscow, ID 83843

Sent via e-mail and U.S. Mail :

Sent via U.S . Mail

.
4.
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IN TH E DIS TR ICT CO UR T OF TH E FIR
TH E STA TE OF IDA HO , IN AN D FO

R TH E CO UN TY OF BO UN DA RY

)
)
)
)
.)
)
)

In the Ma tter of the Est ate of

RO BER T ER NE ST ME LTO N and
HE DW IG "HEDY'' ME LTO N,

Deceased,

________________

ST JUD ICI AL DIS TR ICT OF

Cas e No. CV-2013-313

OP INI ON ON AP PEA L

)

Thi s is an app eal bro ugh t by Hei nz Alt ("H
einz"), the Appellant, in which he
cha llen ges the Ma gist rate Jud ge's decisio
n gra ntin g par tial sum mar y jud gm ent in
favor of Jad wig a Me lton, the per son al rep
rese ntat ive of the Est ate of Robert Ern est
Me lton and Hedwig "Hedy'' Melton. The
Ma gist rate Jud ge hel d tha t the per son al
rep rese nta tive 's reje ctio n of Heinz's claim
was tim ely and tha t because Hei nz failed
to brin g a claim aga inst the esta te of his
mother, Hedwig Melton ("Hedy"), wit hin
thre e yea rs of her dea th, sum mar y jud gm
ent was app rop riat e.
BA CK GR OU ND

Hei nz is the biological son of Hed y and the
step son of her deceased husband,
Rob ert Ern est Me lton ("Robert''). Appella
nt's Br., p. 1. Hei nz alleges tha t he loaned
OP INI ON ON AP PE AL
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mon ey to his moth er and step -fath er to enab le them
to purc hase land and build a
log hom e in Bou ndar y Cou nty. Id. at 2. At som e
poin t, the prope.rty was deed ed to
Hein z. Id.; see also Gift Deed (Ex. B attac hed to the
Aff. of Mar y W. Cusa ck). Hein z
alleg es that the prop erty was deed ed to him as secu
rity for the mon ey he loan ed to
his mot her and step -fath ex. App ellan t's Br., p. 2.
Subs eque ntly, Hein z claim s Hed y
and Rob ert exec uted wills in whic h they bequ eath
ed all of thei r resp ectiv e prop erty
to him . Id. Follo wing the sign ing of the wills by
Hed y and Rob ert, Hein z and his
wife deed ed the prop erty back to Hed y and Rob ert. 1
Id.
Hed y died on Aug ust 11, 2008. Id. At the time of
her deat h, Hed y had a will
dire cting that all of her prop erty wou ld pass to Rob~
rt, and, in the even t that Rob ert
prec eded her in deat h, to Hein z. Last Will and Test
ame nt of Hed wig "Hedy" Melt on
(Ex. G attac hed to the Aff. of Cou nsel (Bre nt C. Feat
hers ton) ). Hed y's will was
neve r prob ated . App ellan t's Br., p. 2,
In 2010, Rob ert mar ried Jadw iga Mel ton ("Jadwiga
"). Id.

Rob ert died on July

4, 2013. Id. At the time of his deat h, Rob ert had
a new will direc ting that all of his
pxop erty wou ld pass to Jadw iga. Last Will and Test
ame nt of Rob ert Mel ton (Ex. B
attac hed to the Aff. of Cou nsel (Bre nt C. Feat hers
ton) ). Rob ert exec uted the new
will in Dece mbe r of 2010 afte r man ying Jadw iga.

Id. Prio r to Dece mbe r 2010,

1 The timel ine

of event s regar ding when the prope rty was deed ed
to Hein z, when the Melto ns execu ted
their wills, and when Hein z deed ed the prope rty back
to the Melto ns are dispu ted facts. In the
Appe llant' s Brief, Hein z claims that "[t]he prope rty
was initia lly titled to [me] and {my] wife as
ackno wled gmen t or secur ity of the loan. Subse quent
ly, the Melto ns execu ted Wills leavi ng all of their
estate s to [meJ. The real prope rty was deede d back
to Melto ns." Appe llant' s Br., p . 2. Howe ver, the
perso nal repre senta tive claims that the prope rty was
origin ally titled to Hedy and Robe rt, and was i:iot
titled to Hein z until July 16, 1999, after the Melto ns'
wills were execu ted. Resp 't's Br., p. 6;Aff . of Mary
W. Cusack.
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Rob ert' s will mir rore d Hedy's will in tha

t if he pre ced ed her in death, all of his

pro per ty would pas s to her, and, if she pre
ceded him in dea th, all of his pro
wou ld pas s to Hei nz. Las t Will and Tes tam
atta che d to the Aff. of Counsel (Br ent C.

per ty

ent of Robert Ern est Melton (Ex. F

Fea ther ston )).

On Aqg ust 29, 2013, Jad wig a filed a Pet itio
n for .Summary Adm inis trat ion of
Rob ert' s esta te plll 'sua nt to LC .§ 15-3-120
5. The onl y asse ts of the esta te are the
lan d and home located in Bonners Fer ry,
Ida ho. Hei nz mai nta ins tha t Hed y and
Rob ert pur cha sed the lan d and con stru cted
the home wit h money he loan ed to
the m. On Aug ust 30, 2013, a Decree Ves
ting Est ate in Surviving Spouse was
ent ere d.
On Sep tem ber 6, 2013, Hei nz filed a Mo tion
to Convert Proceedings to
Sup erv ised Adm inis trat ion and to Det erm

ine Tes tacy bas ed on his claim tha t he is

ent itle d to rep aym ent of the money he loan
pro per ty and con stru ct the home at issue.

ed Hed y and Robert to pur cha se the rea l

On October 21, 2013, an Order Set ting

Aside the Decree Ves ting Est ate in Slll'Viv
ing Spo

use was entered. On December 9,

2014, Jad wig a filed a Pet itio n for For mal
Pro bat e of Will and For

mal Appoi~tment

of Per son al Rep rese ntat ive. Bec aus e Hed
y's will was nev er probated, Jad wig a
req ues ted .tha t the esta tes of bot h Hed y

and Rob ert be join ed for probate in one

proceeding. Thi s was done pur sua nt.t o LC
. § 15-3~111.
On Jan uar y 13> 2015, Hei nz filed a clai m
for $102,574.50 aga inst the esta te
bas ed on LC .§ 15-3-804. Hei nz sub mit ted
sev era l documents to sup por
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_on Feb ruar y 2, 2015, Jadw iga was appo inte d
the pers ona l repr esen tativ e of
the esta te of Rob ert and Hed y Melton. On Feb
ruar y 9, 2015, Jadw iga filed a Notice
to Cred itors with the Cou rt. The noti ce was first
pub lish ed in the Bonners Ferry
Her ald on Feb ruar y 19, 2015. On Mar ch 13, 2015
, Jadw iga mai led a Notice· of
Disa llow ance of Clai m to Hein z's atto rney . The
Notice of Disallowance was filed
with the Cou rt on Mar ch 17, 2015 . In that noti
ce, Hei nz was info rme d that his
clai m was bein g disa llow ed for the following reas
ons: (1) the claim was unti mel y
beca use Hein z faile d to brin g it with in thre e
year s of Hed y's deat h, (2) Hein z failed
to prov ide docu men tatio n that Rob ert owed a
deb t to him , and (3) Hed y's sign atur e
on som e of the docu men ts subm itted by Hein
z had not been auth enti cate d. Notice of
Disa llow ance of Claim, p. 1-2. On May 4, 2015
, Hei nz filed a Peti tion to Allow
Clai ms.
On Jun e 29, 2015, Jadw iga filed a Mot ion for
Sum mar y Judg men t to Den y
Cred itor Clai m. A hear ing was held on Aug ust
24, 2015. On October 8, 2015 ,
Mag istra te Judg e Just in W. Juli an issu ed his
Mem oran dum Opin ion gran ting
Jadw iga' s Mot ion for Sum mar y Judg men t in

part . Specifically, Judg e Juli an

conc lude d that J adw iga's disa llow ance of Hein
z's cred itor clai m was time ly, and
that Hein z's clai m agai nst Hed y's esta te is barr
ed by I .C. § 15-3-803 beca use Hein z
faile d to brin g his clai m with in.th ree year s of
Hed y's deat h. Mem . Op., p. 4-7. The
Mag istra te Jud ge expr essl y stat ed that ''He inz
may still proc eed with his claim
aga inst Rob ert's esta te." Id. at 7. On Dec emb
er 3, 2015, the Mag istra te Judg e
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ent ere d·a Jud gm ent on the above two
iss ues and certified it as

a fin al jud gm ent

_pursuant to Ru le 54(b), Ida ho Ru les
of Civil Pro ced ure . 2
On Jan uar y 13, 2016, He inz filed a
Notice of Ap pea l. An Am end ed Not
ice of
Ap pea l wa s late r filed on Ma rch 2,
2016, and Ap pel lan t's Sta tem ent of
Iss ues on
Ap pea l wa s filed Ma y 4, 2016. He inz
ide ntif ies the following issu es on app
eal :
1. Did the tria l cou rt err in gra nti
ng par tial sum ma ry jud gm ent
det erm inin g tha t the Ap pel lan t's cla
im wa s tim ely disallowed by the
Per son al Rep res ent ativ e?
2. Did the tria l cou rt err in gra nti ng
sum ma ry jud gm ent tha t
Ap pel lan t'e C1·edito1·'s Cla im is tim
e bal'red as aga ins t the Est ate of
He dw ig Melton?
3. Did the tria l cou rt err as a ma tte
r of law hol din g tha t Ida ho Co de§
15-3-111 does not toll ·01· ext end s (sic
) the tim e wit hin which
Ap pel lan t's Cre dito r's Cla im ma y be
ass ert ed aga ins t the join t est ate
of Ro ber t and He dw ig Me lton ?
·
4. Did the tria l cou rt err as a ma tte
r of law in gra nti ng sum ma ry
jud gm ent bas ed upo n Ida ho Code §
15-3-803(a) hol din g tha t all
cla ims are bar red aga ins t He dw ig Me
lton 's est ate wh en tha t sta te
[sic] is filed for pro bat e aft er the thr
ee (3) yea r per iod as a join t
est ate pel 'mi tted by Ida ho Co de§ 153-111?
Ap pel lan t's Sta tem ent of Iss ues on

Appeal, p. 1-2 .

Ora l arg um ent wa s heru.·d by thi s Co
Fea the rsto n app ear ed by tele pho ne

urt on October 7, 2016. Bre nt

and arg ued on beh alf of Heinz. Ma
ry Cusack.

als o app ear ed by tele pho ne and arg
ued on beh alf of Jad wig a. The case
is now rea dy
for a dec isio n to be issu ed.
2 Bec ause the

Mag istra te Jud ge con clud ed that Hei

nz cou ld still pur sue his clai m aga inst
Rob ert's estate,
istra te's decision cou ld be app eale d
even with a Rul e 54(b)
certification. Briefing on the issu e of
juri sdic tion was requ este d. Cou nsel
for both Hei nz and Jadw iga
arg ued that this Cou rt had juri sdic
tion on two inde pen den t base s. Firs
t, beca use of I.C. § 17-201 which
stat es an app eal may be bro ugh t from
a "jud gme nt, or ord er of the mag istra
tes divi sion of the dist rict
cou rt in pro bate mat ters : ... 7. Ref
usin g, allo win g or dire ctin g the ...
pay men t of a deb t, cla:im, legacy or
dist ribu tive sha re." And seco nd bec
ause Rul e 54(b) allo ws for an app eal
to be bro ugh t und er the
foll owi ng circ ums tanc es: "Wh en an
acti on pres ents mor e than one clai m
for relief . .. or whe n mul tipl e
part ies are invo lved .'' It app ears that
juri sdic tion is argu ably affo rded und
er the stat ute and Rul e,
ther efor e, this Cou rt con clud es that
it has juri sdic tion to proc eed.
this Cou rt que stio ned whe ther the Mag
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STA NDA RD OF REVIEW
Whe n an appe llate cour t revi ews a tria l cour t's
decision on sum mar y
judg men t, it eD?-ploys the sam e stan dard as that

prop erly employed by the trial

cou rt whe n orig inal ly ruli ng on the motion. Mon
tgom ery v. Montgomery, 147 Idah o
1, 5, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009).
"Su mm ary judg men t is app ropr iate if the plea

ding s, affidavits, and discovery

docu men ts on file with the court, read in a ligh
t mos t favorable to the non -mo ving
part y, dem onst rate no mat eria l issu e of fact such
that the moving part y is enti tled
to a judg men t as a mat ter ofla w." Har woo d v.
Talbert, 136 Idah o 672, 677, 39 P.3d
612, 617 (2001) (citations omitted); Idah o R. Civ.
P. 56(c) (2015). "A mat eria l fact is
one upo n whi ch the outcome of the case may be
different." Peterson v. Rom ine, 131
Idah o 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (cita
tion omitted). "If the evid ence is
conflicting on mat eria l issues, or if reas onab le
min ds could reac h diffe rent
conclusions, sum mar y judg men t is not appr opri
ate. " Id. "The burd en of prov ing the
abse nce of mat eria l facts is upo n the mov ing pru.ty." Harwood, 136 Idah q at 677, 39
P .3d at 617 (cita tion s omitted). However, whe
n a mot ion ·for sum mar y judg men t is
supp orte d by affidavits, "an adve rse par ty may
not rest upo n the mere alle gati ons
or tlen ials of that part y's pleadings, but the part
y's response, by affidavits or as
othe rwis e prov ided in this rule, mus t set fort h
specific fact s show ing that ther e is a
gen uine issu e for trial ." Idah o R. Civ. P. 56(e)
(2015).
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An appellate com·t "exercises free review over questions oflaw and matters of
statutory interpretation." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924
(2014) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I.

Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim was
disallowed in a timely way by Jadwiga?
Heinz mailed his Claim Against Estate to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9,

2015, and filed his claim with the Court on January 13, 2015. Appellant's Bi·., p. 6.
On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed personal representative of the estate.
Letters Testamentary, p. 1. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed her Notice to
Creditors with the Court and on February 19, 2015, the notice was first published

in the Bonners Ferry Herald (with the last publication on March 5, 2015). Notice to
Creditors; Aff. of Publication. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 3. That Notice of
Disallowance was filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. On these facts, Judge
Julian concluded that Jadwiga's Disallowance of the claim had been timely filed.

Mem. Op., p. 5. Heinz appeals from this adverse determination. Heinz contends
that because the disallowance was untimely, the claim should have been allowed.

Appellant's Br., p. 7.
Heinz argues that Jadwiga did not disallow his claim within the statuto1-y
sixty day time period set forth in LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Jd. at 5-7. Heinz wrote the
following in support of his argument:
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Measu ring the time from Janua cy 9th [the date Heinz mailed
his claim to Jadwi ga's attorne y), and permi tting three (3) day mail rule
for service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate 's clock for
disallowance purpo ses began on Janua ry 12th. (Applying a filing date
of Janua ry 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not change the outcome.)
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a
Disallowance on March 13th. Again, applyi ng a three (3) day mail rule
provid ed for in LR.C.P . Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate 's Disallowance was not
served upon counse l for Alt until March 16th, sixty-t_hree (63) days
after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two [62] days after court filing of the
Claim.)
Mr. Alt's Credit or's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely
disallowed. Under LC. § 15-3-806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow
the Claim has the effect of deeming the Claim allowed. This result
render s the Estate 's Motion for Summ ary Judgm ent moot.
Appel lant's Br., p. 6.
Heinz' s argum ent is predic ated on his claim that a person al repres entativ e
must disallow a creditor's claim within sixty days of its presen tation. Id. at
6-7.
Heinz relies on I.C. § 15-3-806(a), which states: "Failu re of t1:te person al
repres entativ e to mail notice to a claim.a nt of action on his claim for sixty (60)
days
after the time for origin al presen tation of the claim has expire d has the effect
of a
notice of allowance." Heinz a1·gues "[t]he use of 'the' [before claim] in the senten
ce
makes clear that this provis ion is specific to the specific credito r's claim, not
a ·
genera l four (4) month provis ion applicable to 'any' 01· 'all' claims." Appel lant's
Br.,
p. 7.

In granti ng Jadwi ga's Mot~on for Summ ary Judgm ent on this issue, the
Magis trate Judge wrote the following:
While it is true that the local practic e has been to disallow a claim
agains t the estate within 60 days, ... it is clear from a close readin g of
the statut e that the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim does not
accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expira tion of "the time for
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original presentation of the claim." .. . "[T]he time for," which precedes
and modifies the reference to "the,, claim, means that the estate's duty
to disallow begins running after expiration of the deadline for
presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the statute as
Heinz urges, it would simply read".. . 60 days after presentation of the
claim . ..", without any need for reference to "the time for original
presentation" having expired.
Mem. Op., p. 4-5. Judge Julian concluded that the ''disallowance was clearly
timely." Id. at 5.
The Magistrate Judge's finding that the "disallowance was clearly timely"
will be affirmed for two reasons.
First, the plain language of I. C. § 15~3-806(a) makes clear that the personal
after the time for the original presentation of the
rep1·esentative has sixty days
l
claim has expired to mail a notice of disallowance to a claimant.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins
with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of
the statute so that none will be .void, superfluous, or redundant. When
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body mqst be given effect, and the Court need not
consider rules of statutory construction.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P .3d 970, 973 {2011) (quoting Farber v.
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (italics added).

If Heinz's interpwtation were to be employed, the words "the time for
01·iginal" and "has expfred" found in I.C. § 15~3-806(a) would be rendered

superfluous. If the legislature intended the statute to require a personal
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representative to deny a creditor's claim with sixty days of its presentation, the
statute could simply read: "Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to
a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after presentation of the claim

has the effect of a notice of allowance~" Instead, the legislature added the verbiage
"the time for original" and "has expired." Consequently, those words must be given
effect so that they ro·e not rendered superfluous.
This interpretation is consiste~t with Idaho Court of Appeals case law. In
the case In re Estate of Boyd the Court of Appeals wrote the following in

determining when interest on a creditor's claim would begin to accrue:
John filed his notice to creditors in compliance with LC. 15-3-801 on
August 5, 1994, thus starting the four-month period for creditors to file
their claims. I.C. § 15-3-803. Idaho Code§ 15-3-806(d) provides that
"allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period
commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of
the claim has expired." Therefore, the inte1·est on BMH1s claim could
not begin to accumulate until six months after John first published his
notice to creditors.

In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674-75, 8 P .3d 664, 669-70 (Ct. App. 2000)

(italics added). Section (d) ofl.C. § 15-3-806, the provision interpreted by the Court
of Appeals in In re Estate of Boyd, contains language identical to that found iµ
section (a). Section (d) states: "Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in

another court entered against the pe1·sonal representative, allowed claims bear
interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for
original presentation of the claim has expired ...." I.C. § 15-3-806(d) (italics added).
Based on this statutory language, the Court of Appeals concluded that interest on a

creditor's claim (filed on August 8, 1994) could.not begin to accumulate until six
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mont hs after the first notic e to credi tor's was publi shed on
Augu st 5,

1994.3 In re

I

Estat e of Boyd, 134 Idaho at 675, 8 P.3d at 670. This inter preta
tion is consi stent
with the Magi strate Judg e's holdi ng that "the 60 day time limit
for denia l of a claim
does not accru e upon its filing, but rathe1· _upon expp: ation of
'the time for origin al
prese ntati on of the claim ."' Mem. Op., p. 4.
Hein z had to prese nt his claim withi n four mont hs of the date
of the first
publi catio n of notice to credi tors or withi n sixty days after

the notice was maile d or

deliv ered to him. 4 I .C. § 15-3-803(a); LC. § 15-3- S0l(a ) & (b).
The first publi catio n
of the notice occur red on Febr uary 19, 201~ . Hein z there fore
had until June 19,
2015, to prese nt his claim. The estat e then had sixty days
after the time for origi nal

prese ntati on of the claim had expir ed (i.e., sixty days after
June 19, 2015) to mail a
notice of disallowance. LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Beca use the Notic
e ofDis allow ance of
Claim was maile d to Hein z's attor ney on Marc h 13, 2015,
it was timely.

Second, even assum ing, for the sake of argum ent,. that Hein
z's inter preta tion
is corre ct, Jadw iga did, in fact, mail a timel y notice to Hein
z that his claim had been
disallowed. Hein z's claim .was deem ed prese nted on Janu ary
13, 2015, the day he
a Althou gh not at issue in the case, the timelin e analyz ed in Boyd
strong ly sugges ts that Heinz 's
interp retatio n of the 60 day time period is incorrect. In B01Jd,
the person al repres entativ e first publis hed
notice to credito rs on Augus t 5, 1994. On Augus t 8, 1994, the
credito r filed its claim. Notice of
disallo wance of the claim was not filed until.J anuary 25, 1995,
some 170 days after the credito r's claim
was .filed. Howe ver, the disallo wance was .filed within 60 days
after the time for origin al presen tation of
the claim had expire d (i.e., 173 days, or within 60 days after
the four month period for presen tation of
credito rs' claims had expire d).
·
4 It is unclea r
from the record wheth er notice was mailed or delive red to
Heinz. (There is not a certificate
of servic e attach ed to the Notice to Credit ors filed with the
Court on Febru ary 9, 2015.) Howe ver, even
assum ing that Notice was mailed to Heinz at the beginn ing
of Februa ry, the Estate 's disallo wance of his
claim was noneth eless timely . Heinz would have been allowe
d to presen t his claim within 60 days of the
Notice , giving him until the beginn ing of April, and the estate
would have been afford ed an additio nal 60
days after the time for presen tation of the claim had expire
d to disallo w the claim (i.e., the beginn ing of
June).
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filed it with the Court. I.C. § 15-3-804(a) (A "claim is deemed presented on the last
to occur of: (1) delivery or mailing of the written stateme nt of claim to the persona l
represen tative; or, (2) the filing of the claim with the court."). On March 13, 2015,
fifty-nine days after Heinz's claim was deemed presente d, Jadwiga mailed a Notice
of Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney . Appella nt's Br., p. 6. Pursuan t to the

plain languag e of l.C. § 15-3-806(a) a persona l represen tative does not have to
serve, but rather need only mail, a disallowance within sixty days after the time for
original presenta tion of the claim has expired. I.C. § 15-3-806(a) ("Failure of the

persona l represen tative to mail notice to a claiman t of action on his claim for sixty
(60) days after the time for original presenta tion of the claim has expired has the

effect of a notice of allowance. 11).
Consequently, Heinz's assertio n that the disallowance was untimely because
it was not served upon counsel until Mru.·ch 16, 2016, is unpersu asive. Had the
legislatui·e intended . that service must be compJete within sixty days after the time
for original presenta tion of the claim, the term "serve" could have easily been used

in place of the term "mail" in I.C. § 15-3-806(a).
The Magistr ate Judge coi-rectly dete1·mined that Heinz's claim was timely
disallowed by Jadwiga . Summar y judgmen t was appropr iately granted on this ·
issue because there is not a genuine issue of materia l fact and the estate was
entitled to a judgmen t as a matter of law. The Magistr ate Judge's decision on this
issue will therefor e be affirmed .
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Did the trial cour t err in dete rmin ing that Hein z's
claim agai nst
Hed y's esta te is barr ed by I.C. § 15-3-803 beca use he
faile d to brin g
his claim with in thre e year s of her deat h?
I.C. § 15-3-803(a) provides in relev ant part that:

All claim s agai nst a decedent's estat e whic h arose befor
e the deat h of
the decedent, ... whet her due or to become due, abso lut_
e or
contingent, liqui dated or unliquidated, foun ded on contr
act, tort, or
othe r lega l basis, if not barre d earli er by anot her statu te
of limit~tions
or nonclaim statu te, are barre d agai nst the estat e, the
perso nal
repre senta tive, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent,
unle ss
pres ente d with in the earli er of the following dates :
(I) three (3) year s after the decedent's death ; or
(2) with in the time provided in section 15-3-801(b), Idah
o Code, for
cred itors who are given actua l notice, and with in the time
provided in
section 15-3-801(a), Idah o Code, for all c1·editors bar1·ed
by publication.
The three year limit ation for cred itors in LC. § 15-3-803
(a)(l) para llels the general
time limi t for p1·obating an estat e. LC.§ 15-3-108 state
s: "No formal prob ate or
appo intm ent proceeding or formal testa cy 01· appo intm
ent proceeding . . . may be
commenced more than three (3) year s after the decedent'
s death."
Alth ough the gene ral rule requ ires a prob ate actio n to
be commenced with in
three year s of an indiv idua l's death , there are two exce

ptions to the rule. First ,

purs uant to I.C. § 15-3-1205, upon the deat h of a pers on
leavi ng a sul'viving spouse
as the sole devisee or beneficiary, the survi ving spou se
(or any pers on claiming title
to any prop erty throu gh or unde r such surv iving spouse)

may file a petit ion for a

decree vesti ng the prop erty in the surv iving spouse, or_
othe r claimant, with the
condition that the surv iving spouse (or perso n claim ing
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survi ving spouse) assum e and be liable for any and all i~deb
tedne ss that migh t be
claim ed again st the estat e of the deced ent.6
Seco nd,"p ursua nt to I.C. § 15-3-111, a joint proba te may be
commenced to
admi niste r the estat es of two decea sed spous es. That provi
sion reads :

In cases in whic h a mari tal comm unity has been dissolved by the
death
of eithe r spouse at any time, the sm·vivor was then entitl ed
to all of the
prope rty of the deced ent by will, law, or both, and the survi
vor died
before any proce eding had been commenced for the proba te
of the
estat e of the spous e whos e death occur red first, the estat es
of both
deced ents may be joine d fol' proba te in a singl e proce eding
in any court
havin g jurisd iction of the estat e of the spous e whose death
occurred
last. The three (3) year provi sion of sectio n 15-3-108, Idaho
Code,
appli es only to the death of the spous e whose death occur red
last. The
initia l appli catio n or petiti on filed in any such joint proce eding
shall
conta in a state ment of the facts upon whic h such joint proce
eding is
based, in addit ion to all other state ment s requi red by this code
to be
made there in.

Hein z argue s that I .C. § 15-3-111 tolls the norm al three yeai·
statu te of
limit ation s found in LC. § 15-3- 803(a )(l) becau se it exten ds
the three year statu te of
limit ation s for proba ting an estat e found in I.C. § 15-3-108.
Appe llant' s Br., p . 7, 11.
Hein z conte nds that
[i]f the legis latur e provi ded an excep tion to the tlll'ee (3) year
statu te of
limit ation s on proba tes for summ ary admi nisti· ation s and joint
proba tes of husb and and wife wher e the asset s are comm unity
prope rty, it is logical that the same exten sion of time must
be appli ed
to c1·editor's claim s in those two (2) exceptions: summ ary
admi nistra tion and joint proba te upon surv.iving spous e's death
. The
summ ary admi nistra tion, by definition, would have passe d
the log
I.C. § 15-3-1205 does not state a time limit for the summ ary admin
istrati on of estate s in which a
surviv ing spous e is the sole beneficiary, and there is no referen
ce to J.C. § 15-3-108 within the provision.
Theref ore, it appea rs to be an except ion to the genera l rule that
a will must be probat ed within three years
of the decede nt's death since itis not a typical probat e_procee
ding. See J.C.§ 15-3-1205 ("there will be no
admin istrati on of the estate of the decedent."}.
5
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home and prop erty to Robe rt subje ct to Hedy 's debt s and
liabilities,
just as the joint prob ate requ ires admi nistr ation and acco
unting of
both dece dents ' debts and oblig ation s to credi tors.

Id. at 9-10 .
In rejec ting to this argu men t when it was mad e previously
, Judg e Julia n
conc luded that:
Ther e is noth ing in [I.C. § 15-3 -lllJ that state s or sugg
ests any tollin g
of a credi tor's deadline to pres ent a claim, just beca use
the estat e is
sups eque ntly joint ly prob ated. Inde ed, this secti on speci
fically
exem pts the three (3) year limit ation on prob ate following
deat h of the
first spouse, as found in secti on 108. That fact clear ly
demo nstra tes
the legis latur e's abili ty and willi ngne ss to mak e spec ial
exceptions
with in [I.C. § 15-3-111] wher e warr ante d and inten ded.
As there is no
exce ption mad e to the th1·ee (3) year credi tors' bar foun
d in 15-3-803,
one shall not be impl ied by the cour t. Hein z's claim agai
nst Hedy 's
estat e was not filed or "pres ented " with in three year s of
her deat h and
is now barr ed by IC§ 15-3-803(a)(l).
Mem . Op., p. 7.
I.C. § 15-3-111 was adde d to Idah o's prob ate statu tes in

1973. In 1995 the

statu te was amen ded to add the following lang uage : "The
three (3) year provision of
secti on-15-3-108, Idah o Code, appli es only to the deat h
of the spouse whose deat h
occu ned last." The state men t of purp ose read s as follo
ws:
This legis latio n amen ds exist ing Idah o Code Sect ion 15-3111 to clari fy
when a joint prob ate may be used at the second deat h
of a husb and
and wife. Some cour ts have held that the three year limit
on prob ates
in I~ah o Code Section 15-3-108 appli es to the first deat
h and therefore
bars a joint prob ate unle ss both spou ses died with in three
year s of the
time of comm ence ment of the joint prob ate. This legis
latio n make s the
Code Secti on clear ly state that only the seco nd deat h need
be with in
the time perio ds of Idah o Code Secti on 15-3-108.
S.B. 1166, 1995 First Reg. Sess . of the 53rd Leg. (Id. 1995
).
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A basic tenet of statutor y COI?-struction is that the more specific statute or
section addressi ng an issue controls over the statute that is m9re general. Marshall

v. Dept. ofTrans p., 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation
omitted) . "[T]he more general statute should not be interpre ted as encompassing an
area already covered by one which is more specific." Id. (citation omitted). It is
undispu ted that I.C. § 15-3-111 extends the general three yeru.· timefram e in which
to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, LC. § 15-3-111 is
the specific statute, while I.C. § 15-3-108 and I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) are general
statutes. Because the three year provision of I.C. § 15-3-108 only applies to the
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, it would follow that the tm:ee year
timefram e set out in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of the
spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuan t to I.C. § 15-3111.

Addition ally, interpre ting LC. § 15-3-803(a)(1) as barring creditors' claims
against the "estate of the spouse whose death occurred first" in probate actions
commenced pursuan t to LC.§ 15-3-111 simply because the death occuri-ed more
than three years prior to the commencement of the probate action would produce an
absurd result. This is.because LC. § 15-3-111 expressl y allows "the estates of both
deceden ts [to] be joined for probate in a single proceeding'' within three years of the
"death of the spouse whose death occtUTed last." If the statute of limitatio ns for the
first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second
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to die. "Con struc tions of a statu te that would lead to absu
rd or unre ason ably hars h
resu lts are disfavored." State u. Yager, 139 Idah o 680,
690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).
The Mag istra te Judg e there fore erred in deter mini ng
that Heinz's claim
agai nst Hedy 's estat e is barr ed by J.C. § 15-3-803 beca

use he failed to bring his

claim with in three year s of her death . Summai-y judg
men t was cons eque ntly
inapp 1·opl 'iatel y gran ted on this issue . The Mag istra
te Judg e's decision on this issue

will be rever sed.
CONCLUSION
The Mag istra te Judg e's decision that Hei..z;iz's claim was
Jadw iga and that the estat e was entit led to summ ary

time ly disallowed by

judg men t on that issue is

AFF IRM ED.
The Mag istra te Judg e's decision that Hein z's claim agai
nst Hedy's estat e is
barr ed by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that th~ estat e was entit
led to summ ary judg men t on
that basis is REVERSED. This issue is REMANDED
for furth er proceedings.
Date d this

ff-'

~'f day of November 2016.

~ ~

JV. Ste gne r
Dist rict Judg e
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of:
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON,

)

)

CASE NO. CV 13-0313

)
)
)
)

SECOND
AMENDED JUDGMENT

Deceased.
__________
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred

pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-803.
2.

Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment to Den Creditor Claim is hereby

granted.
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)
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)
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and
)
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, Deceased
)
- - - - - - - ----'--- - - - - )
JADIGWA MELTON, Personal Representative
)
)
Plaintiff - Appellant
)
vs.
)
)
)
HEINZ ALT,

SUPREME COURT NO.

44768
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I, Glenda Poston, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify that the above and
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direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that there were no exhibits which were marked for identification
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